On cooperative games with large monotonic core

Cooperative games with large core were introduced by Sharkey (Int. J. Game Theory 11:175–182, 1982), and the concept of Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme was defined by Sprumont (Games Econ. Behav. 2:378–394, 1990). Inspired by these two concepts, Moulin (Int. J. Game Theory 19:219–232, 1990) introduced the notion of large monotonic core giving a characterization for three-player games. In this paper we prove that all games with large monotonic core are convex. We give an effective criterion to determine whether a game has a large monotonic core and, as a consequence, we obtain a characterization for the four-player case.     

Modularity and monotonicity of games

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we generalize Kajii et al. (J Math Econ 43:218–230, 2007) and provide a condition under which for a game \(v\) , its Möbius inverse is equal to zero within the framework of the \(k\) -modularity of \(v\) for \(k \ge 2\) . This condition is more general than that in Kajii et al. (J Math Econ 43:218–230, 2007). Second, we provide a condition under which for a game \(v\) , its Möbius inverse takes non-negative values, and not just zero. This paper relates the study of totally monotone games to that of \(k\) -monotone games. Furthermore, this paper shows that the modularity of a game is related to \(k\) -additive capacities proposed by Grabisch (Fuzzy Sets Syst 92:167–189, 1997). To illustrate its application in the field of economics, we use these results to characterize a Gini index representation of Ben-Porath and Gilboa (J Econ Theory 64:443–467, 1994). Our results can also be applied to potential functions proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 57:589–614, 1989) and further analyzed by Ui et al. (Math Methods Oper Res 74:427–443, 2011).     

Monotonic stable solutions for minimum coloring games

For the class of minimum coloring games (introduced by Deng et al. Math Oper Res, 24:751–766, 1999) we investigate the existence of population monotonic allocation schemes (introduced by Sprumont Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, 1990). We show that a minimum coloring game on a graph $G$ has a population monotonic allocation scheme if and only if $G$ is $(P_4,2K_2)$ -free (or, equivalently, if its complement graph $\bar{G}$ is quasi-threshold). Moreover, we provide a procedure that for these graphs always selects an integer population monotonic allocation scheme.     

Algorithms for lattice games

This paper provides effective methods for the polyhedral formulation of impartial finite combinatorial games as lattice games (Guo et al. Oberwolfach Rep 22: 23–26, 2009; Guo and Miller, Adv Appl Math 46:363–378, 2010). Given a rational strategy for a lattice game, a polynomial time algorithm is presented to decide (i) whether a given position is a winning position, and to find a move to a winning position, if not; and (ii) to decide whether two given positions are congruent, in the sense of misère quotient theory (Plambeck, Integers, 5:36, 2005; Plambeck and Siegel, J Combin Theory Ser A, 115: 593–622, 2008). The methods are based on the theory of short rational generating functions (Barvinok and Woods, J Am Math Soc, 16: 957–979, 2003).     

The Shapley value for shortest path games: a non-graph-based approach

The shortest path games are considered in this paper. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benefits. The problem is to divide the profit of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al. (Math Methods Oper Res 52: 251–264, 2000) introduce the class of shortest path games and show it coincides with the class of monotone games. They also give a characterization of the Shapley value on this class of games. In this paper we consider further five characterizations of the Shapley value (Hart and Mas-Colell’s in Econometrica 57:589–614, 1989; Shapley’s in Contributions to the theory of games II, annals of mathematics studies, vol 28. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307–317, 1953; Young’s in Int J Game Theory 14:65–72, 1985, Chun’s in Games Econ Behav 45:119–130, 1989; van den Brink’s in Int J Game Theory 30:309–319, 2001 axiomatizations), and conclude that all the mentioned axiomatizations are valid for the shortest path games. Fragnelli et al. (Math Methods Oper Res 52:251–264, 2000)’s axioms are based on the graph behind the problem, in this paper we do not consider graph specific axioms, we take $TU$ axioms only, that is we consider all shortest path problems and we take the viewpoint of an abstract decision maker who focuses rather on the abstract problem than on the concrete situations.     

