On the serial cost sharing rule

In this paper we study a solution for discrete cost allocation problems, namely, the serial cost sharing method. We show that this solution can be computed by applying the Shapley value to an appropriate TU game and we present a probabilistic formula. We also define for cost allocation problems a multilinear function in order to obtain the serial cost sharing method as Owen (1972) did for the Shapley value in the cooperative TU context. Moreover we show that the pseudo average cost method is equivalent to an extended Shapley value. Received April 2000/Revised January 2003 RID="*" ID="*"  Authors are indebted to two anonymous referees for especially careful and useful comments. This research has been partially supported by the University of the Basque Country (projects UPV 036.321-HA197/98, UPV 036.321-HA042/99) and DGES Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (project PB96-0247).     

Groups with three real valued irreducible characters

We obtain strong restrictions on the structure of a Sylow 2-subgroup of a group with at most three real valued irreducible characters. This extends results of Iwasaki, who studied groups with at most two real valued irreducible characters. This research was partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, MTM2004-06067-C02-01 and MTM2004-04665, and the FEDER. The first author was also supported by the Programa Ramón y Cajal and the Generalitat Valenciana.     

On the convergence of the Weiszfeld algorithm

In this work we analyze the paper “Brimberg, J. (1995): The Fermat-Weber location problem revisited. Mathematical Programming 71, 71–76” which claims to close the question on the conjecture posed by Chandrasekaran and Tamir in 1989 on the convergence of the Weiszfeld algorithm. Some counterexamples are shown to the proofs showed in Brimberg’s paper. Received: January 1999 / Accepted: December 2001?Published online April 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"Partially supported by PB/11/FS/97 of Fundación Séneca of the Comunidad Autónoma de la Región de Murcia RID="**" ID="**"Plan Nacional de Investigación Científica, Desarrollo e Innovación Tecnológica (I+I+D), project TIC2000-1750-C06-06 RID="*" RID="**"     

具有图结构和联盟结构的Banzhaf值及应用

Banzhaf值是经典可转移效用合作对策中一个著名的分配规则,可以用来评估参与者在对策中的不同作用。本文将Banzhaf值推广到具有联盟结构和图结构的TU-对策中,首先提出并定义了具有联盟结构和图结构的Banzhaf值(简称PL-Banzhaf值),证明了PL-Banzhaf值满足公平性、平衡贡献性和分割分支总贡献性,并给出了该值的两种公理性刻画。其次,讨论了PL-Banzhaf值在跨国天然气管道案例中的应用,并和其他分配规则进行了比较分析。     

Interpolation of Ideal Measures by Abstract K and J Spaces

We work with the abstract K and J interpolation method generated by a sequence lattice Г. We investigate the deviation of an interpolated operator from a given operator ideal by establishing formulae for the ideal measure of the interpolated operator in terms of the ideal measures of restrictions of the operator. Formulae are given in terms of the norms of the shift operators on Г.     

The extended Freudenthal Magic Square and Jordan algebras

The Lie superalgebras in the extended Freudenthal Magic Square in characteristic 3 are shown to be related to some known simple Lie superalgebras, specific to this characteristic, constructed in terms of orthogonal and symplectic triple systems, which are defined in terms of central simple degree three Jordan algebras. I. Cunha was supported by CMUC, Department of Mathematics, University of Coimbra. A. Elduque was supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and FEDER (MTM 2004-081159-C04-02) and by the Diputación General de Aragón (Grupo de Investigación de álgebra).     

On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. We show that these sequencing games are convex if the initial order of the jobs is a concatenation of chains. F. Klijn's research is supported by a Ramón y Cajal contract of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The main part of F. Klijn's work was supported by a Marie Curie Fellowship of the European Community programme “Improving Human Research Potential and the Socio-economic Knowledge Base” under contract number HPMF-CT-2001-01232, carried out at the Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His work is also partially supported by Research Grant BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA     

Real characters and degrees

Several classical theorems on character degrees are revisited from the point of view of the real characters. The research of the first two authors is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MTM2004-06067-C02-01). The third author gratefully acknowledges the support of the NSF (grant DMS-0600967)     

Measuring the interactions among variables of functions over the unit hypercube

By considering a least squares approximation of a given square integrable function f:n[0,1]→R by a multilinear polynomial of a specified degree, we define an index which measures the overall interaction among variables of f. This definition extends the concept of Banzhaf interaction index introduced in cooperative game theory. Our approach is partly inspired from multilinear regression analysis, where interactions among the independent variables are taken into consideration. We show that this interaction index has appealing properties which naturally generalize several properties of the Banzhaf interaction index. In particular, we interpret this index as an expected value of the difference quotients of f or, under certain natural conditions on f, as an expected value of the derivatives of f. Finally, we discuss a few applications of the interaction index in aggregation function theory.     

Rational quadrature formulae on the unit circle with arbitrary poles

Interpolatory quadrature rules exactly integrating rational functions on the unit circle are considered. The poles are prescribed under the only restriction of not lying on the unit circle. A computable upper bound of the error is obtained which is valid for any choice of poles, arbitrary weight functions and any degree of exactness provided that the integrand is analytic on a neighborhood of the unit circle. A number of numerical examples are given which show the advantages of using such rules as well as the sharpness of the error bound. Also, a comparison is made with other error bounds appearing in the literature. The work of the first author was supported by the Dirección General de Investigación, Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, under grants MTM2006-13000-C03-02 and MTM2006-07186 and by UPM and Comunidad de Madrid under grant CCG06-UPM/MTM-539. The work of the second author was partially supported by the Dirección General de Investigación, Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, under grant MTM2005-08571.     

Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values

In a paper in 1975, Dubey characterized the Shapley-Shubik index axiomatically on the class of monotonic simple games. In 1979, Dubey and Shapley characterized the Banzhaf index in a similar way. This paper extends these characterizations to axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values on the class of control games, on the class of simple games and on the class of all transferable utility games. In particular, it is shown that the additivity axiom which is usually used to characterize these values on the class of all transferable utility games can be weakened without changing the result.This research is sponsored by the Foundation for the Promotion of Research in Economic Sciences, which is part of the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).     

The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games

In this paper we analyze ternary bicooperative games, which are a refinement of the concept of a ternary voting game introduced by Felsenthal and Machover. Furthermore, majority voting rules based on the difference of votes are simple bicooperative games. First, we define the concepts of the defender and detractor swings for a player. Next, we introduce the Banzhaf power index and the normalized Banzhaf power index. The main result of the paper is an axiomatization of the Banzhaf power index for the class of ternary bicooperative games. Moreover, we study ternary bicooperative games with two lists of weights and compute the Banzhaf power index using generating functions.     

A Sharp Form of the Cramér–Wold Theorem

The Cramér–Wold theorem states that a Borel probability measure P on ℝ ^d is uniquely determined by its one-dimensional projections. We prove a sharp form of this result, addressing the problem of how large a subset of these projections is really needed to determine P. We also consider extensions of our results to measures on a separable Hilbert space. First author partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, grant BFM2002-04430-C02-02. Second author partially supported by Instituto de Cooperación Iberoamericana, Programa de Cooperación Interuniversitaria AL-E 2003. Third author partially supported by grants from NSERC and the Canada research chairs program.     

Weighted Banzhaf power and interaction indexes through weighted approximations of games

The Banzhaf power index was introduced in cooperative game theory to measure the real power of players in a game. The Banzhaf interaction index was then proposed to measure the interaction degree inside coalitions of players. It was shown that the power and interaction indexes can be obtained as solutions of a standard least squares approximation problem for pseudo-Boolean functions. Considering certain weighted versions of this approximation problem, we define a class of weighted interaction indexes that generalize the Banzhaf interaction index. We show that these indexes define a subclass of the family of probabilistic interaction indexes and study their most important properties. Finally, we give an interpretation of the Banzhaf and Shapley interaction indexes as centers of mass of this subclass of interaction indexes.     

Compromise solutions for bankruptcy situations with references

This paper deals with bankruptcy situations in which in addition to the claims, an exogenously given reference point for the allocation of the estate is present. We introduce and analyse two types of compromise solutions and show that they coincide with the τ value of two corresponding TU games. We apply our solutions to a real-life case of allocating university money to degree courses. Research supported by Generalitat Valenciana, through ACOMP06/040, ACOMP07/136 and GV05/189, and by the Government of Spain and FEDER fund under project MTM2005-09184-C02-02. M. Pulido’s research is partially supported by Fundación Séneca of Comunidad Autónoma de la Región de Murcia, through 02911/PI/05. Ruud Hendrickx author acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).     

基于2可加模糊测度的多线性效用函数建模和求解

构建合适的多属性效用函数是多属性效用分析的关键。针对不同偏好假设,文献从可加独立、效用独立、效用依赖等分别进行了多属性效用函数构建的研究。然而,由于求解的复杂性,多属性效用理论的应用绝大部分限于可加效用函数和多乘效用函数。提出一种基于2可加模糊测度的多线性效用函数建模和求解方法。首先,证明多线性效用函数和基于模糊测度的多线性模型之间的等价性,提出利用基于模糊测度的多线性模型对多线性效用函数进行表示。其次,针对多线性模型的特点和模糊测度识别的复杂性,利用Banzhaf交互指数和2可加模糊测度对多线性模型进行表示,并利用最小方法差进行模糊测度和Banzhaf交互指数识别,进而实现多线性效用函数的求解。最后,将方法用于某可穿戴医疗设备基于顾客需求的多属性效用函数构建,确认了可行性。方法为多线性效用函数的求解提供了一种新思路。     

Consistent values and the core in continuum market games with two types of players

The consistent value is an extension of the Shapley value to the class of games with non-transferable utility.? In this paper, the consistent value will be characterized for market games with a continuum of players of two types. We will show that for such games the consistent value need not belong to the core, and provide conditions under which there is equivalence between the two concepts. Received: October 1998 RID="*" ID="*"  This thesis was completed under the supervision of Professor Sergiu Hart, The Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Department of Mathematics, Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I would like to thank Professor Hart for introducing me to this area of research, for his help and guidance, and, especially, for all his patience.? I would also like to thank Michael Borns for improving the style, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

A decisiveness index for simple games

The decisiveness index introduced in this paper is designed to provide a normalized measure of the agility of all simple games, primarily viewed as collective decision-making mechanisms. We study the mathematical properties of the index and derive different axiomatic characterizations for it. Moreover, a close relationship is shown to the Banzhaf index of power––for which twice the decisiveness index plays the role of potential function––that gives rise to an effective computational procedure. Some real-world examples illustrate the usefulness of the decisiveness index, together with the Banzhaf power index, in applications to political science.