Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms' expected profits and home government's welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter. (© 2008 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

考虑消费者从众特性的动态定价研究

面对掌握大量信息的消费者,厂商需考虑多方因素制定价格策略。研究运用经典的博弈模型,讨论不同消费者特性情况下厂商的定价机制。模型按从众特性和等待特性将消费者分为六类,并引入一个价格偏差变量,分析各类型消费者比例变化对厂商定价和利润的影响。结果显示,一般情况下降价幅度、消费者期望购买总数量和期望销售利润都随着反从众消费者比例的增大而增加。最后扩展分析了效益贴现率,反从众消费者比例和短视型消费者比例三因素对厂商总利润的影响,研究认为效益贴现率和从众消费者比例较高时,厂商利润会随着短视型消费者比例的降低而有所提高。因此,为使收益最大化,厂商在制定定价策略时需同时考虑贴现因素和消费者行为特性。     

绿色混合产品市场下制造企业应对成本突增的策略

在绿色产品和非绿色产品并存的市场环境下,针对绿色产品和非绿色产品的生产成本突增的情况,研究了制造企业的生产调整策略.首先给出了常规环境下,制造企业对绿色产品和非绿色产品的生产策略;接着,研究了绿色产品和非绿色产品生产成本突然增加的情况下,制造企业的生产调整策略.最后,采用数值分析进一步证明了结论的正确性.研究表明:1)常规下的生产策略具有一定的鲁棒性,当突发事件引起生产成本扰动比较小时,应保持常规下的生产策略不变.2)当产品的生产成本突然增加时,会减少产品的市场规模,导致企业的利润受损.3)当产品的生产成本增加幅度比较大时,应该首先适度上调产品的销售价格,同时还要适度调整产品的产量:当其中一类产品的生产成本增加比较大,而另一类产品的生产成本增加比较小(扰动幅度在一定的范围内)时,对成本增加幅度大的产品,应减少产量;对成本增加幅度比较小的产品,应保持常规下的产量不变.随着两类产品的生产成本进一步增加,对成本增加幅度比较大的产品,应进一步减少产量,对成本增加幅度比较小的产品,应适度增加产量.当两类产品的生产成本增加都比较大时,不仅应增加两类产品的销售价格,而且还要减少两类产品的产量,尽管如此,企业的利润还是会大幅度减少.研究结论进一步丰富发展了企业应急管理的理论基础,为企业有效应对突发事件提供了理论指导的作用.     

Take back costs and product durability

Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) initiatives may require a manufacturer to be responsible in the future for taking back the products it produces today. A ramification of EPR is that take back costs may influence firms’ decisions regarding product durability. In the absence of EPR, prior literature has shown that a firm may intentionally lower durability, yielding planned obsolescence. We use a two period model to examine the impact of take back costs on a manufacturer’s product durability and pricing decisions, under both selling and leasing scenarios. We show that compared to selling, leasing provides a greater incentive to raise durability, thus extending a classic insight to a setting with product take backs. Interestingly, we also show that it is possible for the optimal product durability to decrease if the stipulated take back fraction increases. In such situations, were the take back fraction tied to durability rather than a fixed fraction, we demonstrate durability can increase. We explore the impact of take backs on profits and surplus by alternatively considering products for which take back costs are either increasing or decreasing functions of durability. When increasing durability implies higher take back costs, our results demonstrate that leasing can increase durability, profits, and surplus significantly compared to selling. In contrast, when increasing durability implies a lower take back cost, there is a built-in incentive for the firm to increase durability, which can make selling more efficient (i.e., surplus enhancing) than leasing.     

The effects of sensitization and habituation in durable goods markets

We develop a model to study the impact of changes in price sensitivity on the firm as it introduces multiple generations of a durable product where unit costs are a convex function of quality. We incorporate the psychological processes of sensitization and habituation into a model of discretionary purchasing of replacement products motivated by past experience. When price sensitivity decreases with each purchase (sensitization), the myopic firm offers a higher quality product at a much higher price with each generation. When price sensitivity increases with each purchase (habituation), the myopic firm engages in price skimming. When sensitization is followed by habituation, the myopic firm eventually provides higher quality than the market is willing to pay for, leading to a steep drop-off in sales and profits. The actions of the forward-looking firm depend on the discount rate. A firm with a low discount rate builds its customer base before offering a higher quality and higher priced product. In contrast, a firm with a high discount rate quickly increases price and quality following the same path to falling profits of the myopic firm. These results provide insight into the firm and consumer behaviors underlying the phenomenon of “performance oversupply” identified in the innovation literature.     