Axiomatizing core extensions

We give an axiomatization of the aspiration core on the domain of all TU-games using a relaxed feasibility condition, non-emptiness, individual rationality, and generalized versions of the reduced game property (consistency) and superadditivity. Our axioms also characterize the C-core (Guesnerie and Oddou, Econ Lett 3(4):301?C306, 1979; Sun et?al. J Math Econ 44(7?C8):853?C860, 2008) and the core on appropriate subdomains. The main result of the paper generalizes Peleg??s (J Math Econ 14(2):203?C214, 1985) core axiomatization to the entire family of TU-games.     

Nonzero-sum constrained discrete-time Markov games: the case of unbounded costs

In this paper, we consider discrete-time \(N\) -person constrained stochastic games with discounted cost criteria. The state space is denumerable and the action space is a Borel set, while the cost functions are admitted to be unbounded from below and above. Under suitable conditions weaker than those in (Alvarez-Mena and Hernández-Lerma, Math Methods Oper Res 63:261–285, 2006) for bounded cost functions, we also show the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the constrained games by introducing two approximations. The first one, which is as in (Alvarez-Mena and Hernández-Lerma, Math Methods Oper Res 63:261–285, 2006), is to construct a sequence of finite games to approximate a (constrained) auxiliary game with an initial distribution that is concentrated on a finite set. However, without hypotheses of bounded costs as in (Alvarez-Mena and Hernández-Lerma, Math Methods Oper Res 63:261–285, 2006), we also establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the auxiliary game with unbounded costs by developing more shaper error bounds of the approximation. The second one, which is new, is to construct a sequence of the auxiliary-type games above and prove that the limit of the sequence of Nash equilibria for the auxiliary-type games is a Nash equilibrium for the original constrained games. Our results are illustrated by a controlled queueing system.     

The covering values for acyclic digraph games

We introduce a novel covering method to compute values for acyclic digraph games, and we call the values obtained by this method the covering values. These values may be considered as natural extensions of the component efficient solutions for line-graph games studied by van den Brink et?al. (Econ Theory 33:349?C364, 2007), and the tree values studied by Khmelnitskaya (Theory Decis 69(4):657?C669, 2010a). With the new method, we reinterpret the tree values proposed by Khmelnitskaya (2010a). Besides, we propose the covering values in the digraph game with general acyclic digraph structures presenting flow situations when some links may merge while others split into several separate ones. We give axiomatizations of these values, and interpret these values in terms of dividend distributions.     

Values of nondifferentiable vector measure games

We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This new approach enables us to construct new diagonal formulas for the Mertens value (Int J Game Theory 17:1–65, 1988) and the Neyman value (Isr J Math 124:1–27, 2001) on a large space of non-differentiable games. This in turn enables us to give an affirmative answer to the question, first posed by Neyman (Isr J Math 124:1–27, 2001), whether the Mertens value and the Neyman value coincide “modulo Banach limits”? The solution is an intermediate result towards a characterization of values of norm 1 of vector measure games with bounded variation.     

On some characterizations of preinvex fuzzy mappings

Jeyakumar (Methods Oper. Res. 55:109–125, 1985) and Weir and Mond (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 136:29–38, 1988) introduced the concept of preinvex function. The preinvex functions have some interesting properties. For example, every local minimum of a preinvex function is a global minimum and nonnegative linear combinations of preinvex functions are preinvex. Invex functions were introduced by Hanson (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 80:545–550, 1981) as a generalization of differentiable convex functions. These functions are more general than the convex and pseudo convex ones. The type of invex function is equivalent to the type of function whose stationary points are global minima. Under some conditions, an invex function is also a preinvex function. Syau (Fuzzy Sets Syst. 115:455–461, 2000) introduced the concepts of pseudoconvexity, invexity, and pseudoinvexity for fuzzy mappings of one variable by using the notion of differentiability and the results proposed by Goestschel and Voxman (Fuzzy Sets Syst. 18:31–43, 1986). Wu and Xu (Fuzzy Sets Syst 159:2090–2103, 2008) introduced the concepts of fuzzy pseudoconvex, fuzzy invex, fuzzy pseudoinvex, and fuzzy preinvex mapping from \(\mathbb{R}^{n}\) to the set of fuzzy numbers based on the concept of differentiability of fuzzy mapping defined by Wang and Wu (Fuzzy Sets Syst. 138:559–591, 2003). In this paper, we present some characterizations of preinvex fuzzy mappings. The necessary and sufficient conditions for differentiable and twice differentiable preinvex fuzzy mapping are provided. These characterizations correct and improve previous results given by other authors. This fact is shown with examples. Moreover, we introduce additional conditions under which these results are valid.     

