Component ordering strategies in assembly systems with uncertain capacity and random yield

Sourcing components in a complex global supplier network may lead to a high degree of supply uncertainty. Events, such as unexpected production defects or insufficient supplier capacity, can cause unexpected shortages of required components and halt the assembly of final products. Accordingly, the assembly enterprises must effectively manage various supply uncertainties in their component ordering decisions to avoid such component shortfalls. These issues have guided this research to investigate the optimal ordering strategies of an assembler facing the following two types of supply uncertainty: the uncertain production capacity of a standard component (component 1) and the random production yield of a core component (component 2). The assembler makes the component ordering decisions before these supply uncertainties are realized. We characterize the optimal ordering decision and find that the assembler should order components 1 and 2 according to a fixed ratio, which only depends on the random yield of component 2 and the production cost of component 1, but not on the uncertain capacity of component 1. A case study is presented to further explore the intertwined effects of these two uncertainties in an assembly system. Finally, the model is extended to consider a secondary option of buying additional component 1 s after observing some or all of the supply uncertainties, and this secondary option endows the firm with different capabilities in counteracting the supply uncertainties.     

随机需求下基于供应中断的备份供应商决策分析

假定需求服从随机分布,研究由零售商主导的供应链中,采用一个战略供应商和一个备份供应商模式,零售商与备份供应商通过能力期权建立订货契约:首先,零售商向备份供应商预订能力,支付预订成本;接着,向战略供应商订货,如果没有发生突发事件则其供货量等于订货量,否则供货量变为零;然后,零售商基于战略供应商的供货量和备份供应商的能力预订确定向备份供应商的订货量,支付执行成本;最后,零售商用战略供应商和备份供应商的总供货量满足顾客需求。备份供应商在考虑自己的能力维持成本和制造成本后决定是否接受零售商提供的能力期权契约。针对零售商可选择的四种不同策略,求得采取不用策略所满足的条件,并给出相应的最优订货量、能力预订量和能力执行量和最优利润等的解析解。     

Single versus multiple supplier sourcing strategies

Successful supply chain management necessitates an effective sourcing strategy to combat uncertainties in both supply and demand. In particular, supply disruption results in excessive downtime of production resources, upstream and downstream supply chain repercussions, and eventually a loss in the market value of the firm. In this paper we analyze single period, single product sourcing decisions under demand uncertainty. Our approach integrates product prices, supplier costs, supplier capacities, historical supplier reliabilities and firm specific inventory costs. A unique feature of our approach is the integration of a firm specific supplier diversification function. We also extend our analysis to examine the impact of minimum supplier order quantities. Our results indicate that single sourcing is a dominant strategy only when supplier capacities are large relative to the product demand and when the firm does not obtain diversification benefits. In other cases, we find that multiple sourcing is an optimal sourcing strategy. We also characterize a non-intuitive trade-off between supplier minimum order quantities, costs, and supplier reliabilities. Finally, we examine the robustness of our results through an extensive numerical analysis of the key parameters of our model.     

Inventory systems with stochastic demand and supply: Properties and approximations

We model a retailer whose supplier is subject to complete supply disruptions. We combine discrete-event uncertainty (disruptions) and continuous sources of uncertainty (stochastic demand or supply yield), which have different impacts on optimal inventory settings. This prevents optimal solutions from being found in closed form. We develop a closed-form approximate solution by focusing on a single stochastic period of demand or yield. We show how the familiar newsboy fractile is a critical trade-off in these systems, since the optimal base-stock policies balance inventory holding costs with the risk of shortage costs generated by a disruption.     

Sourcing under incomplete information and negative capacity-cost correlation

We study a sourcing problem where a buyer reserves capacity from a set of suppliers. The suppliers have finite capacity and their unit production cost is a decreasing function of their capacity, implying scale economies. The capacity of each supplier and therefore the cost is his private information. The buyer and other suppliers only know the probability distribution of the supplier’s capacity. The buyer’s demand is random and she has to decide how much capacity to reserve in advance from a subset of suppliers and how much to source from marketplace. In this study we determine the buyer’s optimum reservation quantity and the size of the supply base. We find the presence of such capacity cost correlation leads to supply base reduction.     

