Monotonicity of the mapping associated with a noncooperative multiperson game

A noncooperative multiperson game can be associated with a mapping that generates a variational inequality. The problem of searching for Nash points in the game is equivalent to solving this inequality. Numerical methods for solving the variational inequality rely heavily on the monotonicity of the mapping generating the inequality. At the same time, the mapping associated with the noncooperative multiperson game may not be monotone. Necessary and sufficient conditions are established under which the mapping associated with a finite noncooperative mixed-strategy game of three or more persons is monotone.     

Two noncooperative games between a coalition and its surrounding in a class of n-person games with constant sum

A cooperative game engendered by a noncooperative n-person game (the master game) in which any subset of n players may form a coalition playing an antagonistic game against the residual players (the surrounding) that has a (Nash equilibrium) solution, is considered, along with another noncooperative game in which both a coalition and its surrounding try to maximize their gains that also possesses a Nash equilibrium solution. It is shown that if the master game is the one with constant sum, the sets of Nash equilibrium strategies in both above-mentioned noncooperative games (in which a coalition plays with (against) its surrounding) coincide.     

Numerical solution of an equilibrium problem of based on the generalized level method

An equilibrium problem is studied whose special case is finding a Nash point in a noncooperative multiperson game. A numerical algorithm for solving this problem is described. Conditions on the problem are stated under which an estimate is obtained for the convergence rate of the algorithm to a unique solution of the problem. The results are used for a numerical analysis of noncooperative games.     

Formulating an <Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>-person noncooperative game as a tensor complementarity problem

In this paper, we consider a class of n-person noncooperative games, where the utility function of every player is given by a homogeneous polynomial defined by the payoff tensor of that player, which is a natural extension of the bimatrix game where the utility function of every player is given by a quadratic form defined by the payoff matrix of that player. We will call such a problem the multilinear game. We reformulate the multilinear game as a tensor complementarity problem, a generalization of the linear complementarity problem; and show that finding a Nash equilibrium point of the multilinear game is equivalent to finding a solution of the resulted tensor complementarity problem. Especially, we present an explicit relationship between the solutions of the multilinear game and the tensor complementarity problem, which builds a bridge between these two classes of problems. We also apply a smoothing-type algorithm to solve the resulted tensor complementarity problem and give some preliminary numerical results for solving the multilinear games.     

Privacy impact on generalized Nash equilibrium in peer-to-peer electricity market

We consider a peer-to-peer electricity market, where agents hold private information that they might not want to share. The problem is modeled as a noncooperative communication game, which takes the form of a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem, where the agents determine their randomized reports to share with the other market players, while anticipating the form of the peer-to-peer market equilibrium. In the noncooperative game, each agent decides on the deterministic and random parts of the report, such that (a) the distance between the deterministic part of the report and the truthful private information is bounded and (b) the expectation of the privacy loss random variable is bounded. This allows each agent to change her privacy level. We characterize the equilibrium of the game, prove the uniqueness of the Variational Equilibria and provide a closed form expression of the privacy price. Numerical illustrations are presented on the 14-bus IEEE network.     

Modeling of uplink power control for cognitive radio networks: Cooperative and noncooperative

In this paper, the uplink power control problem is modeled by considering both cooperative and noncooperative methods respectively to protect licensed users in cognitive radio networks. The cooperative power control optimization problem is modeled as a concave minimization problem. According to the properties of the power control optimization problem, an improved branch and bound algorithm is proposed. On the other hand, for the noncooperative power control case, a game theoretic model with the exponential pricing function is adopted to restrict the interference to the licensed users. Further, Nash equilibrium for the power control game is discussed. Finally, the performance of the proposed models is evaluated by computer simulation.     

Onn-person noncooperative multicriteria games described in strategic form

This paper undertakes the problem of multicriteria decision support in conflict situations described as a noncooperative game. Construction of such a decision support requires the development of the noncooperative game theory to be generalized for the multicriteria case. New theoretical results in this case are presented. Features of the multicriteria noncooperative games are shown with use of a duopoly model in case of two goods and two criteria of each player. Concepts of the decision support are discussed.     

