动力学系统参数辨识问题最优控制解的理论与方法(Ⅰ)--基本概念及确定性系统参数辨识

本文基于动力学系统参数辨识问题最优控制解的概念和确定性动力学系统的最优控制理论,建立了参数辨识研究与最优控制理论的对应关系.将最优控制的数学理论和算法应用于参数辨识问题的研究.依据Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)方程解的理论阐述了动力学系统参数辨识最优控制解的存在唯一性问题,并据此得到了解决确定性系统参数辨识问题的具体算法步骤.     

二阶非线性奇摄动方程脉冲状空间对照结构

该文对一类二阶非线性奇摄动方程进行研究, 指出该方程在一定条件下可以产生脉冲状空间对照结构, 并用边界函数法构造该问题的渐近解, 证明解的存在性并得到渐近解的误差估计.     

随机递归最优控制和混合最优控制问题

对随机递归最优控制问题即代价函数由特定倒向随机微分方程解来描述和递归混合最优控制问题即控制者还需 决定最优停止时刻, 得到了最优控制的存在性结果. 在一类等价概率测度集中,还给出了递归最优值函数的最小和最大数学期望.     

一类线性奇异摄动最优控制问题的渐近解

研究了一类线性奇异摄动最优控制问题的空间对照结构,讨论了初始点固定,终端自由的情形.首先根据变分法得到了一阶最优性条件,其次运用退化最优控制问题的解证明了异宿轨道的存在性,从而结合奇异摄动理论证明了原问题空间对照结构解的存在性.进一步根据解的结构,利用边界层函数法构造了奇异摄动最优控制问题一致有效的形式渐近解.最后,通...     

非线性经济增长模型的最优控制问题

研究了带有中性技术进步生产函数边界条件的非线性经济增长模型的最优控制问题.利用Banach空间不动点原理,得到了系统解的存在唯一性,利用Gronwall不等式得到了系统解关于控制序列的连续依赖性,借助于法锥和共轭系统,得到了控制问题最优解存在的必要条件.     

具有媒体报道影响的SIRS模型分析

本文研究了一个具有媒体报道影响的感染率的SIRS传染病模型,得到了基本再生数?_0及模型平衡点的存在性.当?_0?_0~*1时,通过构造Lyapunov函数得到了无病平衡点的全局稳定性.进一步,本文研究由媒体报道引起的对易感者通过降低传染率进行管理控制的最优措施,证明了最优控制的存在性且得到最优控制的显式表达式.     

动力学系统参数辨识问题最优控制解的理论与方法（I）—基本概 …

本文基于动力学系统参数辨识问题最优控制解的概念和确定性动力学系统的最优控制理论,建立了参数辨识研究与最优控制理论的对应关系。将最优控制的数学理论和算法应用于参数辨识问题的研究。依据Ｈａｍｉｌｔｏｎ－Ｊａｃｏｂｉ－Ｂｅｌｌｍａｎ（ＨＪＢ）方程解的理论阐述了动力学参数辨识最优控制解的存在唯一性问题,并据此得到了解决确定性系统参数辨识问题的具体算法步骤。     

一类非线性时滞离散系统的渐近行为（英文）

本文研究了一类二维时滞非线性差分系统.利用稳定性理论和最优控制理论等方法,本文首先获得了保证正平衡点的存在唯一以及全局渐近稳定的充分条件;然后对消费函数的最大化的最优控制问题进行讨论,获得了最优解的存在性与稳定性条件;最后,通过数值模拟验证了结果的有效性.本文推广了一维时滞非线性差分系统中给出的相关结论.     

