Effects of asymmetric knowledge spillovers on the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation

In order to investigate the role of asymmetric spillovers in the stability of R&D cooperation, this paper distinguishes two different types of cooperative partners, and uses a game theory approach to reveal the relationship between asymmetric spillovers and R&D investment in the horizontally and vertically related R&D cooperation. In the horizontal R&D cooperation, higher incoming spillovers and lower outgoing spillovers induce firms to invest on R&D efforts as agreed. However, it is the contradiction between horizontal firms’ attitudes towards asymmetric spillovers that leads to the inherent instability of the cooperation. In the vertical R&D cooperation, our results question the usually held opinion about the effects of asymmetric spillovers on the decision of R&D investment. The incoming spillovers are less important in the innovation process for vertically related R&D cooperation. A firm tends to under-invest on the arranged level of R&D efforts when its incoming spillovers increase. Our results also show that efficient mechanisms to restrain firms’ non-cooperative behavior are essential to improve the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation.     

混合所有制改革背景下政府最优减排研发补贴政策研究

通过构建两阶段异质产品减排博弈模型,文章研究了混合所有制改革背景下最优的企业减排研发投资及研发补贴政策,并进一步讨论了最优减排研发补贴政策下政府实施国企混合所有制改革的环境和经济效果。结论表明：政府应主动实施减排研发补贴政策,最优减排研发补贴受技术溢出率、产品差异程度以及混合所有制改革程度的影响。当减排研发效率较低时,随着技术溢出率增大,最优的减排研发补贴水平不断提高,当减排研发效率较高时,随着技术溢出率增大,最优的减排研发补贴水平不断下降;随着产品差异化程度提高,最优减排研发补贴水平不断提高;混合所有制改革程度加深将使得最优减排研发补贴水平下降。最优减排研发补贴政策下,政府实施国企混合所有制改革能够降低整个行业的污染排放、提高行业的利润和社会福利水平,从而能够取得经济和环境的双赢。最后,结合相关结论,本文给出了混合所有制改革背景下减排研发补贴政策设计的相关建议,为政府决策提供一定参考。     

Transitional dynamics in an R&D-based growth model with natural resources

In this paper, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the optimal path for a resource endowed economy with R&D. This path converges to an optimal steady state, which is a saddle point, for each type of resources (renewable or non-renewable). In this steady state, a finite size resource sector coexists with other continuously growing sectors. In comparison, the corresponding decentralized equilibrium is suboptimal and there is either over- or under-investment in R&D from the social planner’s perspective. At optimum, positive long-run growth will be sustained regardless type of resources used.     

Process Spillovers and Growth

This paper develops an R&D based endogenous growth model in which the firm’s free-riding behavior, prompted by an incomplete technological protection at the industry level, can drive economic growth. Unlike existing endogenous growth models, it shows how free-riding behavior and process spillovers can mutually promote dynamic competition at the industry level and how they constitute a major source of growth in the economy. In the dynamic general equilibrium model that we propose, the representative industry is a duopoly that consists of a leader who innovates and a laggard who freerides by exploiting the source of intraindustry spillover. The main results show that the innovation strategies of the two firms can be dynamically strategic complements if a large technology gap prevails and that a fall in the level of technological protection can enhance economic growth. This paper is a substantially revised version of a chapter of S. Luckraz’s Ph.D. thesis. He thanks Julian Wright for his encouragement and helpful suggestions. The paper has also benefited from the comments of Jie Zhang, Mark Donoghue and Ho Kong Weng. The author is also grateful to T.L. Vincent and three anonymous referees for their comments.     

On the prisoner’s dilemma in R&D with input spillovers and incentives for R&D cooperation

This paper considers a standard model of strategic R&D with spillovers in R&D inputs, and extends the result that duopoly firms engaged in a standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition end up in a prisoner’s dilemma situation for their R&D decisions, whenever spillover effects and R&D costs are relatively low. In terms of social welfare, this prisoner’s dilemma always works to the advantage of both consumers and society. This result allows a novel and enlightening perspective on some issues of substantial interest in the innovation literature. In particular, the incentive firms face towards R&D cooperation in the form of an R&D cartel is shown to be maximal for the case of zero spillovers, which is when the prisoner’s dilemma has the largest scope.     

Collaboration in R&D activities: Firm-specific decisions

In this paper, we study the strategic R&D collaboration by introducing a virtual player to reveal cooperative incentives and keeping investment share and market share independent of each other. Not consistently with the traditional opinions, we show that the superiority of the R&D cartel is due to the coexistence of cooperation and competition when spillovers are exogenous. Moreover, we conclude that high R&D input share must be reflected implicitly by high market share, and that firms’ R&D decisions vary with firms’ specific characteristics when spillovers is endogenous.     

