共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 125 毫秒
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研究原制造商和再制造商双向CSR(企业社会责任)投入下,考虑再制造商公平关切的新产品与再制品差别定价问题。分别构建了公平中性、公平关切信息对称与不对称的闭环供应链差别定价决策模型。分析了再制造商的公平关切行为及消费者的双向CSR敏感程度对闭环供应链差别定价与绩效的影响。研究表明:原制造商的CSR投入水平、专利费用及新产品定价与公平关切程度负相关。当公平关切信息不对称时,再制造商的公平关切行为仅会对自身的逆向CSR投入水平、废旧品回收价格产生负面影响。无论公平关切信息对称与否,再制造商的公平关切行为均会促使再制造品降价、新产品销量减少。再制造商的公平关切行为会损害原制造商及闭环供应链整体的利益,并且仅在公平关切信息对称时,再制造商的公平关切行为才对自身有利。 相似文献
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在信息不对称条件下,市场需求、价格和风险厌恶等因素同时干扰时,构建数量折扣契约的供应链博弈模型,寻找其实现供应链协调的内在约束条件。根据显示原理,构建信息不对称条件下多因素干扰的CVaR模型并求解,然后用算例仿真,结果表明:供应商隐瞒生产成本信息会带来额外收益,但给零售商造成额外损失。价格随机与零售商厌恶风险的耦合作用是导致供应链上各决策变量发生分岔现象的内因,与信息是否对称无关。但信息不对称会损害供应链系统的稳定性。在分岔突变区域内供应链失调,在区域之外供应链协调。零售商风险中性的态度和提高信息透明度有利于提高整个供应链的绩效。 相似文献
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基于推测弹性的双寡头研发AJ模型最优成本缩减决策 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
文章通过将推测弹性引入AJ模型,首先考察一致性推测弹性对双寡头企业研发策略的影响,从而得出有推测的双寡头市场结构下的研发均衡结果,然后将零一致性推测弹性的均衡成本缩减量与AJ模型的结果进行对比,最后给出一致性推测弹性和溢出系数之间的关系对研发绩效的影响效果. 相似文献
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基于报童模型,研究了由一个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链在需求信息不对称条件下的契约协调问题,分别得到了离散和连续两种需求类型下的最优回购契约,并分析了最优回购契约对供应链的协调绩效. 相似文献
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本研究利用2006年10月30日至2009年3月13日期间的仿真的沪深300指数期货每日结算价,探讨了期货价格的不对称跳跃波动行为。在实证研究方法上,本文以Chan和Maheu的GARCH(1,1)-ARJI模型为基础并进行了扩展,以EGARCH(1,1)-CJI和EGARCH(1,1)-ARJI两种模型来刻画股指期货价格的不对称和跳跃波动行为。实证结果显示:(1)沪深300仿真股指期货价格存在不对称跳跃波动,而且跳跃强度不为一固定常数,异常信息所产生的跳跃强度是随着时间变动的。(2)经过似然比检验,结果显示EGARCH(1,1)-ARJI模型比EGARCH(1,1)-CJI模型具有更好的拟合能力。 相似文献
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《数学的实践与认识》2015,(17)
非对称信息条件下建立了具有过度自信代理人的委托代理模型.基于模型讨论了代理人过度自信行为对其自身努力水平及委托人利润的影响,得出:与对称信息情形相比,信息不对称条件下,代理人的努力程度更低,委托人利润也会减少.代理人的过度自信特征能降低信息不对称对委托人的不利影响,因而后者更愿意选择过度自信程度高的代理人合作. 相似文献
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制造企业对混合产品专有知识出于盈利与保护目的封锁行为,将使得供需之间产生知识缺口。在厘清缺口形成原因的基础上,分别构建了不同信息条件及不同风险偏好下的供需知识共享激励模型。研究结果表明:在信息对称的条件下,供需双方可达到帕累托最优,客户可通过买断知识产权或建立知识联盟共享企业混合产品的专有知识;而信息不对称的情形下,制造企业采取知识授权的形式进行共享,客户提高收益分配比例对保护性知识的共享边际作用递增,而对盈利性知识的共享边际作用保持不变;考虑知识泄露的风险,仿真发现制造企业愿意承担的风险比例对保护性知识的共享成本系数的敏感性要高于盈利性知识。 相似文献
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考虑一个只含有货币和资本的分散经济 ,通过代表性代理人期望折现效用最大化 ,运用随机动态最优化方法得出经济均衡增长时的各项经济指标 ,分析了政府政策对经济的影响 ,并进行了福利分析 . 相似文献
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How mathematical impossibility changed welfare economics: A history of Arrow's impossibility theorem
During the 20th century, impossibility theorems have become an important part of mathematics. Arrow's impossibility theorem (1950) stands out as one of the first impossibility theorems outside of pure mathematics. It states that it is impossible to design a welfare function (or a voting method) that satisfies some rather innocent looking requirements. Arrow's theorem became the starting point of social choice theory that has had a great impact on welfare economics. This paper will analyze the history of Arrow's impossibility theorem in its mathematical and economic contexts. It will be argued that Arrow made a radical change of the mathematical model of welfare economics by connecting it to the theory of voting and that this change was preconditioned by his deep knowledge of the modern axiomatic approach to mathematics and logic. 相似文献
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构建一个完全信息两阶段博弈模型,分别对财政分权的两个极点—完全分权和完全集权进行讨论,研究财政分权对经济增长及社会福利的影响. 相似文献
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Puu’s incomplete information dynamical system is introduced and applied for Bertrand Duopoly. Multi-team Bertrand game is formulated. It is a generalization of Liu’s work to dynamical non-convex multi-team games. 相似文献
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《Annals of Pure and Applied Logic》2023,174(9):103302
Social welfare relations satisfying Pareto and equity principles on infinite utility streams have revealed a non-constructive nature, specifically by showing that in general they imply the existence of non-Ramsey sets and non-Lebesgue measurable sets. In [4, Problem 11.14], the authors ask whether such a connection holds with non-Baire sets as well. In this paper we answer such a question showing that several versions of Pareto principles acting on different utility domains imply the existence of non-Baire sets. Furthermore, we analyze in more details the needed fragments of AC and we start a systematic investigation of a social welfare diagram in a similar fashion done in the past decades concerning cardinal invariants and regularity properties of the reals. In doing that we use tools from forcing theory, such as specific tree-forcings (in particular variants of Silver and Mathias forcings) and Shelah's amalgamation. 相似文献
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Communication networks are becoming ubiquitous and more and more competitive among revenue-maximizing providers, operating on potentially different technologies. In this paper, we propose to analyze thanks to game theory the competition of providers playing with access prices and fighting for customers. Considering a slotted-time model, the part of demand exceeding capacity is lost and has to be resent. We consider an access price for submitted packets, thus inducing a congestion pricing through losses. Customers therefore choose the provider with the cheapest average price per correctly transmitted unit of traffic. The model is a two-level game, the lower level for the distribution of customers among providers, and the upper level for the competition on prices among providers, taking into account what the subsequent repartition at the lower level will be. We prove that the upper level has a unique Nash equilibrium, for which the user repartition among different available providers is also unique, and, remarkably, efficient in the sense of social welfare (with a so-called price of anarchy equal to one). Moreover, even when adding a higher level game on capacity disclosure with a possibility of lying for providers, providers are better off being truthful, and the unique Nash equilibrium is thus unchanged. 相似文献