Dual-Role Based Pricing in a Dynamic and Competitive Environment

The dual role of price, as a product attribute signaling quality and as a measure of sacrifice, serving as a benchmark for comparing the utility gains from superior product quality, is now well established in the marketing and economic literature. However, knowledge about their long-run impact and the influence of competition on these effects still remains very sparse. In the current paper, with reference to a dynamic and competitive framework, an analytical model is proposed to help determining optimal decision rules for price incorporating both roles. The main results are as follows: (i) The optimal pricing policy is determined as a Nash equilibrium strategy. (ii) The resulting equilibrium price is higher than an equilibrium that disregards the carryover price effects. (iii) For a symmetric competition, we provide normative rules on how firms should set prices as a function of the perceived quality; particularly, how the price should be set initially, when there is little product familiarity and the perceived quality is low, and how this price should vary as the perceived quality increases. (iv) At steady state, we find that the level of equilibrium margin, in percentage terms, decreases with the elasticity of demand with respect to the brand price, but this decrease is moderated by the elasticity of demand with respect to the brand perceived quality, the cross elasticity of demand with respect to the competitor’s perceived quality and the effect of the competitor’s current price on the firm’s perceived quality deterioration. The author thanks Konstantin Kogan for helpful discussions and comments.     

Technological change,population dynamics,and natural resource depletion

In this paper, we integrate fertility and educational choices into a scale-invariant model of directed technological change with non-renewable natural resources, in order to reveal the interaction between population dynamics, technological change, and natural resource depletion. In line with empirical regularities, skill-biased technological change induces a decline in population growth and a transitory increase in the depletion rate of natural resources. In the long-run, the depletion rate also declines in the skill intensity. A decline in population growth is harmful for long-run productivity growth, if R&D is subject to diminishing technological opportunities. The effectiveness of economic policies aimed at sustained economic growth thus hinges on its impact on long-run population growth given the sign of intertemporal spillovers in R&D with respect to existing technological knowledge. We demonstrate that an increase in relative research productivities or an education subsidy enhances long-run growth, if R&D is subject to diminishing technological opportunities, while an increase in the teacher–student ratio is preferable in terms of positive intertemporal knowledge spillovers.     

Randomized group up and down experiments

An up and down (U&D) procedure is a sequential experiment used in binary response trials for identifying the treatment corresponding to a prespecified probability of positive response. Recently, a group version of U&D procedures has been proposed whereby at each stage a group of units is treated at the same level and the number of observed positive responses determines the treatment assigned to the next group. The deterministic nature of this algorithm leads to some limitations that in this paper we propose to overcome by introducing a randomization mechanism. A broad class of randomized group U&D’s is presented, giving the conditions for targeting the treatment level of interest. In addition, we study how the properties of the design change as we vary the method of randomization within this general class and find randomization schemes which guarantee desirable results in terms of the asymptotic behavior of the experiment.     

The role of utility interdependence in public good experiments

A popular approach to explain over-contribution in public good games is based on the assumption that people care (either positively or negatively) about the utility of other participants. Over-contribution then is an outcome of utility maximization where utility depends on subjects’ own payoffs as well as on the payoffs of other players. In this paper, I study to what extent this assumption of utility interdependence is responsible for over-contribution. I design three treatments where subjects’ decisions cannot affect opponents’ payoffs and thus utility interdependence cannot explain cooperative behavior. The main result is that while average contribution in these treatments is below the benchmark it nonetheless stays well above zero. Even when no one benefits from subjects’ generosity the average contributions are as high as one third of the endowment and are only 25% below those in the benchmark level. This suggests that utility interdependence is not the main factor responsible for over-contribution. I would like to thank my dissertation advisor Shyam Sunder for his valuable suggestions that helped improve this paper. I am also grateful to Dan Levin, Ben Polak, Klaus Schmidt, Andrew Schotter, Anat Bracha, Danielle Catambay, Rodney Chan, two anonymous referees and the anonymous Associate Editor for their comments and suggestions. Participants of the 17th International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook University, 2006 ESA International Meeting and 10th Biennial Behavioral Decision Research in Management Conference provided a valuable feedback at earlier stages of the paper. Finally, I would like to thank the Whitebox Fellowship for its generous support of this study.     

