Alethic Functionalism,Manifestation, and the Nature of Truth

Michael Lynch has recently proposed an updated version of alethic functionalism according to which the relation between truth per se and lower-level truth properties is not the realization relation, as might be expected, and as Lynch himself formerly held, but the manifestation relation. I argue that the manifestation relation is merely a resemblance relation and is inadequate to properly relate truth per se to lower-level truth properties. I also argue that alethic functionalism does not justify the claim that truth per se exists, or that truth per se is a functional property. Finally, I suggest a replacement for the manifestation relation. I argue that the resulting theory is a strict improvement over alethic functionalism on two counts, but that the improved theory does not justify the claim that truth per se exists. Since no further improvements to the theory are apparent, the prospects for alethic functionalism are dim.     

基于公式真度的公式集约简

基于经典命题逻辑的真度理论,讨论了经典命题逻辑系统当中公式集的约简问题。提出了真度约简及α-真度约简的概念,为公式集的约简提供了一种可行的操作方法。     

Exploring the Metaphysics of Nomic Relations

After defending the ontologically genuine existence of at least some of the actual nomic relations, I discuss some issues concerning their metaphysical features. I firstly argue in favour of the metaphysical contingency of nomic relations and then I suggest that their relata-specificity is the most plausible metaphysical view that guarantees the unity of facts that the laws of nature are. Finally, I present a novel account according to which some of the actual nomic relations are neither external nor external but contingently possess a kind of hybrid character.     

逻辑系统'Luk中命题积分真度的若干等式与不等式

对' Lukasiewicz逻辑系统,利用序结构知识和赋值函数保并、交、补、蕴涵运算的性质研究了命题的积分真度,推出了若干关于积分真度的等式与不等式,修正完善了积分真度的交推理规则,给出了积分真度的等式与不等式的一些应用,使较复杂的积分真度计算得以简化,或进行较合理的估值.     

A Deflationary Metaphysics of Morality

The metaphysical dispute between moral realists and antirealists is cast in terms of properties: the realist holds that moral properties exist, the antirealist denies this claim. There is a longstanding philosophical dispute over the nature of properties, and the obscurity of properties may make the realist/antirealist dispute even more obscure. In the spirit of deflationary theories of truth, we can turn to a deflationary theory of properties in order to clarify this issue. One might reasonably worry that such an account of properties would not be capable of properly characterizing disputes regarding the existence or nonexistence of genuine moral properties. In this paper, I will show that, within this framework, the traditional disputes over the existence of moral properties can be characterized in a far clearer fashion than is usually the case. A deflationary account of properties, along with an explanatory hierarchy of properties, makes the dispute in ontology clear.     

Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof

This paper provides an interpretation and evaluation of Spinoza’s highly original version of the ontological proof in terms of the concept of substance instead of the concept of perfection in the first book of his Ethics. Taking the lead from Kant’s critique of ontological arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, the paper explores the underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions of Spinoza’s proof. The main topics of consideration are the nature of Spinoza’s definitions, the way he conceives of the relation between a substance and its essence, and his conception of existence. Once clarity is shed upon these fundamental issues, it becomes possible to address the proof in its own terms. It is then easy to see that Kant’s objections miss their target and that the same is true of those advanced by another of the ontological argument’s most famous critics, Bertrand Russell. Finally, several interpretations of Spinoza’s proof are proposed and critically evaluated; on all of them, the argument turns out to be either invalid or question-begging.     

经典逻辑系统中公式的真度及公式间伪距离的一种等价定义

给出了经典命题逻辑中公式的向量表示形式,利用向量表示形式给出公式的真度和公式间伪距离的定义,说明了这种定义与原有的概率形式的定义等价,得到了公式间的伪距离的一些简单性质以及在伪距离空间(F(s),ρ)中,逻辑连接词都是连续的.     