Optimal Dynamics of Innovation in Models of Economic Growth

A nonlinear model of economic growth which involves production, technology stock, and their rates as the main variables is considered. Two trends (growth and decline) in the interaction between the production and R&D investment are examined in the balanced dynamics. The optimal control problem of R&D investment is studied for the balanced dynamics and the utility function with the discounted consumption. The Pontryagin optimality principle is applied for designing the optimal nonlinear dynamics. An existence and uniqueness result is proved for an equilibrium of the saddle type and the convergence property of the optimal trajectories is shown. Quasioptimal feedbacks of the rational type for balancing the dynamical system are proposed. The growth properties of the production rate, R&D, and technology intensities are examined on the generated trajectories.     

Dynamic Model of R&D,Spillovers, and Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria

Using an infinite-horizon two-player differential game, we derive and compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria for a differentiated duopoly engaging in the process of R&D competition. The main findings of this study are as follows. First, Bertrand competition is more efficient if either R&D productivity is low or products are very different. Second, Cournot competition is more efficient provided that R&D productivity is high, products are close substitutes, and spillovers are not close to zero. This last result is different from what has been obtained in the literature. Hence, this shows that considering a dynamic model and more general investment costs does have an impact on the efficiency results.     

A Differential R&D Game: Implications for Knowledge-Based Growth Models

This paper compares the outcomes of strategic and nonstrategic research and development (R&D). Firms undertake cost-reducing R&D in an environment where benefits accrue from their rivals' R&D via a common pool of knowledge. We demonstrate that multiple suboptimal equilibria exist; under these conditions, growth models which do not consider strategic interactions will overestimate or underestimate the growth rate.     

Multi-criteria decision analysis as an aid to the strategic planning of Energy R&D

This paper demonstrates the use of multi-criteria decision analysis to assist an advisory council in selecting areas of interest for government-financed Energy R&D, subject to a budget constraint. The benefits of Energy R&D may be difficult to value in monetary terms. A different way of comparing the anticipated impacts of Energy R&D in various technological areas based on the opinions of the council members given a number of judgment criteria is described, followed by maximizing the overall impact of an Energy R&D programme for a given level of expenditure. Since the council members have different backgrounds, their opinions may diverge and so may the solutions to the optimization problem. The decision model can be used as a discussion model highlighting the points of agreement and disagreement amongst them, so that they can concentrate on the latter in order to reach a vindicated compromise.     

R&;D Equilibrium Strategies with Surfers

A typical assumption in the game-theoretic literature on research and development (R&D) is that all firms belonging to the industry under investigation pursue R&D activities. In this paper, we assume that the industry is composed of two groups; the first (the investors) is made of firms that have R&D facilities and are involved in this type of activity. The second group corresponds to firms that are inactive in R&D (the surfers). The latter group benefits from its competitors’ R&D efforts, thanks to involuntary spillovers. This division of the industry is in line with actual practice, where indeed not all firms are engaged in costly and risky R&D. We adopt a two-stage game formalism where, in the first stage investors decide on their levels of investment in R&D, and in the second stage all firms compete à la Cournot in the product market. We characterize and analyze the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Research supported by NSERC, Canada. F. Ben Abdelaziz is on leave at The College of Engineering, American University of Sharjah, UAE.     

Real R&;D options with time-to-learn and learning-by-doing

We model R&D efforts to enhance the value of a product or technology before final development. Such efforts may be directed towards improving quality, adding new features, or adopting technological innovations. They are implemented as optional, costly and interacting control actions expected to enhance value but with uncertain outcome. We examine the interesting issues of the optimal timing of R&D, the impact of lags in the realization of the R&D outcome, and the choice between accelerated versus staged (sequential) R&D. These issues are also especially interesting since the history of decisions affects future decisions and the distributions of asset prices and induces path-dependency. We show that the existence of optional R&D efforts enhances the investment option value significantly. The impact of a dividend-like payout rate or of project volatility on optimal R&D decisions may be different with R&D timing flexibility than without. The attractiveness of sequential strategies is enhanced in the presence of learning-by-doing and decreasing marginal reversibility of capital effects.     

Change of economic structure-Capital, knowledge, population and pollution

This paper proposes a nonlinear dynamic economic model with endogenous technological change, population, capital accumulation and pollutant accumulation. The system consists of two, industrial and environmental, sectors. The industrial sector produces goods with knowledge, labor, and capital as inputs under perfect competitive conditions, subject to the government's tax policy. The tax income is used by the environmental sector to employ labor and capital. We examine the effects of the environmental policy, knowledge accumulation efficiency and preference change on the environment. We show that the simple system has multiple equilibria and may exhibit permanent oscillations.     

