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运用演化博弈理论分析了在同一市场两类零售企业行为的演化过程.根据两类企业竞争策略的复制者动态方程,分析了两类企业策略选择的演化均衡特征,并分析了一些主要参数对企业竞争策略选择的影响.结果表明,企业的相对实力和两企业竞争成本的乘积对企业行为的演化起着至关重要的作用. 相似文献
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We discuss a model of an economic community consisting of N interacting agents. The state of each agent at any time is characterized, in general, by a mixed strategy profile drawn from a space of s pure strategies. The community evolves as agents update their strategy profiles in response to payoffs received from other agents. The evolution equation is a generalization of the replicator equation. We argue that when N is sufficiently large and the payoff matrix elements satisfy suitable inequalities, the community evolves to retain the full diversity of available strategies even as individual agents specialize to pure strategies. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 相似文献
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Immanuel M. Bomze 《Journal of Global Optimization》1997,10(2):143-164
As is well known, the problem of finding a maximum clique in a graph isNP-hard. Nevertheless, NP-hard problems may have easy instances. This paperproposes a new, global optimization algorithm which tries to exploit favourabledata constellations, focussing on the continuous problem formulation: maximizea quadratic form over the standard simplex. Some general connections of thelatter problem with dynamic principles of evolutionary game theory areestablished. As an immediate consequence, one obtains a procedure whichconsists (a) of an iterative part similar to interior-path methods based on theso-called replicator dynamics; and (b) a routine to escape from inefficient,locally optimal solutions. For the special case of finding a maximum clique ina graph where the quadratic form arises from a regularization of the adjacencematrix, part (b), i.e. escaping from maximal cliques not of maximal size, isaccomplished with block pivoting methods based on (large) independent sets,i.e. cliques of the complementary graph. A simulation study is included whichindicates that the resulting procedure indeed has some merits. 相似文献
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This essay summarizes an inquiry that explores relations between the structure of stratified systems and the processes of vertical mobility. The inquiry considers economic stratification (the distribution of wealth) and is directed to determining whether the structural properties of stratification systems are sufficient to generate basic patterns in vertical mobility observed in empirical research, especially, the rank‐distance effect. In particular, the question is whether these patterns can be generated even if movement is constrained by nothing more than the size of the population over which wealth is distributed and the total amount of wealth to be distributed. Our results show that the rank‐distance effect emerges even under these minimal assumptions and, further, that rates and distances of vertical mobility are closely related to changes in these boundary parameters of a stratified system. The basic theory developed to relate structure and mobility provides results that are highly consistent with many empirical observations. It also challenges existing claims concerning the nature of the mechanisms determining the relative status immobility of most people in large scale systems. The theory implies that the way in which system structure constrains opportunity for movement is, by itself, sufficient to produce this result and others commonly observed. 相似文献
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针对企业生产安全控制问题,建立企业与政府安全生产主管部门之间的博弈模型,利用演化博弈理论的多总体复制子动态方程,给出了企业安全投入与政府监管在博弈互动中的群体演化选择趋势,揭示了经济参数对演化博弈过程的影响规律.研究表明:企业安全投入成本C、企业无安全投入导致的经济损失F、政府安全监管成本D、政府不作为的损失G等经济参数对博弈双方的策略选择有重要影响,特别是C与F、D与G的大小关系,直接决定企业与政府的演化博弈规律,当F>C且G>D时,形成循环的演化博弈趋势,最有利于政府对企业生产安全进行监管.C/F和D/G分别为安全生产社会环境对企业安全投入和政府监管行为产生抑制或促进作用的群体选择总体比例临界值. 相似文献
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有限理性条件下演化博弈行为分析 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
基于博弈双方有限理性的假设,运用动力系统的相关理论和方法对一般2×2非对称演化博弈过程建立了动态复制方程,并对博弈双方在演化过程中的行为进行了分析,得出博弈双方交互系统均衡点及稳定性相应的结论及其全部动力学行为. 相似文献
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介绍了进化动力学的基本知识和研究现状,把表型特征引入种群动力学模型,进而推导出进化适应动力学模型;总结了如何建立适应度函数以及分析研究进化动力学行为的一般理论和方法,并列举实例,模拟分析验证前面所陈述的理论方法,模拟结果说明收获对生物进化产生重要影响,并有效解释了物种多样性。 相似文献
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Cailin O’Connor 《The Journal of mathematical sociology》2017,41(3):155-171
