Supply chain coordination for the joint determination of order quantity and reorder point using credit option

Decisions regarding order quantity and reorder point are two major challenges in supply chain inventory management. In this paper, a coordination model of the joint determination of these two decision variables is proposed. A decentralized supply chain consisting of one buyer and one supplier in a multi-period setting is investigated. Demand and lead times are uncertain in our model. An incentive scheme based on credit option has been developed to encourage the buyer to participate in the coordination model. In this model, the downstream member has the option of using credit to purchase goods during the credit time, subject to its commitment to a jointly agreed order quantity and reorder point. The credit time is determined in such a way that the two parties have incentives to participate. The proposed incentive scheme can share the benefits of coordination between the two members based on their bargaining power. The proposed model shows that the coordination of the reorder point, together with order quantity, can increase the overall chain profitability as well as each member’s profitability.     

Demand disruption and coordination of the supply chain with a dominant retailer

This paper develops two coordination models of a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one dominant retailer and multiple fringe retailers to investigate how to coordinate the supply chain after demand disruption. We consider two coordination schedules, linear quantity discount schedule and Groves wholesale price schedule. We find that, under the linear quantity discount schedule, the manufacturer only needs to adjust the maximum variable wholesale price after demand disruption. For each case of the disrupted amount of demand, the higher the market share of the dominant retailer, the lower its average wholesale price and the subsidy will be under the linear quantity discount schedule, while the higher its fraction of the supply chain’s profit will be under Groves wholesale price schedule. When the increased amount of demand is very large and production cost is sufficiently low, linear quantity discount schedule is better for the manufacturer. However, when the production cost is sufficiently large, Groves wholesale price schedule is always better. We also find that the disrupted amount of demand largely affects the allocation of the supply chain’s profit.     

A rewarding-punishing coordination mechanism based on Trust in a divergent supply chain

Coordination of decentralized supply chains using contract design is a problem that has been widely addressed in the literature. We consider a divergent supply chain including a supplier and several retailers producing fashion products with short sale seasons. The retailers cooperate with the supplier as sales agents; i.e., they work in the framework of revenue sharing contracts. Because of their proximity to the market, retailers can provide more accurate demand forecasts to the supplier that is used to decide on issues such as capacity building and market prices with regard to retailers stiff due dates, different lead times and different price-dependent demand functions. To ensure abundant supply and cope with the demand variability, the retailers have an incentive to exaggerate their private forecast information. In this study, we propose a new rewarding-punishing coordination mechanism based on trust between supply chain tiers, considered as a differentiation factor between honest and deceptive partners. An optimization model is developed as a building block of this mechanism. An approximation method is used to simplify and solve the problem. The model is then implemented using Monte-Carlo simulation in four different situations, according to 10 different strategies for forecast information sharing. The findings from the tests show that the mechanism including trust as a decisional factor performs better than ‘No Trust’ mechanism in all situations. These results suggest that taking into account Trust in designing coordination mechanism may have significant influence on the financial performance of the supply chain.     

Coordination and profit sharing between a manufacturer and a buyer with target profit under credit option

Several studies have focused on buyer vendor coordination through quantity discount/credit option mechanism but few quantitative models and investigations are available that have explored the mechanism for transfer of surplus generated due to coordination. In this paper, we develop a coordination mechanism through credit option such that both the parties can divide the surplus equitably after satisfying their own profit targets. Two situations are explored here; in the first situation; both the parties have no individual profit target from the business whereas in the second situation, there are individual profit target for both the parties. The proposed mechanism for division of surplus is studied through a numerical study and the impact of different parameter values on the results are examined.     

Analysis of supply chain coordination under fuzzy demand in a two-stage supply chain

This paper considers a two-stage supply chain coordination problem and focuses on the fuzziness aspect of demand uncertainty. We use fuzzy numbers to depict customer demand, and investigate the optimization of the vertically integrated two-stage supply chain under perfect coordination and contrast with the non-coordination case. As in the traditional probabilistic analysis, we prove that the maximum expected supply chain profit in a coordination situation is greater than the total profit in a non-coordination situation.     

