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1.
We study conditions for the existence of unblockable states for a class of models studied in a series of articles on multiregional
economic systems. We describe the cooperative games that are associated to these models and reduce some questions of coalition
stability of regional development plans to the appropriate game theory problems. Using the classical Scarf theorem on the
nonemptiness of the cores of cooperative games, we establish quite simple conditions for the existence of unblockable states
of these models of interregional economic interaction. Important roles in the realization of this approach belong to the linearity
of these models and the ensuing polyhedrality of the sets of balanced plans of the regional coalitions. 相似文献
2.
We study a bargaining procedure of coalition formation in the class of hedonic games, where players’ preferences depend solely
on the coalition they belong to. We provide an example of nonexistence of a pure strategy stationary perfect equilibrium,
and a necessary and sufficient condition for existence. We show that when the game is totally stable (the game and all its
restrictions have a nonempty core), there always exists a no-delay equilibrium generating core outcomes. Other equilibria
exhibiting delay or resulting in unstable outcomes can also exist. If the core of the hedonic game and its restrictions always
consist of a single point, we show that the bargaining game admits a unique stationary perfect equilibrium, resulting in the
immediate formation of the core coalition structure. 相似文献
3.
Milan Horniaček 《International Journal of Game Theory》2008,37(2):235-249
We analyze conditions under which negotiated agreements are efficient from the point of view of every possible coalition of
negotiators. The negotiators have lexicographic preferences over agreements they reach. Their utility is the first criterion.
The coalition reaching an agreement is the second criterion. In the analyzed non-cooperative discrete time bargaining game
Γ the players bargain about the choice from the sets of utility vectors feasible for coalitions in a given NTU game (N, V). If Γ has a Markov perfect equilibrium, then the set of equilibrium utility vectors in Markov perfect equilibria in it equals
the core of (N, V).
I thank an anonymous referee, an anonymous Associate Editor, and the Editor for their comments that helped me to improve the
paper. The research reported in this paper was supported by the Grant VEGA 1/1223/04 of the Ministry of Education of the Slovak
Republic. 相似文献
4.
Jean-Marc Bonnisseau 《Set-Valued Analysis》1997,5(3):209-226
We consider a general equilibrium model of an economy in which the production possibilities, the consumption sets and the preferences of the consumers are represented by set-valued mappings which depend on the environment to take into account the possibility of external effect. In order to encompass all kinds of nonconvexities, we do not put any convexity assumption either on the graph of the set-valued mapping which describes the technological possibilities or on the production set for a given environment. The firms are instructed to set their prices according to general pricing rules which may depend on the production plans of other producers and on consumption plans.We report an existence result of general equilibria. As in the model without external effects, the key hypotheses are bounded loss and survival assumptions. Nevertheless, we also assume that the set-valued mappings which describe the fundamentals of the economy are lower semi-continuous and have a closed graph.Our framework is sufficiently large to generalize previous works on the existence of competitive equilibria with externalities when the firms have convex production sets and on the existence of equilibria with general pricing rule without externality. 相似文献
5.
The set of correlated equilibria for a bimatrix game is a closed, bounded, convex set containing the set of Nash equilibria. We show that every extreme point of a maximal Nash set is an extreme point of the above convex set. We also give an example to show that this result is not true in the payoff space, i.e. there are games where no Nash equilibrium payoff is an extreme point of the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs. 相似文献
6.
Dr. A. Rubinstein 《International Journal of Game Theory》1980,9(1):1-12
The set of payoffs for the strong equilibria is characterized for supergames when the evaluation relations are according to the limit of the means and where no coalition can correlate its strategies in a randomized way. It is proven that this set is identical to the set of payoffs of the strong perfect equilibria. On the other hand an example is given to demonstrate that perfection is a significant notion in supergames where the evaluation relations are according to the overtaking criterion. 相似文献
7.
Engelbert J. Dockner Kazuo Nishimura 《Journal of Difference Equations and Applications》2013,19(6):915-926
We formulate a class of N player difference games and derive open—loop and Markov equilibria. It turns out that both types of equilibria can be characterized by a set of difference equations that describe the equilibrium dynamics. We analyze the stability properties of the difference equations that correspond to an equilibrium and find that in both the open—loop and the Markov game there is convergence towards a steady state equilibrium 相似文献
8.
