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1.
We consider the generalized Nash equilibrium problem which, in contrast to the standard Nash equilibrium problem, allows joint
constraints of all players involved in the game. Using a regularized Nikaido-Isoda-function, we then present three optimization
problems related to the generalized Nash equilibrium problem. The first optimization problem is a complete reformulation of
the generalized Nash game in the sense that the global minima are precisely the solutions of the game. However, this reformulation
is nonsmooth. We then modify this approach and obtain a smooth constrained optimization problem whose global minima correspond
to so-called normalized Nash equilibria. The third approach uses the difference of two regularized Nikaido-Isoda-functions
in order to get a smooth unconstrained optimization problem whose global minima are, once again, precisely the normalized
Nash equilibria. Conditions for stationary points to be global minima of the two smooth optimization problems are also given.
Some numerical results illustrate the behaviour of our approaches. 相似文献
2.
This paper presents a Nash equilibrium model where the underlying objective functions involve uncertainty and nonsmoothness. The well-known sample average approximation method is applied to solve the problem and the first order equilibrium conditions are characterized in terms of Clarke generalized gradients. Under some moderate conditions, it is shown that with probability one, a statistical estimator (a Nash equilibrium or a Nash-C-stationary point) obtained from sample average approximate equilibrium problem converges to its true counterpart. Moreover, under some calmness conditions of the Clarke generalized derivatives, it is shown that with probability approaching one exponentially fast by increasing sample size, the Nash-C-stationary point converges to a weak Nash-C-stationary point of the true problem. Finally, the model is applied to stochastic Nash equilibrium problem in the wholesale electricity market. 相似文献
3.
We consider capacity management games between airlines who transport passengers over a joint airline network. Passengers are likely to purchase alternative tickets of the same class from competing airlines if they do not get tickets from their preferred airlines. We propose a Nash and a generalized Nash game model to address the competitive network revenue management problem. These two models are based on well-known deterministic linear programming and probabilistic nonlinear programming approximations for the non-competitive network capacity management problem. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for both games and investigate the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for the Nash game. We provide some further uniqueness and comparative statics analysis when the network is reduced to a single-leg flight structure with two products. The comparative statics analysis reveals some useful insights on how Nash equilibrium booking limits change monotonically in the prices of products. Our numerical results indicate that airlines can generate higher and more stable revenues from a booking scheme that is based on the combination of the partitioned booking-limit policy and the generalized Nash game model. The results also show that this booking scheme is robust irrespective of which booking scheme the competitor takes. 相似文献
4.
We prove an existence result for the time-dependent generalized Nash equilibrium problem under generalized convexity without neither a quasi-variational inequality reformulation nor a quasi-equilibrium problem reformulation. Furthermore, an application to the time-dependent abstract economy is considered. 相似文献
5.
E. Allevi A. Gnudi I.V. Konnov S. Schaible 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》2003,118(2):245-254
We consider the Nash equilibrium problem with vector payoffs in a topological vector space. By employing the recent concept of relative (pseudo) monotonicity, we establish several existence results for vector Nash equilibria and vector equilibria. The results strengthen in a major way existence results for vector equilibrium problems which were based on the usual (generalized) monotonicity concepts. 相似文献
6.
In this paper we reformulate the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) as a nonsmooth Nash equilibrium problem by means
of a partial penalization of the difficult coupling constraints. We then propose a suitable method for the solution of the
penalized problem and we study classes of GNEPs for which the penalty approach is guaranteed to converge to a solution. In
particular, we are able to prove convergence for an interesting class of GNEPs for which convergence results were previously
unknown. 相似文献
7.
《Optimization》2012,61(12):2269-2295
ABSTRACTIn this paper, we propose a best-response approach to select an equilibrium in a two-player generalized Nash equilibrium problem. In our model we solve, at each of a finite number of time steps, two independent optimization problems. We prove that convergence of our Jacobi-type method, for the number of time steps going to infinity, implies the selection of the same equilibrium as in a recently introduced continuous equilibrium selection theory. Thus the presented approach is a different motivation for the existing equilibrium selection theory, and it can also be seen as a numerical method. We show convergence of our numerical scheme for some special cases of generalized Nash equilibrium problems with linear constraints and linear or quadratic cost functions. 相似文献
8.
Yanfang Zhang 《计算数学(英文版)》2023,41(3):415-436
In this paper, we consider the generalized Nash equilibrium with shared constraints in the stochastic environment, and we call it the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium. The stochastic variational inequalities are employed to solve this kind of problems, and the expected residual minimization model and the conditional value-at-risk formulations defined by the residual function for the stochastic variational inequalities are discussed. We show the risk for different kinds of solutions for the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium by the conditional value-at-risk formulations. The properties of the stochastic quadratic generalized Nash equilibrium are shown. The smoothing approximations for the expected residual minimization formulation and the conditional value-at-risk formulation are employed. Moreover, we establish the gradient consistency for the measurable smoothing functions and the integrable functions under some suitable conditions, and we also analyze the properties of the formulations. Numerical results for the applications arising from the electricity market model illustrate that the solutions for the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium given by the ERM model have good properties, such as robustness, low risk and so on. 相似文献
9.
The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP),in which both the utility function and the strategy space of each player depend on the strategies chosen by all other players.This problem has been used to model various problems in applications.However,the convergent solution algorithms are extremely scare in the literature.In this paper,we present an incremental penalty method for the GNEP,and show that a solution of the GNEP can be found by solving a sequence of smooth NEPs.We then apply the semismooth Newton method with Armijo line search to solve latter problems and provide some results of numerical experiments to illustrate the proposed approach. 相似文献
10.