A fuzzy linear programming based approach for tactical supply chain planning in an uncertainty environment

This paper models supply chain (SC) uncertainties by fuzzy sets and develops a fuzzy linear programming model for tactical supply chain planning in a multi-echelon, multi-product, multi-level, multi-period supply chain network. In this approach, the demand, process and supply uncertainties are jointly considered. The aim is to centralize multi-node decisions simultaneously to achieve the best use of the available resources along the time horizon so that customer demands are met at a minimum cost. This proposal is tested by using data from a real automobile SC. The fuzzy model provides the decision maker (DM) with alternative decision plans with different degrees of satisfaction.     

Channel coordination using product returns for a supply chain with stochastic salvage capacity

We examine returns policy in a Newsboy framework. Unlike the prior literature, however, we assume that both supplier and retailer have limited and stochastic salvage capacities. We first analyze the case of integrated supply chain in which the agents’ decisions are fully coordinated for the joint profits. The result prescribes a partial returns policy, in which the retailer returns a part of the leftovers to the supplier and liquidates the remainder through its clearance sale. In a decentralized system, the supplier should motivate the retailer to duplicate the outcome of the integrated system in choosing order and returns quantities. We propose three coordination contracts, of which each uses two benefit transfer schemes as an incentive to the retailer, instead of using a single benefit scheme as in the prior literature. All three effectively coordinate the supply chain. The supplier, as a Stakelberg leader, chooses the most profitable one since each contract yields the different shares of the agents’ profits.     

A note on “Seller’s optimal credit period and cycle time in a supply chain for deteriorating items with maximum lifetime”

In 2014, Wang et al. (2014) extended the model of Lou and Wang (2012) to incorporate the credit period dependent demand and default risk for deteriorating items with maximum lifetime. However, the rates of demand, default risk and deterioration in the model of Wang et al. (2014) are assumed to be specific functions of credit period which limits the contributions. In this note, we first generalize the theoretical results of Wang et al. (2014) under some certain conditions. Furthermore, we also present some structural results instead of a numerical analysis on variation of optimal replenishment and trade credit strategies with respect to key parameters.     

On a cooperative advertising model for a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer

, , ,  and  recently studied a game-theoretic model for cooperative advertising in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. However, the sales-volume (demand) function considered in this model can become negative for some values of the decision variables, and in fact, this does happen for the proposed Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium solutions. Yue et al. (2006) acknowledge the negativity problem and suggest two constraints to fix it; however, they do not incorporate these constraints into their mathematical analysis. In this paper, we show that the results obtained by analyzing the advertising model under the constraints suggested by Yue et al. can differ significantly from those obtained in the previous papers.     

A two-stage supply chain coordination mechanism considering price sensitive demand and quantity discounts

This paper explores the coordination between a supplier and a buyer within a decentralized supply chain, through the use of quantity discounts in a game theoretic model. Within this model, the players face inventory and pricing decisions. We propose both cooperative and non-cooperative approaches considering that the product traded experiences a price sensitive demand. In the first case, we study the dynamics of the game from the supplier's side as the leader in the negotiation obtaining a Stackelberg equilibrium, and then show how the payoff of this player could still improve from this point. In the second case, a cooperative model is formulated, where decisions are taken simultaneously, emulating a centralized firm, showing the benefits of the cooperation between the players. We further formulate a pricing game, where the buyer is allowed to set different prices to the final customer as a reaction to the supplier's discount decisions. For the latter we investigate the difference between feasibility of implementing a retail discount given a current coordination mechanism and without it. Finally the implications of transportation costs are analyzed in the quantity discount schedule. Our findings are illustrated with a numerical example showing the difference in the players’ payoff in each case and the optimal strategies, comparing in each case our results with existing work.     