A Global Optimization Method for Solving Convex Quadratic Bilevel Programming Problems

We use the merit function technique to formulate a linearly constrained bilevel convex quadratic problem as a convex program with an additional convex-d.c. constraint. To solve the latter problem we approximate it by convex programs with an additional convex-concave constraint using an adaptive simplicial subdivision. This approximation leads to a branch-and-bound algorithm for finding a global optimal solution to the bilevel convex quadratic problem. We illustrate our approach with an optimization problem over the equilibrium points of an n-person parametric noncooperative game.     

SEQUENTIAL FISHING: COOPERATIVE AND NON-COOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIA

Two agents control the areas in which a migrating fish stock is located. The harvesting is sequential. The stock available to Agent 1 depends on the growth of the stock, which in turn depends on the amount left after harvesting by Agent 2. The stock available to Agent 2 is the quantity left after harvesting by Agent 1. Each agent fishes down the stock in each period to an “abandonment level” deemed appropriate. The problem is analyzed as a noncooperative versus cooperative, repeated game with an infinite time horizon. In the noncooperative solution, both agents will harvest the stock if the unit cost of Agent 2 is not too much higher than the unit cost of Agent 1. A cooperative solution supported by a threat to revert to the noncooperative solution if deviation occurs implies greater differences in unit costs at which both agents will harvest the stock. The problem is illustrated by a simple, numerical example.     

On implementation via demand commitment games

A simple version of the Demand Commitment Game is shown to implement the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for any n-person characteristic function game. This improves upon previous models devoted to this implementation problem in terms of one or more of the following: a) the range of characteristic function games addressed, b) the simplicity of the underlying noncooperative game (it is a finite horizon game where individuals make demands and form coalitions rather than make comprehensive allocation proposals and c) the general acceptability of the noncooperative equilibrium concept. A complete characterization of an equilibrium strategy generating the Shapley value outcomes is provided. Furthermore, for 3 player games, it is shown that the Demand Commitment Game can implement the core for games which need not be convex but have cores with nonempty interiors. Received March 1995/Final version February 1997     

Noncooperative facility location games

A noncooperative game theoretical approach is considered for the multifacility location problem. It turns out that the facility location game is a potential game in the sense of Monderer and Shapley and some properties of the game are studied.     

A solution for noncooperative games

In this paper, we study solutions of strict noncooperative games that are played just once. The players are not allowed to communicate with each other. The main ingredient of our theory is the concept of rationalizing a set of strategies for each player of a game. We state an axiom based on this concept that every solution of a noncooperative game is required to satisfy. Strong Nash solvability is shown to be a sufficient condition for the rationalizing set to exist, but it is not necessary. Also, Nash solvability is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of the rationalizing set of a game. For a game with no solution (in our sense), a player is assumed to recourse to a standard of behavior. Some standards of behavior are examined and discussed.This work was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. DAAG29-75-C-0024 and by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. MCS-75-17385-A01. The author is grateful to J. C. Harsanyi for his comments and to S. M. Robinson for suggesting the problem.     

On solving generalized Nash equilibrium problems via optimization

This paper deals with the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP), i.e. a noncooperative game in which the strategy set of each player, as well as his payoff function, depends on the strategies of all players. We consider an equivalent optimization reformulation of GNEP using a regularized Nikaido–Isoda function so that solutions of GNEP coincide with global minima of the optimization problem. We then propose a derivative-free descent type method with inexact line search to solve the equivalent optimization problem and we prove that our algorithm is globally convergent. The convergence analysis is not based on conditions guaranteeing that every stationary point of the optimization problem is a solution of GNEP. Finally, we present the performance of our algorithm on some examples.     

A noncooperativen-person semi-Markov game with a separable metric state space

A noncooperativen-person semi-Markov game with a separable metric state space is studied in this paper. We define the equilibrium condition of the noncooperative game, and find a necessary and sufficient condition for which the equilibrium condition holds, and prove that in our game system there possesses an equilibrium point so that each player has his own stationary equilibrium strategy.Partly supported by NSC Taiwan, R.O.C.     

