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1.
Seahwa Kim 《Acta Analytica》2012,27(1):73-76
In this paper, I examine Takashi Yagisawa’s response to van Inwagen’s ontic objection against David Lewis. Van Inwagen criticizes
Lewis’s commitment to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘there is,’ and Yagisawa claims that by adopting modal tenses he
avoids commitment to absolutely unrestricted quantification. I argue that Yagisawa faces a problem parallel to the one Lewis
faces. Although Yagisawa officially rejects the absolutely unrestricted sense of a quantifying expression, he is still committed
to the absolutely unrestricted sense of ‘is
a
real.’ 相似文献
2.
In this article, I discuss Hawthorne’s contextualist solution to Benacerraf’s dilemma. He wants to find a satisfactory epistemology
to go with realist ontology, namely with causally inaccessible mathematical and modal entities. I claim that he is unsuccessful.
The contextualist theories of knowledge attributions were primarily developed as a response to the skeptical argument based
on the deductive closure principle. Hawthorne uses the same strategy in his attempt to solve the epistemologist puzzle facing
the proponents of mathematical and modal realism, but this problem is of a different nature than the skeptical one. The contextualist
theory of knowledge attributions cannot help us with the question about the nature of mathematical and modal reality and how
they can be known. I further argue that Hawthorne’s account does not say anything about a priori status of mathematical and modal knowledge. Later, Hawthorne adds to his account an implausible claim that in some contexts
a gettierized belief counts as knowledge. 相似文献
3.
Javier Kalhat 《Acta Analytica》2011,26(2):115-133
Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility faces the obvious difficulty that not all universals are compatible. In this
paper I develop three objections against Armstrong’s attempt to account for property incompatibilities. First, Armstrong’s account cannot handle incompatibilities holding among properties that are either simple, or that are complex but stand to one another in the relation of overlap rather than in the part/ whole relation. Secondly, at the heart of Armstrong’s account lies a notion of structural universals
which, building on an objection by David Lewis, is shown to be incoherent. I consider and reject two alternative ways of construing
the composition of structural universals in an attempt to meet Lewis’ objection. An important consequence of this is that
all putative structural properties are in fact simple. Finally, I argue that the quasi-mereological account presupposes modality in a way that undermines the reductionist aim
of the combinatorialist theory of which it is a central part. I conclude that Armstrong’ quasi-mereological account of property
incompatibility fails. Without that account, however, Armstrong’s combinatorial theory either fails to get off the ground,
or else must give up its goal of reducing the notion of possibility to something non-modal. 相似文献
4.
Eric Wiland 《Acta Analytica》2010,25(3):279-284
J.J.C. Smart famously complained that rule utilitarianism is incoherent, and that rule utilitarians are guilty of “rule worship”.
Much has been said about whether Smart’s complaint is justified, but I will assume for the sake of argument that Smart was
on to something. Instead, I have three other goals. First, I want to show that Smart’s complaint is a specific instance of
a more general objection to a moral theory—what I will call the Incoherence Objection. Second, I want to illustrate how the
Incoherence Objection can apply both to consequentialist and, surprisingly, some nonconsequentialist theories. Finally, I
want to demonstrate at least one way nonconsequentialist theories that make use of rules, principles, and the like can dodge
the Incoherence Objection. 相似文献
5.
Janez Bregant 《Acta Analytica》2004,19(33):83-94
The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental
causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical
and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby
to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and
beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination
of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of
which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are
always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes
them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical
properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as
usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties
are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation
of events. I try to show that Van Gulick’s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept.
Also called The Problem of Causal Exclusion. 相似文献
6.
Truthmakers, truth conditions, and analyses are closely related, but distinct in rather important ways. A failure to properly appreciate their differences has led to some confusion regarding the role that possible worlds ought to play with respect to modality. Those philosophers who initially proposed the existence of possible worlds were understood as providing an analysis of modality. More recently, many have interpreted them as providing modal truthmakers. But, possible worlds are (at best) only suited to serve as truth conditions for modal truths (or so I will argue). My goals are as follows: First, to dispel this confusion by detailing the differences between these three concepts. Second, to apply the lesson learned to the famous Humphrey objection against possible worlds. While this objection, if successful, does undermine Lewisian modal realism, it only partially undermines ersatzism, and leaves available a route by which ersatzers may avoid the objection altogether. 相似文献
7.
