A subprime lending market primer

Opening a copy of TheMathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

The mathematical ethicist

Opening a copy ofThe Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Williams college student course survey form: Instructor modified version

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligenceryou may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

The three little pigs

Opening a copy ofThe Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column.Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

More from the mathematical ethicist

Opening a copy ofThe Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column.Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

A killer theorem

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Mangum,P.I.

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway —a mathematical journal, or what? ” Or you may ask, “Where am I? ” Or even “Who am I? ” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams ’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It ’s mathematical, it ’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

This theorem is big

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Rumpled stiltskin

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Journey to the center of mathematics

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

The Math fall fashion preview

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Trial and error

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligencer you may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?“ Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Don’t Touch the Button

Opening a copy of The Mathematical Intelligenceryou may ask yourself uneasily, “What is this anyway—a mathematical journal, or what?” Or you may ask, “Where am I?” Or even “Who am I?” This sense of disorientation is at its most acute when you open to Colin Adams’s column. Relax. Breathe regularly. It’s mathematical, it’s a humor column, and it may even be harmless.     

Contextualism on a pragmatic,not a skeptical,footing

Contextualism is supposed to explain why the following argument for skepticism seems plausible: (1) I don’t know that I am not a bodiless brain-in-a-vat (BIV); (2) If I know I have hands, then I know I am not a bodiless BIV; (3) Therefore, I do not know I have hands. Keith DeRose claims that (1) and (2) are “initially plausible.” I claim that (1) is initially plausible only because of an implicit argument that stands behind it; it is not intuitively plausible. The argument DeRose offers is based on the requirement of sensitivity, that is, on the idea that if you know something then you would not believe it if it were false. I criticize the sensitivity requirement thereby undercutting its support for (1) and the skeptical data that contextualism is meant to explain. While skepticism is not a plausible ground for contextualism, I argue that certain pragmatic considerations are. It’s plausible to think that to know something more evidence is required when more is at stake. The best way to handle skepticism is to criticize the arguments for it. We should not adopt contextualism as a means of accommodating skepticism even if there are other pragmatic reasons for being a contextualist about knowledge.     

Fermats ?ad?quare? – und kein Ende?

In his papers on the determination of maxima and minima and on the calculation of tangents Pierre Fermat uses two different Latin verbs, ?quare and ad?quare, which do not differ semantically but are used by him obviously in different meanings. While ?quabitur is used unambiguously in the sense of “is equal” the meaning of ad?quabitur is disputed by the experts since Tannery’s French translation (Œuvres complètes de Fermat, Vol. III, 1896). Herbert Breger (Arch. Hist. Exact Sci. 46, 193–219, (1994), p. 197 f), for instance, holds the view that Fermat used the word ad?quare in the sense of “to put equal” and adds: In a mathematical context, the only difference between “?quare” and “ad?quare” (if there is any) seems to be that the latter gives more stress on the fact that the equality is achieved. In contrast to this Michael Mahoney holds the thesis that ad?quare describes a counterfactual equality (Mahoney, M.S.: Fermat, Pierre de. In: Dictionary of Scientific Biography, vol. IV (1971), p. 569) or a pseudo-equality (Mahoney, M.S.: The Mathematical Career of Pierre de Fermat (1601–1665), (1973), p. 164), whatever that may mean. This viewpoint has been taken up again recently by Enrico Giusti (Ann. Fac. Sci. Toulouse, Math. (6), 18 fascicule spécial, 59–85 (2009)) in order to bring arguments to bear against Breger. In contrast to these (and other) authors, I show that Fermat makes a subtle logical distinction between the words ?quare and ad?quare. The same distinction is made by Nicolas Bourbaki introducing his ?théorie égalitaire?. Notwithstanding: both verbs stand for a ?relation d’égalité?. On this premiss, I describe—using six selected examples—that Fermat’s “method” may be justified right down to the last detail, even from the view of today’s mathematical knowledge.     