OPTIMAL RECOVERY OF A SHARED RESOURCE STOCK: A DIFFERENTIAL GAME MODEL WITH EFFICIENT MEMORY EQUILIBRIA

We consider an optimal two-country management of depleted transboundary renewable resources. The management problem is modelled as a differential game, in which memory strategies are used. The countries negotiate an agreement among Pareto efficient harvesting programs. They monitor the evolution of the agreement, and they memorize deviations from the agreement in the past. If the agreement is observed by the countries, they continue cooperation. If one of the countries breaches the contract, then both countries continue in a noncooperative management mode for the rest of the game. This noncooperative option is called a threat policy. The credibility of the threats is guaranteed by their equilibrium property. Transfer or side payments are studied as a particular cooperative management program. Transfer payments allow one country to buy out the other from the fishery for the purpose of eliminating the inefficiency caused by the joint access to the resources. It is shown that efficient equilibria can be reached in a class of resource management games, which allow the use of memory strategies. In particular, continuous time transfer payments (e.g., a share of the harvest) should be used instead of a once-and-for-all transfer payment.     

Two Game Models for Cooperation with Implicit Noncooperation

We propose two flexible game models to represent and analyze cases that cannot be modeled by current game models. One is called sharing creditability game (SCG) and the other is called bottomline game (BLG). The new models transform cooperative games into new games that incorporate auxiliary information (noncooperative in nature) usually neglected in previous theories. The new games will be solved only by traditional noncooperative game theory. When the new solutions are applied to the original games, the solutions can reflect the auxiliary information in addition to the original objectives of the decision makers or players. Generally, the new solutions are different from the cooperative and the noncooperative solutions of the original games. Existing transferable utility (TU) games and noncooperative games will coincide with special cases of the two new game models. Using SCG and BLG, the prisoner’s dilemma can be reformulated and a richer set of decisions can be considered for the players. The two new game models have potential applications in military and socioeconomic situations.This research was partly funded by the College Engineering, Ohio State University.     

A Differential Game of Transboundary Industrial Pollution with Emission Permits Trading

Transboundary pollution is a particularly serious problem as it leads people located at regional borders to disproportionately suffer from pollution. In 2007, a cooperative differential game model of transboundary industrial pollution was presented by Yeung. It is the first time that time-consistent solutions are derived in a cooperative differential game on pollution control with industries and governments being separate entities. In this paper, we extend Yeung’s model to an even more general model, in which emission permits trading is taken into account. Our objective is to make use of optimal control theory to find the two regions’ noncooperative and cooperative optimal emission paths such that the regions’ discounted stream of net revenues is maximized. We illustrate the results with a numerical example.     

Noncooperative exchange using money and broker-dealers

This paper presents a model of exchange where a single commodity serves as a means of payment and trade must pass through designated brokers. Broker buy and sell prices, trader allocations, and broker profits depend on the buy and sell decisions of all the market participants, and the exchange problem is described as a noncooperative game. The existence of an equilibrium is established and bounds are placed on the price spread on each commodity. Finally, the properties of the noncooperative equilibria under replication are examined.     

On the existence of approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for a game with incomplete information

The paper deals with a noncooperative game with incomplete information. By means of a purification theorem for vector valued payoff functions a procedure is developed by which players are enabled to replace mixed strategies by pure strategies at an approximate equilibrium point. Further, the problem of existence of an approximate equilibrium point is discussed. Assumptions concerning the payoff functions and information structure are given ensuring both the existence of approximate equilibrium and the workability of the replacement procedure.     

An attrition game on an acyclic network

This paper deals with noncooperative games in which two players conflict on a network through an attrition phenomenon. The associated problem has a variety of applications, but we model the problem as a military conflict between an attacker and a defender on an acyclic network. The attacker marches from a starting node to a destination node, expecting to keep his initial members untouched during the march. The defender deploys his forces on arcs to intercept the attacker. If the attacker goes through an arc with deployed defenders, the attacker incurs casualties according to Lanchester’s linear law. In this paper, we discuss two games having the number of remaining attackers as the payoff and propose systems of linear programming formulations to derive their equilibrium points. One game is a two-person zero-sum (TPZS) one-shot game with no information and the other is a TPZS game with two stages separated by information acquisition about players’ opponents.