Agricultural planning of annual plants under demand,maturation, harvest,and yield risk

In this study we present a planning methodology for a firm whose objective is to match the random supply of annual premium fruits and vegetables from a number of contracted farms and the random demand from the retailers during the planning period. The supply uncertainty is due to the uncertainty of the maturation time, harvest time, and yield. The demand uncertainty is the uncertainty of weekly demand from the retailers. We provide a planning methodology to determine the farm areas and the seeding times for annual plants that survive for only one growing season in such a way that the expected total profit is maximized. Both the single period and the multi period cases are analyzed depending on the type of the plant. The performance of the solution methodology is evaluated by using numerical experiments. These experiments show that the proposed methodology matches random supply and random demand in a very effective way and improves the expected profit substantially compared to the planning approaches where the uncertainties are not taken into consideration.     

Price markdown scheme in a multi-echelon supply chain in a high-tech industry

This paper studies the price markdown scheme in a supply chain that consists of a supplier, a contract manufacturer (CM), and a buyer (retailer). The buyer subcontracts the production of the final product to the CM. The CM buys the components from the supplier and charges the buyer a service fee for the final product produced. The price markdown is made possible by the supplier with the development of new manufacturing technologies that reduce the production cost for the sourced component. Consequently, the buyer adjusts the retail price in order to possibly stimulate stronger demand that may benefit both the supplier and the buyer. Under this scenario, we identify the optimal discount pricing strategies, capacity reservation, and the stocking policies for the supplier and the buyer. We also investigate the optimal inventory decision for the CM to cope with the price discount by considering both demand and delivery uncertainties. Our results suggest that higher production cost accelerates the effects of higher price sensitivity on lowering the optimal capacity and stocking policies in the supply chain. The effect of mean demand error on the optimal prices is relatively marginal compared with that from price sensitivity. We also found that increasing the standard deviation of the random demand does not necessarily increase the stocking level as one would predict. The results show that delivery uncertainty plays an important role in the inventory carried beyond the price break. We discuss potential extensions for future research.     

Sourcing decisions with capacity reservation contracts

By committing to long-term supply contracts, buyers seek to lower their purchasing costs, and have products delivered without interruption. When a long-term contract is available, suppliers are less pressured to find new customers, and can afford to charge a price lower than the prevailing spot market price. We examine sourcing decisions of a firm in the presence of a capacity reservation contract that this firm makes with its long-term supplier in addition to the spot market alternative. This contract entails delivery of any desired portion of a reserved fixed capacity in exchange for a guaranteed payment by the buyer. We investigate rational actions of the two parties under two different types of periodic review inventory control policies used by the buyer: the two-number policy, and the base stock policy. When typical demand probability distributions are considered, inclusion of the spot market source in the buyer’s procurement plan significantly reduces the capacity commitments from the long-term supplier.     

Coordination mechanism for the supply chain with leadtime consideration and price-dependent demand

We study a coordination contract for a supplier–retailer channel producing and selling a fashionable product exhibiting a stochastic price-dependent demand. The product’s selling season is short, and the supply chain faces great demand uncertainty. We consider a scenario where the supplier reserves production capacity for the retailer in advance, and permits the retailer to place an order not exceeding the reserved capacity after a demand information update during a leadtime. We formulate a two-stage optimization problem in which the supplier decides the amount of capacity reservation in the first stage, and the retailer determines the order quantity and the retail price after observing the demand information in the second stage. We propose a three-parameter risk and profit sharing contract that coordinates the supply chain. The proposed contract permits any agreed-upon division of the supply-chain profit between the channel members.     

Random yield supply chain with a yield dependent secondary market

This paper considers a simple supply chain with one supplier and one retailer where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield and the retailer faces uncertain demand. There exists a secondary market for acquiring or disposing products by the supplier. We study both the centralized and decentralized systems. In the decentralized system, a no risk sharing contract and a risk sharing minimum commitment contract are analyzed. The supply chain with the risk sharing contract is further analyzed with a constant secondary market price and a yield dependent secondary market price. We present both the supplier’s and the retailer’s optimal strategies and provide insights for managers when making decisions under random yield risk and demand uncertainty. We find that the secondary market generally has a positive impact on supply chain performance and the actual effect of random yield risk on the supply chain performance depends on cost parameters and supply chain contract settings. Under certain conditions, reducing yield randomness may weaken the double marginalization effect and improve the chain performance. From the numerical study, we also show that there exists an optimal commitment level for the supply chain.     