Coordinating a decentralized supply chain with customer returns and price-dependent stochastic demand using a buyback policy

We investigate a decentralized supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a retailer where the retailer simultaneously determines the retail price and order quantity while experiencing customer returns and price dependent stochastic demand. We propose an agreement between the manufacturer and the retailer that includes two buyback prices, one for unsold inventory and a second for customer returns, and show that this type of easy-to-implement agreement can achieve perfect supply chain coordination and be a win-win for both manufacturer and retailer when a complementary profit-sharing agreement is included.     

Time-dependent optimization of a multi-item uncertain supply chain network: A hybrid approximation algorithm

We consider the uncertain least cost shipping problem. The input is a multi-item supply chain network with time-evolving uncertain costs and capacities. Exploiting the operational law of uncertainty theory, a mathematical model of the problem is established and the indeterminacy factors are tackled. We use the scaling idea together with transformation approach and uncertainty programming to develop a hybrid algorithm to optimize and obtain the uncertainty distribution of the total shipping cost. We analyze the practical performance of the algorithm and present an illustrative example.     

The value of early order commitment in a two-level supply chain

One approach to supply chain coordination is early order commitment, whereby a retailer commits to purchase a fixed-order quantity at a fixed delivery time before demand uncertainty is resolved. In this paper, we develop an analytical model to quantify the cost savings of an early order commitment in a two-level supply chain where demand is serially correlated. A decision rule is derived to determine whether early order commitment will benefit the supply chain, and accordingly to determine the optimal timing for early commitment. Our results indicate that the supply chain would experience greater savings from early order commitment when – (a) the inventory item receives less value-added activities at the retailer site; (b) the manufacturing lead time is short; (c) demand correlation over time is positive but weak; or (d) the delivery lead time is long (if a condition exists). We also propose a rebate scheme for the supply chain partners to share the gains of practicing early order commitment.     

Initiating a state of the art system for real-time supply chain coordination

Intelligent Wireless Web (IWW) employs the capabilities of high speed wireless networks and exploits the parallel advancements in Internet-based technologies such as the Semantic Web, Web Services, Agent-based Technologies, and context awareness. Considering its great potentials to be applied in business systems, we have devised an innovative model, based on the IWW services, for a typical mobile real-time supply chain coordination system which has been developed and tested in a real operational environment. Our article investigates the proposed system in this way: at the start, the building blocks of the IWW are discussed in detail. Then, we fully explain the basic concepts of mobile real-time supply chain coordination and concentrate on the motivations to implement such a modern system. The vision of intelligent wireless web services, as discussed in this paper, centers on the need to provide mobile supply chain members highly specific data and services in real-time on an as-needed basis, with the flexibility of use for the user. In this regard, we investigate nine enabling technologies of the IWW for our system and discuss how, by exploiting the convergence and synergy between different technologies, it has become possible to deliver intelligent wireless web support to mobile real-time supply chain coordination. Afterwards, a practical framework is clearly established in four phases. This initiative system has been implemented in the laboratory and has passed the evaluation processes successfully. Further details will be announced in near future in another research article.     

Ordering policy and coordination of a supply chain with two-period demand uncertainty

We develop a two-period game model of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain to investigate the optimal decisions of the players, where stock-out and holding costs are incorporated into the model. The demand at each period is stochastic and price sharply drops in mid-life. We assume the retailer has a single order opportunity, and decides how much inventory to keep in the middle of selling season. We show that both the price-protection mid-life and end-of-life returns (PME) scheme and the only mid-life and end-of-life returns (ME) scheme may achieve channel coordination and access a ‘win-win’ situation under some conditions. The larger the lowest expected profit of the retailer, the lower the possibility of ‘win-win’ situation will be. Combined with the analysis of feasible regions for coordination policies, we find that PME scheme is not always better than ME scheme from the perspective of implementable mechanism. Finally, we find that adopting the dispose-down-to (DDT) policy can bring a larger improvement of the expected channel profit in the centralized setting, and it is interesting that by using DDT policy, double marginalization occurs only at Period 1, and however, does not plague the retailer in Period 2.     