8.
Matthew Boyle 《Acta Analytica》2010,25(1):9-20
I critically discuss the account of self-knowledge presented in Dorit Bar-On’s Speaking My Mind (OUP 2004), focusing on Bar-On’s understanding of what makes our capacity for self-knowledge puzzling and on her ‘neo-expressivist’
solution to the puzzle. I argue that there is an important aspect of the problem of self-knowledge that Bar-On’s account does
not sufficiently address. A satisfying account of self-knowledge must explain not merely how we are able to make accurate
avowals about our own present mental states, but how we can reasonably regard ourselves as entitled to claim self-knowledge. Addressing this aspect of the problem of self-knowledge requires confronting questions about the
metaphysical nature of mental states, questions that Bar-On’s approach seeks to avoid. 相似文献
9.
Danilo Šuster 《Acta Analytica》2005,20(4):41-52
Davies argues that the ontology of artworks as performances offers a principled way of explaining work-relativity of modality. Object oriented contextualist ontologies of art (Levinson) cannot adequately
address the problem of work-relativity of modal properties because they understand looseness in what counts as the same context
as a view that slight differences in the work-constitutive features of provenance are work-relative. I argue that it is more
in the spirit of contextualism to understand looseness as context-dependent. This points to the general problem—the context
of appreciation is not robust enough to ground modal intuitions about objective entities. In general, when epistemology dictates
ontology there is always a threat of anti-realism, scepticism and relativism. Davies also appeals to the modality principle—an
entity’s essential properties are all and only its constitutive properties. Davies understands essentiality in a traditional
way: a property P is an essential property of an object o iff o could not exist and lack P. Kit Fine has recently made a convincing case for the view that the notion of essence is not to
be understood in modal terms. I explore some of the implications of this view for Davies’ modal argument for the performance
theory. 相似文献
10.
11.
J. Adam Carter 《Acta Analytica》2011,26(3):285-293
Jonathan Kvanvig has recently attempted to reconcile the problem of (apparently) pointless truths with the claim that the
value of truth is unrestricted—that truth is always and everywhere valuable. In this paper, I critically evaluate Kvanvig’s
argument and show it to be defective at a crucial juncture. I propose my own alternative strategy for generating Kvanvig’s
result—an alternative that parts ways with Kvanvig’s own conception of the cognitively ideal. 相似文献
12.
13.
P. Sorba 《Theoretical and Mathematical Physics》2000,123(2):673-682
Deformedw
n
-algebras in the classical case (i.e., Poisson structures) and in the quantum case (exchange algebras) are constructed from
the elliptic algebras
.
In memory of M. Saveliev
When I think about Misha, and this has been happening rather frequently these recent months, it is his enthusiasm and his
communicative energy that first come to mind. Something very important to Misha was friendship. We scientists have the priviledge
to possess friends, real friends, among our colleagues, and Misha was a friend. Something else was fundamental for Misha,
his family, i.e., his parents, his wife, and his daughter. As Professor Manin said, summarizing Misha’s behavior very simply
and elegantly, Misha was “a good son, a good husband, a good father.” Misha’s parents died about three years ago, and I remember
how he was sad when I met him in Georgia in September 1996 and he informed me about his father’s and mother’s deaths a few
months before. After that, he concentrated all his forces to protect his wife and daughter, the two Svetlanas, as he used
to say! He was so proud of his gifted daughter, a good musician, a good painter, and a brilliant student. I wish to present
them my most respectful thoughts.
Misha was a great expert in integrable systems. He was deeply interested in developing models, which he did so nicely in the
framework of Toda theories. I learned much from him about Toda theories and also continuous Lie algebras. Misha was highly
convinced of the importance of symmetries and was especially interested in the use of infinite symmetries, the W-algebras
among them. The landscape of continuous symmetries, and particularly of infinite-dimensional symmetries, is becoming richer
and richer these years. I dare to think that Misha would have been interested in the modest seminar I now present.
Translated from Teoreticheskaya i Matematicheskaya Fizika, Vol. 123, No. 2, pp. 311–322, May, 2000. 相似文献
14.
Marcello Felisatti 《Mediterranean Journal of Mathematics》2008,5(4):493-499
In this article we give a construction of Max Karoubi’s multiplicative K-theory as the K-theory of an appropriate functor
between two categories. We use this construction to explain why the two definitions of relative multiplicative K-theory for
a compact pair of manifolds we give in the article agree.
