Sequencing games without initial order

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., one-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (Eur J Oper Res 40:344–351, 1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost allocation rules for uncertainty sequencing situations with equal processing times.     

Control costs and potential functions for spatial games

Van Damme and Weibull (1998, 2002) model the noise in games as endogenously determined tremble probabilities, by assuming that with some effort players can control the probability of implementing the intended strategy. Following their methodology, we derive logit-like adjustment rules for games played on quasi-symmetric weighted graphs and explore the properties of the ensuing Markov chain. Received: November 2000/Revised: June 2002     

On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games

In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. We show that these sequencing games are convex if the initial order of the jobs is a concatenation of chains. F. Klijn's research is supported by a Ramón y Cajal contract of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The main part of F. Klijn's work was supported by a Marie Curie Fellowship of the European Community programme “Improving Human Research Potential and the Socio-economic Knowledge Base” under contract number HPMF-CT-2001-01232, carried out at the Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His work is also partially supported by Research Grant BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA     

Balancedness of Sequencing Games with Multiple Parallel Machines

We provide simple constructive proofs of balancedness of classes of m-PS (m-Parallel Sequencing) games, which arise from sequencing situations with m parallel machines. This includes the setting that is studied by Calleja et al. (2001) and Calleja et al. (2002), who provided a complex constructive proof and a simple non-constructive proof of balancedness of a restricted class of 2-PS games, respectively. Furthermore, we provide a counterexample to illustrate that our balancedness results cannot be extended to a general setting.     

On a new class of nonzero-sum discounted stochastic games having stationary Nash equilibrium points

A new class of nonzero-sum Borel state space discounted stochastic games having stationary Nash equilibria is presented. Some applications to economic theory are also included. Received: January 2002/Revised: July 2002     

最小成本生成树对策上Shapley值的新刻画及其应用

2002年,Kar利用有效性、无交叉补贴性、群独立性和等处理性四个公理对最小成本生成树对策上的Shapley值进行了刻画。本文提出了“群有效性”这一公理,利用这一公理和“等处理性”两个公理,给出了最小成本生成树对策上Shapley值的一种新的公理化刻画。最后,运用最小成本生成树对策的Shapley值,对网络服务的费用分摊问题进行了分析。