Is There a Conceptual Connection Between Intentionality and Consciousness?

It is argued that Searle’s argument for the thesis that there is a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness suffers from serious ambiguities. Searle’s argument is reconstructed as consisting of three premises that contain the notions of aspectual shape and irreducible subjectivity. Having identified two different readings of ‘aspectual shape’ and ‘irreducibly subjective,’ I conclude that each version of Searle’s argument incorporates at least one false premise. This paper is a descendant of a paper presented at the Wittgenstein Symposium at Kirchberg am Wechsel in August 2004. I would like to thank the reviewer of this journal for his/her helpful comments on a previous draft.     

Continuous learning methods in two-buyer pricing problem

This paper presents continuous learning methods in a monopoly pricing problem where the firm has uncertainty about the buyers’ preferences. The firm designs a menu of quality-price bundles and adjusts them using only local information about the buyers’ preferences. The learning methods define different paths, and we compare how much profit the firm makes on these paths, how long it takes to learn the optimal tariff, and how the buyers’ utilities change during the learning period. We also present a way to compute the optimal path in terms of discounted profit with dynamic programming and complete information. Numerical examples show that the optimal path may involve jumps where the buyer types switch from one bundle to another, and this is a property which is difficult to include in the learning methods. The learning methods have, however, the benefit that they can be generalized to pricing problems with many buyers types and qualities.     

Imitation,coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium

We consider a learning dynamic in which players imitate and better reply. Sufficient conditions are provided for Nash equilibrium play to emerge over time. The role of imitation in the learning dynamic is discussed through a series of examples. Most interestingly we demonstrate how imitation can ‘help’ the emergence of Nash equilibrium where ‘more rational’ methods do not.     

Investors’ preference for a positive tax rate depends on the level of the interest rate

In a financial market with only one stock, Cadenillas and Pliska (Financ Stoch 3:137–165, 1999) showed that sometimes investors can take advantage of a positive tax rate to maximize their portfolio return. Buescu et al. (Math Finance 17:477–485, 2007) generalized this surprising result to a market with one stock and one bank account with zero interest rate. We consider instead a financial market with one stock and one bank account with positive interest rate. As in the papers above, we assume that there are taxes and transaction costs in the financial market. We succeed in solving the problem of an investor who wants to maximize the long-run growth rate of his investment, even though the positivity of the interest rate increases the dimensionality of the problem and the difficulty of the computations. We characterize how the investors’ preference for a positive tax rate depends on the interest rate level: investors prefer a positive tax rate when the level of the interest rate is low, and the opposite occurs when the level of the interest rate is high. Most of the contributions of C. Buescu were made during his doctoral studies at the University of Alberta. The research of C. Buescu and A. Cadenillas was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada grants 410-2003-1401 and 410-2006-1069. We are grateful to Stanley R. Pliska for comments and suggestions to a previous version of the paper, and to the associate editor and referees for constructive remarks. Existing errors are our sole responsibility.     

能源约束下的经济增长模型

建立能源利用动态变化方程,在经济增长模型中引入能源约束,讨论如何在保证能源可持续利用的条件下,实现经济的可持续增长及社会的可持续发展.得出结论为:现代经济增长的源动力是技术进步.只有提高生产技术水平,降低能耗.提高能源利用效率,才有可能在保证能源可持续利用的条件下,实现经济的长期可持续增长.     

人力资本投资内生波动的控制研究

将人力资本投资引入一个代际叠代经济增长框架中,研究了系统中人力资本投资引起经济增长内生复杂性及其控制的问题.动力学行为分析表明:信息成本上升是造成经济系统中人力资本存量波动的主要原因.在不改变其初始条件的前提下,这种不稳定性可以通过外部机制(譬如市场的自发调节和政府的工资政策等)得以抑制.此外,通过应用确定函数,文章证...     

