REBUILDING THE EASTERN BALTIC COD STOCK UNDER ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (PART II): TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COSTS OF A MARINE PROTECTED AREA

Abstract This study adds a cost analysis of the Eastern Baltic cod fishery to the existing model presented in Röckmann et al. [2007a] . As cost data on this international fishery do not exist, data from Denmark are extrapolated to the whole international fishery. Additionally, unit and total variable costs are simulated, and the sensitivity to a set of different cost–stock and cost–output elasticities is tested. The study supports preliminary conclusions that a temporary marine reserve policy, which focuses on protecting the Eastern Baltic cod spawning stock in the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) subdivision 25, is a valuable fisheries management tool to (i) rebuild the overexploited Eastern Baltic cod stock and (ii) increase operating profits. The negative effects of climate change can be postponed for at least 20 years—depending on the assumed rate of future climate change. Including costs in the economic analysis does not change the ranking of management policies as proposed in the previous study where costs were neglected.     

COMPARING PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE MANAGEMENT: MANAGING A TRANSBOUNDARY FISH STOCK UNDER CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

Environmental change in general, and climate change in particular, can lead to changes in distribution of fish stocks. When such changes involve transboundary fish stocks, the countries sharing the stock need to reconsider their harvesting policies. We investigate the effects of changing stock distribution on the optimal fishing policies in a two players’ noncooperative game. We compare reactive management, under which the manager ignores future distributional shifts (knowingly or unknowingly), with proactive management where the manager considers such shifts in his decisions. A dynamic programming model is developed to identify closed‐loop Nash strategies. We show that the role of two players is symmetric under reactive management but asymmetric under proactive management where managers anticipate future changes in stock ownership. The player losing the stock tends to harvest more aggressively compared to the player gaining the stock who acts more conservatively. Strategic interactions show tendency for complementary actions that can change abruptly during the ownership transition. The differences between management regimes vary from quantitative to qualitative; differences are minimal for stocks with little or no schooling, whereas highly schooling stocks may avoid collapse only under proactive management.