A multi-item newsvendor problem with preseason production and capacitated reactive production

Given items with short life cycles or seasonal demands, one can potentially improve profits by producing during the selling season, especially when its production capacity is substantial. We develop a two-stage, multi-item model incorporating reactive production that employs a firm’s internal capacity. Production occurs in an uncapacitated preseason stage and a capacitated reactive stage. Demands occur in the reactive stage. Reactive capacities are pre-allocated to each item in the preseason stage and cannot be changed during the reactive stage. Reactive production occurs during the selling season with full knowledge of demands. The objective is expected profit maximization. Unsatisfied demand is lost. The revenue, salvage value, and production and lost sales costs are proportional. Assuming no fixed costs, we present a simple algorithm for computing optimal policies. For a model with fixed costs for allocating preseason stage production and reactive stage capacity to product families, we characterize optimal policies and develop optimal and heuristic algorithms.     

Combined pricing and supply chain operations under price-dependent stochastic demand

In this study, we determined product prices and designed an integrated supply chain operations plan that maximized a manufacturer’s expected profit. The computational results of this study revealed that as the variance of the demand distribution increases, a manufacturer will increase its inventory to levels that are greater than the anticipated demand to prevent the potential loss of sales and will simultaneously raise product prices to obtain a greater profit. In the cost minimization approach, the manufacturer may earn the highest possible profits, as determined by the profit optimization approach, only if this firm precisely forecasts the mean market demand for its products. Greater inaccuracies in this forecast will produce lower levels of expected profit.     

Lead-time hedging and coordination between manufacturing and sales departments using Nash and Stackelberg games

In a firm, potential conflict exists between manufacturing and sales departments. Salespersons prefer to order from manufacturing departments in advance so that they can secure products in the amount they need to satisfy customers in time. This time in advance strategy is defined as “lead-time hedging.” While this hedging strategy is good for the sales department to guarantee the right quantity at the right time for customers, it adds additional costs and pressure to the manufacturing department. One scheme to resolve this conflict is to introduce a fair “internal price,” charged by the manufacturing department to the sales department. In this paper, two models involving a fair internal price are introduced. In one model, a Nash game is played to reach an optimal strategy for both parties. In the other model, a Stackelberg game is played in which the manufacturing department serves as the leader. We show that these two models can successfully reduce lead-time hedging determined by the salesperson and can increase the firm’s overall profit, as compared to the traditional model without considering the internal price. More insights have also been analyzed that include the comparisons of the manufacturer’s and the salesperson’s profits among the traditional model, the Nash game model, the Stackelberg game model, and the centralized global optimization model.     

零售商主导的模糊供应链博弈——考虑销售努力的情形

以包含一个制造商与一个零售商的两级供应链为研究对象,考虑零售商居于主导地位并付出销售努力时供应链各成员的决策。结合经济环境的不确定性,将市场需求函数和制造商的制造成本、零售商的经营成本视为模糊变量;运用斯塔克尔伯格模型刻画零售商和制造商之间的博弈过程,并引入期望值模型、机会约束模型来解决最优决策问题;通过一个数值算例证明了供应链博弈模型的有效性。研究表明,在均衡结果中,考虑到零售商所承担的销售努力成本,其总体期望值利润相比于制造商而言偏低,但单位产品边际利润较高。原因在于,零售商的主导地位使其不仅通过销售努力提高产品销量,提高了供应链的整体利润,同时也能够采用压低批发价格的方式,使自身在供应链中获取更多收益。     

Optimal sales force compensation plans: an operational procedure

This paper describes an operational procedure for identifying optimal sales force compensation plans featuring salary, commissions and/or quota/bonus. Utility-maximising salespeople's behaviours and reactions to given compensation plans are simulated, and the resulting sales, costs and long-term expected profits are assessed. Then, a search technique attempts to identify the long-term profit-maximising compensation plan structure. Operationally, the simulation model parameters are calibrated so as to reflect those of an actual sales force, and consequently the optimal compensation scheme for this specific sales force can be identified. The concept is illustrated in an actual case study.     

