Insufficiency of the quantum state for deducing observational probabilities

It is usually assumed that the quantum state is sufficient for deducing all probabilities for a system. This may be true when there is a single observer, but it is not true in a universe large enough that there are many copies of an observer. Then the probability of an observation cannot be deduced simply from the quantum state (say as the expectation value of the projection operator for the observation, as in traditional quantum theory). One needs additional rules to get the probabilities. What these rules are is not logically deducible from the quantum state, so the quantum state itself is insufficient for deducing observational probabilities. This is the measure problem of cosmology.     

On the relation between quantum mechanical probabilities and event frequencies

The probability `measure' for measurements at two consecutive moments of time is non-additive. These probabilities, on the other hand, may be determined by the limit of relative frequency of measured events, which are by nature additive. We demonstrate that there are only two ways to resolve this problem. The first solution places emphasis on the precise use of the concept of conditional probability for successive measurements. The physically correct conditional probabilities define additive probabilities for two-time measurements. These probabilities depend explicitly on the resolution of the physical device and do not, therefore, correspond to a function of the associated projection operators. It follows that quantum theory distinguishes between physical events and propositions about events, the latter are not represented by projection operators and that the outcomes of two-time experiments cannot be described by quantum logic. The alternative explanation is rather radical: it is conceivable that the relative frequencies for two-time measurements do not converge, unless a particular consistency condition is satisfied. If this is true, a strong revision of the quantum mechanical formalism may prove necessary. We stress that it is possible to perform experiments that will distinguish the two alternatives.     

Decoherent Histories and Realism

We reconsider the decoherent histories approach to quantum mechanics and analyze some problems related to its interpretation which we believe have not been adequately clarified by its proponents. We put forward some assumptions which, in our opinion, are necessary for a realistic interpretation of the probabilities that the formalism attaches to decoherent histories. We prove that such assumptions, unless one limits the set of the decoherent families which can be taken into account, lead to a logical contradiction. The line of reasoning we follow is conceptually different from other arguments which have been presented and which have been rejected by the supporters of the decoherent histories approach. The conclusion is that the decoherent histories approach, to be considered as an interesting realistic alternative to the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics, requires the identification of a mathematically precise criterion to characterize an appropriate set of decoherent families which does not give rise to any problem.     

An Introduction to Many Worlds in Quantum Computation

The interpretation of quantum mechanics is an area of increasing interest to many working physicists. In particular, interest has come from those involved in quantum computing and information theory, as there has always been a strong foundational element in this field. This paper introduces one interpretation of quantum mechanics, a modern ‘many-worlds’ theory, from the perspective of quantum computation. Reasons for seeking to interpret quantum mechanics are discussed, then the specific ‘neo-Everettian’ theory is introduced and its claim as the best available interpretation defended. The main objections to the interpretation, including the so-called “problem of probability” are shown to fail. The local nature of the interpretation is demonstrated, and the implications of this both for the interpretation and for quantum mechanics more generally are discussed. Finally, the consequences of the theory for quantum computation are investigated, and common objections to using many worlds to describe quantum computing are answered. We find that using this particular many-worlds theory as a physical foundation for quantum computation gives several distinct advantages over other interpretations, and over not interpreting quantum theory at all.     

On the structure of quantal proposition systems

I define sublaltices of quantum propositions that can be taken as having determinate (but perhaps unknown) truth values for a given quantum state, in the sense that sufficiently many two-valued maps satisfying a Boolean homomorphism condition exist on each determinate sublattice to generate a Kolmogorov probability space for the probabilities defined by the slate. I show that these sublattices are maximal, subject to certain constraints, from which it follows easily that they are unique. I discuss the relevance of this result for the measurement problem, relating it to an early proposal by Jauch and Piron for defining a new notion of state for quantum systems, to a recent uniqueness proof by Clifton for the sublattice of propositions specified as determinate by modal interpretations of quantum mechanics that exploit the polar decompostion theorem, and to my own previous suggestions for interpreting quantum mechanics without the projection postulate.     

Incompatible stochastic processes and complex probabilities

The definition of conditional probabilities is based upon the existence of a joint probability. However, a reconstruction of the joint probability from given conditional probabilities imposes certain constraints upon the latter, so that if several conditional probabilities are chosen arbitrarily, the corresponding joint probability may not exist. Such an incompleteness in conditional probabilities can be eliminated by introducing complex probabilities. The physical meaning of the new mathematical formalism, as well as its relation to quantum probabilities, is discussed.     

