On linear differential games with integral constraints

The paper is devoted to quasilinear conflict-controlled processes of general form with a cylindrical terminal set. A specific feature is that, instead of a dynamical system, we start with representation of a solution in a form that allows one to include an additive term with the initial data and a control unit. This makes it possible to consider a broad spectrum of dynamic processes in a unified scheme. Our study is based on the method of resolving functions. We obtain sufficient conditions for the solvability of the pursuit problem at a certain guaranteed time in the class of strategies that use information on the behavior of the opponent in the past, as well as in the class of stroboscopic strategies. We also find conditions under which information on the prehistory of the evader does not matter. The guaranteed times of various schemes of the resolving function method are compared with the guaranteed time of Pontryagin’s first direct method. The qualitative results are illustrated by an example of a game problem with simple motions and incomplete sweeping for special control domains in the Pontryagin condition.     

Linear differential pursuit games with integral constraints in the presence of delay

Problems involving linear differential pursuit games were studied by many authors; their work served as a basis for studying pursuit problems in linear differential games with integral constraints. In the present paper, we obtain sufficient conditions for the solvability of linear pursuit problems with integral constraints on the control of the players in the presence of delay.     

Dynamically stable cooperative solutions in randomly furcating differential games

The paradigm of randomly furcating differential games incorporates stochastic elements via randomly branching payoffs in differential games. This paper considers dynamically stable cooperative solutions in randomly furcating differential games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random events are derived. This new approach widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to problems where future environments are not known with certainty.     

Sufficient conditions for optimality in two-person zero-sum differential games with state and strategy constraints

A sufficiency theorem for optimal feedback strategies in two-person zero-sum differential games is given. The theorem is applicable to a wide class of such games for which strategies are Borel measurable functions on a subset of the state space. The theorem generalizes those of [1, 2, and 5].     

The bounded core for games with precedence constraints

An element of the possibly unbounded core of a cooperative game with precedence constraints belongs to its bounded core if any transfer to a player from any of her subordinates results in payoffs outside the core. The bounded core is the union of all bounded faces of the core, it is nonempty if the core is nonempty, and it is a continuous correspondence on games with coinciding precedence constraints. If the precedence constraints generate a connected hierarchy, then the core is always nonempty. It is shown that the bounded core is axiomatized similarly to the core for classical cooperative games, namely by boundedness (BOUND), nonemptiness for zero-inessential two-person games (ZIG), anonymity, covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), and certain variants of the reduced game property (RGP), the converse reduced game property (CRGP), and the reconfirmation property. The core is the maximum solution that satisfies a suitably weakened version of BOUND together with the remaining axioms. For games with connected hierarchies, the bounded core is axiomatized by BOUND, ZIG, COV, and some variants of RGP and CRGP, whereas the core is the maximum solution that satisfies the weakened version of BOUND, COV, and the variants of RGP and CRGP.     

Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory

In this paper I analyze a repeated coordination game between a bounded memory player and a fully rational player. A bounded memory player is a player who is subject to imperfect recall, but, conditional on this constraint, acts optimally every point in time given her beliefs over the actual history of the game. I show that the results contrast with the ones in the finite automata literature. In particular, a result denoted the “tyranny of the weak” in Gilboa and Samet (Games Econ Behav 1: 213–221, 1989) is no longer present here.     

Assignment games with stable core

We prove that the core of an assignment game (a two-sided matching game with transferable utility as introduced by Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is stable (i.e., it is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern solution) if and only if there is a matching between the two types of players such that the corresponding entries in the underlying matrix are all row and column maximums. We identify other easily verifiable matrix properties and show their equivalence to various known sufficient conditions for core-stability. By these matrix characterizations we found that on the class of assignment games, largeness of the core, extendability and exactness of the game are all equivalent conditions, and strictly imply the stability of the core. In turn, convexity and subconvexity are equivalent, and strictly imply all aformentioned conditions. Final version: April 1, 2001     

Partial differential equations with differential constraints

A geometric setting for constrained exterior differential systems on fibered manifolds with n-dimensional bases is proposed. Constraints given as submanifolds of jet bundles (locally defined by systems of first-order partial differential equations) are shown to carry a natural geometric structure, called the canonical distribution. Systems of second-order partial differential equations subjected to differential constraints are modeled as exterior differential systems defined on constraint submanifolds. As an important particular case, Lagrangian systems subjected to first-order differential constraints are considered. Different kinds of constraints are introduced and investigated (Lagrangian constraints, constraints adapted to the fibered structure, constraints arising from a (co)distribution, semi-holonomic constraints, holonomic constraints).     

The mixed expansion of differential games with incomplete information

Kuhn's theorem [1953] about behavioral strategies is proved for the mixed expansion of a differential game.     

Communication games with partially soft power constraints

We consider a class of communication games which involves the transmission of a Gaussian random variable through a conditionally Gaussian memoryless channel in the presence of an intelligent jammer. The jammer is allowed to tap the channel and feed a correlated signal back into it. The transmitter-receiver pair is assumed to cooperate in minimizing some quadratic fidelity criterion while the jammer maximizes this same criterion. Security strategies which protect against irrational jammer behavior and which yield an upper bound on the cost are shown to exist for the transmitter-receiver pair over a class of fidelity criteria. Closed-form expressions for these strategies are provided in the paper, which are, in all cases but one, linear in the available information.This work was supported in part by the US Air Force under Grant No. AFOSR-84-0056 and in part by the Joint Services Electronics Program under Contract No. N00014-84-C-0149. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1986 IEEE Symposium on Information Theory, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1986.     

General sum games with joint chance constraints

We consider an $n$-player non-cooperative game with continuous strategy sets. The strategy set of each player contains a set of stochastic linear constraints. We model the stochastic linear constraints of each player as a joint chance constraint. We assume that the row vectors of a matrix defining the stochastic constraints of each player are independent and each row vector follows a multivariate normal distribution. Under certain conditions, we show the existence of a Nash equilibrium for this game.     

Differential games of fixed duration with state constraints

We consider differential games of fixed duration with phase coordinate restrictions on the players. Results of Ref. 1 on games with phase restrictions on only one of the players are extended. Using Berkovitz's definition of a game (Ref. 2), we prove the existence and continuity (or Lipschitz continuity) of the value under appropriate assumptions. We also note that the value can be characterized as the viscosity solution of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation.This work comprises a part of the author's PhD Thesis completed at Purdue University under the direction of Professor L. D. Berkovitz. The author wishes to thank Professor Berkovitz for suggesting the problem and many valuable discussions. During the research for this work, the author was supported by a David Ross Grant from Purdue University as well as by NSF Grant No. DMS-87-00813.     

Bicriterion differential games with qualitative outcomes

Combat games are studied as bicriterion differential games with qualitative outcomes determined by threshold values on the criterion functions. Survival and capture strategies of the players are defined using the notion of security levels. Closest approach survival strategies (CASS) and minimum risk capture strategies (MRCS) are important strategies for the players identified as solutions to four optimization problems involving security levels. These are used, in combination with the preference orderings of the qualitative outcomes by the players, to delineate the win regions and the secured draw and mutual kill regions for the players. It is shown that the secured draw regions and the secured mutual kill regions for the two players are not necessarily the same. Simple illustrative examples are given.This paper is based partially on research supported by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, India, through a Research Associateship Grant to the second author.     

Nonzero-sum differential games with bargaining solutions

Nash's bargaining solution for finite games is extended to differential games with nonzero-sum integral payoffs. Sufficient conditions for the optimality of a strategy pair are established. An example is given.