Price competition in the Hotelling model with uncertainty on costs

For the linear Hotelling model with firms located at the boundaries of the segment line, we study the price competition in a scenario of incomplete information in the production costs of both firms. We introduce the bounded uncertain costs (BUC) condition in the production costs and we prove that there is a local optimum price strategy if and only if the BUC condition holds. We compute explicitly the local optimum price strategy and we prove that it does not depend upon the distributions of the production costs of the firms, except on their first moments. We prove that the ex-post profit of a firm is smaller than its ex-ante profit if and only if the production cost of the other firm is greater than its expected cost.     

Asymmetric dynamic price competition with uncertainty

We consider a dynamic setting-price duopoly model in which a dominant (leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (follower) firm moves second. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on the profits of the firms, for different values of the intercept demand parameters. (© 2008 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

Reinforcement learning for joint pricing,lead-time and scheduling decisions in make-to-order systems

The paper investigates a problem faced by a make-to-order (MTO) firm that has the ability to reject or accept orders, and set prices and lead-times to influence demands. Inventory holding costs for early completed orders, tardiness costs for late delivery orders, order rejection costs, manufacturing variable costs, and fixed costs are considered. In order to maximize the expected profits in an infinite planning horizon with stochastic demands, the firm needs to make decisions from the following aspects: which orders to accept or reject, the trade-off between price and lead-time, and the potential for increased demand against capacity constraints. We model the problem as a Semi-Markov Decision Problem (SMDP) and develop a reinforcement learning (RL) based Q-learning algorithm (QLA) for the problem. In addition, we build a discrete-event simulation model to validate the performance of the QLA, and compare the experimental results with two benchmark policies, the First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS) policy and a threshold heuristic policy. It is shown that the QLA outperforms the existing policies.     

Supply chain analysis under a price-discount incentive scheme for electric vehicles

We investigate an automobile supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer serve heterogeneous consumers with electric vehicles (EVs) under a government’s price-discount incentive scheme that involves a price discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We show that the subsidy ceiling is more effective in influencing the optimal wholesale pricing decision of the manufacturer with a higher unit production cost. However, the discount rate is more effective for the manufacturer with a lower unit production cost. Moreover, the expected sales are increasing in the discount rate but may be decreasing in the subsidy ceiling. Analytic results indicate that an effective incentive scheme should include both a discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We also derive the necessary condition for the most effective discount rate and subsidy ceiling that maximize the expected sales of EVs, and obtain a unique discount rate and subsidy ceiling that most effectively improve the manufacturer’s incentive for EV production.     

Optimal purchasing policy in a two-component assembly system with different purchasing contracts for each component

This paper considers an assembly system where a firm produces a single product which is assembled using two types of components (component 1 and component 2). The components are provided by individual suppliers (supplier 1 and supplier 2). We assume that the firm makes different procurement contracts with supplier 1 and supplier 2. To supplier 1, the firm specifies the maximum inventory level of component 1 and makes a commitment to purchase the component as long as its inventory level is below this target level. To supplier 2, the firm has the option of purchasing or rejecting component 2 at each instant supplier 2 provides it. Formulating our model as a Markov decision problem, we identify a component 2 purchasing policy which maximizes the firm’s profits subject to the costs of rejecting component 1, holding component 2, and purchasing component 2. We also investigate how the changes in the sales price and cost parameters affect the optimal purchasing policy. Finally, we present numerical study for the optimal performance evaluation.This material is based upon work supported by the Korea Science and Engineering Foundation (KOSEF) through the Northeast Asia e-Logistics Research Center at University of Incheon.     