Double marginalization and coordination in the supply chain with uncertain supply

This paper explores a generalized supply chain model subject to supply uncertainty after the supplier chooses the production input level. Decentralized systems under wholesale price contracts are investigated, with double marginalization effects shown to lead to supply insufficiencies, in the cases of both deterministic and random demands. We then design coordination contracts for each case and find that an accept-all type of contract is required to coordinate the supply chain with random demand, which is a much more complicated situation than that with deterministic demand. Examples are provided to illustrate the application of our findings to specific industrial domains. Moreover, our coordination mechanisms are shown to be applicable to the multi-supplier situation, which fills the research gap on assembly system coordination with random yield and random demand under a voluntary compliance regime.     

A periodic-review inventory system with a capacitated backup supplier for mitigating supply disruptions

We consider a periodic-review inventory system with two suppliers: an unreliable regular supplier that may be disrupted for a random duration, and a reliable backup supplier that can be used during a disruption. The backup supplier charges higher unit purchasing cost and fixed order cost when compared to the regular supplier. Because the backup supplier is used at unplanned moments, its capacity to replenish inventory is considered limited. Analytical results partially characterize the structure of the optimal order policy: a state-dependent (X(i), Y(i)) band structure (with corresponding bounds of X(i) and Y(i) to be given), where i represents the status of the regular supplier. Numerical studies illustrate the structure of the optimal policy and investigate the impacts of major parameters on optimal order decisions and system costs.     

Mitigating supply risk: an approach with quantity flexibility procurement

This paper considers a buyer that procures from its major supplier whose production is subject to random yield risk. To mitigate supply risk, the buyer can procure from another reliable supplier who provides quantity flexibility (QF) contract. Under both deterministic and stochastic demand, we study the buyer’s optimal procurement decisions. We analyze the structural properties of optimal solutions and identify the conditions under which the quantity flexibility procurement policy should be used. We also examine the effect of supply risk, flexibility, wholesale price and demand risk on the procurement decisions. We find that the higher supply risk and demand risk reduce the buyer’s profit but have different impact on the buyer’s order policy. For the QF supplier, it may not obtain more orders by providing larger flexibility to the buyer, on the contrary, doing this may benefit the risky supplier. For the QF supplier or risky supplier, given its competitor’s wholesale price, it can increase its order share by lower wholesale price.     

Dynamic price dispersion in Bertrand–Edgeworth competition

This paper studies a dynamic oligopoly model of price competition under demand uncertainty. Sellers are endowed with one unit of the good and compete by posting prices in every period. Buyers each demand one unit of the good and have a common reservation price. They have full information regarding the prices posted by each firm in the market; hence, search is costless. The number of buyers coming to the market in each period is random. Demand uncertainty is said to be high if there are at least two non-zero demand states that give a seller different option values of waiting to sell. Our model features a unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in which price dispersion prevails if and only if the degree of demand uncertainty is high. Several testable theoretical implications on the distribution of market prices are derived.     

Optimal pricing and inventory policies with reliable and random-yield suppliers: characterization and comparison

In this paper, we study the joint pricing and inventory replenishment problem for a periodic-review inventory system with random demand and dual suppliers, one of the suppliers is reliable but more expensive, the other supplier is less expensive but is unreliable with random yield. We characterize the firm’s optimal policies that simultaneously determine the optimal ordering and pricing decisions in each period over a finite planning horizon, and investigate the impacts of supply source diversification and supplier reliability on the firm and on its customers. We show that having source diversification or higher reliability of suppliers not only increases the firm’s expected profit, but also results in a lower optimal selling price, thus they benefit both the firm and its customers.     

First- and second-price sealed-bid auctions applied to push and pull supply contracts

We investigate a newsvendor-type retailer sourcing problem under demand uncertainty who has the option to source from multiple suppliers. The suppliers’ manufacturing costs are private information. A widely used mechanism to find the least costly supplier under asymmetric information is to use a sealed-bid reverse auction. We compare the combinations of different simple auction formats (first- and second-price) and risk sharing supply contracts (push and pull) under full contract compliance, both for risk-neutral and risk-averse retailer and suppliers. We show the superiority of a first-price push auction for a risk-neutral retailer. However, only the pull contracts lead to supply chain coordination. If the retailer is sufficiently risk-averse, the pull is preferred over the push contract. If suppliers are risk-averse, the first-price push auction remains the choice for the retailer. Numerical examples illustrate the allocation of benefits between the retailer and the (winning) supplier for different number of bidders, demand uncertainty, cost uncertainty, and degree of risk-aversion.     

