A Penalty Approach for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem

The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP),in which both the utility function and the strategy space of each player depend on the strategies chosen by all other players.This problem has been used to model various problems in applications.However,the convergent solution algorithms are extremely scare in the literature.In this paper,we present an incremental penalty method for the GNEP,and show that a solution of the GNEP can be found by solving a sequence of smooth NEPs.We then apply the semismooth Newton method with Armijo line search to solve latter problems and provide some results of numerical experiments to illustrate the proposed approach.     

求解广义纳什均衡问题的指数型惩罚函数方法

本文利用指数型惩罚函数部分地惩罚耦合约束,从而将广义纳什均衡问题(GNEP)的求解转化为求解一系列光滑的惩罚纳什均衡问题 (NEP)。我们证明了若光滑的惩罚NEP序列的解序列的聚点处EMFCQ成立,则此聚点是 GNEP的一个解。进一步,我们把惩罚 NEP的KKT条件转化为一个非光滑方程系统,然后应用带有 Armijo 线搜索的半光滑牛顿法来求解此系统。最后,数值结果表明我们的指数型惩罚函数方法是有效的。     

Time-Dependent Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem

We prove an existence result for the time-dependent generalized Nash equilibrium problem under generalized convexity without neither a quasi-variational inequality reformulation nor a quasi-equilibrium problem reformulation. Furthermore, an application to the time-dependent abstract economy is considered.     

Gap Functions for Quasivariational Inequalities and Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

The gap function (or merit function) is a classic tool for reformulating a Stampacchia variational inequality as an optimization problem. In this paper, we adapt this technique for quasivariational inequalities, that is, variational inequalities in which the constraint set depends on the current point. Following Fukushima (J. Ind. Manag. Optim. 3:165–171, 2007), an axiomatic approach is proposed. Error bounds for quasivariational inequalities are provided and an application to generalized Nash equilibrium problems is also considered.     

Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

The Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem is an important model that has its roots in the economic sciences but is being fruitfully used in many different fields. In this survey paper we aim at discussing its main properties and solution algorithms, pointing out what could be useful topics for future research in the field.     

指派问题的纳什均衡解

为弥补传统指派问题解不符合个体理性的不足,提出指派问题的纳什均衡解,并证明有限指派问题有且仅有纯纳什均衡解。相比传统的指派问题解,纯纳什均衡符合Pareto最优,是个体理性视角下的最优解。在此基础上,给出一个综合考虑个体理性与集体理性的求解方法。     

How to Select a Solution in Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems

We propose a new solution concept for generalized Nash equilibrium problems. This concept leads, under suitable assumptions, to unique solutions, which are generalized Nash equilibria and the result of a mathematical procedure modeling the process of finding a compromise. We first compute the favorite strategy for each player, if he could dictate the game, and use the best response on the others’ favorite strategies as starting point. Then, we perform a tracing procedure, where we solve parametrized generalized Nash equilibrium problems, in which the players reduce the weight on the best possible and increase the weight on the current strategies of the others. Finally, we define the limiting points of this tracing procedure as solutions. Under our assumptions, the new concept selects one reasonable out of typically infinitely many generalized Nash equilibria.     

混合策略纳什均衡的新教法

理解博弈论中的最优混合策略对本科生而言具有一定困难,而目前教材中对此内容的讲述又过于抽象.提出一个简单而有效地讲授混合策略纳什均衡的方法.首先利用猜硬币游戏引入并介绍混合策略的基本该念.再通过将混合策略加入到支付矩阵中构造拓展支付矩阵,使学生可以清晰地看到采用混合策略的结果,实现从纯策略到混合策略的自然过渡.然后引导学生思考博弈参与者采用混合策略的各种动机,并在拓展支付矩阵中检验其是否达成均衡.最后介绍最优混合策略计算的一般方法,并分析其与参与者行为动机之间的一致性.课堂实践证明,方法可以有效提高学生对混合策略纳什均衡的综合理解,学生不仅能够更好地掌握求解技术,而且能更深入地理解其经济学含义.     

