多目标随机结盟对策的区间模糊ZS-值

研究多重目标随机结盟对策问题,引用区间模糊教有关理论,同时考虑局中人参与程度模糊化和支付函数模糊化的情形以及局中人对不同目标的偏好程度,给出多目标随机结盟对策的区间模糊ZS-值的定义及定理.区间模糊ZS-值能更好解决企业合作中存在的不精确数据时的利益分配问题,最后通过一个实例说明其可行性.     

具有合作结构对策的τ-值

具有合作结构的对策是指带有可行结盟集族的合作对策,而可行结盟描述了在对策中可以进行协商的结盟.本文研究了合作结构的模型及相应的限制以策,在此限制对策中可行结盟是那些属于分割系统的结盟;定义了具有合作结构对策的τ-值,它是TU-对策的τ-值在具有合作结构对策中的推广,讨论了它的一些性质和公理化特征.     

关于限制结盟单调集对策的边缘值

把限制结盟投影与单调集对策结合在一起,得到限制结盟单调集对策的边缘值,该值是对经典边缘值的推广,随之给出了该值的公理体系.     

重复模糊结盟对策的妥协值

以模糊结盟和重复模糊结盟对策理论为基础,定义了重复模糊结盟对策的核心、明确核心,同时在此基础上首次定义了凸重复模糊结盟对策的妥协值(C-值),并证明了该妥协值具有个体合理性、有效性、对称性、正仿射变换性.该成果为重复模糊结盟对策解的研究奠定了基础.     

直觉模糊多目标二人零和矩阵对策

研究矩阵对策是深入研究对策理论的一个基本途径和重要手段。根据直觉模糊多目标决策和模糊对策理论,研究了支付值为直觉模糊值的多目标二人零和矩阵对策。首先介绍了基于直觉模糊集的多目标二人零和矩阵对策模型,接着提出了求解直觉模糊多目标二人零和矩阵对策的线性规划方法。最后以数例说明本文提出的方法。结果表明该方法能方便地得到对策的均衡策略和均衡解。     

带层次结构效用可转移合作对策的collective值

层次结构是比联盟结构更一般化的结盟限制形式.文章给出了带层次结构效用可转移合作对策collective值的两种定义.第一种类似于带层次结构效用可转移合作对策的ζ值,从多步分配的角度定义了collective值;第二种类似于带图结构效用可转移合作对策的Myerson值,从交流限制的角度定义了collective值.文中证明了这两种定义是等价的,并给出了collective值的一个公理化刻画.研究结果丰富了带层次结构效用可转移合作对策的解概念,可为研究其它带结盟限制效用可转移合作对策的值函数提供借鉴.     

多目标线性生产规划的模糊联盟对策

研究多目标生产规划的模糊联盟对策的求解问题,提出了求解多目标模糊联盟对策的Shapley值方法.通过建立多目标线性生产规划的模糊联盟对策模型,提出了多目标对策转化为多个单目标对策的权重分析法.结合多目标线性生产规划问题的实例,给出不同权重系数下局中人合作的利益分配策略.     

模糊多人合作对策研究现状及展望

模糊合作对策是经典合作对策理论与模糊集理论的有机结合,是对策论的一个理论分支.近年来,合作对策中的模糊不确定性信息受到越来越多学者的重视,模糊多人合作对策理论及其应用逐渐成为研究热点.按照多人合作形式(结盟合作与非结盟合作)以及合作对策解的分类(集合解与单值解),对模糊多人合作对策的研究现状进行论述,并对其未来发展方向进行了探讨.     