考虑大数据营销和风险规避的绿色供应链决策与协调

通过建立考虑大数据营销及零售商风险规避的博弈模型,对绿色供应链定价、产品绿色度及利润进行比较分析。研究发现：无论集中决策、双方风险中性分散决策还是仅零售商风险规避分散决策,考虑大数据营销时的供应链整体期望利润和产品绿色度较高,且大数据营销效率因子对产品绿色度的增加有正向作用;双方风险中性分散决策下,一定条件下,两部定价契约能够有效协调供应链整体利润,实现帕累托改进;仅零售商风险规避分散决策下,零售商的风险规避行为会降低其对大数据营销的投入,一定条件下,两部定价契约也能够实现供应链整体期望利润的帕累托改进。     

Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering

This paper investigates a wholesale-price contract of supply chain under the endogenous information structure. This supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer during the selling season. The retailer does not know his selling cost but can spend resources to acquire information. The supplier offers a contract, which induces the retailer to gather information and generate more production orders with beta costs. We find that there exists an upper bound of the information gathering cost such that the supplier induces the retailer to gather information. The increasing cost of information gathering may decrease the order quantity and wholesale price. Moreover, the cost beta has an impact on the expected profits of the two parties. With the increasing cost of information gathering, the supplier’s expected profit is reduced, while that of the retailer becomes ambiguous in terms of the distribution function and the interval of selling cost information. Finally, a numerical example is presented to explain the main results.     

The construction of a comprehensive model for production strategy evaluation

To acquire reasonable profits and to be competitive in the globalize market, more and more firms today have exploited various kinds of production strategies, such as outsourcing, joint venture, or some kind of strategic alliance. Since every production strategy has its benefits and costs and may bring a firm different opportunities and risks, which kind of production strategy is the most suitable for a firm to carry out is a difficult and complicated decision with a high degree of uncertainty. Therefore, this research proposes a comprehensive production strategy evaluation model that can facilitate such a decision making for a firm. The factors that should be considered for devising a production strategy are listed for the benefits, opportunities, costs and risks (BOCR) merits first, and fuzzy Delphi method is applied next to select the most important factors under each merit. A network with BOCR merits is constructed to incorporate the selected factors, and fuzzy analytic network process is then applied to consider the interdependence and feedback inside the network. The proposed model can effectively aid decision making on which kind of production strategy should be adopted by a firm. A case of a printed circuit board manufacturer is presented for the illustration of the proposed model.     

A profit sharing scheme for a two-firm joint venture

Consider the scenario when two firms are setting up a joint venture. One firm has a set of technologies and knowhow for a new product while the other contributes the necessary capital for setting up and running the venture. The key issue that the two firms face in negotiating the joint venture is to determine a fair value for the technologies and knowhow. This paper presents an approach by which each firm bids a price for the technology with an objective to maximize their own profits from the joint venture. Provided that their bids satisfy a cooperation condition, the two firms settle on a price using a simple valuation formula. We analyze the impact of various factors on the decision process and provide numerical results to illustrate the bidding strategies. We conclude that in order to maximize their profits, it is often more important for both firms to increase the chance of cooperation than to increase their own shares of the joint venture.     

A stochastic investiment model for a survival conscious firm

A stochastic investiment is analyzed to show the consequences of an unwillingness by the entrepreneur to accept any positive risk of the firm's failure. The entrepreneur does not invest in additional capacity, even in the face of continuing positive expected profits, if that investment would infringe on the firm's ability to survive. Survival of the firm conditions all investment decisions, which are functions (via the physical and financial capital accounts) of the random outcomes observed at the time of decision. This conditioning shows how worse than expected outcomes will affect the firm's net asset position and its ability to survive. Managerially, the entrepreneur has principles by which to explicitly consider unpleasant surprises in planning for the continued growth of the firm. In contrast, knowledge of the random outcomes is shown to be of no consequence in an alternative model where maximization of expected profits is the sole criterion of the entrepreneur. In that model, the optimal investiment decisions can be made at the beginning of the firm's life, because those decisions are not functions of the future yields. Reduction of the survival model to a linear programming (LP) problem highlights the additional complexity of the survival problem. This reduction means that the maximum value of the objective function for the primal (expected profits) equals the minimum value of the objective function for the dual (resource costs), which economists interpret as zero profits. The zero profit consequence is in accordance with Knight's long-standing economic conjecture: If all risks are measureable, total risk aversion will result in no profits. Also, LP methods provide a way in application to analyze a wide range of risk possibilities from acceptance of no risk of failure to acceptance of some risk of failure.The economist as such does not advocate criteria of optimality. He may invent them. ... the ultimate choice is made by the procedures of decision making inherent in the institutions, laws and customs of society. Tjalling C. Koopmans, Nobel Memorial Lecture, 11th December 1975.