THE IMPACT OF SCARCITY AND ABUNDANCE IN FOOD CHAINS ON SPECIES POPULATION DYNAMICS

ABSTRACT. The population dynamics in a food chain are derived from a sequence of short‐run equilibria of an ecosystem where predator species demand prey biomass, supply own biomass to their predators and are assumed to behave as if they maximize net biomass intake. Introducing prices as scarcity indicators for the biomass of each species enables us to determine a short‐run ecosystem equilibrium guided by prices. Equilibrium regimes differ with respect to their mix of zero‐priced (= abundant) and positive‐priced (= scarce) species. The population dynamics turn out to vary with the prevailing equilibrium regime. Our analysis yields a richer and more complex population dynamics than the traditional predator‐prey dynamics of the Lotka‐Volterra type.     

Capacity and entry issues in online exchanges

With the advent of open standards and Internet technologies, the number of sellers who can participate in online exchanges is greatly increased. We model the competition between identical sellers vying for the same business, and find that there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in prices. The results help us understand the dynamics between a seller’s capacity and his motivation to participate in an auction.     

Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms

We compare two alternative mechanisms for capping prices in two-settlement electricity markets. With sufficient lead time, forward market prices are implicitly capped by competitive pressure of potential entry that will occur when forward prices rise above some backstop price. Another more direct approach is to cap spot prices through a regulatory intervention. In this paper we explore the implications of these two alternative mechanisms in a two-settlement Cournot equilibrium framework. We formulate the market equilibrium as a stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) capturing congestion effects, probabilistic contingencies and horizontal market power. As an illustrative test case, we use the 53-bus Belgian electricity network with representative generator costs but hypothetical demand and ownership structure. Compared to a price-uncapped two-settlement system, a forward cap increases firms’ incentives for forward contracting, whereas a spot cap reduces such incentives. Moreover, in both cases, more forward contracts are committed as the generation resource ownership structure becomes more diversified.     

Competitive equilibrium:walras meets darwin

Prime objects of this note are (I) excess demandgenerated by priee-taking economic agents, and (II) an alternative version of tàtonnementWe relate laws of demand, axioms of revealed preferences, and other notions of generalized monotonicity to “evolutionary stable” prices. Focus is on localstability of competitive equilibrium. Specifically, we establish that evolutionary stable prices are asymptotically attractive under so-called replicator dynamics     

Intertemporal service pricing with strategic customers

We study a two-period intertemporal pricing game in a single-server service system with forward-looking strategic customers who make their purchase decision based on current information and anticipated future gains. Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) prices are derived. A comparison between revenue-maximizing equilibrium prices and welfare-maximizing equilibrium prices is conducted and the impact on the system’s performance of misunderstanding customers’ type is evaluated.     

Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination

This paper shows how a multimarket incumbent can use low pre-entry prices for entry deterrence. We consider an incumbent who operates in two independent markets and has private information about his production cost. In one of the markets, there is a potential entrant offering a differentiated product. The most reasonable perfect Bayesian equilibrium is either the least-cost separating equilibrium or the pooling equilibrium where both types of incumbents set the low-cost monopoly prices. This equilibrium may involve a downward distortion in the pre-entry prices of both markets. Our model has interesting implications for antitrust regulation as well as for international trade policy. First, predatory tests based on a single market are inadequate for a multimarket incumbent. Second, a lower price in a foreign market is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of entry deterrence in a foreign market.     

Structured products equilibria in conic two price markets

A novel equilibrium theory is developed for two price markets permitting investors to trade personally designed structured products. Classical market clearing is enhanced for structured products where the market allows these products to be freely bought at ask prices or sold for bid prices. Competitive pressures lead the market to lower the ask prices and raise the bid prices with the market offering individual investors the widest possible set of acceptable risks provided the aggregate counter cash flow held by the market is consistent with a more conservative prespecified set of acceptable risks. We learn that in equilibrium heterogeneous investors inherit a common hedging objective of maximizing the bid prices of the final structured product sold to market or equivalently minimizing the ask price of what is bought.     

A Cournot–Nash–Bertrand game theory model of a service-oriented Internet with price and quality competition among network transport providers

This paper develops a game theory model of a service-oriented Internet in which profit-maximizing service providers provide substitutable (but not identical) services and compete with the quantities of services in a Cournot–Nash manner, whereas the network transport providers, which transport the services to the users at the demand markets, and are also profit-maximizers, compete with prices in Bertrand fashion and on quality. The consumers respond to the composition of service and network provision through the demand price functions, which are both quantity and quality dependent. We derive the governing equilibrium conditions of the integrated game and show that it satisfies a variational inequality problem. We then describe the underlying dynamics, and provide some qualitative properties, including stability analysis. The proposed algorithmic scheme tracks, in discrete-time, the dynamic evolution of the service volumes, quality levels, and the prices until an approximation of a stationary point (within the desired convergence tolerance) is achieved. Numerical examples demonstrate the modeling and computational framework.     

