A Semantic Approach to the Completeness Problem in Quantum Mechanics

The old Bohr–Einstein debate about the completeness of quantum mechanics (QM) was held on an ontological ground. The completeness problem becomes more tractable, however, if it is preliminarily discussed from a semantic viewpoint. Indeed every physical theory adopts, explicitly or not, a truth theory for its observative language, in terms of which the notions of semantic objectivity and semantic completeness of the physical theory can be introduced and inquired. In particular, standard QM adopts a verificationist theory of truth that implies its semantic nonobjectivity; moreover, we show in this paper that standard QM is semantically complete, which matches Bohr's thesis. On the other hand, one of the authors has provided a Semantic Realism (or SR) interpretation of QM that adopts a Tarskian theory of truth as correspondence for the observative language of QM (which was previously mantained to be impossible); according to this interpretation QM is semantically objective, yet incomplete, which matches EPR's thesis. Thus, standard QM and the SR interpretation of QM come to opposite conclusions. These can be reconciled within an integrationist perspective that interpretes non-Tarskian theories of truth as theories of metalinguistic concepts different from truth.     

The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen Effect: Paradox or Gate?

The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) paradox represents one of the most controversial aspects of quantum mechanics (QM). In this paper, we suggest that it can be solved by taking into account the fact that physical quantum phenomena can be extended backward in time (i.e. we take into account two arrows of time instead of one). We derive such a strong statement as a consequence of symmetries and conservation laws implying field equations which are invariant under time reversal. Our approach, violating Einstein's locality postulate, confirms QM predictions and explains the failure of Bell's inequalities.     

Physical Propositions and Quantum Languages

The word proposition is used in physics with different meanings, which must be distinguished to avoid interpretational problems. We construct two languages ℒ ^* (x) and ℒ(x) with classical set-theoretical semantics which allow us to illustrate those meanings and to show that the non-Boolean lattice of propositions of quantum logic (QL) can be obtained by selecting a subset of p-testable propositions within the Boolean lattice of all propositions associated with sentences of ℒ(x). Yet, the aforesaid semantics is incompatible with the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) because of known no-go theorems. But if one accepts our criticism of these theorems and the ensuing SR (semantic realism) interpretation of QM, the incompatibility disappears, and the classical and quantum notions of truth can coexist, since they refer to different metalinguistic concepts (truth and verifiability according to QM, respectively). Moreover one can construct a quantum language ℒ _TQ (x) whose Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra is isomorphic to QL, the sentences of which state (testable) properties of individual samples of physical systems, while standard QL does not bear this interpretation.     

Where is an object before you look at it?

According to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM), no meaning can be assigned to the statement that a particle has a precise value of any one of the variables describing its physical propertes before having interacted with a suitable measuring instrument. On the other hand, it is well known that QM tends to classical statistical mechanics (CSM) when a suitable classical limit is performed. One may ask therefore how is it that in this limit, the statement, meaningless in QM, that a given variable has always a precise value independently of having been measured, gradually becomes meaningful. In other words, one may ask how can it be that QM, which is a theory describing the intrinsically probabilistic properties of a quantum object, becomes a statistical theory describing a probabilistic knowledge of intrinsically well determined properties of classical objects.In the present paper we try to answer to this question and show that an inconsistency arises between the conventional interpretation of CSM which presupposes objectively existing Newtonian trajectories, and the standard interpretation of QM. We conclude that the latter needs revisiting unnless we wish to adopt a strictly subjective conception of the world around us, implying that macroscopic objects as well are not localized anywhere before we look at them.     

Is the Devil in h?