Reduction about approximation spaces of covering generalized rough sets

The introduction of covering generalized rough sets has made a substantial contribution to the traditional theory of rough sets. The notion of attribute reduction can be regarded as one of the strongest and most significant results in rough sets. However, the efforts made on attribute reduction of covering generalized rough sets are far from sufficient. In this work, covering reduction is examined and discussed. We initially construct a new reduction theory by redefining the approximation spaces and the reducts of covering generalized rough sets. This theory is applicable to all types of covering generalized rough sets, and generalizes some existing reduction theories. Moreover, the currently insufficient reducts of covering generalized rough sets are improved by the new reduction. We then investigate in detail the procedures to get reducts of a covering. The reduction of a covering also provides a technique for data reduction in data mining.     

Theories and Theories of Truth

Formal theories, as in logic and mathematics, are sets of sentences closed under logical consequence. Philosophical theories, like scientific theories, are often far less formal. There are many axiomatic theories of the truth predicate for certain formal languages; on analogy with these, some philosophers (most notably Paul Horwich) have proposed axiomatic theories of the property of truth. Though in many ways similar to logical theories, axiomatic theories of truth must be different in several nontrivial ways. I explore what an axiomatic theory of truth would look like. Because Horwich’s is the most prominent, I examine his theory and argue that it fails as a theory of truth. Such a theory is adequate if, given a suitable base theory, every fact about truth is a consequence of the axioms of the theory. I show, using an argument analogous to Gödel’s incompleteness proofs, that no axiomatic theory of truth could ever be adequate. I also argue that a certain class of generalizations cannot be consequences of the theory.     

Rolle定理的逆证新思考

Rolle定理是微分中值定理中最基本、最重要的,其证明具有广泛的代表性.本文侧重从分析定理的条件着手,利用反证法并借助确界原理、闭区间套原理等不同理论,给出了Rolle定理一些新的证法.     

Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge

In this paper I argue, against some recent criticisms, that the factivity of ??knows?? does not support the traditional truth condition on knowledge. I articulate a conception of the factivity of ??knows?? on which it is a matter of cancelable pragmatic presupposition, and consider the epistemological implications of this.     

Marrying the Merits of Nagelian Reduction and Functional Reduction

This paper points out the merit of Nagelian reduction, namely to propose a model of inter-theoretic reduction that retains the scientific quality of the reduced theory and the merit of functional reduction, namely to take multiple realization into account and to offer reductive explanations. By considering Lewis and Kim??s proposal for local reductions, we establish that functional reduction fails to achieve a theory reduction and cannot retain the scientific quality of the reduced theory. We improve on that proposal by showing how one can build functional sub-types that are coextensive with physical realizer types and thereby obtain a theory reduction that is explanatory and that vindicates the scientific quality of the special sciences.     

基于双线性变换法的心磁信号降噪初探

利用心磁图来诊断心脏疾病是目前医学界的一种新方法.心磁信号在测量过程中往往会引入各种噪声,这将影响对心磁信号的进一步分析和计算.因此,降低噪声是心磁信号处理中的一个关键环节.利用双线性变换法对心磁信号的降噪处理进行了初步地研究,并结合一些实际的心磁数据进行了比较与分析,从而展现了该方法的实用性.     

Non-Realist Cognitivism,Truth and Objectivity

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that (i) normative judgments are beliefs; (ii) that some normative beliefs are true; (iii) that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and (iv) that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim of this article is to argue that Parfit’s theory is problematic because its defenders have no resources to make sense of the nature of normative truth, which is an essential element of their view. I do this by showing how the traditional theories of truth are not available for the non-realist cognitivists.     

Godel n值命题逻辑中公式的随机真度和形式推演结论的不可靠度估计

利用Godel n值命题逻辑赋值域上概率的无穷乘积,在Godeln值命题逻辑系统中引入命题公式的随机真度和不可靠度概念。证明在Godeln值逻辑系统中,一个有效推理结论的不可靠度不超过各前提的不可靠度与其必要度的乘积之和。通过不可靠度在全体公式集上建立伪距离,给出基于伪距离和不可靠度的两种近似推理模式。     

关于随机真度的若干注记

以随机真度为基础,在三值R_0命题逻辑系统中给出了三种不同的近似推理模式并讨论了它们之间的关系,其次利用根的性质得出误差定义的若干推理结果.