求解一类广义Nash均衡问题

Generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is an important model that has many applications in practice. However, a GNEP usually has multiple or even infinitely many Nash equilibrium points and it is not easy to choose a favorable solution from those equilibria. This paper considers a class of GNEP with some kind of separability. We first extend the so-called normalized equilibrium concept to the stationarity sense and then, we propose an approach to solve the normalized stationary points by reformulating the GNEP as a single optimization problem. We further demonstrate the proposed approach on a GNEP model in similar product markets.     

Stochastic Variational Inequality Approaches to the Stochastic Generalized Nash Equilibrium with Shared Constraints

In this paper, we consider the generalized Nash equilibrium with shared constraints in the stochastic environment, and we call it the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium. The stochastic variational inequalities are employed to solve this kind of problems, and the expected residual minimization model and the conditional value-at-risk formulations defined by the residual function for the stochastic variational inequalities are discussed. We show the risk for different kinds of solutions for the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium by the conditional value-at-risk formulations. The properties of the stochastic quadratic generalized Nash equilibrium are shown. The smoothing approximations for the expected residual minimization formulation and the conditional value-at-risk formulation are employed. Moreover, we establish the gradient consistency for the measurable smoothing functions and the integrable functions under some suitable conditions, and we also analyze the properties of the formulations. Numerical results for the applications arising from the electricity market model illustrate that the solutions for the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium given by the ERM model have good properties, such as robustness, low risk and so on.     

A Stochastic Nash Equilibrium Problem for Medical Supply Competition

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications - In this paper, we study the competition of healthcare institutions for medical supplies in emergencies caused by natural disasters. In particular,...     

Relaxation Methods for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems with Inexact Line Search

The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is an extension of the standard Nash game where, in addition to the cost functions, also the strategy spaces of each player depend on the strategies chosen by all other players. This problem is rather difficult to solve and there are only a few methods available in the literature. One of the most popular ones is the so-called relaxation method, which is known to be globally convergent under a set of assumptions. Some of these assumptions, however, are rather strong or somewhat difficult to understand. Here, we present a modified relaxation method for the solution of a certain class of GNEPs. The convergence analysis uses completely different arguments based on a certain descent property and avoids some of the technical conditions for the original relaxation method. Moreover, numerical experiments indicate that the modified relaxation method performs quite well on a number of different examples taken from the literature.     

一类隐变分不等式及其在Nash限制平衡问题中的应用

本文研究了一类隐变分不等式解的存在性，削弱了此类问题的紧性要求。作为本文结果的应用，我们讨论了它与经济数学中Nash限制平衡问题的关系。     

Variational Problem,Generalized Convexity,and Application to a Competitive Equilibrium Problem

The main purpose of this article is to present a new formulation of a competitive equilibrium in terms of a suitable quasivariational inequality involving multivalued maps. More precisely, a pure exchange economy is considered where the consumer's preferences are represented by utility functions that we assume to be generalized concave and non-differentiable. In the concave context, we have characterized the equilibrium by means of a variational problem involving the subdifferential. Now, by relaxing concavity and differentiability assumptions on utility functions, the subdifferential operator of the utility function is replaced by a suitable multimap involving a new concept, recently introduced in [1 D. Aussel and N. Hadjisavvas ( 2005 ). Adjusted sublevel sets, normal operator and quasiconvex programming . SIAM J. Optim. 16 : 358 – 367 .[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]]: the normal operator to the adjusted sublevel sets. Thanks to this variational formulation we are able to achieve the existence of equilibrium points by using arguments of the set-valued analysis. Finally, we provide some example of utility functions which verify our assumptions.     

Banach空间中广义混合平衡问题

在一致光滑和严格凸的Banach空间的框架下,采用综合性算法,借以寻求广义混合平衡问题的解集、变分不等式的解集、及一有限族的拟φ-非扩张映象公共不动点集的公共元,作为应用,把所得结果应用于研究最优化问题,所得结果推广和改进了Ceng,Takahashi,Qin等人所发布的新结果.     

约束形式下广义最大元Nash均衡的存在性

运用广义最大元方法在非传递性偏好下给出了博弈均衡的存在性定理,推广了一些经典的博弈均衡存在性定理.在文中介绍策略式博弈的Nash均衡具有宽泛的条件,在微观经济理论中有广泛的应用.