Impact of Technology Assimilation on Investment Policy: Dynamic Optimization and Econometric Identification

The paper introduces a dynamic model of optimization of R&D intensity under the effect of technology assimilation. The model involves R&D investments, technology stock, production, and technology productivity as main variables. The model characterizes the “growth” and “decline” trends that describe the interaction between R&D investments and transformation process of production factors. The technology stock is constructed as a function of indigenous and exogenous technology stocks and their growth rates. The research focuses on the issue of a reasonable balance between the indigenous technology stock and assimilated technology flow. Econometric linearization of the technology assimilation effect is used to construct a reasonable optimal control model. The existence of the value function for the problem of the optimal economic growth on the infinite horizon is proved and the basic features of the value function are outlined. The property of strong invariance for the main proportions of the model such as technology productivity and R&D intensity is proved. The model is calibrated on the aggregate data of the Japanese automotive industry. The research was sponsored by the SIMOT Program of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. The second author was supported by the Russian Fund for Basic Research, Grants 05-01-00601, 05-01-08034, by the Russian Fund for Humanities, Grant RFH 05-02-02118a, and by the Program for the Sponsorship of Leading Scientific Schools, Grant NSCH-791.2003.1.     

On strictly ergodic models which are not almost topologically conjugate

Answering a question raised by Glasner and Rudolph (1984) we construct uncountably many strictly ergodic topological systems which are metrically isomorphic to a given ergodic system (X, ℬ,μ, T) but not almost topologically conjugate to it. This paper is part of the second author’s Ph.D. thesis, written under the supervision of Professor A. Bellow of the Department of Mathematics, Northwestern University. The author is grateful for her encouragement and advice. We acknowledge B. Weiss for helpful comments.     

Joint pricing-servicing decision and channel strategies in the supply chain

This paper investigates the equilibrium behavior of a two-echelon supply chain in four channel strategies: (i) vertical integration, (ii) vertical Nash (iii) manufacturer’s Stackelberg and (vi) retailer’s Stackelberg. We examine the price and service level decision for each of the above four channel strategies in two cases: (i) Simultaneous service-level decision: Here, the manufacturer and retailer simultaneously choose a service level. (ii) Sequentially service-level decision: Here, the manufacturer and retailer sequentially choose a service level. We model the demand as a deterministic linear function of retailer’s price and both manufacturer’s and retailer’s service levels. We discuss the optimal configuration from each individual’s perspective for each of the above channel strategies. We show that vertical integration dominates other strategies and leads to the highest service level but lowest retail price among various channel coordination policies considered here. We yield several conclusions about the provision of service level by each supply chain individual to coordinate the channel.     

Demographic change in models of endogenous economic growth. A survey

While in exogenous growth models demographic variables are linked to economic prosperity mainly via the population size, the structure of the workforce, and the capital intensity of workers, endogenous growth models and their successors also allow for interrelationships between demographic variables and technological change. However, most of the existing literature considers only the interrelationships based on population size and its growth rate and does not explicitly account for population aging. The aim of this paper is (a) to review the role of population size and population growth in the most commonly used endogenous economic growth models, (b) discuss models that also allow for population aging, and (c) sketch out the policy implications of the most commonly used endogenous growth models and compare them to each other.     

Reliability of Coupled Oscillators

We study the reliability of phase oscillator networks in response to fluctuating inputs. Reliability means that an input elicits essentially identical responses upon repeated presentations, regardless of the network’s initial condition. Single oscillators are well known to be reliable. We show in this paper that unreliable behavior can occur in a network as small as a coupled oscillator pair in which the signal is received by the first oscillator and relayed to the second with feedback. A geometric explanation based on shear-induced chaos at the onset of phase-locking is proposed. We treat larger networks as decomposed into modules connected by acyclic graphs, and give a mathematical analysis of the acyclic parts. Moreover, for networks in this class, we show how the source of unreliability can be localized, and address questions concerning downstream propagation of unreliability once it is produced.     

