DEA production games

In this paper, linear production games are extended so that instead of assuming a linear production technology with fixed technological coefficients, the more general, non-parametric, DEA production technology is considered. Different organizations are assumed to possess their own technology and the cooperative game arises from the possibility of pooling their available inputs, collectively processing them and sharing the revenues. Two possibilities are considered: using a joint production technology that results from merging their respective technologies or each cooperating organization keeping its own technology. This gives rise to two different DEA production games, both of which are totally balanced and have a non-empty core. A simple way of computing a stable solution, using the optimal dual solution for the grand coalition, is presented. The full cooperation scenario clearly produces more benefits for the organizations involved although the implied technology sharing is not always possible. Examples of applications of the proposed approach are given.     

Computing payoff allocations in the approximate core of linear programming games in a privacy-preserving manner

We investigate privacy-preserving ways of allocating payoffs among players participating in a joint venture, using tools from cooperative game theory and differential privacy. In particular, we examine linear programming games, an important class of cooperative games that model a myriad of payoff sharing problems, including those from logistics and network design. We show that we can compute a payoff allocation in the approximate core of these games in a way that satisfies joint differential privacy.     

The not-quite non-atomic game: Non-emptiness of the core in large production games

We show that, in cooperative production games, when the production functions are not concave, the core may well be empty. However, as the number of players increases (subject to some regularity conditions), the relative deficit obtained by using concavified functions decreases to zero. Furthermore, differentiability of the functions will cause the absolute deficit to go to zero.     

Lower and upper bounds for linear production games

We study the problem of allocating the total profit of a production enterprise among the resource owners, using the game-theoretic framework introduced by Owen [Owen, G., 1975. On the core of linear production games. Mathematical Programming 9, 358–370]. We provide lower (upper) bounds on the values of the game by aggregating over columns (rows) of the LP-problem. By choosing aggregation weights corresponding to optimal solutions of the primal (dual) LP-problem, we can create new games whose core form a superset (subset) of the original core. An estimate of the resulting error, in terms of an ?$?$-core, is obtained by solving a mixed integer programming problem, and we also suggest an iterative procedure for improving the bounds. Using a set of numerical examples, we investigate how the performance of the aggregation approach depends on the structure of the problem data.     

A characterization of vNM-stable sets for linear production games

We discuss linear production games or market games with a continuum of players which are represented as minima of finitely many nonatomic measures.?Within this context we consider vNM-Stable Sets according to von Neumann and Morgenstern. We classify or characterize all solutions of this type which are convex polyhedra, i.e., which are the convex hull of finitely many imputations. Specifically, in each convex polyhedral vNM-Stable Set (and not only in the symmetric ones), the different types of traders must organize themselves into cartels. The vNM-Stable Set is then the convex hull of the utility distributions of the cartels.?Using the results from the continuum, we obtain a similar characterization also for finite glove market games. Received December 1998/Revised version June 1999     

A generalized linear production model: A unifying model

We introduce a generalized linear production model whose attractive feature being that the resources held by any subset of producersS is not restricted to be the vector sum of the resources held by the members ofS. We provide sufficient conditions for the non-emptiness of the core of the associated generalized linear production game, and show that if the core of the game is not empty then a solution in it can be produced from a dual optimal solution to the associated linear programming problem. Our generalized linear production model is a proper generalization of the linear production model introduced by Owen, and it can be used to analyze cooperative games which cannot be studied in the ordinary linear production model framework. We use the generalized model to show that the cooperative game induced by a network optimization problem in which players are the nodes of the network has a non-empty core. We further employ our model to prove the non-emptiness of the core of two other classes of cooperative games, which were not previously studied in the literature, and we also use our generalized model to provide an alternative proof for the non-emptiness of the core of the class of minimum cost spanning tree games. Thus, it appears that the generalized linear production model is a unifying model which can be used to explain the non-emptiness of the core of cooperative games generated by various, seemingly different, optimization models.This research was partially done while the author was visiting the Graduate School of Business Administration at Tel-Aviv University. The research was partially supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council Canada Grant A4181 and by SSHRC leave fellowship 451-83-0030.Dedicated to George B. Dantzig.     

Multiple Fund Investment Situations and Related Games

This paper deals with interactive multiple fund investment situations, in which investors can invest their capital in a number of funds. The investors, however, face some restrictions. In particular, the investment opportunities of an investor depend on the behaviour of the other investors. Moreover, the individual investment returns may differ. We consider this situation from a cooperative game theory point of view. Based on different assumptions modelling the gains of joint investment, we consider three corresponding games and analyse their properties. We propose an allocation process for the maximal total investment revenues.Ruud Hendrickx acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).     

Fuzzy chance constrained linear programming model for optimizing the scrap charge in steel production

Optimizing the charge in secondary steel production is challenging because the chemical composition of the scrap is highly uncertain. The uncertainty can cause a considerable risk of the scrap mix failing to satisfy the composition requirements for the final product. In this paper, we represent the uncertainty based on fuzzy set theory and constrain the failure risk based on a possibility measure. Consequently, the scrap charge optimization problem is modeled as a fuzzy chance constrained linear programming problem. Since the constraints of the model mainly address the specification of the product, the crisp equivalent of the fuzzy constraints should be less relaxed than that purely based on the concept of soft constraints. Based on the application context we adopt a strengthened version of soft constraints to interpret fuzzy constraints and form a crisp model with consistent and compact constraints for solution. Simulation results based on realistic data show that the failure risk can be managed by proper combination of aspiration levels and confidence factors for defining fuzzy numbers. There is a tradeoff between failure risk and material cost. The presented approach applies also for other scrap-based production processes.     