Part of this work has been done while I was holding an EEC postdoctoral position funded by the network ‘Algebraic K-theory,
linear algebraic groups and related structures’ at University College Dublin. I would like to thank Professor David Lewis
for inviting me to Dublin. During the later stages of the work, I was supported by EPSERC grant GR/S08046/01. 相似文献
15.
Conclusion It is important to distinguish between physics, which is an experimental science, andphysicists, who are people. The latter are most certainlynot objective. Thus, Lipschütz-Yevick’s assertion that Ruskai says that the publication of Bohm’s controversial articles in thePhysical Review is evidence of the objectivity of the establishment towards [Bohm] is not supported by my statement
It should be noted that even though studying the foundations of quantum mechanics has long been far from the mainstream, it
has never been suppressed. The papers of Bohm, Bell,et al. were published in reputable journals, …
Reasonable people may disagree on the significance of a particular theory or individual’s contribution. It is here, rather
than in the physicsper se, that questions of social influence are likely to arise. I have commented elsewhere, e.g., [17], on the role that gender
sometimes plays. In a subsequent article, I will also discuss the distinction between the effect of the social and political
climate on the development of the careers of individuals and the development of physics.
The articles by Cronin and Lipschütz-Yevick have stimulated me to think anew about a number of issues related to Bohmian mechanics,
for which a full discussion requires clarification of some technical issues regarding the EPR experiment and non-locality.
These will be discussed in a forthcoming article. 相似文献
16.
We study self adjoint operators of the form?H
ω = H
0 + ∑λω(n) <δ
n
,·>δ
n
,?where the δ
n
’s are a family of orthonormal vectors and the λω(n)’s are independently distributed random variables with absolutely continuous probability distributions. We prove a general
structural theorem saying that for each pair (n,m), if the cyclic subspaces corresponding to the vectors δ
n
and δ
m
are not completely orthogonal, then the restrictions of H
ω to these subspaces are unitarily equivalent (with probability one). This has some consequences for the spectral theory of
such operators. In particular, we show that “well behaved” absolutely continuous spectrum of Anderson type Hamiltonians must
be pure, and use this to prove the purity of absolutely continuous spectrum in some concrete cases.
Oblatum 27-V-1999 & 6-I-2000?Published online: 8 May 2000 相似文献
17.
Andrea Sauchelli 《Acta Analytica》2013,28(4):411-421
Accounts of modality in terms of fictional possible worlds face an objection based on the idea that when modal claims are analysed in terms of fictions, the connection between analysans and analysandum seems artificial. Strong modal fictionalism, the theory according to which modal claims are analysed in terms of a fiction, has been defended by, among others, Seahwa Kim, who has recently claimed that the philosophical objection that the connection between modality and fictions is artificial can be met. I propose a new way of spelling out the intuition of artificiality and show that strong modal fictionalism should be rejected. 相似文献
18.
Dov M. Gabbay 《Israel Journal of Mathematics》1971,10(2):135-146
A Kripke type semantics is given to a large class of tense logics with statability operators (including PriorsQK
t) in such a manner as to obtain their decidability using Rabin’s theorem.
Dedicated to the Memory of A. N. Prior 相似文献
19.
Daniel Lehmann 《Israel Journal of Mathematics》1971,10(4):526-530
A clear proof of the statement that every deterministic language has an LR(l) grammar is given. It uses a definition ofLR(k) grammars found in Lewis and Stearns and the Ginsburg’s simulation of apda by a contex-free grammar.
This work is part of a Master’s thesis conducted under the supervision of Professor Eliahu Shamir. 相似文献
20.
Joseph A. Baltimore 《Metaphysica》2011,12(2):117-124
A major criticism of David Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation is that it allows too many things to count as causes, especially since Lewis allows, in addition to events, absences to be causes as well. Peter Menzies has advanced this concern under the title “the problem of profligate causation.” In this paper, I argue that the problem of profligate causation provides resources for exposing a tension between Lewis’ acceptance of absence causation and his modal realism. The result is a different problem of profligate causation—one that attacks the internal consistency of Lewisian metaphysics rather than employing common sense judgments or intuitions that conflict with Lewis’ extensive list of causes. 相似文献