Imitation, local interaction, and coordination

This paper analyzes players’ long-run behavior in evolutionary coordination games with imitation and one-dimensional local interaction. Players are assumed to interact with their two neighbors and to imitate actions with the highest average payoffs. We find that the payoff-dominant equilibrium survives in the long run with positive probability. The results derive the conditions under which both risk-dominant-strategy and payoff-dominant-strategy takers co-exist in the long run. The risk-dominant equilibrium is the unique long-run equilibrium for the remaining cases. This study extends and complements the analyses of Eshel et al. (Am Econ Rev 88:157–179, 1998) and Vega-Redondo (Evolution, games, and economic behaviour, 1996). Combining Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer’s (Econ Lett 93:163–168, 2006; J Econ Theory 14:251–274, 2008) and our results, we conclude that players’ long-run behavior varies with imitation rules and information collecting modes. Finally, we show the convergence rate to all the long-run equilibria.     

Strong NP-hardness of scheduling problems with learning or aging effect

Proofs of strong NP-hardness of single machine and two-machine flowshop scheduling problems with learning or aging effect given in Rudek (Computers & Industrial Engineering 61:20–31, 2011; Annals of Operations Research 196(1):491–516, 2012a; International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology 59:299–309, 2012b; Applied Mathematics and Computations 218:6498–6510, 2012c; Applied Mathematical Modelling 37:1523–1536, 2013) contain a common mistake that make them incomplete. We reveal the mistake and provide necessary corrections for the problems in Rudek (Computers & Industrial Engineering 61:20–31, 2011; Annals of Operations Research 196(1):491–516, 2012a; Applied Mathematical Modelling 37:1523–1536, 2013). NP-hardness of problems in Rudek (International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology 59:299–309, 2012b; Applied Mathematics and Computations 218:6498–6510, 2012c) remains unknown because of another mistake which we are unable to correct.     

Defect and Area in Beltrami–Klein Model of Hyperbolic Geometry

Ungar (Beyond the Einstein addition law and its gyroscopic Thomas Precession: The Theory of Gyrogroups and Gyrouector Spaces, 2001; Comput Math Appl 49:187–221, 2005; Comput Math Appl 53, 2007) introduced into hyperbolic geometry the concept of defect based on relativity addition of A. Einstein. Another approach is from Karzel (Resultate Math. 47:305–326, 2005) for the relation between the K-loop and the defect of an absolute plane in the sense (Karzel in Einführung in die Geometrie, 1973). Our main concern is to introduce a systematical exact definition for defect and area in the Beltrami–Klein model of hyperbolic geometry. Combining the ideas and methods of Karzel and Ungar give an elegant concept for defect and area in this model. In particular we give a rigorous and elementary proof for the defect formula stated (Ungar in Comput Math Appl 53, 2007). Furthermore, we give a formulary for area of circle in the Beltrami–Klein model of hyperbolic geometry.     

Algebraic Hecke characters and strictly compatible systems of abelian mod p Galois representations over global fields

In [10] (C R Acad Sci Paris Ser I Math 323(2) 117–120, 1996), [11] (Math Res Lett 10(1):71–83 2003), [12] (Can J Math 57(6):1215–1223 2005), Khare showed that any strictly compatible systems of semisimple abelian mod p Galois representations of a number field arises from a unique finite set of algebraic Hecke characters. In this article, we consider a similar problem for arbitrary global fields. We give a definition of Hecke character which in the function field setting is more general than previous definitions by Goss and Gross and define a corresponding notion of compatible system of mod p Galois representations. In this context we present a unified proof of the analog of Khare’s result for arbitrary global fields. In a sequel we shall apply this result to strictly compatible systems arising from Drinfeld modular forms, and thereby attach Hecke characters to cuspidal Drinfeld Hecke eigenforms.     