Option pricing for large agents

This paper considers arbitrage-free option pricing in the presence of large agents. These large agents have a significant market power, and their trading strategies influence the dynamics of the financial asset prices. First, a simple asset pricing model in the presence of large agents is presented. Then a nonlinear partial differential equation is found for the prices of European options in the model. The unit option price depends on the large agent's asset holdings. Finally, a game model is introduced for the interaction between different market players. In this game, the outstanding number of options, as well as the option price, is found as a Nash equilibrium.     

On price competition in location-price models with spatially separated markets

In this paper we study price competition for two types of location-price models in which facility locations are set up and price decisions have to be made in order to maximise profit. We discuss the existence and determination of equilibrium prices in a general location space when facilities have different production costs. It is assumed that each price is bounded from below and demand for a single homogeneous product is price-inelastic. When facilities set mill prices, a price equilibrium rarely exists and necessary conditions for existence are obtained. In particular, when the location space is a tree network, we give a characterisation of the locations for which a unique equilibrium exists for two competitors. With spatial price discrimination, though equilibrium prices might not exist, it is shown that ε-equilibrium prices always exist for any locations of the facilities. A characterisation of ε-equilibrium is also given. Then the location-price problem is reduced to a location problem. A comparison of results with the two types of price determination is also presented. This work has been supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology of Spain under the research project BEC2002-01026, in part financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).     

Strategic interactions in service supply chain with horizontal competition

We analyze strategic interaction issues that arise in service supply chain, such as consulting, service outsourcing, and travel service. To capture strategic interactions in service supply chain, we study a case where there are two service vendors providing competing service products and selling them through a common Service Integrator. In particular, we derive and compare equilibrium solutions (e.g. service prices, wholesale prices, service volumes) for the service supply chain under three different scenarios. We then study the effect of key parameters in the model upon the equilibrium solution using sensitivity analysis, and discuss our results along with a numerical experiment. Finally, future research direction is pointed out.     

Distributed Price Adjustment Based on Convex Analysis

In this paper, we suggest a distributed process of price adjustment toward a partial market equilibrium. As the main contribution, our algorithm of price adjustment is computationally efficient and decentralized. Its convergence properties are crucially based on convex analysis. The proposed price adjustment corresponds to a subgradient scheme for minimizing a special nonsmooth convex function. This function is the total excessive revenue of the market’s participants and its minimizers are equilibrium prices. As the main result, the algorithm of price adjustment is shown to converge to equilibrium prices. Additionally, the market clears on average during the price adjustment process, i.e., by historical averages of supply and demand. Moreover, a global rate of convergence is obtained. We endow our algorithm with decentralized prices by introducing the trade design with price initiative of producers. The latter suggests that producers settle and update their individual prices, and consumers buy at the lowest purchase price.     

Constrained Consumptions, Lipschitzian Demands, and Regular Economies

We consider an exchange economy where the consumers face linear inequality constraints on consumption. We parametrize the economy with the initial endowments and constraints. We exhibit sufficient conditions on the constraints implying that the demand is locally Lipschitzian and continuously differentiable on an open dense subset of full Lebesgue measure. Using this property, we show that the equilibrium manifold is lipeomorphic to an open, connected subset of an Euclidean space and that the lipeomorphism is almost everywhere continuously differentiable. We prove that regular economies are generic and that they have a finite odd number of equilibrium prices and local differentiable selections of the equilibrium prices.Communicated by J. P. CrouzeixThis work was partially supported by CCE, ECOS, and ICM Sistemas Complejos de Ingeniería.     

Equilibrium Correspondence of Linear Exchange Economies

According to Mertens (Ref. 1), the set of equilibrium prices in a linear exchange economy is a convex polyhedral cone (after adding {0}). We give a constructive proof of this fact. Then, we establish a lower-semicontinuity property of the equilibrium price correspondence. The set of equilibrium allocations is a closed, convex polyhedron. We give a characterization of this set.     

Finding all pure strategy Nash equilibria in a planar location game

In this paper, we deal with a planar location-price game where firms first select their locations and then set delivered prices in order to maximize their profits. If firms set the equilibrium prices in the second stage, the game is reduced to a location game for which pure strategy Nash equilibria are studied assuming that the marginal delivered cost is proportional to the distance between the customer and the facility from which it is served. We present characterizations of local and global Nash equilibria. Then an algorithm is shown in order to find all possible Nash equilibrium pairs of locations. The minimization of the social cost leads to a Nash equilibrium. An example shows that there may exist multiple Nash equilibria which are not minimizers of the social cost.     