This note is a part of my effort to rid quantum mechanics (QM) nonlocality. Quantum nonlocality is a two faced Janus: one face is a genuine quantum mechanical nonlocality (defined by the Lüders’ projection postulate). Another face is the nonlocality of the hidden variables model that was invented by Bell. This paper is devoted the deconstruction of the latter. The main casualty of Bell’s model is that it straightforwardly contradicts Heisenberg’s uncertainty and Bohr’s complementarity principles generally. Thus, we do not criticize the derivation or interpretation of the Bell inequality (as was done by numerous authors). Our critique is directed against the model as such. The original Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) argument assumed the Heisenberg’s principle without questioning its validity. Hence, the arguments of EPR and Bell differ crucially, and it is necessary to establish the physical ground of the aforementioned principles. This is the quantum postulate: the existence of an indivisible quantum of action given by the Planck constant. Bell’s approach with hidden variables implicitly implies rejection of the quantum postulate, since the latter is the basis of the reference principles.     

Generalized Observables,Bell’s Inequalities and Mixtures in the ESR Model for QM

The extended semantic realism (ESR) model proposes a new theoretical perspective which embodies the mathematical formalism of standard (Hilbert space) quantum mechanics (QM) into a noncontextual framework, reinterpreting quantum probabilities as conditional instead of absolute. We provide in this review an overall view on the present status of our research on this topic. We attain in a new, shortened way a mathematical representation of the generalized observables introduced by the ESR model and a generalization of the projection postulate of elementary QM. Basing on these results we prove that the Bell-Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (BCHSH) inequality, a modified BCHSH inequality and quantum predictions hold together in the ESR model because they refer to different parts of the picture of the physical world supplied by the model. Then we show that a new mathematical representation of mixtures must be introduced in the ESR model which does not coincide with the standard representation in QM and avoids some deep problems that arise from the representation of mixtures provided by QM. Finally we get a nontrivial generalization of the Lüders postulate, which is justified in a special case by introducing a reasonable physical assumption on the evolution of the compound system made up of the measured system and the measuring apparatus.     

On a physical interpretation of the Schwarzschild metric

A method is devised for giving a physical interpretation to the customary Schwarzschild coordinates in the vicinity of a charged or uncharged isolated mass. The construction is accomplished by introducing systems that are allowed to freely fall in toward the mass from infinity (drift-systems). It is demonstrated that the Schwarzschild spatial coordinates and their increments have a full physical significance in terms of rod and clock measurements performed in the drift-systems. The time coordinate and its increment are not so amenable to treatment and cannot be considered as having been given such physical significance. In the discussion the Schwarzschild metric about an uncharged and charged mass is derived, in part, by heuristic classical arguments employing conservation of energy. The arguments are then shown to be valid by consulting the Field Equations. In the derivation the gravitational singularity (at 2GM/C ²) takes on the significance of being the location at which a drift-system achieves the speed of light relative to a proper system at the same point.     

Removal of J-coupling peak distortion in PGSE experiments

Peak distortion caused by homonuclear J-coupling is a major problem that limits the utility of the pulsed-field gradient spin–echo (PGSE) method for studying translational diffusion. This unwanted effect can be removed by incorporation of anti-phase magnetization purging pulse elements at the end of the spin–echo sequence. Three methods, namely, trim-pulse, homospoil pulse gradient and chirp based z-filter were evaluated as potential candidates for an improved NMR diffusion method that is less sensitive to J-coupling peak distortion. The chirp based z-filter was found to be excellent in suppressing anti-phase magnetization while leaving the in-phase magnetization basically intact in spin–echo and stimulated-echo based experiments. The incorporation of chirp based z-filter into PGSE could allow diffusion analysis that would otherwise be impossible by conventional means.     

What Is a Quantum-Mechanical “Weak Value” the Value of?

A so called “weak value” of an observable in quantum mechanics (QM) may be obtained in a weak measurement + post-selection procedure on the QM system under study. Applied to number operators, it has been invoked in revisiting some QM paradoxes (e.g., the so called Three-Box Paradox and Hardy’s Paradox). This requires the weak value to be interpreted as a bona fide property of the system considered, a par with entities like operator mean values and eigenvalues. I question such an interpretation; it has no support in the basic axioms of quantum mechanics and it leads to unreasonable results in concrete situations.     