Why do minority groups tend to be discriminated against when it comes to situations of bargaining and resource division? In this article, I explore an explanation for this disadvantage that appeals solely to the dynamics of social interaction between minority and majority groups—the cultural Red King effect (Bruner, 2017). As I show, in agent-based models of bargaining between groups, the minority group will tend to get less as a direct result of the fact that they frequently interact with majority group members, while majority group members meet them only rarely. This effect is strengthened by certain psychological phenomenon—risk aversion and in-group preference—is robust on network models, and is strengthened in cases where preexisting norms are discriminatory. I will also discuss how this effect unifies previous results on the impacts of institutional memory on bargaining between groups. 相似文献
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Massimiliano Landi Pier Luigi Sacco 《Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory》2001,7(3):233-266
We study a model of partnership with costly commitment in an evolutionary game-theoretic framework. We introduce various types of cooperative players with different degrees of strategic sophistication. We find that a necessary condition for cooperation at the social equilibrium is that the probability of a high opportunity value falls below a certain critical threshold. Such condition, however, is not sufficient. If players are too naively cooperative, the permanence of cooperation at the equilibrium is put at risk because naive cooperation entails playing inefficient responses to other equilibrium strategies. As a consequence, naive cooperation will be present at the equilibrium selected by the social dynamics only under somewhat special conditions. If cooperators are more flexible, in that they remain in the partnership only if mated to a first stage cooperator and only in lack of favorable outside opportunities, cooperation is almost granted provided that it is Pareto efficient (perverse lock in cases under unfavorable initial conditions are possible). Finally, the selection of Pareto superior cooperation with certainty may be granted by a certain norm-oriented type of strategically sophisticated behavior, that we call Rawlsian altruism. 相似文献
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虚拟科技创新团队知识转移稳定性研究——基于演化博弈视角 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
虚拟科技创新团队作为一种优势资源的有效整合机制和从事创新性工作的知识密集型组织,知识的有效转移和持续流动是其成功的关键。本文运用演化博弈论的方法,将转移效应、制度因素、成本损失等影响知识转移的主要因素作为研究问题的关注角度,以知识转移效用函数为切入点,对虚拟科技创新团队知识转移的条件进行分析,系统研究了团队内部知识转移的稳定性、持续性以及演化趋势,并在此基础上提出了改善虚拟科技创新团队知识转移的对策建议。 相似文献
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Tadeusz Sozański 《The Journal of mathematical sociology》2013,37(2-3):105-125
A minimal social situation is a game‐like situation in which there are two actors, each of them has two possible actions, and both evaluate the outcomes of their joint actions in terms of two categories (say, ‘success’ and ‘failure'). By fixing actors and actions and varying ‘payoffs’ the set of 256 ‘configurations’ is obtained. This set decomposes into 43 ‘structural forms’, or equivalence classes with respect to the relation of isomorphism defined on it. This main theorem and other results concerning related configurations (minimal decision situations) are derived in this paper by means of certain tools of group theory. Some extensions to larger structures are proved in the Appendix. In the introductory section after a brief explanation of the meaning given to the terms ‘structure’ and ‘isomorphism’ in mathematics (Bourbaki) it is shown how these terms can be used to formalize the concept of ‘social form’. 相似文献
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带有环境反馈的两策略博弈被广泛研究,本文研究带有环境反馈的三策略博弈模型.环境被分为富裕斑块和贫穷斑块,富裕的斑块可以为玩家提供额外的环境收益,而贫穷斑块不为玩家提供任何收益.首先,建立模仿者动力学模型,推导模型平衡点稳定性的充分条件.该模型平衡点的稳定性取决于各策略的成本、富裕环境的收益、策略C对策略A和策略B的干扰以及策略A和策略B的合作效益.此外,通过对模型进行数值模拟,可以发现与初始期望结果一致,并且得到了在异质环境下各策略的频率. 相似文献
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This work is devoted to the study of an evolutionary system where similar individuals are competing for the same resources. Mathematically it is a Fisher equation with an integral term describing this non-local competition. Due to this competition, an initially monomorphic population may split into two distinct sub-populations, hence exhibiting a branching capacity. This framework can be applied to various contexts where recognizers are competing for some signals. The pattern formation capacity of this model is investigated analytically and numerically. 相似文献
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运用进化博弈相关理论,以我国证券市场中的理性和非理性投资者为局中人建立进化博弈单群体模型,并求解此单群体模型的渐进稳定均衡策略,得到理性与非理性投资者的渐进稳定均衡比例,得出理性交易策略与噪声交易策略应同时存在而且适度的噪声有利于保持市场的流动性的结论,为我国证券市场和政府监管者提出政策性建议. 相似文献
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为研究征收拆迁中政府和被拆迁人的拆迁行为选择及其影响因素,在政府和被拆迁人具有有限理性的前提下,构建了拆迁行为的演化博弈模型,对政府和被拆迁人策略选择的互动行为及稳定状态进行了分析。在此基础上,进一步建立系统动力学模型进行仿真,分析不同因素对拆迁中双方行为的动态影响。结果表明:政府的行政成本和外部缺失对政府的决策有明显的影响;拆迁补偿费用和斗争成本对被拆迁人的行为有显著影响。可以从合理制定拆迁补偿费用、完善沟通机制、制定科学应对机制以及提升政府公信力等方面促进拆迁项目的顺利进行。 相似文献