A continuous-review inventory model with random disruptions at the primary supplier

We consider a continuous-review inventory problem for a retailer facing constant customer demand for a single product. This retailer is assumed to follow the well known and widely used order-up-to policy in making replenishment decisions, and can order from two suppliers who differ in reliability and costs. Supplier 1, the primary supplier, is cheaper, but is subject to random disruptions. Supplier 2, the backup supplier or the contingent source, is more expensive, but is perfectly reliable. If Supplier 1 is available when the inventory level at the retailer reaches the reorder point, the retailer orders from Supplier 1. Otherwise, it will wait for a while to see if Supplier 1 can recover from the disruption quickly. If so, it will still get replenishment from Supplier 1 to take advantage of its lower charge. However, the retailer will reroute to the backup supplier if Supplier 1 still does not recover from the disruption when the cap of waiting (the maximal waiting time of the retailer if Supplier 1 is disrupted) is reached. We analytically study the optimal sourcing and replenishment decisions at the retailer, and the impacts of various problem parameters on the optimal decisions. We also conduct extensive numerical experiments to compare different sourcing and replenishment decisions the retailer can make and get further managerial insights into the problem.     

Bundling decisions in supply chains

Firms often sell products in bundles to extract consumer surplus. While most bundling decisions studied in the literature are geared to integrated firms, we examine a decentralized supply chain where the suppliers retain decision rights. Using a generic distribution of customers’ reservation price we establish equilibrium solutions for three different bundling scenarios in a supply chain, and generate interesting insights for distributions with specific forms. We find that (i) in supply chain bundling the retailer’s margin equals the margin of each independent supplier, and it equals the combined margin when the suppliers are in a coalition, (ii) when the suppliers form a coalition to bundle their products the bundling gain in the supply chain is higher and retail price is lower than when the retailer bundles the products, (iii) the supply chain has more to gain from bundling relative to an integrated firm, (iv) the first-best supply chain bundling remains viable over a larger set of parameter values than those in the case of the integrated firm, (v) supplier led bundling is preferable to separate sales over a wider range of parameter values than if the retailer led the bundling, and (vi) if the reservation prices are uniformly distributed bundling can be profitable when the variable costs are low and valuations of the products are not significantly different from one another. For normally distributed reservation prices, we show that the bundling set is larger and the bundling gain is higher than that for a uniform distribution.     

Optimal ordering policies in inventory systems with random demand and random deal offerings

In this paper, we determine the optimal order policies for a firm facing random demand and random deal offerings. In a periodic review setting, a firm may first place an order at the regular price. Later in the period, if a price promotion is offered by the supplier (with a certain probability), the firm may decide to place another order. We consider two models in the paper. In the first model, the firm does not share the cost savings (due to the promotion offered by the supplier) with its own customers, i.e. its demand distribution remains fixed. In the second model, the cost savings are shared with the final customers. As a result, the demand distribution shifts to the right. For both the models, in a dynamic finite-horizon problem, the order policy structure is divided into three regions and is as follows. If the initial inventory level for the firm exceeds a certain threshold level, it is optimal not to order anything. If it is in the medium range, it is optimal to wait for the promotion and order only if it is offered. The order quantity when the promotion is offered has an ‘order up to’ policy structure. Finally, if the inventory level is below another threshold, it is optimal to place an order at the regular price, and to place a second order if the promotion is offered. The low initial inventory level makes it risky to just wait for the promotion to be offered. The sum of the order quantities in this case has an ‘order up to’ structure. Finally, we model the supplier's problem as a Stackelberg game and discuss the motivation for the supplier to offer a promotion for the case of uniform demand distribution for the firm. In the first model (when the firm does not share the cost savings with its customers), we show that it is rarely optimal for the supplier to offer a promotion. In the second model, the supplier may offer a promotion depending on the price elasticity of the product.     

Optimal production in a competitive market under yield uncertainty

Motivated by the U.S. influenza vaccine market, we study the impact of random yield and production capacity on the number of firms, total supply, consumer surplus and social welfare in a market with identical suppliers. We formulate a two-stage game with endogenous entry, where each entering firm aims to maximize its profit under yield uncertainty subject to a production capacity constraint. We show that if firms produce full capacity in the equilibrium, then there are fewer firms in the equilibrium compared to the social optimum even for small levels of yield uncertainty. Furthermore, we prove that if firms do not produce full capacity in the equilibrium, they will not produce full capacity in the social optimum.