Righting the early history of computing,or how sausage was made

The short answer to the question just posed seems to be, “Not much.” Since I have given “the long answer” elsewhere,¹² I can summarize it here. Berg could see no point in writing Bromley. What could he write to someone he believed guilty of plagiarism? What could such a letter accomplish? He did, however, write to New York University Press; to all the universities involved, and to the Works’ English publisher (Pickering and Chatto), who said they passed the letter on to Campbell-Kelly (30 June 1990); to a great many professional societies in Australia, England, and the United States; to a great many governmental agencies and some politicians in those countries; to some publications, both academic and popular; to the Pope and several cardinals; and to a miscellany of other individuals. Generally, those in the best position to do something—for example, the three universities involved —did not even answer Berg’s letter. Others often did answer, but their answer was generally that they were in no position to do anything. That was how matters stood when I published my first article on “the Berg Affair”.₁₂ Its publication finally roused those best positioned to answer. Late in 1993, Galler, Bromley, and Campbell-Kelly wrote letters to the editor of Accountability in Research criticizing me for not getting their side of the story before I published Berg’s. Campbell-Kelly threatened the journal’s publisher with a lawsuit if I (or it) did not retract. The three also provided some insight into what their explanation of events might be. Bromley, though listed prominently in ads for the Works, claimed to have had only a small part, merely advising Campbell-Kelly on selection and arrangement of the papers printed in Volumes 2 and 3. Campbell-Kelly confirmed that Bromley took no part in the detailed editing or in the provision of documents. That work was performed by one C.J.D. (“Jim”) Roberts, a “London-based independent scholar” who was “editorial consultant to the Works” (and, apparently, worked directly under Campbell-Kelly). Roberts seems to deserve more public credit than he has so far received. According to Campbell-Kelly, it was Roberts who, making a systematic search for unknown holdings of Babbage, turned up the original of the letter to Quetelet by writing the Royal Library (one “tiny triumph” among many). Campbell-Kelly also claimed that neither he nor Roberts knew of Berg’s prior discovery.     

Expressing and Describing Experiences. A Case of Showing Versus Saying

Experiences are interpreted as conscious mental occurrences that are of phenomenal character. There is already a kind of (weak) intentionality involved with this phenomenal interpretation. A stricter conception of experiences distinguishes between purely phenomenal experiences and intentional experiences in a narrow sense. Wittgenstein’s account of psychological (experiential) verbs is taken over: Usually, expressing mental states verbally is not describing them. According to this, “I believe” can be seen as an expression of one’s own belief, but not as an expression of a belief about one’s belief. Hence, the utterance “I believe it is raining” shows that I believe that it is raining, although it is not said by these words that I believe that it is raining. Thinking thoughts such as “I believe it is raining, but it is not raining” (a variant of Moore’s paradox) is an absurdity between what is already said by silently uttering “It is not raining” and what is shown by silently uttering “I believe it is raining.” The paper agrees with a main result of Wittgenstein’s considerations of Moore’s paradox, namely the view that logical structure, deducibility, and consistency cannot be reduced solely to propositions—besides a logic of propositions, there is, for example, a logic of assertions and of imperatives, respectively.     

What Mary’s Aboutness Is About

The aim of this paper is to reinforce anti-physicalism by extending the “hard problem” to a specific kind of intentional states. For reaching this target, I investigate the mental content of the new intentional states of Jackson’s Mary. I proceed in the following way: I start analyzing the knowledge argument, which highlights the “hard problem” tied to phenomenal consciousness. In a second step, I investigate a powerful physicalist reply to this argument: the phenomenal concept strategy. In a third step, I propose a constitutional account of phenomenal concepts that captures the Mary scenario adequately, but implies anti-physicalist referents. In a last step, I point at the ramifications constitutional phenomenal concepts have on the constitution of Mary’s new intentional states. Therefore, by focusing the attention on phenomenal concepts, the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness will be carried over to the alleged “easy problem” of intentional states as well.     

Opinion

The calculus sequence is a juggernaut and there are strong indications that we are heading for the 1500-page text. If enough mathematicians are willing to devote their energies to writing one-year texts that include standard topics decided on by a national committee and if major publishers with a large fixed focus can be found to promote such texts, there is a chance of reversing the trend toward mammoth books. However, it is important to avoid a “consensus text”; we need several competing books, each with a stamp of its author or authors. Negating the influence of publishers will be difficult, and I have no idea how to bring it about. The calculus market is enormous, and the commercial firms active in it will continue to attempt to gain an advantage any way they can. It would be helpful if all TA’s were required to have at least one course in physics so that topics with applications could be discussed with authority. For example, one of the most beautiful applications of integration is that of computing areas and volumes of irregularly shaped objects. Yet this topic is not considered an “application,” because students are not convinced they will ever have to calculate such an area or volume. It is hard to find real applications of calculus that students can identify as important. Finally, how do we change the study habits of the average student? Or should we try? The organization of most texts works against change; unless we develop another system we will be locked into the one we have.     

The semantics of knowledge attributions

The basic idea of conversational contextualism is that knowledge attributions are context sensitive in that a given knowledge attribution may be true if made in one context but false if made in another, owing to differences in the attributors’ conversational contexts. Moreover, the context sensitivity involved is traced back to the context sensitivity of the word “know,” which, in turn, is commonly modelled on the case either of genuine indexicals such as “I” or “here” or of comparative adjectives such as “tall” or “rich.” But contextualism faces various problems. I argue that in order to solve these problems we need to look for another account of the context sensitivity involved in knowledge attributions and I sketch an alternative proposal.