A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market

Given an assignment market, we introduce a set of vectors, one for each possible ordering on the player set, which we name the max-payoff vectors. Each one of these vectors is obtained recursively only making use of the assignment matrix. Those max-payoff vectors that are efficient turn out to give the extreme core allocations of the market. When the assignment game has a large core, all the max-payoff vectors are extreme core allocations.     

The enumeration of extreme rigid honeycombs

Journal of Algebraic Combinatorics - Rigid honeycombs were introduced by Knutson et al. (J Am Math Soc 17:19–48, 2004), and they were shown in Bercovici et al. (J Funct Anal...     

The pressure distribution in extreme Stokes waves

In this paper we prove that the pressure beneath an extreme Stokes wave over finite depth is strictly increasing with depth. Additionally it is shown that the pressure decreases in moving between a crest-line and trough-line, while it is stationary with respect to the horizontal coordinate along these lines themselves.     

The extreme set condition of a graph

Let G be a simple graph. The size of any largest matching in G is called the matching number of G and is denoted by ν(G). Define the deficiency of G, def(G), by the equation def(G)=|V(G)|−2ν(G). A set of points X in G is called an extreme set if def(G−X)=def(G)+|X|. Let c₀(G) denote the number of the odd components of G. A set of points X in G is called a barrier if c₀(G−X)=def(G)+|X|. In this paper, we obtain the following:

(1) Let G be a simple graph containing an independent set of size i, where i2. If X is extreme in G for every independent set X of size i in G, then there exists a perfect matching in G.

(2) Let G be a connected simple graph containing an independent set of size i, where i2. Then X is extreme in G for every independent set X of size i in G if and only if G=(U,W) is a bipartite graph with |U|=|W|i, and |Γ(Y)||U|−i+m+1 for any Y U, |Y|=m (1mi−1).

(3) Let G be a connected simple graph containing an independent set of size i, where i2. Then X is a barrier in G for every independent set X of size i in G if and only if G=(U,W) is a bipartite graph with |U|=|W|=i, and |Γ(Y)|m+1 for any Y U, |Y|=m (1mi−1).     

The exact extreme response and the confidence extreme response analysis of structures subjected to uncertain-but-bounded excitations

In this study, the methods for computing the exact bounds and the confidence bounds of the dynamic response of structures subjected to uncertain-but-bounded excitations are discussed. Here the Euclidean norm of the nodal displacement is considered as the measurement of the structural response. The problem of calculating the exact lower bound, the confidence (outer) approximation and the inner approximation of the exact upper bound, and the exact upper bound of the dynamic response are modeled as three convex QB (quadratic programming with box constraints) problems and a problem of quadratic programming with bivalent constraints at each time point, respectively. Accordingly, the DCA (difference of convex functions algorithm) and the vertex method are adopted to solve the above convex QB problems and the quadratic programming problem with bivalent constraints, respectively. Based on the inner approximation and the outer approximation of the exact upper bound, the error between the confidence upper bound and the exact upper bound of dynamic response could be yielded. Specially, we also investigate how to obtain the confidence bound of the dynamic response of structures subjected to harmonic excitations with uncertain-but-bounded excitation frequencies. Four examples are given to show the efficiency and accuracy of the proposed method.     

The core of discontinuous games

The traditional design of cooperative games implicitly assumes that preferences are continuous. However, if agents implement tie breaking procedures, preferences are effectively lexicographic and thus discontinuous. This rouses concern over whether classic core nonemptiness theorems apply in such settings. We show that balanced NTU games may have empty cores when agents have discontinuous preferences. Moreover, exchange economies may lack coalitionally rational trades when consumers implement tie breaking rules, even if these rules are themselves continuous and convex as are all first order preferences. Results are more positive when “utility” is transferable. We prove that balancedness is necessary and sufficient to ensure a nonempty core in lexicographic TU games.     

The modiclus and core stability

The modiclus, a relative of the prenucleolus, assigns a singleton to any cooperative TU game. We show that the modiclus selects a member of the core for any exact orthogonal game and for any assignment game that has a stable core. Moreover, by means of an example we show that there is an exact TU game with a stable core that does not contain the modiclus.     