Optimal Expenditure Patterns of a Double-Path Engineering Project

The optimal expenditure pattern for a double-path engineering project, i.e., a project composed of a nonroutine risky R&D path and a routine nonrisky preparatory path, manufacturing related or marketing related, is studied via the calculus of variations to derive a set of twin second-order nonlinear differential equations whose solution yields the optimal joint expenditure. Assuming independence between the risky and nonrisky paths, a constant return per unit time, a gamma-type unimodal conditional-completion density function for the R&D activity, and the principle of diminishing returns on the effort, we find an interesting interplay between the two paths for the peak position and termination of the expenditures. Counterintuitively, we find that the peak expenditure of the R&D path does not necessarily precede that of the preparatory path, although both path expenditure peaks obey the well-known Kamien–Schwartz theorem. That is, for both paths, the expenditure peak positions precede always the peak of the conditional-completion density function of the R&D path.     

Oil producing countries and development problems: A case study of the Iranian economy

This paper focuses on the long-run problem facing economies based on exhaustible resources. A planning model is built to examine the intertemporal investment strategies of a typical oil-based economy. The model is applied to Iran as an example of an oil-producing country. The results show clearly that the expansion pressures imposed on Iran during the mid 1970's overheated the economy to the extent that was beyond the control of the economic planners.     

Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: strategic interactions between R&D, defense and pre-emption

In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium responses (in terms of defense, R&D and preemption) to a potential terrorist attack in a two-country framework (Home and Foreign) using a multi-stage game with imperfect information. We highlight three different types of strategic interactions: (a) how the choice of defense, R&D and pre-emption affects the choice of the same in the other country (strategic interdependence across countries); (b) the strategic interaction between the instruments of terrorism deterrence, namely, defense, R&D and pre-emption in a given country and (c) the strategic interaction between the terrorist and the defender. Our main results are as follows: (i) defense effort in Home is a strategic complement to the defense effort in Foreign. (ii) Even without R&D sharing between countries, we find that R&D effort in one country is a strategic substitute to that in the other; (iii) similar results hold for pre-emption because of its public good nature; (iv) for a given country, defense and R&D efforts may be strategic substitutes or complements depending on the magnitude of the ratio of weighted expected damage between Foreign and Home; (v) R&D and pre-emption may be strategic substitutes or complements depending on the magnitude of the elasticity of damage and (vi) an increase in the likelihood of the terrorist being weak reduces defense effort, may increase or decrease R&D depending on the magnitude of elasticity of damage but increases pre-emptive effort in both countries.     

Social Interactions within a Dynamic Competitive Economy

This paper considers social interactions and investigates how far the properties of moderate social influence and of diminishing returns foster the uniqueness and stability of a dynamic competitive economy. In particular, in contrast to the static framework, it is shown that moderate social influence can neither ensure unique long run outcomes nor rule out other kinds of complexities such as indeterminacy; also, the assumption of diminishing returns for the aggregate economy does not eliminate any of these complexities. Instead, the (derived) property of moderate dynamic social influence, which accounts explicitly for intertemporal spillovers, provides the proper criterion for the (saddlepoint) stable evolution of a competitive economy.     

Development of weapon systems in developing countries: a case study of long range strategies in Taiwan

A long period of economic and industrial development has allowed developing countries to evolve into newly industrialised countries (NICs). Simultaneously, the development of their major weapon systems has evolved from foreign weapons acquisition to independent development due to establishing research and development (R&D) capabilities. However, competitive pressures in the international arms market has finally led these countries to return to foreign acquisition, consequently rapidly eroding their R&D capability. Balancing foreign acquisition and independent development is a long-term strategic problem for NICs. This study applies the system dynamics methodology to construct a weapon systems development model for Taiwan. This model is used to analyse the impact of acquisition policy. The results here indicate three major possible growth curves for weapon systems R&D capability based on alternative weapon systems acquisition policies.     

The option value of advanced R & D

Existing tools for making R&D investment decisions cannot properly capture the option value in R&D. Since many new products are identified as failures during the R&D stages, the possibility of refraining from market introduction may add a significant value to the NPV of the R&D project. This paper presents new theoretical insight by developing a stochastic jump amplitude model in a real setting. The option value of the proposed model depends on the expected number of jumps and the expected size of the jumps in a particular business. The model is verified with empirical knowledge of current research in the field of multimedia at Philips Corporate Research. This way, the gap between real option theory and the practice of decision making with respect to investments in R&D is diminished.