Mathematics Majors' Perceptions of Conviction,Validity, and Proof

In this paper, 28 mathematics majors who completed a transition-to-proof course were given 10 mathematical arguments. For each argument, they were asked to judge how convincing they found the argument and whether they thought the argument constituted a mathematical proof. The key findings from this data were (a) most participants did not find the empirical argument in the study to be convincing or to meet the standards of proof, (b) the majority of participants found a diagrammatic argument to be both convincing and a proof, (c) participants evaluated deductive arguments not by their form but by their content, but (d) participants often judged invalid deductive arguments to be convincing proofs because they did not recognize their logical flaws. These findings suggest improving undergraduates' comprehension of mathematical arguments does not depend on making undergraduates aware of the limitations of empirical arguments but instead on improving the ways in which they process the arguments that they read.     

Are You Convinced? Middle‐Grade Students' Evaluations of Mathematical Arguments

Students learn norms of proving by observing teachers generating proofs, engaging in proving, and generalizing features of proofs deemed convincing by an authority, such as a textbook. Students at all grade levels have difficulties generating valid proof; however, little research exists on students' understandings about what makes a mathematical argument convincing prior to more formal instruction in methods of proof. This study investigated middle‐school students' (ages 12–14) evaluations of arguments for a statement in number theory. Students evaluated both an empirical and a general argument in an interview setting. The results show that students tend to prefer empirical arguments because examples enhance an argument's power to show that the statement is true. However, interview responses also reveal that a significant number of students find arguments to be most convincing when examples are supported with an explanation that “tells why” the statement is true. The analysis also examined the alignment of students' reasons for choosing arguments as more convincing along with the strategies they employ to make arguments more convincing. Overall, the findings show middle‐school students' conceptions about what makes arguments convincing are more sophisticated than their performance in generating arguments suggests.     

Is this a coincidence? The role of examples in fostering a need for proof

It is widely known that students often treat examples that satisfy a certain universal statement as sufficient for showing that the statement is true without recognizing the conventional need for a general proof. Our study focuses on special cases in which examples satisfy certain universal statements, either true or false in a special type of mathematical task, which we term “Is this a coincidence?”. In each task of this type, a geometrical example was chosen carefully in a way that appears to illustrate a more general and potentially surprising phenomenon, which can be seen as a conjecture. In this paper, we articulate some design principles underlying the choice of examples for this type of task, and examine how such tasks may trigger a need for proof. Our findings point to two different kinds of ways of dealing with the task. One is characterized by a doubtful disposition regarding the generality of the observed phenomenon. The other kind of response was overconfidence in the conjecture even when it was false. In both cases, a need for “proof” was evoked; however, this need did not necessarily lead to a valid proof. We used this type of task with two different groups: capable high school students and experienced secondary mathematics teachers. The findings were similar in both groups.     

Theorems that admit exceptions, including a remark on Toulmin

It is a plausible assumption that proof-novices try to make sense of the meaning of mathematical proof out of the perspective of every day thinking. In every day thinking, however, the domain of objects to which a general statement refers is not completely and definitely determined. Thus the very notion of a “universally valid statement” is not as obvious as it might seem. The phenomenon of a statement with an indefinite domain of reference can also be found in the history of mathematics when authors spoke of “theorems that admit exceptions”. Without having understood and accepted the theoretical nature of the idea of a universally valid statement the logical distinctions between, for example an implication and its converse loose their meaning for the learner. This might explain some disappointing findings of empirical research. Following a proposal by Inglis, Mejia–Ramos and Simpson it is suggested that in modelling mathematical thinking in proof situations the full scheme of Toulmin should be used including qualifications and rebuttals rather than a reduced version as is frequently done.     

How persuaded are you? A typology of responses

Several recent studies have suggested that there are two different ways in which a person can proceed when assessing the persuasiveness of a mathematical argument: by evaluating whether it is personally convincing, or by evaluating whether it is publicly acceptable. In this paper, using Toulmin's (1958) argumentation scheme, we produce a more detailed theoretical classification of the ways in which participants can interpret a request to assess the persuasiveness of an argument. We suggest that there are (at least) five ways in which such a question can be interpreted. The classification is illustrated with data from a study that asked undergraduate students and research-active mathematicians to rate how persuasive they found a given argument. We conclude by arguing that researchers interested in mathematical conviction and proof validation need to be aware of the different ways in which participants can interpret questions about the persuasiveness of arguments, and that they must carefully control for these variations during their studies.     