The uniqueness of the core

Simple proofs are given for two theorems of Duffus and Rival: If a finite poset is dismantled by irreducibles as much as possible, the subposet one finally obtains is unique up to isomorphism. If one dismantles by doubly irreducibles, the subposet is unique.     

The Edgeworth expansion for distributions of extreme values

We present necessary and sufficient conditions of Edgeworth expansion for distributions of extreme values. As a corollary, rates of the uniform convergence for distributions of extreme values are obtained.     

The number of extreme points of tropical polyhedra

The celebrated upper bound theorem of McMullen determines the maximal number of extreme points of a polyhedron in terms of its dimension and the number of constraints which define it, showing that the maximum is attained by the polar of the cyclic polytope. We show that the same bound is valid in the tropical setting, up to a trivial modification. Then, we study the tropical analogues of the polars of a family of cyclic polytopes equipped with a sign pattern. We construct bijections between the extreme points of these polars and lattice paths depending on the sign pattern, from which we deduce explicit bounds for the number of extreme points, showing in particular that the upper bound is asymptotically tight as the dimension tends to infinity, keeping the number of constraints fixed. When transposed to the classical case, the previous constructions yield some lattice path generalizations of Gale's evenness criterion.     

The assignment game I: The core

The assignment game is a model for a two-sided market in which a product that comes in large, indivisible units (e.g., houses, cars, etc.) is exchanged for money, and in which each participant either supplies or demands exactly one unit. The units need not be alike, and the same unit may have different values to different participants. It is shown here that the outcomes in thecore of such a game — i.e., those that cannot be improved upon by any subset of players — are the solutions of a certain linear programming problem dual to the optimal assignment problem, and that these outcomes correspond exactly to the price-lists that competitively balance supply and demand. The geometric structure of the core is then described and interpreted in economic terms, with explicit attention given to the special case (familiar in the classic literature) in which there is no product differentiation — i.e., in which the units are interchangeable. Finally, a critique of the core solution reveals an insensitivity to some of the bargaining possibilities inherent in the situation, and indicates that further analysis would be desirable using other game-theoretic solution concepts.     

Estimation of the extreme value and the extreme points

Summary Letf be a continuous function defined on some domainA andX ₁,X ₂, ... be iid random variables. We estimate the extreme value off onA by studying the limiting distribution of min {f(X ₁), ...,f(X _n )} or max {f(X ₁), ...,f(X _n )} properly normalized. Sufficient conditions for the existence of the limiting distribution as well as a characterization of the limiting distribution relative to the extreme points off will be provided. A discussion of the multidimensional case is also carried out. Partially supported by CNPq-No. 301508/84.     

The core of zero-dimensional monomial ideals

The core of an ideal is the intersection of all its reductions. We describe the core of a zero-dimensional monomial ideal I as the largest monomial ideal contained in a general reduction of I. This provides a new interpretation of the core in the monomial case as well as an efficient algorithm for computing it. We relate the core to adjoints and first coefficient ideals, and in dimension two and three we give explicit formulas.     

The core operator and congruent submodules

The Hardy spaces H²(D²) can be conveniently viewed as a module over the polynomial ring C[z₁,z₂]. Submodules of H²(D²) have connections with many areas of study in operator theory. A large amount of research has been carried out striving to understand the structure of submodules under certain equivalence relations. Unitary equivalence is a well-known equivalence relation in set of submodules. However, the rigidity phenomenon discovered in [Douglas et al., Algebraic reduction and rigidity for Hilbert modules, Amer. J. Math. 117 (1) (1995) 75-92] and some other related papers suggests that unitary equivalence, being extremely sensitive to perturbations of zero sets, lacks the flexibility one might need for a classification of submodules. In this paper, we suggest an alternative equivalence relation, namely congruence. The idea is motivated by a symmetry and stability property that the core operator possesses. The congruence relation effectively classifies the submodules with a finite rank core operator. Near the end of the paper, we point out an essential connection of the core operator with operator model theory.