Bidding in sequential electricity markets: The Nordic case

For electricity market participants trading in sequential markets with differences in price levels and risk exposure, it is relevant to analyze the potential of coordinated bidding. We consider a Nordic power producer who engages in the day-ahead spot market and the hour-ahead balancing market. In both markets, clearing prices and dispatched volumes are unknown at the time of bidding. However, in the balancing market, the market participant faces an additional risk of not being dispatched. Taking into account the sequential clearing of these markets and the gradual realization of market prices, we formulate the bidding problem as a multi-stage stochastic program. We investigate whether higher risk exposure may cause hesitation to bid into the balancing market. Furthermore, we quantify the gain from coordinated bidding, and by deriving bounds on this gain, assess the performance of alternative bidding strategies used in practice.     

Neuro-fuzzy approach for short-term electricity price forecasting developed MATLAB-based software

Bid and offer competition is a main transaction approach in deregulated electricity markets. Locational marginal prices (LMP) resulting from bidding competition determine electricity prices at a node or in an area. The LMP exhibits important information for market participants to develop their bidding strategies. Moreover, LMP is also a vital indicator for a Security Coordinator to perform market redispatch for congestion management. This paper presents a method using modular feed forward neural networks (FFNN) and fuzzy inference system (FIS) for forecasting LMPs. FFNN is used to forecast the electricity prices in a short time horizon and FIS to forecast the prices of special days. FFNN system includes an autocorrelation method for selecting parameters and methods for data preprocessing and preparing historical data to train the artificial neural network (ANN). In this paper, the historical LMPs of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland (PJM) market are used to test the proposed method. It is found that the proposed neuro-fuzzy method is capable of forecasting LMP values efficiently. In addition, MATLAB-based software is designed to test and use the proposed model in different markets and environments. This is an efficient tool to study and model power markets for price forecasting. It is included with a database management system, data classifier, input variable selection, FFNN and FIS configuration and report generator in custom formats.     

Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market

In this paper we introduce an asymmetric model of continuous electricity auctions with limited production capacity and bounded supply functions. The strategic bidding is studied with this model by means of an electricity market game. We prove that for every electricity market game with continuous cost functions a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists. In particular, we focus on the behavior of producers in the Spanish electricity market. We consider a very simple form for the Spanish electricity market: an oligopoly consisting just of independent hydro-electric power production units in a single wet period. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the Spanish electricity market game always exists.     

Electricity price forecasting through transfer function models

Forecasting electricity prices in presentday competitive electricity markets is a must for both producers and consumers because both need price estimates to develop their respective market bidding strategies. This paper proposes a transfer function model to predict electricity prices based on both past electricity prices and demands, and discuss the rationale to build it. The importance of electricity demand information is assessed. Appropriate metrics to appraise prediction quality are identified and used. Realistic and extensive simulations based on data from the PJM Interconnection for year 2003 are conducted. The proposed model is compared with naïve and other techniques.     

Day-ahead market bidding for a Nordic hydropower producer: taking the Elbas market into account

In many power markets around the world the energy generation decisions result from two-sided auctions in which producing and consuming agents submit their price-quantity bids. The determination of optimal bids in power markets is a complicated task that has to be undertaken every day. In the present work, we propose an optimization model for a price-taker hydropower producer in Nord Pool that takes into account the uncertainty in market prices and both production and physical trading aspects. The day-ahead bidding takes place a day before the actual operation and energy delivery. After this round of bidding, but before actual operation, some adjustments in the dispatched power (accepted bids) have to be done, due to uncertainty in prices, inflow and load. Such adjustments can be done in the Elbas market, which allows for trading physical electricity up to one hour before the operation hour. This paper uses stochastic programming to determine the optimal bidding strategy and the impact of the possibility to participate in the Elbas. ARMAX and GARCH techniques are used to generate realistic market price scenarios taking into account both day-ahead price and Elbas price uncertainty. The results show that considering Elbas when bidding in the day-ahead market does not significantly impact neither the profit nor the recommended bids of a typical hydro producer.     

