Designing contracts for a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry

This paper studies the problem of designing contracts in a closed-loop supply chain when the cost of collection effort is the retailer’s private information. We investigate four cases: two contracts (a two-part nonlinear contract and a collection effort requirement contract), each under complete information and asymmetric information. We derive the manufacturer’s optimal contracts for all four cases and analyze the impact of information on the equilibrium results of supply chain members.     

Optimal service contract under cost information symmetry/asymmetry

Service outsourcing has become a hot topic in both industry and academy. This paper studies the contract design problems for a service seller who consigns the service to a vendor. The vendor’s service cost parameter may or may not completely be known by the seller, which constitutes the cases of information symmetry or asymmetry. In both cases, the optimal contracts are developed to maximize the seller’s expected profit, with the consideration of contractible and non-contractible service qualities. The properties of the contract parameters are explored, along with the analysis of information rent and value of cost information. Moreover, we find that non-contractible service quality is not an issue for the service seller under cost information symmetry since a revenue-sharing type of contract can guarantee the seller’s profit. However, this result does not hold under cost information asymmetry and thus non-contractibility of the service quality indeed costs the seller.     

Optimizing maintenance service contracts under imperfect maintenance and a finite time horizon

When a company decides to outsource a service, the most important reasons for doing so usually are to focus on core business, to be able to access high‐quality services at lower costs, or to benefit from risk sharing. However, service contracts typically follow a structure whereby both owner and contractor attempt to maximize expected profits in a noncoordinated way. Previous research has considered supply chain coordination by means of contracts but is based on unrealistic assumptions such as perfect maintenance and infinite time‐span contracts. In this work, these limitations are overcome by defining the supply chain through a preventive maintenance strategy that maximizes the total expected profit for both parties in a finite time‐span contract. This paper presents a model to establish such conditions when maintenance is imperfect, and the contract duration is fixed through a number of preventive maintenance actions along a significant part of the asset life cycle under consideration. This formulation leads to a win–win coordination under a set of restrictions that can be evaluated a priori. The proposed contract conditions motivate stakeholders to continually improve their maintenance services to reach channel coordination in which both parties obtain higher rewards. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal contracts under endogenous demand information acquisition

We consider a supplier selling to a retailer who decides whether or not to exert a fixed cost to acquire private demand information. We show that quantity discounts, established by the extant literature to be the optimal response for exogenous information acquisition, are also optimal under the setting with endogenous information acquisition.     

Electricity market equilibrium under information asymmetry

We study a competitive electricity market equilibrium with two trading stages, day-ahead and real-time. The welfare of each market agent is exposed to uncertainty (here from renewable energy production), while agent information on the probability distribution of this uncertainty is not identical at the day-ahead stage. We show a high sensitivity of the equilibrium solution to the level of information asymmetry and demonstrate economic, operational, and computational value for the system stemming from potential information sharing.     

Channel incentives in sharing new product demand information and robust contracts

Demand for a new product is often highly uncertain. As the developer of a new product, the manufacturer may reduce the uncertainty of the product’s demand through observing progress in his product development process or receiving demand signals directly from customers. This paper first shows that a centralized channel always benefits from improved demand information. Yet, to realize this benefit in a decentralized manufacturer–retailer channel, the manufacturer needs to disclose his private demand information to the retailer. We show that the manufacturer’s incentive to share his improved demand information depends on the supply contract signed with the retailer. Furthermore, mandating the manufacturer to disclose his improved demand information can actually reduce the total channel profit. We provide managerial insights by analyzing three widely used contract forms. We investigate whether these contracts are robust under an unanticipated demand information update observed by the manufacturer. We show that the quantity flexibility contract with a high return rate is not robust. The buyback contract, however, is robust and always achieves information sharing while preserving channel performance.     

Optimizing product assortment under customer-driven demand substitution

The problem of product assortment and inventory planning under customer-driven demand substitution is analyzed and a mathematical model for this problem is provided in this paper. Realistic issues in a retail context such as supplier selection, shelf space constraints, and poor quality procurement are also taken into account. The performance of three modified models, one that neglects customers’ substitution behavior, another that excludes supplier selection decision, and one that ignores shelf space limitations, are analyzed separately with computational experiments. The results of the analysis demonstrate that neglecting customer-driven substitution or excluding supplier selection or ignoring shelf space limitations may lead to significantly inefficient assortments. The effects of demand variability and substitution cost on optimal assortment and supplier selection decisions as well as on the optimal revenue are also investigated. The main contribution of this paper is the development of a practical and flexible model to aid retailers in finding optimal assortments to maximize the expected profit.     

