Estimating output gains by means of Luenberger efficiency measures

In this paper we propose a new measure of input allocative efficiency that we estimate using directional distance functions. Our new measure compares the gain in output if a firm reduces technical inefficiency for the direct production possibility set and the gain in output if the firm reduces technical inefficiency for the indirect production possibility set. Because the directional distance function uses a translated origin, the gain in output from an optimal reallocation of inputs can be estimated for non-radial expansions in output. We estimate efficiency for Japanese banks during 1992–1999. The gains in outputs from reducing allocative inefficiency by reallocating inputs are greater than the gains in outputs that can be attained by reducing technical inefficiency.     

Estimating output allocative efficiency and productivity change: Application to Japanese banks

A new measure of output allocative efficiency is developed by comparing the input technical efficiency of a firm for the direct input requirement set and the indirect input requirement set proposed by Shephard [Indirect Production Functions, Verlag Anton Hain, Meisenheim Am Glan]. The ratio of the direct and indirect input quasi-distance functions serves as the measure of output allocative efficiency. As such, it measures the ratio of potential to actual inputs if the firm had chosen the revenue maximizing output mix. Using panel data on Japanese banks operating during 1992–1996 productivity growth is measured and decomposed into changes in output allocative efficiency, changes in input technical efficiency, and technical change. During the period, Japanese banks experienced productivity declines averaging 2% per year and could have used only 78–93% of actual inputs if they had chosen the revenue maximizing output mix.     

Decomposing technical inefficiency using the principle of least action

In for-profit organizations, profit efficiency decomposition is considered important since estimates on profit drivers are of practical use to managers in their decision making. Profit efficiency is traditionally due to two sources – technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. The contribution of this paper is a novel decomposition of technical efficiency that could be more practical to use if the firm under evaluation really wants to achieve technical efficiency as soon as possible. For this purpose, we show how a new version of the Measure of Inefficiency Proportions (MIP), which seeks the minimization of the total technical effort by the assessed firm, is a lower bound of the value of technical inefficiency associated with the directional distance function. The targets provided by the new MIP could be beneficial for firms since it specifies how firms may become technically efficient simply by decreasing one input or increasing one output, suggesting that each firm should focus its effort on a specific dimension (input or output). This approach is operationalized in a data envelopment analysis framework and applied to a dataset of airlines.     

Accounting for slacks to measure and decompose revenue efficiency in the Spanish Designation of Origin wines with DEA

In this paper, we show how Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) may be used to measure and decompose revenue inefficiency, taking into account all sources of technical waste in the context of an application to assess the Spanish quality wine sector, in particular Designation of Origin (DO) wines. We try to go beyond the standard approaches, which use Shephard distance functions or directional distance functions, to provide decomposition that incorporates slacks as a source of technical inefficiency. To accomplish this, we will base our analysis on a recent approach introduced in Cooper et al. (2011a). In particular, we show how an output-oriented version of the Weighted Additive model can be used to properly identify revenue, technical, and allocative inefficiencies in Spanish DOs. In the application, we conclude that the main source of revenue inefficiency in this sector is technical waste, and that Cava can be highlighted as the DO that performs as a benchmark for more numbers of units.     

A DEA approach to derive individual lower and upper bounds for the technical and allocative components of the overall profit efficiency

In this paper, we propose a slack-based data envelopment analysis approach to be used in economic efficiency analyses when the objective is profit maximization. The focus is on the measurement of the technical component of the overall efficiency with the purpose of guaranteeing the achievement of the Pareto efficiency. As a result, we will be able to estimate correctly the allocative component in the sense that this latter only reflects the improvements that can be accomplished by reallocations along the Pareto-efficient frontier. Some new measures of technical and allocative efficiency in terms of both profit ratios and differences of profits are defined. We do not make any assumption on the way the technical efficiency is to be measured, that is, we do not use, for example, either a hyperbolic measure or a directional distance function, which allows us to extend this approach and derive individual lower and upper bounds for these efficiency components. To do it, we use novel models of minimum distance to the frontier. This broadens the range of possibilities for the explanation of the overall efficiency in terms of technical and allocative inefficiencies.     

Developing a decomposable measure of profit efficiency using DEA

In for-profit organizations efficiency measurement with reference to the potential for profit augmentation is particularly important as is its decomposition into technical, and allocative components. Different profit efficiency approaches can be found in the literature to measure and decompose overall profit efficiency. In this paper, we highlight some problems within existing approaches and propose a new measure of profit efficiency based on a geometric mean of input/output adjustments needed for maximizing profits. Overall profit efficiency is calculated through this efficiency measure and is decomposed into its technical and allocative components. Technical efficiency is calculated based on a non-oriented geometric distance function (GDF) that is able to incorporate all the sources of inefficiency, while allocative efficiency is retrieved residually. We also define a measure of profitability efficiency which complements profit efficiency in that it makes it possible to retrieve the scale efficiency of a unit as a component of its profitability efficiency. In addition, the measure of profitability efficiency allows for a dual profitability interpretation of the GDF measure of technical efficiency. The concepts introduced in the paper are illustrated using a numerical example.     

