Hierarchical multi-objective decision systems for general resource allocation problems

We consider optimization methods for hierarchical power-decentralized systems composed of a coordinating central system and plural semi-autonomous local systems in the lower level, each of which possesses a decision making unit. Such a decentralized system where both central and local systems possess their own objective function and decision variables is a multi-objective system. The central system allocates resources so as to optimize its own objective, while the local systems optimize their own objectives using the given resources. The lower level composes a multi-objective programming problem, where local decision makers minimize a vector objective function in cooperation. Thus, the lower level generates a set of noninferior solutions, parametric with respect to the given resources. The central decision maker, then, parametric with respect to the given resources. The central decision maker, then, chooses an optimal resource allocation and the best corresponding noninferior solution from among a set of resource-parametric noninferior solutions. A computational method is obtained based on parametric nonlinear mathematical programming using directional derivatives. This paper is concerned with a combined theory for the multi-objective decision problem and the general resource allocation problem.The authors are indebted to Professor G. Leitmann for his valuable comments and suggestions.     

Multicriterion Aerodynamic Shape Design Optimization and Inverse Problems Using Control Theory and Nash Games

Multicriterion design is gaining importance in aeronautics in order to cope with new needs of society. In the literature, contributions to single discipline and/or single-point design optimization abound. The goal of this paper is to introduce a new approach combining the adjoint method with a formulation derived from game theory for multipoint aerodynamic design problems. Transonic flows around lifting airfoils are analyzed via Euler computations. Airfoil shapes are optimized according to various aerodynamic criteria. The notion of player is introduced. In a competitive Nash game, each player attempts to optimize its own criterion through a symmetric exchange of information with others. A Nash equilibrium is reached when each player, constrained by the strategy of the others, cannot improve further its own criterion. Specific real and virtual symmetric Nash games are implemented to set up an optimization strategy for design under conflict. This work has benefited partially from the support of the National Science Foundation of China Grant NSFC-10372040 and Scientific Research Foundation (SRF) for Returned Overseas Chinese Scholars (ROCS) Grant 2003-091. The first author acknowledges the support of INRIA (Institut National de Recherche en Information et en Automatique), France.     

An approach for an algorithmic solution of discrete optimal control problems and their game-theoretical extension

We consider time discrete systems which are described by a system of difference equations. The related discrete optimal control problems are introduced. Additionally, a gametheoretic extension is derived, which leads to general multicriteria decision problems. The characterization of their optimal behavior is studied. Given starting and final states define the decision process; applying dynamic programming techniques suitable optimal solutions can be gained. We generalize that approach to a special gametheoretic decision procedure on networks. We characterize Nash equilibria and present sufficient conditions for their existence. A constructive algorithm is derived. The sufficient conditions are exploited to get the algorithmic solution. Its complexity analysis is presented and at the end we conclude with an extension to the complementary case of Pareto optima.Dmitrii Lozovanu was Supported by BGP CRDF-MRDA MOM2-3049-CS-03.     

Algorithms and the calculation of Nash equilibria for multi-objective control of time-discrete systems and polynomial-time algorithms for dynamic c-games on networks

We consider a multi-objective control problem of time-discrete systems with given starting and final states. The dynamics of the system are controlled by p actors (players). Each of the players intends to minimize his own integral-time cost of the system’s transitions using a certain admissible trajectory. Nash Equilibria conditions are derived and algorithms for solving dynamic games in positional form are proposed in this paper. The existence theorem for Nash equilibria is related to the introduction of an auxiliary dynamic c-game. Stationary and non-stationary cases are described. The paper concludes with a complexity analysis for that decision process.     

A Nash-game approach to joint image restoration and segmentation

We propose a game-theoretic approach to simultaneously restore and segment noisy images. We define two players: one is restoration, with the image intensity as strategy, and the other is segmentation with contours as strategy. Cost functions are the classical relevant ones for restoration and segmentation, respectively. The two players play a static game with complete information, and we consider as solution to the game the so-called Nash equilibrium. For the computation of this equilibrium we present an iterative method with relaxation. The results of numerical experiments performed on some real images show the relevance and efficiency of the proposed algorithm.     