一种有限元-边界元耦合分域算法

提出了一种有限元-边界元耦合分域算法．该算法将所分析问题的区域分解成有限元和边界元子域,在满足两子域界面上位移和面力协调连续的条件下,通过迭代求解得到问题的解．在迭代求解过程中,引入动态松弛系数,使收敛得以加速．该方法在两子域界面上有限单元结点和边界单元结点的位置相互独立,无需协调一致,对诸如裂纹扩展过程的模拟具有独特的优势．用所提出的耦合算法分析算例,得到的结果与有限元法、边界元法和另一种耦合算法的数值计算结果一致,验证了这种算法的正确性和可行性．     

不完全免疫的多阶段绵羊布鲁氏菌病模型的稳定性分析与最优控制

本文研究一个多阶段的不完全免疫的布鲁氏菌病模型,得到模型平衡点的存在唯一性以及基本再生数R₀.通过构造合适的Lyapunov函数,证明了无病平衡点与地方病平衡点的全局渐近稳定性.在考虑控制成本的情况下,利用最优控制理论得到了布鲁氏菌病最优控制策略.最后用数值模拟验证了理论结果.     

Deterministic Time-inconsistent Optimal Control Problems - an Essentially Cooperative Approach

A general deterministic time-inconsistent optimal control problem is formulated for ordinary differential equations. To find a time-consistent equilibrium value function and the corresponding time-consistent equilibrium control, a non-cooperative N-person differential game (but essentially cooperative in some sense) is introduced. Under certain conditions, it is proved that the open-loop Nash equilibrium value function of the N -person differential game converges to a time-consistent equilibrium value function of the original problem, which is the value function of a time-consistent optimal control problem. Moreover, it is proved that any optimal control of the time-consistent limit problem is a time-consistent equilibrium control of the original problem.     

A two-person non-zero-sum game model of the world oil market

The world oil market is modelled as a two-person non-zero-sum game in normal form with each player having a continuum of strategies. The two players are the oil importing nations (OPIC) and the oil exporting nations (OPEC). The game is solved in the noncooperative sense using the equilibrium point solution concept due to Nash. The Nash equilibrium point solution yields an analytic expression for the optimal price per barrel of oil for OPEC and the optimal level of imports of oil for OPIC assuming noncooperation between the players. The cooperative solution to the game is also investigated using the von Neumann-Morgenstern negotiation set solution and Nash's bargaining point solution. Again, we give analytic expressions for the optimal price of a barrel of oil and the optimal level of imports of oil assuming that the players cooperate (negotiate, bargain, etc., for a binding agreement) in arriving at a solution.     

Singular mean-field control games

This article studies singular mean field control problems and singular mean field two-players stochastic differential games. Both sufficient and necessary conditions for the optimal controls and for the Nash equilibrium are obtained. Under some assumptions the optimality conditions for singular mean-field control are reduced to a reflected Skorohod problem, whose solution is proved to exist uniquely. Motivations are given as optimal harvesting of stochastic mean-field systems, optimal irreversible investments under uncertainty and mean-field singular investment games. In particular, a simple singular mean-field investment game is studied, where the Nash equilibrium exists but is not unique.     

Two-person game with nash equilibrium in optimal control problems

A two-person game with a Nash equilibrium is formulated for optimal control problems with a free right end and a linear differential system. The game is reduced to the calculation of a fixed point of an extremal mapping, which in turn is reduced to a variational inequality with linear constraints generated by systems of linear differential controllable processes. An extra-gradient iterative method is proposed for calculating the Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game. The convergence of the method is proved.     

基于模糊数的政府与绿色制造商博弈分析

近年来环境问题已经成为人们迫切需要解决的重要问题,促使制造商采取绿色制造模式也是各国政府正在面临的一大难题。因此文章结合三角模糊数与博弈理论建立了政府与绿色制造商的模糊博弈模型,将博弈结果分为纯策略和混合策略两类,并讨论了各种情形下政府与绿色制造商的不同策略以及影响因素,分析了最优博弈结果以及相应的管理策略,为绿色制造模式的顺利实施提供了相关建议。研究结果表明,政府的补贴和惩罚等策略在绿色制造模式的采取方面起着举足轻重的作用。最后利用三角结构元法对算例分纯策略和混合策略两种情况进行分析求解,从而验证了结论的正确性和可行性。     

