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《代数通讯》2013,41(7):3497-3504
Abstract In this paper,we present a sharp bound for the nilpotency class of a finite p-group (where p is an odd prime) in terms of its coexponent. As to a powerful p-group,we give the sharp bound for the nilpotency class in terms of its coexponent for arbitrary prime p. 相似文献
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László Héthelyi 《Monatshefte für Mathematik》2000,130(3):201-209
In this paper we investigate the action of a p-group G on its powerful normal subgroup N. We shall mainly be concerned to find conditions which guarantee that G acts uniserially on N. We shall also study what consequences uniserial action on N has on the structure of N. (Received 21 August 1998; in revised form 28 June 1999) 相似文献
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Let $G$ be a finite $p$-group with a cyclic Frattini subgroup. Inthis paper, the automorphism group of $G$ is determined. 相似文献
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设G是一个群,X是G的一个子集,若对于任意x,y∈X且x≠y,都有xy≠yx,则称X是G的一个非交换集.进一步,如果对于G中的任意其他非交换子集Y,都有|X|≥|Y|,那么称X是G的一个极大非交换集.本文界定了中心循环的有限p-群中极大非交换集的势. 相似文献
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The Wielandt subgroup of a group G,denoted by w(G),is the intersection of the normalizers of all subnormal subgroups of G.In this paper,the authors show that for a p-group of maximal class G,either wi(G) = ζi(G) for all integer i or wi(G) = ζi+1(G) for every integer i,and w(G/K) = ζ(G/K) for every normal subgroup K in G with K = 1.Meanwhile,a necessary and suflcient condition for a regular p-group of maximal class satisfying w(G) = ζ2(G) is given.Finally,the authors prove that the power automorphism group PAut(G) is an elementary abelian p-group if G is a non-abelian pgroup with elementary ζ(G) ∩ 1(G). 相似文献
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The purpose of this note is to give a proof of a theorem ofSerre, which states that if G is a p-group which is not elementaryabelian, then there exist an integer m and non-zero elementsx1, ..., xm H1 (G, Z/p) such that
with ß the Bockstein homomorphism. Denote by mG thesmallest integer m satisfying the above property. The theoremwas originally proved by Serre [5], without any bound on mG.Later, in [2], Kroll showed that mG pk 1, with k =dimZ/pH1 (G, Z/p). Serre, in [6], also showed that mG (pk 1)/(p 1). In [3], using the Evens norm map, Okuyamaand Sasaki gave a proof with a slight improvement on Serre'sbound; it follows from their proof (see, for example, [1, Theorem4.7.3]) that mG (p + 1)pk2. However, mG can be sharpenedfurther, as we see below. For convenience, write H*(G, Z/p) = H*(G). For every xi H1(G),set
1991 Mathematics SubjectClassification 20J06. 相似文献
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Gustavo A. Fernández-Alcober 《代数通讯》2013,41(11):3928-3942
Let ν(G) be the number of conjugacy classes of non-normal subgroups of a finite group G. We obtain two new lower bounds for ν(G) when G is a non-abelian finite p-group and p is odd. More precisely, if |G| =p n , exp Z(G) = p e , and exp G/G′ =p f , let us define λ(G) = n ? e and κ(G) = n ? f. Then we prove that ν(G) ≥ p(λ(G) ?3) +2 and ν(G) ≥ p(κ(G) ?3) +2. The first bound improves the bound ν(G) ≥ λ(G) ?1 given by [10], and almost in every case, the second one improves the bound ν(G) ≥ p(k ? 1) +1 obtained by [6], where k is defined by the condition that |G′| =p k . 相似文献
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一个有限p-群G称为一个LA-群,如果当G是非循环的且|G|>p~2时有|G|/|Aut(G)|,本文证明了一个含有p~(n-2)阶元的p~n阶p-群是一LA-群。 相似文献
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Massimiliano Landi Pier Luigi Sacco 《Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory》2001,7(3):233-266
We study a model of partnership with costly commitment in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. We introduce various types of cooperative players with different degrees of strategic sophistication. We find that a necessary condition for cooperation at the social equilibrium is that the probability of a high opportunity value falls below a certain critical threshold. Such condition, however, is not sufficient. If players are too naively cooperative, the permanence of cooperation at the equilibrium is put at risk because naive cooperation entails playing inefficient responses to other equilibrium strategies. As a consequence, naive cooperation will be present at the equilibrium selected by the social dynamics only under somewhat special conditions. If cooperators are more flexible, in that they remain in the partnership only if mated to a first stage cooperator and only in lack of favorable outside opportunities, cooperation is almost granted provided that it is Pareto efficient (perverse lock in cases under unfavorable initial conditions are possible). Finally, the selection of Pareto superior cooperation with certainty may be granted by a certain norm-oriented type of strategically sophisticated behavior, that we call Rawlsian altruism. 相似文献
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本文讨论了牛曼─贝塞尔级数的共轭级数,建立了其部分和与相应的共轭Fourier三角级数的部分和之间的关系,同时给出了两个收敛定理。 相似文献
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We anwser two conjectures concerning the norms of the best projectionsonto an ideal in the disk algebra. 相似文献
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It is shown that the CaratheodoryFejer extension of afinite geometric series can be given explicitly up to a simplepolynomial equation in an auxiliary variable. This result allowsus to analyse the Caratheodory-Fejer approximation method inthe case where the quotients of successive Maclaurin coefficientsof the given function tend to a limit.
*Research carried out while this author was at ETH Zurich partiallysupported by a Royal Society European Visiting Fellowship. 相似文献