Finding all pure strategy Nash equilibria in a planar location game

In this paper, we deal with a planar location-price game where firms first select their locations and then set delivered prices in order to maximize their profits. If firms set the equilibrium prices in the second stage, the game is reduced to a location game for which pure strategy Nash equilibria are studied assuming that the marginal delivered cost is proportional to the distance between the customer and the facility from which it is served. We present characterizations of local and global Nash equilibria. Then an algorithm is shown in order to find all possible Nash equilibrium pairs of locations. The minimization of the social cost leads to a Nash equilibrium. An example shows that there may exist multiple Nash equilibria which are not minimizers of the social cost.     

一种n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性判别法

本首先给出了n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在的充要条件。然后给出n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性的一种判别方法。最后在判别纯策略纳什均衡存在的条件下，给出判定该静态博弈存在多少纯策略纳什均衡以及哪些纯策略组合是纯策略纳什均衡(解)的方法。     

Strategic control and interests,its effects on decision outcomes

Application of the model to artificial data shows that actors with strong preferences in the center have more possibilities to realize good outcomes than other actors. On the basis of an empirical application it is shown that a Nash equilibrium does not always arise after a large number of iterations unless actors have learning capabilities or are severely restricted in their strategic behavior.

In political systems and large organizations, ultimate decision makers are usually just a small subset of all actors in the social system. To arrive at acceptable decisions, decision makers have to take into account the preferences of other actors in the system. Typically preferences of more interested and more powerful actors are weighted heavier than those of less interested and powerful actors. This implies that the total leverage of an actor on the decision is determined by the combination of his power (his potential) and his interest (his willingness to mobilize his power). As the exact level of an actor's leverage is difficult to estimate for the other actors in the system, an actor is able to optimize his effects on outcomes of decisions by providing strategic informatioa

In this paper, first an analytic solution is presented for the optimization of strategic leverage in collective decision making by one single actor. In this solution, the actor makes assumptions about the leverage other actors will show in decision making. Subsequently, the actor optimizes the outcomes of decisions by manipulating the distribution of his leverage over a set of issues.

The analytic solution can be theoretically interpreted by decomposing the solution into three terms, the expected external leverage of the other actors on the issue, the evaluation of the deviance of the expected from the preferred outcome of the issue, and the restrictions on the distribution of leverage over the issues. The higher the expectation of the leverages the other actors will allocate to the issue, the less an actor is inclined to allocate leverage to the issue. The higher the evaluation of the deviance, the more an actor is inclined to allocate leverage to the issue. This is restricted, however, by the required distribution of leverages over the issues. The researcher is able to manipulate these restrictions to investigate its consequences for the outcomes.

In the next step, we investigate whether we can find a Nash equilibrium if all actors optimize their leverage simultaneously. Under certain conditions, a Nash equilibrium can be found by an iterative process in which actors update their estimates oh each other's leverages on the basis of what the other actors have shown in previous iterations.     

An Approach to Fuzzy Noncooperative Nash Games

Systems that involve more than one decision maker are often optimized using the theory of games. In the traditional game theory, it is assumed that each player has a well-defined quantitative utility function over a set of the player decision space. Each player attempts to maximize/minimize his/her own expected utility and each is assumed to know the extensive game in full. At present, it cannot be claimed that the first assumption has been shown to be true in a wide variety of situations involving complex problems in economics, engineering, social and political sciences due to the difficulty inherent in defining an adequate utility function for each player in these types of problems. On the other hand, in many of such complex problems, each player has a heuristic knowledge of the desires of the other players and a heuristic knowledge of the control choices that they will make in order to meet their ends.In this paper, we utilize fuzzy set theory in order to incorporate the players' heuristic knowledge of decision making into the framework of conventional game theory or ordinal game theory. We define a new approach to N-person static fuzzy noncooperative games and develop a solution concept such as Nash for these types of games. We show that this general formulation of fuzzy noncooperative games can be applied to solve multidecision-making problems where no objective function is specified. The computational procedure is illustrated via application to a multiagent optimization problem dealing with the design and operation of future military operations.     

