工业产品实物消耗的综合评价

本文运用多元统计分析工具，给出一种企业工产品多种材料消耗的综合评价与因子分析模型．结果对于合理利用资源、降低成本等管理工作具有一定的现实意义。     

Theories and Theories of Truth

Formal theories, as in logic and mathematics, are sets of sentences closed under logical consequence. Philosophical theories, like scientific theories, are often far less formal. There are many axiomatic theories of the truth predicate for certain formal languages; on analogy with these, some philosophers (most notably Paul Horwich) have proposed axiomatic theories of the property of truth. Though in many ways similar to logical theories, axiomatic theories of truth must be different in several nontrivial ways. I explore what an axiomatic theory of truth would look like. Because Horwich’s is the most prominent, I examine his theory and argue that it fails as a theory of truth. Such a theory is adequate if, given a suitable base theory, every fact about truth is a consequence of the axioms of the theory. I show, using an argument analogous to Gödel’s incompleteness proofs, that no axiomatic theory of truth could ever be adequate. I also argue that a certain class of generalizations cannot be consequences of the theory.     

Substantial Riemannian submersions ofS 15 with 7-dimensional fibres

In this paper we show that a substantial Riemannian submersion ofS ¹⁵ with 7-dimensional fibres is congruent to the standard Hopf fibration. As a consequence we prove a slightly weak form of the diameter rigidity theorem for the Cayley plane which is considerably stronger than the very recent radius rigidity theorem of Wilhelm.     

Non-Realist Cognitivism,Truth and Objectivity

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that (i) normative judgments are beliefs; (ii) that some normative beliefs are true; (iii) that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and (iv) that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim of this article is to argue that Parfit’s theory is problematic because its defenders have no resources to make sense of the nature of normative truth, which is an essential element of their view. I do this by showing how the traditional theories of truth are not available for the non-realist cognitivists.     

Truth versus validity in mathematical proof

In mathematics education, it is often said that mathematical statements are necessarily either true or false. It is also well known that this idea presents a great deal of difficulty for many students. Many authors as well as researchers in psychology and mathematics education emphasize the difference between common sense and mathematical logic. In this paper, we provide both epistemological and didactic arguments to reconsider this point of view, taking into account the distinction made in logic between truth and validity on one hand, and syntax and semantics on the other. In the first part, we provide epistemological arguments showing that a central concern for logicians working with a semantic approach has been finding an appropriate distance between common sense and their formal systems. In the second part, we turn from these epistemological considerations to a didactic analysis. Supported by empirical results, we argue for the relevance of the distinction and the relationship between truth and validity in mathematical proof for mathematics education.     

由真值向量求异或开关函数

由于卡诺图受到变量个数的限制,在数字电路中由真值向量推求函数表达式未完美解决。在本文中,通过定义向量的两种收缩性,得到了由已知函数真值向量推求异或开关函数的简捷方法,该方法不受变量个数的限制,且易于电脑操作。     

Coherentism,Truth, and Witness Agreement

Coherentists on epistemic justification claim that all justification is inferential, and that beliefs, when justified, get their justification together (not in isolation) as members of a coherent belief system. Some recent work in formal epistemology shows that “individual credibility” is needed for “witness agreement” to increase the probability of truth and generate a high probability of truth. It can seem that, from this result in formal epistemology, it follows that coherentist justification is not truth-conducive, that it is not the case that, under the requisite conditions, coherentist justification increases the probability of truth and generates a high probability of truth. I argue that this does not follow.     

Truth tabular degrees of recursively enumerable sets

The upper semilattice of truth tabular degrees of recursively enumerable (r.e.) sets is studied. It is shown that there exists an infinite set of pairwise tabularly incomparable truth tabular degrees higher than any tabularly incomplete r.e. truth tabular degree. A similar assertion holds also for r.e. m-degrees. Hence follows that a complete truth tabular degree contains an infinite antichain of r.e. m-degrees.Translated from Matematicheskie Zametki, Vol. 14, No. 5, pp. 697–702, November, 1973.     

关于随机真度的若干注记

以随机真度为基础,在三值R_0命题逻辑系统中给出了三种不同的近似推理模式并讨论了它们之间的关系,其次利用根的性质得出误差定义的若干推理结果.     

模糊逻辑系统公理真度分析

分别对Lukasiewicz逻辑系统中的公理在R0系统和G(o)del系统中的真度大小、R0系统逻辑系统中的公理在Lukasiewicz系统和中G(o)del系统的真度大小和G(o)del逻辑系统中的公理在R0系统和Lukasiewicz系统中的真度大小进行了计算和分析,从真度方面研究和分析了常用逻辑系统之间的关系.     

On Dilatations and Substantial Boundary Points of Homeomorphisms of Jordan Curves

We study the relation between the dilatations K_h and K_h* of a homeomorphism h of Jordan curves. We show that if K_h= K_h*, then either h is induced by an affine map or there is a substantial boundary point for h. In particular, we prove that if h is symmetric (in the sense of Gardiner and Sullivan), then K_h* > K_h. This is quite contrary to a previously conjectured relation between K_h and K_h*.     

Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge

In this paper I argue, against some recent criticisms, that the factivity of ??knows?? does not support the traditional truth condition on knowledge. I articulate a conception of the factivity of ??knows?? on which it is a matter of cancelable pragmatic presupposition, and consider the epistemological implications of this.     

Functionalism about Truth and the Metaphysics of Reduction

Functionalism about truth is the view that truth is an explanatorily significant but multiply-realizable property. According to this view the properties that realize truth vary from domain to domain, but the property of truth is a single, higher-order, domain insensitive property. We argue that this view faces a challenge similar to the one that Jaegwon Kim laid out for the multiple realization thesis. The challenge is that the higher-order property of truth is equivalent to an explanatorily idle disjunction of its realization bases. This consequence undermines the alethic functionalists’ non-deflationary ambitions. A plausible response to Kim’s argument fails to carry over to alethic functionalism on account of significant differences between alethic functionalism and psychological functionalism. Lynch’s revised view in his book Truth as One and Many (2009) fails to answer our challenge. The upshot is that, while mental functionalism may survive Kim’s argument, it mortally wounds functionalism about truth.