Comments on “A note on “A novel approach to multi attribute group decision making based on trapezoidal interval type-2 fuzzy soft sets””

In a recently published paper “A note on “A novel approach to multi attribute group decision making based on trapezoidal interval type-2 fuzzy soft sets””, Khalil and Hassan pointed out that assertions (3) and (4) of Theorem 3.2 in our previous paper “A novel approach to multi attribute group decision making based on trapezoidal interval type-2 fuzzy soft sets” are not true [2]. Furthermore, they introduced the notions of a generalized trapezoidal interval type-2 fuzzy soft subset and a generalized trapezoidal interval type-2 fuzzy soft equal and used these two notions to correct the flaw in assertions (3) and (4) of Theorem 3.2 in our previous paper. In this paper, we show by a counterexample that Khalil and Hassan's correction is incorrect and provide the modified versions of assertions (3) and (4) of Theorem 3.2, along with a strict proof. In addition, Khalil and Hassan pointed out by a counterexample that assertions (3)–(6) of Theorem 3.5 in our paper are not true and proposed the corrections of those assertions. In this paper, we show that Khalil and Hassan's counterexample and corrections are incorrect and provide a new example to verify the inaccuracies of assertions (3) and (5) of Theorem 3.5 in our paper. Moreover, we offer the modified versions of assertions (3) and (5) of Theorem 3.5 and prove them. Finally, Khalil and Hassan's statement that assertions (4) and (6) of Theorem 3.5 in our previous paper are not true is proven to be incorrect, i.e. assertions (4) and (6) of Theorem 3.5 in our previous paper are true.     

On the different ways that mathematicians use diagrams in proof construction

The processes by which individuals can construct proofs based on visual arguments are poorly understood. We investigated this issue by presenting eight mathematicians with a task that invited the construction of a diagram, and examined how they used this diagram to produce a formal proof. The main findings were that participants varied in the extent of their diagram usage, it was not trivial for participants to translate an intuitive argument into a formal proof, and participants’ reasons for using diagrams included noticing mathematical properties, verifying logical deductions, representing ideas or assertions, and suggesting proof approaches.     

A sense-making approach to proof: Strategies of students in traditional and problem-based number theory courses

This paper reports the results of an exploratory study of the perceptions of and approaches to mathematical proof of undergraduates enrolled in lecture-based and problem-based “transition to proof” courses. While the students in the lecture-based course demonstrated conceptions of proof that reflect those reported in the research literature as insufficient and typical of undergraduates, the students in the problem-based course were found to hold conceptions of and approach the construction of proofs in ways that demonstrated efforts to make sense of mathematical ideas. This sense-making manifested itself in the ways in which students employed initial strategies, notation, prior knowledge and experiences, and concrete examples in the proof construction process. These differences were also seen when students were asked to determine the validity of completed proofs. These results suggest that such a problem-based course may provide opportunities for students to develop conceptions of proof that are more meaningful and robust than does a traditional lecture-based course.     

Two proving strategies of highly successful mathematics majors

We examined the proof-writing behaviors of six highly successful mathematics majors on novel proving tasks in calculus. We found two approaches that these students used to write proofs, which we termed the targeted strategy and the shotgun strategy. When using a targeted strategy students would develop a strong understanding of the statement they were proving, choose a plan based on this understanding, develop a graphical argument for why the statement is true, and formalize this graphical argument into a proof. When using a shotgun strategy, students would begin trying different proof plans immediately after reading the statement and would abandon a plan at the first sign of difficulty. The identification of these two strategies adds to the literature on proving by informing how elements of existing problem-solving models interrelate.     

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

This paper provides an interpretation and evaluation of Spinoza’s highly original version of the ontological proof in terms of the concept of substance instead of the concept of perfection in the first book of his Ethics. Taking the lead from Kant’s critique of ontological arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, the paper explores the underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions of Spinoza’s proof. The main topics of consideration are the nature of Spinoza’s definitions, the way he conceives of the relation between a substance and its essence, and his conception of existence. Once clarity is shed upon these fundamental issues, it becomes possible to address the proof in its own terms. It is then easy to see that Kant’s objections miss their target and that the same is true of those advanced by another of the ontological argument’s most famous critics, Bertrand Russell. Finally, several interpretations of Spinoza’s proof are proposed and critically evaluated; on all of them, the argument turns out to be either invalid or question-begging.     

Studying teachers’ mathematical argumentation in the context of refuting students’ invalid claims

This study investigates teachers’ argumentation aiming to convince students about the invalidity of their mathematical claims in the context of calculus. 18 secondary school mathematics teachers were given three hypothetical scenarios of a student's proof that included an invalid algebraic claim. The teachers were asked to identify possible mistakes and explain how they would refute the student's invalid claims. Two of them were also interviewed. The data were analysed in terms of the content and structure of argumentation and the types of counterexamples the teachers generated. The findings show that teachers used two main approaches to refute students’ invalid claims, the use of theory and the use of counterexamples. The role of these approaches in the argumentation process was analysed by Toulmin's model and three types of reasoning emerged that indicate the structure of argumentation in the case of refutation. Concerning the counterexamples, the study shows that few teachers use them in their argumentation and in general they underestimate their value as a proof method.     