Optimization techniques for Available Transfer Capability (ATC) and market calculations

The recent movement towards an open, competitive market environmentintroduced new optimization problems such as market clearingmechanism, bidding decision and Available Transfer Capability(ATC) calculation. These optimization problems are characterizedby the complexity of power systems and the uncertainties inthe electricity market. Accurate evaluation of the transfercapability of a transmission system is required to maximizethe utilization of the existing transmission systems in a competitivemarket environment. The transfer capability of the transmissionnetworks can be limited by various system constraints such asthermal, voltage and stability limits. The ability to incorporatesuch limits into the optimization problem is a challenge inthe ATC calculation from an engineering point of view. In thecompetitive market environment, a power supplier needs to findan optimal strategy that maximizes its own profits under variousuncertainties such as electricity prices and load. On the otherhand, an efficient market clearing mechanism is needed to increasethe social welfare, i.e. the sum of the consumers’ andproducers’ surplus. The need to maximize the social welfaresubject to system operational constraints is also a major challengefrom a societal point of view. This paper presents new optimizationtechniques motivated by the competitive electricity market environment.Numerical simulation results are presented to demonstrate theperformance of the proposed optimization techniques.     

Optimal bidding of a virtual power plant on the Spanish day-ahead and intraday market for electricity

We develop a multi-stage stochastic programming approach to optimize the bidding strategy of a virtual power plant (VPP) operating on the Spanish spot market for electricity. The VPP markets electricity produced in the wind parks it manages on the day-ahead market and on six staggered auction-based intraday markets. Uncertainty enters the problem via stochastic electricity prices as well as uncertain wind energy production. We set up the problem of bidding for one day of operation as a Markov decision process (MDP) that is solved using a variant of the stochastic dual dynamic programming algorithm. We conduct an extensive out-of-sample comparison demonstrating that the optimal policy obtained by the stochastic program clearly outperforms deterministic planning, a pure day-ahead strategy, a benchmark that only uses the day-ahead market and the first intraday market, as well as a proprietary stochastic programming approach developed in the industry. Furthermore, we study the effect of risk aversion as modeled by the nested Conditional Value-at-Risk as well as the impact of changes in various problem parameters.     

Spatial dependencies of wind power and interrelations with spot price dynamics

Wind power has seen strong growth over the last decade and increasingly affects electricity spot prices. In particular, prices are more volatile due to the stochastic nature of wind, such that more generation of wind energy yields lower prices. Therefore, it is important to assess the value of wind power at different locations not only for an investor but for the electricity system as a whole. In this paper, we develop a stochastic simulation model that captures the full spatial dependence structure of wind power by using copulas, incorporated into a supply and demand based model for the electricity spot price. This model is calibrated with German data. We find that the specific location of a turbine – i.e., its spatial dependence with respect to the aggregated wind power in the system – is of high relevance for its value. Many of the locations analyzed show an upper tail dependence that adversely impacts the market value. Therefore, a model that assumes a linear dependence structure would systematically overestimate the market value of wind power in many cases. This effect becomes more important for increasing levels of wind power penetration and may render the large-scale integration into markets more difficult.     

Bidding under price uncertainty in multi-unit pay-as-bid procurement auctions for power systems reserve

In this paper a methodology for profit maximized bidding under price uncertainty in a day-ahead, multi-unit and pay-as-bid procurement auction for power systems reserve is proposed. Within this novel methodology a bidder is considered to follow a Bayes-strategy. Thereby, one bidder is assumed to behave strategically and the behavior of the remaining is summarized in a probability distribution of the market price and a reaction function to price dumping by the strategic bidder. With this approach two problems arise: First, as a pay-as-bid auction is considered, no uniform price and therefore no single probability distribution of the market price is readily available. Second, if historic bidding data of all participants are used to estimate such a distribution and market power is a relevant factor, the bid of the strategically behaving bidder is likely to influence the distribution. Within this paper for both of the problems solutions are presented. It is shown that by estimating a probability of acceptance the optimal bidding price with respect to a given capacity can be calculated by maximizing a stochastic non-linear objective function of expected profit. Taking the characteristics of recently established markets in Germany into account, the methodology is applied using exemplary data. It is shown that the methodology helps to manage existing price uncertainties and hence supports the trading decisions of a bidder. It is inferred that the developed methodology may also be used for bidding on other auction markets with a similar market design.     