Capacity allocation,ordering, and pricing decisions in a supply chain with demand and supply uncertainties

This paper studies coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain that consists of one Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), one manufacturer, and one distributor, and possesses uncertainties at both demand and supply sides. These uncertainties emerge, respectively, from random demand the distributor faces and randomness of capacity with which the OEM processes the manufacturer’s outsourced quantity. Sharing supply and demand uncertainty information along the supply chain enables us to develop three models with different coordination efforts—the OEM and manufacturer coordination, the manufacturer and distributor coordination, and the OEM, manufacturer, and distributor coordination—and quantify the coordinated decisions in these three models. Our analysis of these coordination models suggests that coordinating with the OEM improves the manufacturer’s probability of meeting downstream demand and his expected profit, yet coordinating with the manufacturer is not necessarily beneficial to the OEM when downstream coordination is lacking.     

A note on “Price discount based on early order commitment in a single manufacturer-multiple retailer supply chain”

In a recent paper by Xie et al. [Xie, J., Zhou, D., Wei, J.C., Zhao, X., 2010. Price discount based on early order commitment in a single manufacturer-multiple retailer supply chain. European Journal of Operational Research 200, 368-376], the authors have studied the early order commitment (EOC) strategy for a decentralized, two-level supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers. They fail to provide an algorithm to determine the optimal EOC periods to minimize the total supply chain cost. This note proposes a polynomial-time algorithm to find the optimal solutions, and provides a new set of sufficient conditions under which the wholesale price discount scheme coordinates the whole supply chain.     

Interactive group decision-making using a fuzzy linguistic approach for evaluating the flexibility in a supply chain

With global competition rapidly intensifying and shifting to the supply chain level, the supply chain flexibility has become increasingly important. However, the literature addressing supply chain flexibility remains limited. This study thus builds a group decision-making structure model of flexibility in supply chain management development. This study presents a framework for evaluating supply chain flexibility comprising two parts, an evaluation hierarchy with flexibility dimensions and related metrics, and an evaluation scheme that uses a three-stage process to evaluate supply chain flexibility. This study then proposes an algorithm for determining the degree of supply chain flexibility using a fuzzy linguistic approach. Evaluations of the degree of supply chain flexibility can identify the need to improve supply chain flexibility, and identify specific dimensions of supply chain flexibility as the best directions for improvement. The results of this study are more objective and unbiased for two reasons. First, the results are generated by group decision-making with interactive consensus analysis. Second, the fuzzy linguistic approach used in this study has more advantage to preserve no loss of information than other methods. Additionally, this study presents an example using a case study to illustrate the availability of the proposed methods and compare it with other methods.     

Seller’s optimal credit period and cycle time in a supply chain for deteriorating items with maximum lifetime

Due to evaporation, obsolescence, spoilage, etc., some products (e.g., fruits, vegetables, pharmaceuticals, volatile liquids, and others) not only deteriorate continuously but also have their expiration dates. To attract new buyers and increase sales, a seller frequently offers its buyers a trade credit period to settle the purchase amount. There is no interest charge to a buyer if the purchasing amount is paid within the credit period, and vice versa. On the other hand, granting a credit period from a seller to its buyers increases default risk. In this paper, we propose an economic order quantity model for a seller by incorporating the following relevant facts: (1) deteriorating products not only deteriorate continuously but also have their maximum lifetime, and (2) credit period increases not only demand but also default risk. We then characterize the seller’s optimal credit period and cycle time. Furthermore, we discuss a special case for non-deteriorating items. Finally, we run several numerical examples to illustrate the problem and provide some managerial insights.