We examine the role of support for coalition stability in common pool resource games such as fisheries games. Some players may not want to join a coalition that jointly manages a resource. Still, because they benefit from spillovers, they may want to support the coalition with a transfer payment to set incentives for others to join. We find that the impact of support on equilibria of this game is limited to games with three or five players. Recommendations for Resource Managers
- Coalitions may be able to effectively manage common pool resources such as fisheries but such coalitions are often not stable due to free-rider incentives.
- We explore the impact of a transfer scheme that can improve this coalition stability which would lead to larger and more effective coalitions.
- Our results show that this new transfer scheme works only for cases where the number of players is small.
9.
Noah D. Stein Asuman Ozdaglar Pablo A. Parrilo 《International Journal of Game Theory》2011,40(4):749-767
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed
extension of matching pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and compact, the structure of its
extreme points can be quite complicated. In finite games the ratio of extreme correlated to extreme Nash equilibria can be
greater than exponential in the size of the strategy spaces. In polynomial games there can exist extreme correlated equilibria
which are not finitely supported; we construct a large family of examples using techniques from ergodic theory. We show that
in general the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of a polynomial game cannot be described by conditions on finitely
many moments (means, covariances, etc.), in marked contrast to the set of Nash equilibria which is always expressible in terms
of finitely many moments. 相似文献
10.
J.M. Díaz-Báñez M. Heredia B. Pelegrín P. Pérez-Lantero I. Ventura 《European Journal of Operational Research》2011,214(1):91-98
In this paper, we deal with a planar location-price game where firms first select their locations and then set delivered prices in order to maximize their profits. If firms set the equilibrium prices in the second stage, the game is reduced to a location game for which pure strategy Nash equilibria are studied assuming that the marginal delivered cost is proportional to the distance between the customer and the facility from which it is served. We present characterizations of local and global Nash equilibria. Then an algorithm is shown in order to find all possible Nash equilibrium pairs of locations. The minimization of the social cost leads to a Nash equilibrium. An example shows that there may exist multiple Nash equilibria which are not minimizers of the social cost. 相似文献
11.
We consider an n-player non-cooperative game with random payoffs and continuous strategy set for each player. The random payoffs of each player are defined using a finite dimensional random vector. We formulate this problem as a chance-constrained game by defining the payoff function of each player using a chance constraint. We first consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player does not depend on the strategies of other players. If a random vector defining the payoffs of each player follows a multivariate elliptically symmetric distribution, we show that there exists a Nash equilibrium. We characterize the set of Nash equilibria using the solution set of a variational inequality (VI) problem. Next, we consider the case where the continuous strategy set of each player is defined by a shared constraint set. In this case, we show that there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium for elliptically symmetric distributed payoffs. Under certain conditions, we characterize the set of a generalized Nash equilibria using the solution set of a VI problem. As an application, the random payoff games arising from electricity market are studied under chance-constrained game framework. 相似文献
12.
13.
V. A. Vasil’ev 《Journal of Applied and Industrial Mathematics》2012,6(4):501-513
We establish rather general conditions for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in the interregional interaction models studied in a series of articles on multiregional economic systems. In contrast to the complicated technical assumptions of the previously announced existence theorem, the conditions here amount to simple modifications of the standard requirements of equilibrium analysis: the absence of regional ??cornucopia?? and strict autarchy of all participants of the model. Furthermore, strict autarchy is directly analogous to the well-known positivity conditions of initial supply for the classical exchange model. In addition to a proof of the main result we discuss its application to the comparative analysis of unblocking states and Walrasian and Edgeworthian equilibrium states of the multiregional economic systems under consideration. 相似文献
14.
We introduce and compare several coalition values for multichoice games. Albizuri defined coalition structures and an extension of the Owen coalition value for multichoice games using the average marginal contribution of a player over a set of orderings of the player’s representatives. Following an approach used for cooperative games, we introduce a set of nested or two-step coalition values on multichoice games which measure the value of each coalition and then divide this among the players in the coalition using either a Shapley or Banzhaf value at each step. We show that when a Shapley value is used in both steps, the resulting coalition value coincides with that of Albizuri. We axiomatize the three new coalition values and show that each set of axioms, including that of Albizuri, is independent. Further we show how the multilinear extension can be used to compute the coalition values. We conclude with a brief discussion about the applicability of the different values. 相似文献
15.