Property composition in Healey's interpretation of quantum mechanics

I show that on Richard Healey's interpretation of quantum mechanics, a composite property is possessed if and only if each of its factors is possessed. This result has a number of agreeable consequences, the foremost being that it exempts Healey's interpretation from the Decomposition Problem, a problem afflicting some rival interpretations. At the heart of my argument is a purely mathematical theorem, which I prove, concerning projection operators in tensorproduct Hilbert spaces.     

Objective Probability and Quantum Fuzziness

This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the “objective preparations view” or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities. This makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the only testable feature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement outcomes. Most important among these are the objective fuzziness of all relative positions and momenta and the consequent incomplete spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world. The latter makes it possible to draw a clear distinction between the macroscopic and the microscopic. This in turn makes it possible to understand the special status of measurements in all standard formulations of the theory. Whereas Bayesians have written contemptuously about the “folly” of conjoining “objective” to “probability,” there are various reasons why quantum-mechanical probabilities can be considered objective, not least the fact that they are needed to quantify an objective fuzziness. But this cannot be appreciated without giving thought to the makeup of the world, which Bayesians refuse to do. Doing this on the basis of how quantum mechanics assigns probabilities, one finds that what constitutes the macroworld is a single Ultimate Reality, about which we know nothing, except that it manifests the macroworld or manifests itself as the macroworld. The so-called microworld is neither a world nor a part of any world but instead is instrumental in the manifestation of the macroworld. Quantum mechanics affords us a glimpse “behind” the manifested world, at stages in the process of manifestation, but it does not allow us to describe what lies “behind” the manifested world except in terms of the finished product—the manifested world, for without the manifested world there is nothing in whose terms we could describe its manifestation.     

Eigenvalue Distributions of Reduced Density Matrices

Given a random quantum state of multiple distinguishable or indistinguishable particles, we provide an effective method, rooted in symplectic geometry, to compute the joint probability distribution of the eigenvalues of its one-body reduced density matrices. As a corollary, by taking the distribution’s support, which is a convex moment polytope, we recover a complete solution to the one-body quantum marginal problem. We obtain the probability distribution by reducing to the corresponding distribution of diagonal entries (i.e., to the quantitative version of a classical marginal problem), which is then determined algorithmically. This reduction applies more generally to symplectic geometry, relating invariant measures for the coadjoint action of a compact Lie group to their projections onto a Cartan subalgebra, and can also be quantized to provide an efficient algorithm for computing bounded height Kronecker and plethysm coefficients.     

Probability sum rules and consistent quantum histories

An example shows that weak decoherence is more restrictive than the minimal logical decoherence structure that allows probabilities to be used consistently for quantum histories. The probabilities in the sum rules that define minimal decoherence are all calculated by using a projection operator to describe each possibility for the state at each time. Weak decoherence requires more sum rules. They bring in additional variables, that require different measurements and a different way to calculate probabilities, and raise questions of operational meaning. The example shows that extending the linearly positive probability formula from weak to minimal decoherence gives probabilities that are different from those calculated in the usual way using the Born and von Neumann rules and a projection operator at each time.     

Quantum Probability’s Algebraic Origin

Max Born’s statistical interpretation made probabilities play a major role in quantum theory. Here we show that these quantum probabilities and the classical probabilities have very different origins. Although the latter always result from an assumed probability measure, the first include transition probabilities with a purely algebraic origin. Moreover, the general definition of transition probability introduced here comprises not only the well-known quantum mechanical transition probabilities between pure states or wave functions, but further physically meaningful and experimentally verifiable novel cases. A transition probability that differs from 0 and 1 manifests the typical quantum indeterminacy in a similar way as Heisenberg’s and others’ uncertainty relations and, furthermore, rules out deterministic states in the same way as the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. However, the transition probability defined here achieves a lot more beyond that: it demonstrates that the algebraic structure of the Hilbert space quantum logic dictates the precise values of certain probabilities and it provides an unexpected access to these quantum probabilities that does not rely on states or wave functions.     

Inverse spin-<Emphasis Type="Italic">s</Emphasis> portrait and representation of qudit states by single probability vectors

Using the tomographic probability representation of qudit states and the inverse spin-portrait method, we suggest a bijective map of the qudit density operator onto a single probability distribution. Within the framework of the approach proposed, any quantum spin-j state is associated with the (2j+1)(4j+1)-dimensional probability vector whose components are labeled by spin projections and points on the sphere S². Such a vector has a clear physical meaning and can be relatively easily measured. Quantum states form a convex subset of the 2j(4j + 3) simplex, with the boundary being illustrated for qubits (j = 1/2) and qutrits (j = 1). A relation to the (2j +1)^2_ and (2j +1)(2j +2)-dimensional probability vectors is established in terms of spin-s portraits. We also address an auxiliary problem of the optimum reconstruction of qudit states, where the optimality implies a minimum relative error of the density matrix due to the errors in measured probabilities.     