Learning About Mathematical Proof: Conviction and Validity

This article is concerned with shedding some light on Mathematics students' perceptions of mathematical proof, and how these perceptions may change over their first year at University. We consider separately the private and public aspects of proof, that is, convincing oneself of the veracity of a result as opposed to convincing a community, and also consider two different types of argument, empirical and deductive. Our data, collected on three occasions over the year, indicate that for the empirical justifications, the subjects considered personal conviction and public validation to be distinct attributes, judged by different criteria, whereas for the deductive justification, there was little evidence of any perceived distinction. Understanding of what constitutes an empirical proof improved significantly between the first and second run of the experiment, and a tendency to accept a deductive argument as a proof (whether or not it was) increased over time.     

Erratum to “Coincidence of function space topologies” [Topology Appl. 157 (2) (2010) 336–351]

We show that an alleged theorem stated in a previous article by the author is invalid for general topological spaces, by giving a counter-example. We show that the statement of the claimed theorem is valid for regular spaces.     

What do mathematicians mean by proof? A comparative-judgement study of students’ and mathematicians’ views

We present a study in which mathematicians and undergraduate students were asked to explain in writing what mathematicians mean by proof. The 175 responses were evaluated using comparative judgement: mathematicians compared pairs of responses and their judgements were used to construct a scaled rank order. We provide evidence establishing the reliability, divergent validity and content validity of this approach to investigating individuals’ written conceptions of mathematical proof. In doing so, we compare the quality of student and mathematician responses and identify which features the judges collectively valued. Substantively, our findings reveal that despite the variety of views in the literature, mathematicians broadly agree on what people should say when asked what mathematicians mean by proof. Methodologically, we provide evidence that comparative judgement could have an important role to play in investigating conceptions of mathematical ideas, and conjecture that similar methods could be productive in evaluating individuals’ more general (mathematical) beliefs.     

Why does trigonometric substitution work?

Modern calculus textbooks carefully illustrate how to perform integration by trigonometric substitution. Unfortunately, most of these books do not adequately justify this powerful technique of integration. In this article, we present an accessible proof that establishes the validity of integration by trigonometric substitution. The proof offers calculus instructors a simple argument that can be used to show their students that trigonometric substitution is a valid technique of integration.     

What Does “Without Loss of Generality” Mean,and How Do We Detect It

When one goes from a geometrical statement to an algebraic statement, the immediate translation is to replace every point by a pair of coordinates, if in the plane (or more as required). A statement with N points is then a statement with 2N (or 3N or more) variables, and the complexity of tools like cylindrical algebraic decomposition is doubly exponential in the number of variables. Hence one says “without loss of generality, A is at (0,0)” and so on. How might one automate this, in particular the detection that a “without loss of generality” argument is possible, or turn it into a procedure (and possibly even a formal proof)?     

Understanding authority in small-group co-constructions of mathematical proof

Authority becomes shared in mathematics classrooms when perceived sources of valid mathematical knowledge extend beyond the teacher/textbook and allow both students and disciplinary modes of reasoning to hold authority. The goal of this research is to better understand classroom situations that are intended to facilitate shared authority over proof, namely small-group episodes where students are granted authority (Gerson & Bateman, 2010) to co-construct mathematical proofs. We sought to better understand the content of undergraduate students’ attention during group proving and the sources of legitimacy for students. Using Stylianides’ (2007) definition of proof as an analytical frame, we found that student discourse focused primarily upon the mode of argumentation, followed by the mode of argument representation, and then the set of accepted statements. We identified four themes with respect to the sources of authority students relied upon in their group proving: (1) the course rubric, (2) peers’ confidence, (3) form and symbols, and (4) logical structure. Implications for research and practice are presented.     

Rethinking the discovery function of proof within the context of proofs and refutations

Proof and proving are important components of school mathematics and have multiple functions in mathematical practice. Among these functions of proof, this paper focuses on the discovery function that refers to invention of a new statement or conjecture by reflecting on or utilizing a constructed proof. Based on two cases in which eighth and ninth graders engaged in proofs and refutations, we demonstrate that facing a counterexample of a primitive statement can become a starting point of students’ activity for discovery, and that a proof of the primitive statement can function as a useful tool for inventing a new conjecture that holds for the counterexample. An implication for developing tasks by which students can experience this discovery function is mentioned.