风险的动态定量和一个相关的随机对策问题

本文讨论不完全市场中股票收益率不确定时的动态风险度量问题和一个相关的随机对策问题。该动态风险度量可表示为一个随机最优控制问题的值函数,以倒向随机微分方程为工具我们给出了最优目标具有的形式,并给出随机对策问题上值与下值相等的充分条件和鞍点的存在性。     

一种扩张n人正规对策上的计策问题

1°本文扩充了经典 n人正规对策的结构及平衡局势的概念 ;2°引进最优结盟及最优局势集以及求最优结盟方案的算法 ;3°在施计论中给出计策的结构和性质 ;4°在破计论中 ,给出将计就计的模型及其值得度的概念 ;5°讨论了某结盟的计策有恰被一人识破的可能时最好以多大概率选用其各个隐蔽策略     

On some families of cooperative fuzzy games

In a fuzzy cooperative game the players may choose to partially participate in a coalition. A fuzzy coalition consists of a group of participating players along with their participation level. The characteristic function of a fuzzy game specifies the worth of each such coalition. This paper introduces well-known properties of classical cooperative games to the theory of fuzzy games, and studies their interrelations. It deals with convex games, exact games, games with a large core, extendable games and games with a stable core.     

具有联盟结构的position值

position值是图对策中著名的分支有效解, 该值充分体现了图的边在合作中的贡献, 因而也可作为网络中心性的一种测度方法。本文基于van den Brink等提出的具有联盟结构与图结构的合作对策, 将position值推广到具有联盟结构的图对策上, 提出了具有联盟结构的position值, 该值可以作为受优先联盟约束的网络中心性的一种测度方法。本文首先证明了具有联盟结构的position值可以由分割分支有效性和平衡边贡献性所唯一刻画。其次, 以跨国天然气管道网的收益分配为例, 对这个值与其他值做了比较分析。     

Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). A game is exact if for each coalition there is a core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set.     

A sufficiency condition for coalitive pareto-optimal solutions

In ak-player, nonzero-sum differential game, there exists the possibility that a group of players will form a coalition and work together. If allk players form the coalition, the criterion usually chosen is Pareto optimality whereas, if the coalition consists of only one player, a minmax or Nash equilibrium solution is sought.In this paper, games with coalitions of more than one but less thank players are considered. Coalitive Pareto optimality is chosen as the criterion. Sufficient conditions are presented for coalitive Pareto-optimal solutions, and the results are illustrated with an example.     

On the stability of the solution for multiobjective generalized games with the payoffs perturbed

This paper studies the stability of weakly Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equilibrium for multiobjective generalized games with the payoff perturbed. Using a simple characterization of the weakly Pareto-Nash solution, we obtain a generic continuous result concerning weakly Pareto-Nash solution mapping. Examples are given to show that Pareto-Nash equilibrium mapping is neither upper semicontinuous nor lower semicontinuous. Through seeking the sub-mapping, we prove that most multiobjective generalized games have at least one essential Pareto-Nash solution.     

Computational complexity in additive hedonic games

We investigate the computational complexity of several decision problems in hedonic coalition formation games and demonstrate that attaining stability in such games remains NP-hard even when they are additive. Precisely, we prove that when either core stability or strict core stability is under consideration, the existence problem of a stable coalition structure is NP-hard in the strong sense. Furthermore, the corresponding decision problems with respect to the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure and of an individually stable coalition structure turn out to be NP-complete in the strong sense.     

多目标博弈平衡点存在性定理的推广

以向量值KyFan不等式的推广为基础,讨论支付函数为向量形式的n人非合作多目标博弈弱Pareto-Nash平衡点存在性条件,将多目标博弈平衡点存在性定理中策略空间的紧性,支付函数的凸性等条件减弱.     

具有区间联盟值n人对策的Shapley值

本文提出了一类具有区间联盟收益值n人对策的Shapley值.利用区间数运算有关理论,通过建立公理化体系,对具有区间联盟收益值n人对策的Shapley值进行深入研究,证明了这类n人对策Shapley值存在性与唯一性,并给出了此Shapley值的具体表达式及一些性质.最后通过一个算例检验了其有效性与正确性.     

Common pool resources with support

We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players. Recommendations for Resource Managers

• Coalitions may be able to effectively manage common pool resources such as fisheries but such coalitions are often not stable due to free-rider incentives.
• We explore the impact of a transfer scheme that can improve this coalition stability which would lead to larger and more effective coalitions.
• Our results show that this new transfer scheme works only for cases where the number of players is small.