Market Price Calculations in Restructured Electricity Markets

In the traditional organisation of the power market, the generation Unit Commitment and Dispatch problem was solved as a cost minimisation problem. After deregulation of the electricity sector, the problem must be solved as a profit maximising problem. It is necessary to find feasible market prices. This is difficult, because simple marginal cost based prices not always cover startup and operation-independent costs, with the result that the generator would choose not to run with such prices. In this paper a market structure is proposed with a central market operator computing the market equilibrium for both energy and reserves, based on generator offers and consumer bids. It is shown that it is possible to find feasible market prices. Using a simple test system, it is shown that demand elasticity can have a profound impact on prices and generator revenues and profits during peaking hours.     

Cyclic behavior in dynamic investment decisions for deregulated energy markets

In the first years after the deregulation of the electricity industry, investment into new generation capacity has not taken place on a large scale in any central european country. Recent increases in prices indicate that investment could be very profitable. However, the fear is that the need for new capacity can be overestimated and that could lead to a decrease in prices and profits and consequently to a reduction/stop of new investments. The aim of this paper is to model and analyze factors that influence the stability of electricity prices. The electricity market is modeled using a Cournot game and the stability of electricity prices is analyzed by simulations. The research was supported by the grant 1/3001/06 of the Grant Agency of Slovak Republic (VEGA) and grant VVGS 36/2006.     

Stochastic models for bidding strategies on oligopoly electricity market

In this paper we consider the forward/futures contracts and Asian-type call options for power delivery as important components of the bidding strategies of the players’ profits on the electricity market. We show how these derivatives can affect their profit. We use linear asymmetric supply function equilibrium (SFE) and Cournot models to develop firms’ optimal bidding strategies by including forward/futures contracts and Asian-type options. We extend the methodology proposed by Niu et al. (IEEE Trans Power Syst 20(4):1859–1867, 2005), where only forward contracts for power delivery were considered in the SFE model.     

Evaluating Individual Market Power in Electricity Markets via Agent-Based Simulation

We use agent-based simulation in a coordination game to analyse the possibility of market power abuse in a competitive electricity market. The context of this was a real application to the England and Wales electricity market as part of a Competition Commission Inquiry into whether two particular generators could profitably influence wholesale prices. The research contributions of this paper are both in the areas of market power and market design policy issues for electricity markets, and in the methodological use of large industry-wide evolutionary simulation models.     

Capacity expansion and forward contracting in a duopolistic power sector

The surge in demand for electricity in recent years requires that power companies expand generation capacity sufficiently. Yet, at the same time, energy demand is subject to seasonal variations and peak-hour factors that cause it to be extremely volatile and unpredictable, thereby complicating the decision-making process. We investigate how power companies can optimise their capacity-expansion decisions while facing uncertainty and examine how expansion and forward contracts can be used as suitable tools for hedging against risk under market power. The problem is solved through a mixed-complementarity approach. Scenario-specific numerical results are analysed, and conclusions are drawn on how risk aversion, competition, and uncertainty interact in hedging, generation, and expansion decisions of a power company. We find that forward markets not only provide an effective means of risk hedging but also improve market efficiency with higher power output and lower prices. Power producers with higher levels of risk aversion tend to engage less in capacity expansion with the result that together with the option to sell in forward markets, very risk-averse producers generate at a level that hardly varies with scenarios.     

Australian electricity market and price volatility

Australian Electricity Market has experienced high price volatility since the deregulation in early 1990s. In this exploratory and preliminary analysis of 2010 data from South Australian electricity market we identify and exhibit a number of phenomena which, arguably, contribute to (A) high cost of electricity supply to consumers and (B) volatility in spot prices. These phenomena include: (i) Distinct bidding patterns of some generators occurring in trading intervals corresponding to periods of low, medium and high spot prices, (ii) Low correlation between electricity demand and spot prices on days when spot price spikes are observed, (iii) Failure of the lottery model and associated Markowitz-type optimisation approaches to adequately explain the shifting structure of generators’ bids and (iv) Unexpectedly high contribution to the consumers costs and risks from the relatively small number of trading intervals where spot price spikes were observed.     