Decomposing technical efficiency and scale elasticity in two-stage network DEA

The constant returns to scale assumption maintained by neoclassical theorists for justifying the black-box structure of production technology in long run does not necessarily allow one to infer that there are no scale benefits available in its sub-technologies. Most of real-life production technologies are multi-stage in nature, and the sources of increasing returns lie in the sub-technologies. It is, therefore, imperative to estimate the scale economies of a firm not only for the network technology but also for the sub-technologies. To accomplish this, two approaches are suggested in this contribution, based on the premise concerning whether a network technology construct considers allocative inefficiency. The first approach, which is ours, makes use of a single network technology for two interdependent sub-technologies. The second approach, which is due to Kao and Hwang (2011), however, assumes complete allocative efficiency by considering two independent sub-technology frontiers, one for each sub-technology. The distinction between these two approaches is important from a policy point of view since the network efficiencies revealed from these two approaches have distinctive causative factors that do not permit them to be used interchangeably.     

Resolving a strange case of efficiency

In a recent paper in the Journal of the Operational Research Society, Tone proposes an alternative to the Farrell cost efficiency index to avoid the ‘strange case’ problem in which firms with identical inputs and outputs but with input prices differing by some factor (eg, one has input prices twice another) will have the same Farrell cost efficiency. We provide an alternative cost efficiency indicator that avoids this problem, allows for decomposition into technical and allocative efficiency, and is easily estimated using DEA type models.     

A cost Malmquist productivity index

This paper develops a productivity index applicable when producers are cost minimisers and input prices are known. The index is inspired by the Malmquist index as extended to productivity measurement. The index developed here is defined in terms of input cost rather than input quantity distance functions. Hence, productivity change is decomposed into overall efficiency and cost technical change. Furthermore, overall efficiency change is decomposed into technical and allocative efficiency change and cost technical change into a part capturing shifts of input quantities and shifts of relative input prices. These decompositions provide a clearer picture of the root sources of productivity change. They are illustrated here in a sample of hospitals; results are computed using non-parametric mathematical programming.     

Technical and allocative efficiency in European banking

This paper specifies an empirical framework for estimating both technical and allocative efficiency using the translog cost-share system, thus providing a solution to the issue known in the literature as the Greene problem. The model is applied to a large panel of European banks and the results are compared with those of a model that does not include an allocative inefficiency term and also with those obtained by using a consistent Bayesian technique. Our results suggest that models which include only technical efficiency, significantly overestimate it, while parameter estimates from the model that includes both technical and allocative efficiency are very close to the ones obtained from the Bayesian approach, thus enhancing our confidence in the proposed methodology. Finally, the fact that allocative efficiency of banks in our sample improves more than technical efficiency underlines the importance of including an allocative inefficiency component in parametric efficiency models.     

Estimating technical and allocative efficiency in the public sector: A nonparametric analysis of Dutch schools

Public sector output provision is influenced not only by discretionary inputs but also by exogenous environmental factors. In this paper, we extended the literature by developing a conditional DEA estimator of allocative efficiency that allows a decomposition of overall cost efficiency into allocative and technical components while simultaneously controlling for the environment. We apply the model to analyze technical and allocative efficiency of Dutch secondary schools. The results reveal that allocative efficiency represents a significant 37 percent of overall cost efficiency on average, although technical inefficiency is still the dominant part. Furthermore, the results show that the impact of environment largely differs between schools and that having a more unfavorable environment is very expensive to schools. These results highlight the importance of including environmental variables in both technical and allocative efficiency analysis.     

Economic inefficiency measurement of input spending when decision-making units face different input prices

In a recent paper, Kaoru Tone (J Opl Res Soc (2002) 2: 429–444) showed that when the Farrell measure of cost efficiency is estimated for two firms that have different input prices, a firm with higher costs can be deemed more efficient than a firm with lower costs. As an alternative approach, Tone proposed a radial cost efficiency measure that is estimated using levels of spending on each input, rather than input quantities. Thus, firms with higher costs are less efficient than firms with lower costs. In this paper, we extend Tone's approach by allowing for non-radial changes in spending. Our approach builds on earlier work by Luenberger (J Math Econ (1992) 21: 461–481) and Chambers et al (J Econ Theo (1996) 70: 407–419) who use directional distance functions to measure inefficiency. We provide an example and illustration of our approach using Japanese bank data.     