双人静态博弈纯战略纳什均衡存在性判别

本文给出了双人有限静态博弈纯战略纳什均衡存在性的一种判别方法。并且，在纳什均衡存在的条件下，本判别法将给出纳什均衡解及解的唯一性判别。     

Market Power Issues in Bid-Based Hydrothermal Dispatch

The objective of this work is to investigate market power issues in bid-based hydrothermal scheduling. Initially, market power was simulated with a single stage Cournot–Nash equilibrium model. In this static model the equilibrium was calculated analytically. It was shown that the total production of N strategic agents is smaller than the least-cost solution by a factor of (N/(N+1)). Market power analysis for multiple stages was then carried through a stochastic dynamic programming scheme, where the decision in each stage and state is the Cournot–Nash equilibrium of a multi-agent game. Case studies with data taken from the Brazilian system are presented.     

一个带产品定价约束的竞争选址双层规划模型及其求解算法

以大型连锁卖场的选址为研究背景,提出了一个在竞争环境下使获利最大的竞争选址定价双层规划模型,其中上层模型做出选址决策,下层模型确定产品的纳什均衡价格.将设施效用引入到模型中,用指数效用函数来刻画顾客的购物行为偏好,首次证明了不合作状态下双方价格均衡解的存在性和唯一性,并给出了求解最优设施点设置方案和价格均衡解的算法思想及数值算例.     

目标值不确定的协调多指标决策模型

本文建立了一类目标值不确定的多指标决策的协调模型,并对其解的概念、性质及其求解方法进行了研究,获得了一些新的结论。     

Multimodel design of a Nash strategy

For interconnected systems with slow and fast modes, we analyze a multimodel design of a Nash equilibrium strategy. Decision makers use different models of the same system to obtain a composite strategy that approximates the exact Nash strategy. It is discussed in what sense this approximation holds.This work was supported by the Department of Energy, Electrical Energy Systems Division, under Contract No. EX-76-C-01-2088. The author wishes to thank Professor P. V. Kokotovic for his helpful suggestions in the course of this work.     

随机环境下再制造产品的定价策略研究

再制造产品的定价是逆向供应链中重要的决策问题之一。依据目前我国废旧品回收和再制造的运作机制,在随机环境下建立了以传统生产厂为主导、再制造工厂为从属的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了新产品与再制造产品的差异定价策略,结合数值算例给出了最优的定价结果。并进一步将模型进行扩展,考虑了二者形成垂直纳什均衡以及存在集成厂商时的情形。研究表明:集成厂商对两种产品的定价最高,系统收益也最大,Stack-elberg情形次之,纳什均衡时最低。     

On the existence of strong Nash equilibria

This paper investigates the existence of strong Nash equilibria (SNE) in continuous and concave games. It is shown that the coalition consistency property introduced in the paper, together with concavity and continuity of payoffs, permits the existence of SNE in games with compact and convex strategy spaces. We also characterize the existence of SNE by providing necessary and sufficient conditions. We suggest an algorithm for computing SNE. The results are illustrated with applications to economies with multilateral environmental externalities and to the static oligopoly model.     

“齐王赛马＂的Nash谈判解

“齐王赛马”是一个典型的对策论例子,本文运用对策论相关知识,求出了“齐王赛马”的Nash谈判解．同时得出结论：齐王和田忌的期望收益正好与问题的Nash谈判解一致．     

On a game in manufacturing

We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved that a Nash equilibrium is unique if it exists and that a Nash equilibrium exists when the capital costs of the players are zero or when the players are equal in every respect. However, when the capital costs differ, in general a Nash equilibrium exists only when the players' capital costs are high compared to their profit rates.     

Sufficient conditions for optimality of threat strategies in a differential game

The problem of defining threat strategies in nonzero-sum games is considered, and a definition of optimal threat strategies is proposed in the static case. This definition is then extended to differential games, and sufficient conditions for optimality of threat strategies are derived. These are then applied to a simple example. The definition proposed here is then compared with the definition of threat strategies given by Nash.