运输问题的合作对策求解方法

产地间或销地间往往存在竞争,在这种情况下,使用运输问题最优化方法是不合理的。因此,从个体理性的视角提出运输问题的合作对策求解方法,方法将运输问题看作是一个博弈问题,各个产地或销地是博弈的局中人,求解其纳什均衡与纳什讨价还价解。在此基础上,说明了运输问题的非合作形式是一个指派问题,并证明指派问题的最优解是一个纳什均衡点。接着,通过实验验证运输问题的最优解是一个纳什讨价还价解,满足产地或销地的自身利益。在此基础上,针对纳什讨价还价解不唯一的问题,从决策者的视角给出最大可能激励成本的计算方法。最后,为弥补纳什讨价还价解不唯一及纳什讨价还价解不允许出现子联盟的缺陷,给出运输收益分配或成本分摊的Shapely值计算方法。     

Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions for Regular–Singular Stochastic Differential Games with Asymmetric Information

We consider a class of regular–singular stochastic differential games arising in the optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. The information available to the two players is asymmetric partial information and the control variable of each player consists of two components: regular control and singular control. We establish the necessary and sufficient optimality conditions for the saddle point of the zero-sum game. Then, as an application, these conditions are applied to an optimal investment and dividend problem of an insurer under model uncertainty. Furthermore, we generalize our results to the nonzero-sum regular–singular game with asymmetric information, and then the Nash equilibrium point is characterized.     

Mean-field type forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations and related stochastic differential games

We study a kind of partial information non-zero sum differential games of mean-field backward doubly stochastic differential equations, in which the coefficient contains not only the state process but also its marginal distribution, and the cost functional is also of mean-field type. It is required that the control is adapted to a sub-filtration of the filtration generated by the underlying Brownian motions. We establish a necessary condition in the form of maximum principle and a verification theorem, which is a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point. We use the theoretical results to deal with a partial information linear-quadratic (LQ) game, and obtain the unique Nash equilibrium point for our LQ game problem by virtue of the unique solvability of mean-field forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equation.     

Strategic Manipulation Approach for Solving Negotiated Transfer Pricing Problem

This paper suggests an approach for solving the transfer pricing problem, where negotiation between divisions is carried out considering the manipulation game theory model for a multidivisional firm. The manipulation equilibrium point is conceptualized under the Machiavellian social theory, represented by three concepts: views, tactics and immorality. In this approach, we are considering a non-cooperative model for the transfer pricing problem: a game model involving manipulating and manipulated players engaged cooperatively in a Nash game, restricted by a Stackelberg game. The cooperation is represented by the Nash bargaining solution. The transfer pricing problem is conceptualized as a strong Stackelberg game involving manipulating and manipulated divisions. This structure established conditions of unequal relative power among divisions, where high-power divisions tend to be abusive and less powerful divisions have a tendency to behave compliantly. For computation purposes, we transform the Stackelberg game model into a Nash game, where every division is able of manipulative behavior to some degree: the Nash game relaxes the interpretation of the manipulation game and the equilibrium selection for the transfer pricing problem. The manipulation dynamics and rationality proposed for the transfer pricing problem correspond to many real-world negotiation situations. We present an example, that illustrates how manipulation can be employed to solve the transfer pricing problem in a multidivisional firm.     

Pareto-optimal solutions for a wastewater treatment problem

In this paper we present an application of optimal control theory of partial differential equations combined with multi-objective optimization techniques to formulate and solve an economical-ecological problem related to the management of a wastewater treatment system. The problem is formulated as a parabolic multi-objective optimal control problem, and it is studied from a non-cooperative point of view (looking for a Nash equilibrium), and also from a cooperative point of view (looking for Pareto-optimal solutions “better” than the Nash equilibrium). In both cases we state the existence of solutions, give a useful characterization of them, and propose a numerical algorithm to solve the problem. Finally, a numerical experience for a real world situation in the estuary of Vigo (NW Spain) is presented.