On market prices in linear production games

Consider a game in which resources may be combined to produce products of known values. For linear production processes, the game may be characterized by a family of linear programs. It is shown that appropriately defined market prices for the resources coincide with the set of optimal dual solutions to one of these linear programs. This result generalizes and unifies the known cases in game theory, in which the core of a game coincides with the set of dual optimal solutions to a corresponding master linear programming problem.Based on working papers by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1982) and Granot (1983). The work was motivated by an application, reported in Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1983), supported by the US EPA.Research was partially supported by the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada Grant A4181.     

Singular surfaces in a linear pursuit-evasion game with elliptical vectograms

In a linear pursuit-evasion game with elliptical vectograms, singular surfaces appear in the plane of symmetry containing the ellipses minor axes and, as a consequence, locally nonsmooth isocost tubes are generated. Both dispersal and attractive focal surfaces are encountered. The dispersal surface is a zone of initial conditions for trajectories leaving the plane of symmetry. Optimal trajectories attracted by the focal surface merge tangentially to the plane of symmetry and remain there until the boundary of the dispersal zone is reached. Determination of the saddle-point strategies in the focal surface leads to constructing the isocost surfaces in the entire game space.     

On the fuzzy solution of LR fuzzy linear systems

In this paper, the solution of fuzzy linear system (FLS) is investigated based on a 1$1$-level expansion. To this end, 1$1$-level of FLS is solved for calculating the core of fuzzy solution and then its spreads are obtained by solving an optimization problem with a special objective function. Using our proposed method, if the computed solution satisfies the FLS, it can be as exact or approximated solution. Finally, the existence of solution of FLS is proved in details and some numerical examples are solved to illustrate the accuracy and capability of the method.     

Qualities of goods in the models of production

In this paper the models of production in which the qualities of goods are considered are presented. Such models are completely described by the families of matrices or by a function which has some properties which are natural from the economic point of view. The special cases of the models are the well known linear model of production and the van Neumann-Gale's model.     

Estimation of population spectrum for linear processes with random coefficients

A set of time series generated by stationary linear processes with an absolutely continuous spectral distribution is analysed. The time series can then be considered realizations of a linear process of random coefficients. Likewise, each spectral density function is a realization of a stochastic process whose function of means is called a population spectrum. We propose a kernel estimator for the population spectrum and give conditions for its consistency. We then illustrate the properties of this estimator in a simulation study and compare its performance with an alternative parametric estimator that can be found in the literature.      

A linear proportional effort allocation rule

This paper proposes a new class of allocation rules in network games. Like the solution theory in cooperative games of how the Harsanyi dividend of each coalition is distributed among a set of players, this new class of allocation rules focuses on the distribution of the dividend of each network. The dividend of each network is allocated in proportion to some measure of each player’s effort, which is called an effort function. With linearity of the allocation rules, an allocation rule is specified by the effort functions. These types of allocation rules are called linear proportional effort allocation rules. Two famous allocation rules, the Myerson value and the position value, belong to this class of allocation rules. In this study, we provide a unifying approach to define the two aforementioned values. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic analysis of this class of allocation rules, and axiomatize the Myerson value, the position value, and their non-symmetric generalizations in terms of effort functions. We propose a new allocation rule in network games that also belongs to this class of allocation rules.     

Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games

Partitioning games are useful on two counts: first, in modeling situations with restricted cooperative possibilities between the agents; second, as a general framework for many unrestricted cooperative games generated by combinatorial optimization problems.We show that the family of partitioning games defined on a fixed basic collection is closed under the strategic equivalence of games, and also for taking the monotonic cover of games. Based on these properties we establish the coincidence of the Mas-Colell, the classical, the semireactive, and the reactive bargaining setswith the core for interesting balanced subclasses of partitioning games, including assignment games, tree-restricted superadditive games, and simple network games. Prepared during the author’s Bolyai János Research Fellowship. Also supported by OTKA grant T46194.     

A note on sign symmetry for a subclass of efficient,symmetric, and linear values

Symmetry requires that equally productive players should get the same payoff. Sign symmetry is a considerable weakening of symmetry, which requires equally productive players' payoffs to have the same sign. In this note, we apply sign symmetry, as a substitute of symmetry to characterize a subclass of efficient, symmetric, and linear values.     

Steady state analysis of an M/G/1 queue with linear retrial policy and two phase service under Bernoulli vacation schedule

We consider a single server queueing system with two phases of heterogeneous service and Bernoulli vacation schedule which operate under the so called linear retrial policy. This model extends both the classical M/G/1 retrial queue with linear retrial policy as well as the M/G/1 queue with two phases of service and Bernoulli vacation model. We carry out an extensive analysis of the model.     

Stability of marriage with externalities

In many matching problems, it is natural to consider that agents may have preferences not only over the set of potential partners but also over what other matches occur. Once such externalities are considered, the set of stable matchings will depend on what agents believe will happen if they deviate. In this paper, we introduce endogenously generated beliefs (which depend on the preferences). We introduce a particular notion of endogenous beliefs, called sophisticated expectations, and show that with these beliefs, stable matchings always exist. I would like to thank the editor, William Thomson, two anonymous referees, Kalyan Chatterjee, Federico Echenique, Matthew Jackson, Tarık Kara, Semih Koray, and Manabu Toda for their comments and suggestions. I am very much indebted to Vijay Krishna for his guidance and support.     

The core of a cooperative game without side payments

For cooperative games without side payments, there are several types of conditions which guarantee nonemptiness of the core, for example balancedness and convexity. In the present paper, a general condition for nonempty core is introduced which includes the known ones as special cases. Moreover, it is shown that every game with nonempty core satisfies this condition.