Affine Defects and Gravitation

We argue that the structure general relativity (GR) as a theory of affine defects is deeper than the standard interpretation as a metric theory of gravitation. Einstein–Cartan theory (EC), with its inhomogeneous affine symmetry, should be the standard-bearer for GR-like theories. A discrete affine interpretation of EC (and gauge theory) yields topological definitions of momentum and spin (and Yang–Mills current), and their conservation laws become discrete topological identities. Considerations from quantum theory provide evidence that discrete affine defects are the physical foundation for gravitation.     

Dirac Equation in Space–Time with Torsion

The Dirac equation in a curved space–time endowed with compatible affine connection is reconsidered. After a detailed decomposition of the total action, the equation is obtained by varying with respect to the Dirac spinor and the torsion field. The result is a known Dirac-like equation with constraints that can be interpreted as the equation of a self-interacting spin 1/2 particle in curved space–time. The scheme is then translated into the language of the 2-spinor formalism of curved space–time based on the choice of a null tetrad frame. The spinorial equation so obtained coincides with the standard one in case of no torsion, while in general it remains a nonlinear equation describing a self-interacting spin 1/2 particle. The nonlinearity is produced by the interaction of the particle with its own current that remains conserved as in the free torsion case.     

Quantum mechanics without the projection postulate and its realistic interpretation

It is widely held that quantum mechanics is the first scientific theory to present scientifically internal, fundamental difficulties for a realistic interpretation (in the philosophical sense). The standard (Copenhagen) interpretation of the quantum theory is often described as the inevitable instrumentalistic response. It is the purpose of the present article to argue that quantum theory doesnot present fundamental new problems to a realistic interpretation. The formalism of quantum theory has the same states—it will be argued—as the formalisms of older physical theories and is capable of the same kinds of philosophical interpretation. This result is reached via an analysis of what it means to give a realistic interpretation to a theory. The main point of difference between quantum mechanics and other theories—as far as the possibilities of interpretation are concerned—is the special treatment given tomeasurement by the projection postulate. But it is possible to do without this postulate. Moreover, rejection of the projection postulate does not, in spite of what is often maintained in the literature, automatically lead to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. A realistic interpretation is possible in which only the reality ofone (our) world is recognized. It is argued that the Copenhagen interpretation as expounded by Bohr is not in conflict with the here proposed realistic interpretation of quantum theory.     

A Toss without a Coin: Information,Discontinuity, and Mathematics in Quantum Theory

The article argues that—at least in certain interpretations, such as the one assumed in this article under the heading of “reality without realism”—the quantum-theoretical situation appears as follows: While—in terms of probabilistic predictions—connected to and connecting the information obtained in quantum phenomena, the mathematics of quantum theory (QM or QFT), which is continuous, does not represent and is discontinuous with both the emergence of quantum phenomena and the physics of these phenomena, phenomena that are physically discontinuous with each other as well. These phenomena, and thus this information, are described by classical physics. All actually available information (in the mathematical sense of information theory) is classical: it is composed of units, such as bits, that are—or are contained in—entities described by classical physics. On the other hand, classical physics cannot predict this information when it is created, as manifested in measuring instruments, in quantum experiments, while quantum theory can. In this epistemological sense, this information is quantum. The article designates the discontinuity between quantum theory and the emergence of quantum phenomena the “Heisenberg discontinuity”, because it was introduced by W. Heisenberg along with QM, and the discontinuity between QM or QFT and the classical physics of quantum phenomena, the “Bohr discontinuity”, because it was introduced as part of Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and QM, under the assumption of Heisenberg discontinuity. Combining both discontinuities precludes QM or QFT from being connected to either physical reality, that ultimately responsible for quantum phenomena or that of these phenomena themselves, other than by means of probabilistic predictions concerning the information, classical in character, contained in quantum phenomena. The nature of quantum information is, in this view, defined by this situation. A major implication, discussed in the Conclusion, is the existence and arguably the necessity of two—classical and quantum—or with relativity, three and possibly more essentially different theories in fundamental physics.     