We consider an n-player non-cooperative game with random payoffs and continuous strategy set for each player. The random payoffs of each player are defined using a finite dimensional random vector. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by defining the payoff function of each player using a chance constraint. We first consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player does not depend on the strategies of other players. If a random vector defining the payoffs of each player follows a multivariate elliptically symmetric distribution, we show that there exists a Nash equilibrium. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria using the solution set of a variational inequality (VI) problem. Next, we consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player is defined by a shared constraint set. In this case, we show that there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium for elliptically symmetric distributed payoffs. Under certain conditions, we characterize the set of a generalized Nash equilibria using the solution set of a VI problem. As an application, the random payoff games arising from electricity market are studied under chance-constrained game framework. 相似文献
11.
Qamrul Hasan Ansari Siegfried Schaible Jen-Chih Yao 《Journal of Global Optimization》2002,22(1-4):3-16
In this paper, we introduce the system of generalized vector equilibrium problems which includes as special cases the system of generalized implicit vector variational inequality problems, the system of generalized vector variational and variational-like inequality problems and the system of vector equilibrium problems. By using a maximal element theorem, we establish existence results for a solution of these systems. As an application, we derive existence results for a solution of a more general Nash equilibrium problem for vector-valued functions. 相似文献
12.
Huifu Xu 《Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications》2010,368(2):692-708
Sample average approximation (SAA) is one of the most popular methods for solving stochastic optimization and equilibrium problems. Research on SAA has been mostly focused on the case when sampling is independent and identically distributed (iid) with exceptions (Dai et al. (2000) [9], Homem-de-Mello (2008) [16]). In this paper we study SAA with general sampling (including iid sampling and non-iid sampling) for solving nonsmooth stochastic optimization problems, stochastic Nash equilibrium problems and stochastic generalized equations. To this end, we first derive the uniform exponential convergence of the sample average of a class of lower semicontinuous random functions and then apply it to a nonsmooth stochastic minimization problem. Exponential convergence of estimators of both optimal solutions and M-stationary points (characterized by Mordukhovich limiting subgradients (Mordukhovich (2006) [23], Rockafellar and Wets (1998) [32])) are established under mild conditions. We also use the unform convergence result to establish the exponential rate of convergence of statistical estimators of a stochastic Nash equilibrium problem and estimators of the solutions to a stochastic generalized equation problem. 相似文献
13.
We define the concept of reproducible map and show that, whenever the constraint map defining the quasivariational inequality (QVI) is reproducible then one can characterize the whole solution set of the QVI as a union of solution sets of some variational inequalities (VI). By exploiting this property, we give sufficient conditions to compute any solution of a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) by solving a suitable VI. Finally, we define the class of pseudo-Nash equilibrium problems, which are (not necessarily convex) GNEPs whose solutions can be computed by solving suitable Nash equilibrium problems. 相似文献
14.
Axel Dreves Anna von Heusinger Christian Kanzow Masao Fukushima 《Journal of Global Optimization》2013,56(2):327-340
The generalized Nash equilibrium is a Nash game, where not only the players’ cost functions, but also the constraints of a player depend on the rival players decisions. We present a globally convergent algorithm that is suited for the computation of a normalized Nash equilibrium in the generalized Nash game with jointly convex constraints. The main tool is the regularized Nikaido–Isoda function as a basis for a locally convergent nonsmooth Newton method and, in another way, for the definition of a merit function for globalization. We conclude with some numerical results. 相似文献
15.
运用广义最大元方法在非传递性偏好下给出了博弈均衡的存在性定理,推广了一些经典的博弈均衡存在性定理.在文中介绍策略式博弈的Nash均衡具有宽泛的条件,在微观经济理论中有广泛的应用. 相似文献
16.
《Optimization》2012,61(12):1627-1650
This article presents a two-stage stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (SEPEC) model. Some source problems which motivate the model are discussed. Monte Carlo sampling method is applied to solve the SEPEC. Convergence analysis on the statistical estimators of Nash equilibria and Nash stationary points are presented. 相似文献
17.
In this paper, we first introduce the system of generalized implicit variational inequalities and prove the existence of its solution. Then we derive existence results for systems of generalized variational and variational like inequalities and system of variational inequalities. As applications, we establish some existence results for a solution to the system of optimization problems which includes the Nash equilibrium problem as a special case 相似文献
18.
Eleftherios Couzoudis Philipp Renner 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2013,77(3):459-472
We present a new way to solve generalized Nash equilibrium problems. We assume the feasible set to be compact. Furthermore all functions are assumed to be polynomials. However we do not impose convexity on either the utility functions or the action sets. The key idea is to use Putinar’s Positivstellensatz, a representation result for positive polynomials, to replace each agent’s problem by a convex optimization problem. The Nash equilibria are then feasible solutions to a system of polynomial equations and inequalities. Our application is a model of the New Zealand electricity spot market with transmission losses based on a real dataset. 相似文献
19.
产地间或销地间往往存在竞争,在这种情况下,使用运输问题最优化方法是不合理的。因此,从个体理性的视角提出运输问题的合作对策求解方法,方法将运输问题看作是一个博弈问题,各个产地或销地是博弈的局中人,求解其纳什均衡与纳什讨价还价解。在此基础上,说明了运输问题的非合作形式是一个指派问题,并证明指派问题的最优解是一个纳什均衡点。接着,通过实验验证运输问题的最优解是一个纳什讨价还价解,满足产地或销地的自身利益。在此基础上,针对纳什讨价还价解不唯一的问题,从决策者的视角给出最大可能激励成本的计算方法。最后,为弥补纳什讨价还价解不唯一及纳什讨价还价解不允许出现子联盟的缺陷,给出运输收益分配或成本分摊的Shapely值计算方法。 相似文献