The emissions trading paradox

This article considers the price history of CO₂ allowances in the EU Emission Trading Scheme. Since European Emissions Trading started in 2005, the prices of allowances have varied between less than one and thirty Euro per ton of CO₂. This previously unpredicted volatility and, more notably, a significant price crash in May 2005 led to the hypothesis that electricity producers might use their market power to influence the prices of allowances. Besides market power, the combination of information asymmetry and price interdependencies (between prices of primary goods – especially electricity – and allowances) plays an important role in explaining the emissions trading paradox. The model presented will show that banking can lead to such a price crash if market participators act rationally. Furthermore, in such a scenario banking can be profitable for sellers at the cost of buyers.     

Market power analysis in electricity markets using supply function equilibrium model

This paper presents a surveillance method based on the gametheory which is used by the ISO to find whether a power supplierin an electricity market has market power. The paper uses thesupply function equilibrium model to analyse the generationsuppliers’ bidding behaviour and models the ISO's marketpower monitoring problem as a bi-level multi-objective problem.The outer sub-problem is a multi-objective problem which maximizessuppliers’ payoffs, while the inner one is the ISO's marketclearing problem based on the locational marginal pricing mechanism.A discrete method is adopted to find ‘good enough’solutions, in a continuous bidding strategy space, which arethe intersection of all suppliers’ optimal response spacesaccording to Nash equilibrium. The paper utilizes the IEEE 118-bussystem to illustrate the application of the proposed methodwith three suppliers as price setters in the energy market andthe other generators as price takers. The numerical resultsshow that the transmission congestion may enhance the suppliers’ability to exercise market power. Likewise, suppliers’gaming behaviour could relieve the transmission congestion.It is shown that applying price caps is an efficient way ofmitigating market power.     

ATLANTIS: techno-economic model of the European electricity sector

Since the nuclear accident in Fukushima the European electricity economy has been in transition. The ongoing shut down of nuclear power plants and the widespread installation of wind power and photovoltaic generation capacities, especially in Germany, has led to a high share of intermittent renewable electricity production. This high amount of generation with very little variable cost has led to a significant decline of the prices at the European energy exchange. This has meant that many thermal power plants are no longer able to work economically and have already been shut down, although they would be needed in times of high demands and as backup capacities. Therefore, a redesign of the European electricity market is needed and in order to find out the right characteristics and effects of such a redesign pre-investigations based on simulation models are reasonable. This paper introduces ATLANTIS, which is a simulation model of the European electricity economy and covers technical as well as economic and environmental issues and allows the calculation of different scenarios up to 2050 and even beyond regarding the specific characteristics of the electricity economy. After a comprehensive introduction of the model some example applications and an outlook are presented.     

Equilibrium prices supported by dual price functions in markets with non-convexities

The issue of finding market clearing prices in markets with non-convexities has had a renewed interest due to the deregulation of the electricity sector. In the day-ahead electricity market, equilibrium prices are calculated based on bids from generators and consumers. In most of the existing markets, several generation technologies are present, some of which have considerable non-convexities, such as capacity limitations and large start-up costs. In this paper we present equilibrium prices composed of a commodity price and an uplift charge. The prices are based on the generation of a separating valid inequality that supports the optimal resource allocation. In the case when the sub-problem generated as the integer variables are held fixed to their optimal values possess the integrality property, the generated prices are also supported by non-linear price functions that are the basis for integer programming duality.     

Study on probability distribution of prices in electricity market: A case study of zhejiang province,china

The study on probability density function and distribution function of electricity prices contributes to the power suppliers and purchasers to estimate their own management accurately, and helps the regulator monitor the periods deviating from normal distribution. Based on the assumption of normal distribution load and non-linear characteristic of the aggregate supply curve, this paper has derived the distribution of electricity prices as the function of random variable of load. The conclusion has been validated with the electricity price data of Zhejiang market. The results show that electricity prices obey normal distribution approximately only when supply-demand relationship is loose, whereas the prices deviate from normal distribution and present strong right-skewness characteristic. Finally, the real electricity markets also display the narrow-peak characteristic when undersupply occurs.