This paper studies endogenous coalition formation in a rivalry environment where continuing conflict exists. A group of heterogeneous players compete for a prize with the probability of winning for a player depending on his strength as well as the distribution of strengths among his rivals. Players can pool their strengths together to increase their probabilities of winning as a group through coalition formation. The players in the winning coalition will compete further until one individual winner is left. We show that in any equilibrium there are only two coalitions in the initial stage of the contest. In the case of three players, the equilibrium often has a coalition of the two weaker players against the strongest. The equilibrium coalition structure with four players mainly takes one of the two forms: a coalition of the three weaker players against the strongest or a coalition of the weakest and strongest players against a coalition of the remaining two. Our findings imply that the rivalry with the possibility of coalition formation in our model exhibits a pattern of two-sidedness and a balance of power. We further study the impact of binding agreements by coalition members on equilibrium coalition structures. Our analysis sheds some light on problems of temporary cooperation among individuals who are rivals by nature. 相似文献
16.
Rose-Anne Dana 《Annals of Operations Research》2002,114(1-4):105-115
We discuss the existence and the qualitative properties of equilibria when agents have multiple priors and there is only one good in each state of the world. We first prove a general existence result in infinite dimension economies. We then fully describe the equilibria in two special cases. We first consider the case of CEU maximizers that have same capacities. We next consider the case of no aggregate uncertainty. We prove that if agents have non-random initial endowments and are uncertainty averse and maximize the minimal expected utility according to a set of possible priors, then the existence of a common prior is equivalent to the existence of a unique equilibrium, the no-trade equilibrium. We lastly give a mild assumption for indeterminacy of equilibria and compute the dimension of indeterminacy. 相似文献
17.
Hannu Salonen 《International Journal of Game Theory》2010,39(3):351-357
We study the existence of Nash equilibria in games with an infinite number of players. We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium
in mixed strategies in all normal form games such that pure strategy sets are compact metric spaces and utility functions
are continuous. The player set can be any nonempty set. 相似文献
18.
B Pelegrín-Pelegrín P Dorta-González P Fernández-Hernández 《The Journal of the Operational Research Society》2011,62(4):729-741
We address the problem of finding location equilibria of a location-price game where firms first select their locations and then set delivered prices in order to maximize their profits. Assuming that firms set the equilibrium prices in the second stage, the game is reduced to a location game for which a global minimizer of the social cost is a location equilibrium if demand is completely inelastic and marginal production cost is constant. The problem of social cost minimization is studied for both a network and a discrete location space. A node optimality property when the location space is a network is shown and an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) formulation is obtained to minimize the social cost. It is also shown that multiple location equilibria can be found if marginal delivered costs are equal for all competitors. Two ILP formulations are given to select one of such equilibria that take into account the aggregated profit and an equity criterion, respectively. An illustrative example with real data is solved and some conclusions are presented. 相似文献
19.
BONNISSEAU J. M. FLORIG M. JOFRÉ A. 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》2001,109(2):237-263
The purpose of this paper is to study the continuity and uniqueness properties of equilibria for linear exchange economies. We characterize the sets of utility vectors and initial endowments for which the equilibrium price is unique and respectively the set for which the equilibrium allocation is unique. We show that the equilibrium allocation correspondence is continuous with respect to the initial endowments and we characterize the set of full measure where the equilibrium allocation correspondence with respect to the initial endowments and utility vectors is continuous. 相似文献
20.
We study the boundary exact controllability for the semilinear Schrödinger equation defined on an open, bounded, connected set Ω of a complete, n-dimensional, Riemannian manifold M with metric g. We prove the locally exact controllability around the equilibria under some checkable geometrical conditions. Our results show that exact controllability is geometrical characters of a Riemannian metric, given by the coefficients and equilibria of the semilinear Schrödinger equation. We then establish the globally exact controllability in such a way that the state of the semilinear Schrödinger equation moves from an equilibrium in one location to an equilibrium in another location. 相似文献