Service outsourcing under co-opetition and information asymmetry

Co-opetition refers to the phenomenon that firms simultaneously cooperate and compete in order to maximize their profits. This paper studies the contracting for an outsourcing supply chain (a user company vs. a service provider) in the presence of co-opetition and information asymmetry. The user company outsources part of his service capacity at a discount price to the service provider for sale. The service provider charges a commission for doing outsourcing work and competes with the user company for the service capacity to satisfy their respective demands. We solve for the service provider’s optimal commission decision and the user company’s optimal outsourcing decisions (outsourcing volume and price discount) when the user company has private information about his service capacity. Specifically, we highlight the following observations. For the service provider, a menu of two-part tariffs that consist of a fixed commission and a per-volume commission can reveal the true type of the user company’s capacity; the user company’s optimal outsourcing proportion is quasi-convex and the optimal price discount is non-decreasing in his capacity volume, which is counterintuitive.     

Optimal batch service of a polling system under partial information

We consider the optimal scheduling of an infinite-capacity batch server in aN-node ring queueing network, where the controller observes only the length of the queue at which the server is located. For a cost criterion that includes linear holding costs, fixed dispatching costs, and linear service rewards, we prove optimality and monotonicity of threshold scheduling policies.     

Contracting with an urgent supplier under cost information asymmetry

We investigate a contract setting problem faced by a manufacturer who can procure major modules from an overseas supplier, as well as a local supplier. The overseas supplier is prime and offers quality products, whereas the local supplier is viewed only as a backup, and its products are inferior in quality. As the local supplier needs to put in additional effort to fulfill the urgent orders, it is difficult for the manufacturer to estimate this urgent supplier’s production cost. This asymmetric cost information becomes an obstacle for the manufacturer in managing the urgent supplier. In this paper, we study two types of contingent contracts. One is the common price-only contract, and the other is a contract menu consisting of a transfer payment and a lead time quotation. We construct a Stackelberg game model and evaluate how the involvement of an urgent supplier with private cost information affects performances of the prime supplier and the manufacturer in different scenarios (with or without the urgent supplier, under different contingent contracts). We also conduct numerical experiments to show how the parameters of the contracts affect profits of the manufacturer.     

Optimizing winter road maintenance operations under real-time information

This paper introduces a real-time optimization model that can be used by maintenance managers to develop and evaluate alternative resources allocation plans for winter road maintenance operations. The model takes into account a wide range of road and weather condition factors such as road network topology, road class, weather forecasts, and contractual service levels, and produces a vehicle dispatch schedule that is optimal with respect to operating costs and quality of service. The model is then used in an analysis on a realistic case to illustrate the potential impact of improved information on winter maintenance operations.     

Supply chain contracts for capacity decisions under symmetric and asymmetric information

Central European Journal of Operations Research - Production capacity decision under random demand is an important factor that significantly effects supply chain profits. It is realized in...     

Pricing in a supply chain for auction bidding under information asymmetry

We examine a supply chain in which a manufacturer participates in a sealed-bid lowest price procurement auction through a distributor. This form of supply chain is common when a manufacturer is active in an overseas market without establishing a local subsidiary. To gain a strategic advantage in the division of profit, the manufacturer and distributor may intentionally conceal information about the underlying cost distribution of the competition. In this environment of information asymmetry, we determine the equilibrium mark-up, the ex-ante expected mark-up and expected profit of the manufacturer and the equilibrium bid of the distributor. In unilateral communication, we demonstrate the informed agent’s advantage resulting to higher mark-up. Under information sharing, we show that profit is equally shared among the supply chain partners and we explicitly derive the mark-up when the underlying cost distribution is uniform in [0, 1]. The model and findings are illustrated by a numerical example.     

Impacts of risk attitude and outside option on compensation contracts under different information structures

We consider an agency problem where a firm (she) hires a manager (he) who has related managerial expertise to implement a new project. The manager’s managerial expertise is his private information and characterized as an uncertain variable. The revenue brought about by the project in the future is also assumed to be uncertain. In light of these challenges, this paper investigates the impacts of the manager’s risk attitude and the type-and-effort dependent outside option on the optimal compensation contracts under different information structures. Through developing the manager’s decision criterion based on his risk attitude instead of the expected-utility-maximization criterion, we find that, if the manager is conservative and the outside option’s revenue uncertainty is sufficiently high, the optimal commission rate will be distorted upwards under asymmetric managerial expertise information compared with that under symmetric managerial expertise information. Our analysis also confirms that the existence of a type-and-effort dependent outside option distorts up the compensation structure tailored at a fixed outside option. We further show that, comparing with the setting of a fixed outside option when the manager is aggressive, the presence of a type-and-effort dependent outside option results in a surprising phenomenon that the manager’s private information makes no distortion of the firm’s profit.     