Divergence points and normal numbers

In Olsen and Winter (J Lond Math Soc 67(2):103–122, 2003) and Baek et?al. (Advan Math 214:267–287, 2007) the authors have introduced the notion of “normal” and “non-normal” points of a self-similar set as a main tool for studying the Hausdorff and the packing dimensions of a set of divergence points of self-similar measures. In this paper we will extend the results about the Hausdorff and the packing dimensions of “non-normal” points of a self-similar set in a point of view of Bisbas (Bulletin des Sciences Mathématiques 129(1):25–37, 2005). Namely, we will prove that both the Hausdorff and packing dimensions remain the same if we consider subsets determined by the normality to some bases. This will be proved using the techniques from Bisbas (Bulletin des Sciences Mathématiques 129(1):25–37, 2005) and the construction of suitable measures. Simultaneously this will also give simpler proofs of some of the results from Olsen and Winter (J Lond Math Soc 67(2):103–122, 2003) and Baek et?al. (Advan Math 214:267–287, 2007).     

Symmetric rearrangements around infinity with applications to Lévy processes

We prove a new rearrangement inequality for multiple integrals, which partly generalizes a result of Friedberg and Luttinger (Arch Ration Mech 61:35–44, 1976) and can be interpreted as involving symmetric rearrangements of domains around $\infty $ . As applications, we prove two comparison results for general Lévy processes and their symmetric rearrangements. The first application concerns the survival probability of a point particle in a Poisson field of moving traps following independent Lévy motions. We show that the survival probability can only increase if the point particle does not move, and the traps and the Lévy motions are symmetrically rearranged. This essentially generalizes an isoperimetric inequality of Peres and Sousi (Geom Funct Anal 22(4):1000–1014, 2012) for the Wiener sausage. In the second application, we show that the $q$ -capacity of a Borel measurable set for a Lévy process can only decrease if the set and the Lévy process are symmetrically rearranged. This result generalizes an inequality obtained by Watanabe (Z Wahrsch Verw Gebiete 63:487–499, 1983) for symmetric Lévy processes.     

On the Gauss–Newton method

We provide a new semilocal convergence analysis of the Gauss–Newton method (GNM) for solving nonlinear equation in the Euclidean space. Using a combination of center-Lipschitz, Lipschitz conditions, and our new idea of recurrent functions, we provide under the same or weaker hypotheses than before (Ben-Israel, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 15:243–252, 1966; Chen and Nashed, Numer. Math. 66:235–257, 1993; Deuflhard and Heindl, SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 16:1–10, 1979; Guo, J. Comput. Math. 25:231–242, 2007; Häußler, Numer. Math. 48:119–125, 1986; Hu et al., J. Comput. Appl. Math. 219:110–122, 2008; Kantorovich and Akilov, Functional Analysis in Normed Spaces, Pergamon, Oxford, 1982), a finer convergence analysis. The results can be extended in case outer or generalized inverses are used. Numerical examples are also provided to show that our results apply, where others fail (Ben-Israel, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 15:243–252, 1966; Chen and Nashed, Numer. Math. 66:235–257, 1993; Deuflhard and Heindl, SIAM J. Numer. Anal. 16:1–10, 1979; Guo, J. Comput. Math. 25:231–242, 2007; Häußler, Numer. Math. 48:119–125, 1986; Hu et al., J. Comput. Appl. Math. 219:110–122, 2008; Kantorovich and Akilov, Functional Analysis in Normed Spaces, Pergamon, Oxford, 1982).     

Concepts of efficiency for uncertain multi-objective optimization problems based on set order relations

In this paper we present new concepts of efficiency for uncertain multi-objective optimization problems. We analyze the connection between the concept of minmax robust efficiency presented by Ehrgott et al. (Eur J Oper Res, 2014, doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2014.03.013) and the upper set less order relation \(\preceq _s^u\) introduced by Kuroiwa (1998, 1999). From this connection we derive new concepts of efficiency for uncertain multi-objective optimization problems by replacing the set ordering with other set orderings. Those are namely the lower set less ordering (see Kuroiwa 1998, 1999), the set less ordering (see Nishnianidze in Soobshch Akad Nauk Gruzin SSR 114(3):489–491, 1984; Young in Math Ann 104(1):260–290, 1931, doi:10.1007/BF01457934; Eichfelder and Jahn in Vector Optimization. Springer, Berlin, 2012), the certainly less ordering (see Eichfelder and Jahn in Vector Optimization. Springer, Berlin, 2012), and the alternative set less ordering (see Ide et al. in Fixed Point Theory Appl, 2014, doi:10.1186/1687-1812-2014-83; Köbis 2014). We analyze the resulting concepts of efficiency and present numerical results on the occurrence of the various concepts. We conclude the paper with a short comparison between the concepts, and an outlook to further work.