Values of nondifferentiable vector measure games

We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This new approach enables us to construct new diagonal formulas for the Mertens value (Int J Game Theory 17:1–65, 1988) and the Neyman value (Isr J Math 124:1–27, 2001) on a large space of non-differentiable games. This in turn enables us to give an affirmative answer to the question, first posed by Neyman (Isr J Math 124:1–27, 2001), whether the Mertens value and the Neyman value coincide “modulo Banach limits”? The solution is an intermediate result towards a characterization of values of norm 1 of vector measure games with bounded variation.     

A characterization of polyhedral market games

The class of games without side payments obtainable from markets having finitely many commodities and continuous concave utility functions is considered. It is first shown that each of these so-called market games is totally balanced, for a reasonable generalization of the idea of a balanced side payment game. It is then shown that among polyhedral games (i.e., games for which each (V(S) is a polyhedron), this property characterizes the market games.     

WT measure vector spaces

n- M WT- , M n–1 . . WT- . .     

A characterization of vNM-stable sets for linear production games

We discuss linear production games or market games with a continuum of players which are represented as minima of finitely many nonatomic measures.?Within this context we consider vNM-Stable Sets according to von Neumann and Morgenstern. We classify or characterize all solutions of this type which are convex polyhedra, i.e., which are the convex hull of finitely many imputations. Specifically, in each convex polyhedral vNM-Stable Set (and not only in the symmetric ones), the different types of traders must organize themselves into cartels. The vNM-Stable Set is then the convex hull of the utility distributions of the cartels.?Using the results from the continuum, we obtain a similar characterization also for finite glove market games. Received December 1998/Revised version June 1999     

A characterization of strong measure zero sets

We show that a setXυR has strong measure zero iff for every closed measure zero setFυR,F+X has measure zero. Supported by KBN grant PB 2 1017 91 01.     

On p-adic vector measure spaces

For a separating algebra R of subsets of a set X, E a complete Hausdorff non-Archimedean locally convex space and m:R→E a bounded finitely additive measure, we study some of the properties of the integrals with respect to m of scalar-valued functions on X. The concepts of convergence in measure, with respect to m, and of m-measurable functions are introduced and several results concerning these notions are given.     

A characterization of convex games by means of bargaining sets

The aim of the paper is to characterize the classical convexity notion for cooperative TU games by means of the Mas-Colell and the Davis–Maschler bargaining sets. A new set of payoff vectors is introduced and analyzed: the max-Weber set. This set is defined as the convex hull of the max-marginal worth vectors. The characterizations of convexity are reached by comparing the classical Weber set, the max-Weber set and a selected bargaining set.     

Stochastic differential games: Occupation measure based approach

A new approach based on occupation measures is introduced for studying stochastic differential games. For two-person zero-sum games, the existence of values and optimal strategies for both players is established for various payoff criteria. ForN-person games, the existence of equilibria in Markov strategies is established for various cases.     

Stochastic differential games: Occupation measure based approach

An error in the proof of Theorem 4.1 of Ref. 1 is corrected.     

Summability in of a vector measure

We show a picture of the relations among different types of summability of series in the space  of integrable functions with respect to a vector measure m of relatively norm compact range. In order to do that, we study the class of the so‐called m‐1‐summing operators. We give several applications regarding the existence of copies of c ₀ in , as well as on m‐1‐summing operators which are weakly compact, Asplund or weakly precompact.     

The range of a vector measure

Let X be a completely regular Hausdorff space and E be a locally convex Hausdorff space. Then C_b(X) ? E is dense in (C_b(X, E), β₀), (C_b(X), β) ?_?E = (C_b(X) ? E, β) and (C_b(X), β₁) ?_?E = (C_b(X) ? E, β₁). For a separable space E, (C_b(X, E), β₀) is separable if and only if X is separably submetrizable. As a corollary, for a locally compact paracompact space X, if (C_b(X, E), β₀) is separable, then X is metrizable.     

A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games

For the class of tree games, a new solution called the average tree solution has been proposed recently. We provide a characterization of this solution. This characterization underlines an important difference, in terms of symmetric treatment of the agents, between the average tree solution and the Myerson value for the class of tree games.     

A characterization on n-critical economical generalized tic-tac-toe games

There is a so called generalized tic-tac-toe game playing on a finite set X with winning sets A₁, A₂,…, A_m. Two players, F and S, take in turn a previous untaken vertex of X, with F going first. The one who takes all the vertices of some winning set first wins the game. Erd s and Selfridge proved that if |A₁|=|A₂|==|A_m|=n and m<2ⁿ⁻¹, then the game is a draw. This result is best possible in the sense that once m=2ⁿ⁻¹, then there is a family A₁, A₂,…, A_m so that F can win. In this paper we characterize all those sets A₁,…, A_2n−1 so that F can win in exactly n moves. We also get similar result in the biased games.