A multi-class discrete-time queueing system under the FCFS service discipline

The problem with the FCFS server discipline in discrete-time queueing systems is that it doesn’t actually determine what happens if multiple customers enter the system at the same time, which in the discrete-time paradigm translates into ‘during the same time-slot’. In other words, it doesn’t specify in which order such customers are served. When we consider multiple types of customers, each requiring different service time distributions, the precise order of service even starts to affect quantities such as queue content and delays of arbitrary customers, so specifying this order will be prime. In this paper we study a multi-class discrete-time queueing system with a general independent arrival process and generally distributed service times. The service discipline is FCFS and customers entering during the same time-slot are served in random order. It will be our goal to search for the steady-state distribution of queue content and delays of certain types of customers. If one thinks of the time-slot as a continuous but bounded time period, the random order of service is equivalent to FCFS if different customers have different arrival epochs within this time-slot and if the arrival epochs are independent of customer class. For this reason we propose two distinct ways of analysing; one utilizing permutations, the other considering a slot as a bounded continuous time frame.     

Optimizing the system of virtual paths by tabu search

In an asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) network, given the network topology and traffic demands, the establishment of the system of virtual paths (VPs), and the assignment of connections to them so that the network performance is optimized, entails a number of computationally hard subproblems. The optimization problem discussed here focuses on finding a system of VP routes for a given set of VP terminators and VP capacity demands. Although it has been proven that the existing random path algorithm yields the worst case time bound, the solution performance still depends highly on the number of iterations. In this paper, an exact solution procedure and a heuristic method based on a simple tabu search have been developed for optimizing the system of VPs. Computational results show that the proposed tabu search algorithm is effective in obtaining high quality solutions, and the performance of the proposed algorithm is increasingly attractive as the problem size becomes larger.     

Stability of a two-queue cyclic polling system with BMAPs under gated service and state-dependent time-limited service disciplines

The stability of a cyclic polling system, with a single server and two infinite-buffer queues, is considered. Customers arrive at the two queues according to independent batch Markovian arrival processes. The first queue is served according to the gated service discipline, and the second queue is served according to a state-dependent time-limited service discipline with the preemptive repeat-different property. The state dependence is that, during each cycle, the predetermined limited time of the server’s visit to the second queue depends on the queue length of the first queue at the instant when the server last departed from the first queue. The mean of the predetermined limited time for the second queue either decreases or remains the same as the queue length of the first queue increases. Due to the two service disciplines, the customers in the first queue have higher service priority than the ones in the second queue, and the service fairness of the customers with different service priority levels is also considered. In addition, the switchover times for the server traveling between the two queues are considered, and their means are both positive as well as finite. First, based on two embedded Markov chains at the cycle beginning instants, the sufficient and necessary condition for the stability of the cyclic polling system is obtained. Then, the calculation methods for the variables related to the stability condition are given. Finally, the influence of some parameters on the stability condition of the cyclic polling system is analyzed. The results are useful for engineers not only checking whether the given cyclic polling system is stable, but also adjusting some parameters to make the system satisfy some requirements under the condition that the system is stable.     

On the many-server fluid limit for a service system with routing based on delayed information

Pender, Rand and Wesson recently established a delay differential equation limit for a parallel service system with routing based on delayed information. We provide an interpretation of their scaling under which their limit can be regarded as an instance of a law of large numbers in the familiar many-server heavy-traffic scaling. It requires scaling in the probabilistic routing function. We also obtain related many-server heavy-traffic delay-differential-equation limits for more general models.     

Control of a production-inventory system with returns under imperfect advance return information

We consider a production-inventory system with product returns that are announced in advance by the customers. Demands and announcements of returns occur according to independent Poisson processes. An announced return is either actually returned or cancelled after a random return lead time. We consider both lost sale and backorder situations. Using a Markov decision formulation, the optimal production policy, with respect to the discounted cost over an infinite horizon, is characterized for situations with and without advance return information. We give insights in the potential value of this information. Also some attention is paid to combining advance return and advance demand information. Further applications of the model as well as topics for further research are indicated.     

Optimizing a multi-stage production/inventory system by DC programming based approaches

This paper deals with optimizing the cost of set up, transportation and inventory of a multi-stage production system in presence of bottleneck. The considered optimization model is a mixed integer nonlinear program. We propose two methods based on DC (Difference of Convex) programming and DCA (DC Algorithm)—an innovative approach in nonconvex programming framework. The mixed integer nonlinear problem is first reformulated as a DC program and then DCA is developed to solve the resulting problem. In order to globally solve the problem, we combine DCA with a Branch and Bound algorithm (BB-DCA). A convex minorant of the objective function is introduced. DCA is used to compute upper bounds while lower bounds are calculated from a convex relaxation problem. The numerical results compared with those of COUENNE (http://www.coin-or.org/download/binary/Couenne/), a solver for mixed integer nonconvex programming, show the rapidity and the ?-globality of DCA in almost cases, as well as the efficiency of the combined DCA-Branch and Bound algorithm. We also propose a simple heuristic algorithm which is proved by experimental results to be better than an existing heuristic in the literature for this problem.