A Discrete-Time Dynamic Game of Seasonal Water Allocation

We present a method for the derivation of feedback Nash equi- libria in discrete-time finite-horizon nonstationary dynamic games. A partic- ular motivation for such games stems from environmental economics, where problems of seasonal competition for water levels occur frequently among heterogeneous economic agents. These agents are coupled through a state variable, which is the water level. Actions are strategically chosen to max- imize the agents individual season-dependent utility functions. We observe that, although a feedback Nash equilibrium exists, it does not satisfy the (exogenous) environmental watchdog expectations. We devise an incentive scheme to help meeting those expectations and calculate a feedback Nash equilibrium for the new game that uses the scheme. This solution is more environmentally friendly than the previous one. The water allocation game solutions help us to draw some conclusions regarding the agents behavior and also about the existence of feedback Nash equilibria in dynamic games. The paper draws from Refs.1–2. Its earlier version was presented at the Victoria International Conference 2004, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand, February 9–13, 2004. We thank the anonymous referee and Christophe Deissenberg for insightful comments, which have helped us to clarify its message. We also thank our colleagues Sophie Thoyer, Robert Lifran, Odile Pourtalier, and Vladimir Petkov for helpful discussions on the model and techniques used in this Paper. Gratitude is expressed to the Kyoto Institute for Economic Research, Kyoto University, for this author's support in the final stages of the paper preparation     

基于最优组合赋权法的我国能源效率评价及影响因素研究

本文总结我国能源效率的主要影响因素,具体包括产业结构、技术进步、能源消费结构、经济发展水平、市场化程度和开放程度,构建我国能源效率影响因素的指标体系。基于最优组合赋权法建立能源效率评价模型,并对2000~2011年我国能源效率及影响因素进行实证分析。实证结果表明:我国能源效率整体呈上升趋势,能源效率显著提高;第二产业产值占国内生产总值比重、重工业占工业产值比重、第二产业增长值比重、R&D投入、第三产业产值占国内生产总值比重和煤炭消费量占能源消费总量比重是我国能源效率最主要的影响指标,而天然气消费量占能源消费总量比重和水、核、风消费量占能源消费总量比重对我国能源效率影响相对较小。     

中国物流业碳排放特征及其影响因素分析——基于LMDI分解技术

在对我国物流业碳排放特征进行分析的基础上,运用LMDI分解技术,建立中国物流业人均碳排放的因素分解模型,定量分析了1991-2010年能源结构、能源效率、运输方式、物流发展、经济增长以及人口等6种因素对物流业人均碳排放的影响.分析表明:经济增长是拉动物流业碳排放增长最主要的动力,在研究期间呈指数增长的趋势.运输方式对碳排放增长也表现出明显的促进作用,能源结构和能源效率虽然表现出拉动作用,但效果微弱.而物流发展因素则对物流业人均碳排放量表现出明显的抑制作用.因此,应大力推进物流业科技水平的提高,进一步发挥物流发展因素对碳排放的抑制作用,同时,优化物流运输体系,形成以铁路为主体,水运和管道为支撑,公路和航空运输为辅的低碳化的综合运输体系.     

The method of integral relations for computing blunt body flows with a detached shock wave

Dorodnicyn’s classical work concerning the method of integral relations is given in his original presentation. Developments of the method provided by Dorodnicyn’s students are outlined. Belotserkovskii’s 1956 paper concerning a technique for computing the detached shock wave in flow over a cylinder is presented in full (with comments and numerical results). A technique for the study of flow characteristics for space vehicles of particular shapes is described. The breakthrough character of techniques proposed more than 50 years ago is demonstrated, and their (still important) philosophy is assessed.