Transitions to the Continuum: Three Different Approaches

We present three different derivations of the transition probabilities to the continuum. It is shown that calculations, performed as a direct application of the postulates of orthodox quantum mechanics (OQM), do not yield results consistent with experiments. Traditional treatments are summarized and criticized. The relation of the transitions to the continuum with the traditional quantum measurement problem is pointed out; we sum up and comment some contributions concerning this issue. It is shown that an approach based on the notion of spontaneous projections yields expressions of the transition probabilities similar to those obtained in the traditional way and new predictions which could be submitted to experimental tests.     

Quantum Interference and Many Worlds: A New Family of Classical Analogies

We present a new way of constructing classical analogies of quantum interference. These analogies share one common factor: they treat closed loops as fundamental entities. Such analogies can be used to understand the difference between quantum and classical probability; they can also be used to illuminate the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. An examination of these analogies suggests that closed loops (particularly closed loops in time) may have special significance in interpretations of quantum interference, because they allow probabilities to remain classically additive.     

The Ithaca Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, and Objective Probabilities

The Ithaca interpretation of quantum mechanics, proposed in 1996 by David Mermin, seeks to reduce the interpretive puzzles of quantum mechanics to the single puzzle of interpreting objective quantum probabilities. Some suggestions are made as to how the numerical values of quantum probabilities could be ontologically based in a world containing all the possible outcomes of all probabilistic processes. It is then shown that Hardy's paradox, discussed by Mermin, can be resolved when probabilities are interpreted in this way.     

The Madelung Picture as a Foundation of Geometric Quantum Theory

Despite its age, quantum theory still suffers from serious conceptual difficulties. To create clarity, mathematical physicists have been attempting to formulate quantum theory geometrically and to find a rigorous method of quantization, but this has not resolved the problem. In this article we argue that a quantum theory recursing to quantization algorithms is necessarily incomplete. To provide an alternative approach, we show that the Schrödinger equation is a consequence of three partial differential equations governing the time evolution of a given probability density. These equations, discovered by Madelung, naturally ground the Schrödinger theory in Newtonian mechanics and Kolmogorovian probability theory. A variety of far-reaching consequences for the projection postulate, the correspondence principle, the measurement problem, the uncertainty principle, and the modeling of particle creation and annihilation are immediate. We also give a speculative interpretation of the equations following Bohm, Vigier and Tsekov, by claiming that quantum mechanical behavior is possibly caused by gravitational background noise.     

Nonstandard (non-σ-additive) probabilities in algebraic quantum field theory

Traditionally, physicists deduce the observational (physical) meaning of probabilistic predictions from the implicit assumption that thewell-defined events whose probabilities are 0 never occur. For example, the conclusion that in a potentially infinite sequence of identical experiments with probability 0.5 (like coin tossing) the frequency of heads tends to 0.5 follows from the theorem that sequences for which the frequencies do not tend to 0.5 occur with probability 0. Similarly, the conclusion that in quantum mechanics, measuring a quantity always results in a number from its spectrum is justified by the fact that the probability of getting a number outside the spectrum is 0. In the mid-60s, a consistent formalization of this assumption was proposed by Kolmogorov and Martin-Löf, who defined arandom element of a probability space as an element that does not belong to any definable set of probability 0 (definable in some reasonable sense). This formalization is based on the fact that traditional probability measures are σ-additive, i.e., that the union of countably many sets of probability 0 has measure 0. In quantum mechanics with infinitely many degrees of freedom (e.g., in quantum field theory) and in statistical physics one must often consider non-σ-additive measures, for which the Martin-Löf's definition does not apply. Many such measures can be defined as “limits” of standard probability distributions. In this paper, we formalize the notion of a random element for such finitely-additive probability measures, and thus explain the observational (physical) meaning of such probabilities.     

A discussion on the origin of quantum probabilities

We study the origin of quantum probabilities as arising from non-Boolean propositional-operational structures. We apply the method developed by Cox to non distributive lattices and develop an alternative formulation of non-Kolmogorovian probability measures for quantum mechanics. By generalizing the method presented in previous works, we outline a general framework for the deduction of probabilities in general propositional structures represented by lattices (including the non-distributive case).