Equilibrium in an ambiguity-averse mean–variance investors market

In a financial market composed of n risky assets and a riskless asset, where short sales are allowed and mean–variance investors can be ambiguity averse, i.e., diffident about mean return estimates where confidence is represented using ellipsoidal uncertainty sets, we derive a closed form portfolio rule based on a worst case max–min criterion. Then, in a market where all investors are ambiguity-averse mean–variance investors with access to given mean return and variance–covariance estimates, we investigate conditions regarding the existence of an equilibrium price system and give an explicit formula for the equilibrium prices. In addition to the usual equilibrium properties that continue to hold in our case, we show that the diffidence of investors in a homogeneously diffident (with bounded diffidence) mean–variance investors’ market has a deflationary effect on equilibrium prices with respect to a pure mean–variance investors’ market in equilibrium. Deflationary pressure on prices may also occur if one of the investors (in an ambiguity-neutral market) with no initial short position decides to adopt an ambiguity-averse attitude. We also establish a CAPM-like property that reduces to the classical CAPM in case all investors are ambiguity-neutral.     

Bayesian estimation of nonlinear equilibrium models with random coefficients

In this paper, we develop a conditional likelihood based approach for estimating the equilibrium price and shares in markets with differentiated products and oligopoly supply. We model market demand using a discrete choice model with random coefficients and random utility. For most applications, the likelihood function of equilibrium prices and shares is intractable and cannot be directly analyzed. To overcome this, we develop a Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation strategy to estimate parameters and distributions. To illustrate our methodology, we generate a dataset of prices and quantities simulated from a differentiated goods oligopoly across a number of markets. We apply our methodology to this dataset to demonstrate its attractive features as well as its accuracy and validity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal portfolio choice and stochastic volatility

In this paper we examine the effect of stochastic volatility on optimal portfolio choice in both partial and general equilibrium settings. In a partial equilibrium setting we derive an analog of the classic Samuelson–Merton optimal portfolio result and define volatility‐adjusted risk aversion as the effective risk aversion of an individual investing in an asset with stochastic volatility. We extend prior research which shows that effective risk aversion is greater with stochastic volatility than without for investors without wealth effects by providing further comparative static results on changes in effective risk aversion due to changes in the distribution of volatility. We demonstrate that effective risk aversion is increasing in the constant absolute risk aversion and the variance of the volatility distribution for investors without wealth effects. We further show that for these investors a first‐order stochastic dominant shift in the volatility distribution does not necessarily increase effective risk aversion, whereas a second‐order stochastic dominant shift in the volatility does increase effective risk aversion. Finally, we examine the effect of stochastic volatility on equilibrium asset prices. We derive an explicit capital asset pricing relationship that illustrates how stochastic volatility alters equilibrium asset prices in a setting with multiple risky assets, where returns have a market factor and asset‐specific random components and multiple investor types. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resale price maintenance in supply chains with general multiplicative demand

We analyze a supply chain with a Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contract in which the manufacturer sets the retail price with a general multiplicative price–demand function and prove the existence/uniqueness of an equilibrium. We also compare the equilibrium prices and quantities, consumer surplus and total system welfare for the RPM and wholesale price contracts. We conclude that a manufacturer may capture a smaller share of the total supply chain profit despite her ability to set the retail price.     

Pricing with markups in industries with increasing marginal costs

We study a game that models a market in which heterogeneous producers of perfect substitutes make pricing decisions in a first stage, followed by consumers that select a producer that sells at lowest price. As opposed to Cournot or Bertrand competition, producers select prices using a supply function that maps prices to production levels. Solutions of this type of models are normally referred to as supply function equilibria. We consider a market where producers’ convex costs functions are proportional to each other, depending on the efficiency of each particular producer. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that uses simple supply functions that replicate the cost structure. We then specialize the model to monomial cost functions with exponent \(q>0\) , which allows us to reinterpret the simple supply functions as a markup applied to the production cost. We prove that an equilibrium for the markups exists if and only if the number of producers in the market is strictly larger than \(1+q\) , and if an equilibrium exists, it is unique. The main result for monomials is that the equilibrium nearly minimizes the total production cost when the market is competitive. The result holds because when there is enough competition, markups are bounded, thus preventing prices to be significantly distorted from costs. Focusing on the case of linear unit-cost functions on the production quantities, we characterize the equilibrium accurately and refine the previous result to establish an almost tight bound on the worst-case inefficiency of equilibria. Finally, we derive explicitly the producers’ best response for series-parallel networks with linear unit-cost functions, extending our previous result to more general topologies. We prove that a unique equilibrium exists if and only if the network that captures the market structure is 3-edge-connected. For non-series-parallel markets, we provide an example that does not admit an equilibrium on markups.