Cooperative games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in the marketplace

Two games of interacting between a coalition of players in a marketplace and the residual players acting there are discussed, along with two approaches to fair imputation of gains of coalitions in cooperative games that are based on the concepts of the Shapley vector and core of a cooperative game. In the first game, which is an antagonistic one, the residual players try to minimize the coalition's gain, whereas in the second game, which is a noncooperative one, they try to maximize their own gain as a coalition. A meaningful interpretation of possible relations between gains and Nash equilibrium strategies in both games considered as those played between a coalition of firms and its surrounding in a particular marketplace in the framework of two classes of n-person games is presented. A particular class of games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in which models of firms operating in the marketplace are those with linear constraints and utility functions being sums of linear and bilinear functions of two corresponding vector arguments is analyzed, and a set of maximin problems on polyhedral sets of connected strategies which the problem of choosing a coalition for a particular firm is reducible to are formulated based on the firm models of the considered kind.     

Coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for information exchange

This paper investigates the coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for exchanges of information about their cost functions in a game-theoretical framework. An oligopolistic market under uncertainty is considered in which each firm knows its own cost function but not those of all the others. The following results are shown. It is profitable for each firm to exchange the information about cost functions with other firms. When the uncertainty levels of the cost functions of all firms are symmetric. it is common interest for them to exchange their information by forming the grand coalition. On the other hand, when their uncertainty levels are highly asymmetric, firms possessing less uncertain cost functions come into conflict with one another when exchanging information exclusively with the most uncertain firms. As a result, more than one coalition may be formed among firms.     

Shapley mappings and the cumulative value for n-person games with fuzzy coalitions

In this paper we prove existence and uniqueness of the so-called Shapley mapping, which is a solution concept for a class of n-person games with fuzzy coalitions whose elements are defined by the specific structure of their characteristic functions. The Shapley mapping, when it exists, associates to each fuzzy coalition in the game an allocation of the coalitional worth satisfying the efficiency, the symmetry, and the null-player conditions. It determines a “cumulative value” that is the “sum” of all coalitional allocations for whose computation we provide an explicit formula.     

Allocative efficiency of technically inefficient production units

We discuss how to measure allocative efficiency without presuming technical efficiency. This is relevant when it is easier to introduce reallocations than improvements of technical efficiency. We compare the approach to the traditional one of assuming technical efficiency before measuring allocative efficiency. In particular, we develop necessary and sufficient conditions in the technology to ensure consistent measures, we suggest alternative interpretations of the approaches, and we relate them to motivational and organizational change perspectives.     

Measuring the impacts of production risk on technical efficiency: A state-contingent conditional order-m approach

This article studies the influence of risk on farms’ technical efficiency levels. The analysis extends the order-m efficiency scores approach proposed by Daraio and Simar (2005) to the state-contingent framework. The empirical application focuses on cross section data of Catalan specialized crop farms from the year 2011. Results suggest that accounting for production risks increases the technical performance. A 10% increase in output risk will result in a 2.5% increase in average firm technical performance.     

Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems

This paper examines coalition formation problems from the viewpoint of mechanism design. We consider the case where (i) the list of feasible coalitions (those coalitions which are permitted to form) is given in advance; and (ii) each individual’s preference is a ranking over those feasible coalitions which include this individual. We are interested in requiring the mechanism to guarantee each coalition the “right” of forming that coalition at least when every member of the coalition ranks the coalition at the top. We name this property coalitional unanimity. We examine the compatibility between coalitional unanimity and incentive requirements, and prove that if the mechanism is strategy-proof and respects coalitional unanimity, then for each preference profile, there exists at most one strictly core stable partition, and the mechanism chooses such a partition whenever available. Further, the mechanism is coalition strategy-proof and respects coalitional unanimity if, and only if, the strictly core stable partition uniquely exists for every preference profile.     

Profitability of a sample of Portuguese bank branches and its decomposition into technical and allocative components

The efficiency literature, both using parametric and non-parametric methods, has been focusing mainly on cost efficiency analysis rather than on profit efficiency. In for-profit organisations, however, the measurement of profit efficiency and its decomposition into technical and allocative efficiency is particularly relevant. In this paper a newly developed method is used to measure profit efficiency and to identify the sources of any shortfall in profitability (technical and/or allocative inefficiency). The method is applied to a set of Portuguese bank branches first assuming long run and then a short run profit maximisation objective. In the long run most of the scope for profit improvement of bank branches is by becoming more allocatively efficient. In the short run most of profit gain can be realised through higher technical efficiency.     

Evolution of bank efficiency in Brazil: A DEA approach

This paper investigates cost, technical and allocative efficiencies for Brazilian banks in the recent period (2000–2007). We use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to compute efficiency scores. Brazilian banks were found to have low levels of economic (cost) efficiency compared to banks in Europe and in the US. For the period with high macroeconomic volatility (2000–2002) the economic inefficiency in Brazilian banks can be attributed mainly to technical inefficiency rather than allocative inefficiency. State-owned banks are significantly more cost efficient than foreign, private domestic and private with foreign participation. There is no evidence of differences in economic efficiency due to type of activity and bank size. These results may provide some useful guidance for financial regulators and bank managers.