Remarks on Black Hole Instabilities and Closed String Tachyons

Physical arguments stemming from the theory of black-hole thermodynamics are used to put constraints on the dynamics of closed-string tachyon condensation in Scherk–Schwarz compactifications. A geometrical interpretation of the tachyon condensation involves an effective capping of a noncontractible cycle, thus removing the very topology that supports the tachyons. A semiclassical regime is identified in which the matching between the tachyon condensation and the black-hole instability flow is possible. We formulate a generalized correspondence principle and illustrate it in several different circumstances: an Euclidean interpretation of the transition from strings to black holes across the Hagedorn temperature and instabilities in the brane-antibrane system.     

Spacetime Topology (I) – Chirality and the Third Stiefel–Whitney Class

The standard model of particle physics poses certain limitations upon the topology of spacetime, most notably by imposing the triviality of an important family of characteristic classes, the Stiefel–Whitney classes. In this, the first of two articles, we present a physical interpretation of the first three Stiefel–Whitney classes. While the relationship of the first two to the existence of spinor fields has been known since the sixties, apparently no connection between the third class and microscopical physics seems to be known. We show that the third class is related to chirality.     

X-rays and matter – the basic interactions

In this introductory article we attempt to provide the theoretical basis for developing the interaction between X-rays and matter, so that one can unravel properties of matter by interpretation of X-ray experiments on samples. We emphasize that we are dealing with the basics, which means that we shall limit ourselves to a discussion of the interaction of an X-ray photon with an isolated atom, or rather with a single electron in a Hartree–Fock atom. Subsequent articles in this issue deal with more complicated – and interesting – forms of matter encompassing many atoms or molecules. To cite this article: J. Als-Nielsen, C. R. Physique 9 (2008).     

Relation Between Relativistic and Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics as Integral Transformation

A formulation of quantum mechanics (QM) in the relativistic configurational space (RCS) is considered. A transformation connecting the non-relativistic QM and relativistic QM (RQM) has been found in an explicit form. This transformation is a direct generalization of the Kontorovich–Lebedev transformation. It is shown also that RCS gives an example of non-commutative geometry over the commutative algebra of functions.     

On “Decisions and Revisions Which a Minute Will Reverse”: Consciousness,The Unconscious and Mathematical Modeling of Thinking

This article considers a partly philosophical question: What are the ontological and epistemological reasons for using quantum-like models or theories (models and theories based on the mathematical formalism of quantum theory) vs. classical-like ones (based on the mathematics of classical physics), in considering human thinking and decision making? This question is only partly philosophical because it also concerns the scientific understanding of the phenomena considered by the theories that use mathematical models of either type, just as in physics itself, where this question also arises as a physical question. This is because this question is in effect: What are the physical reasons for using, even if not requiring, these types of theories in considering quantum phenomena, which these theories predict fully in accord with the experiment? This is clearly also a physical, rather than only philosophical, question and so is, accordingly, the question of whether one needs classical-like or quantum-like theories or both (just as in physics we use both classical and quantum theories) in considering human thinking in psychology and related fields, such as decision science. It comes as no surprise that many of these reasons are parallel to those that are responsible for the use of QM and QFT in the case of quantum phenomena. Still, the corresponding situations should be understood and justified in terms of the phenomena considered, phenomena defined by human thinking, because there are important differences between these phenomena and quantum phenomena, which this article aims to address. In order to do so, this article will first consider quantum phenomena and quantum theory, before turning to human thinking and decision making, in addressing which it will also discuss two recent quantum-like approaches to human thinking, that by M. G. D’Ariano and F. Faggin and that by A. Khrennikov. Both approaches are ontological in the sense of offering representations, different in character in each approach, of human thinking by the formalism of quantum theory. Whether such a representation, as opposed to only predicting the outcomes of relevant experiments, is possible either in quantum theory or in quantum-like theories of human thinking is one of the questions addressed in this article. The philosophical position adopted in it is that it may not be possible to make this assumption, which, however, is not the same as saying that it is impossible. I designate this view as the reality-without-realism, RWR, view and in considering strictly mental processes as the ideality-without-idealism, IWI, view, in the second case in part following, but also moving beyond, I. Kant’s philosophy.