拟阵限制下合作对策解的传递性

Vincent Feltkamp研究了Shapley解和Banzhaf解的公理性．Bilbao等人又对拟阵限制下的Shapley解的性质进行了讨论．本文在此基础上主要研究了拟阵限制下的合作对策Shapley解，并利用传递性、交换性、概率有效性和P-哑元性等四条公理证明了拟阵限制下合作对策Shapley解的唯一性．进而证明了拟阵限制条件下简单对策Shapley解的唯一性．最后给出了拟阵限制下合作对策的Banzhaf解的唯一性定理．     

拟阵上合作对策的Banzhaf函数

本文结合文[1,2]中关于拟阵上静态结构和动态结构合作对策Shapley函数的描述,探讨了两类拟阵上的Banzhaf函数.通过给出相应的公理体系,论述了两类拟阵上Banzhaf函数的存在性和唯一性,拓展了拟阵上分配指标的研究范围.同时讨论了两类合作对策上Banzhaf函数的有关性质.最后通过算例来说明局中人在此类合作对策中的Banzhaf指标.     

Banzhaf权力指标的特性

Banzhaf权力指标主要用来刻画政治选举中权力的分配问题.本文研究了Banzhaf权力指标的四条性质,它们分别为2人有效性,哑元性,等价性和边缘贡献性.并利用这四条性质刻画了Banzhaf权力指标的唯一性.最后通过一个实例说明了Banzhaf权力指标的应用.     

格上合作对策的Banzhaf值

本文介绍了格上的合作对策,并给出了格上合作对策的Banzhaf解,同时利用线性性,哑元性,单调性,对称性,不变性和2-有效性等六条公理完成了对Banzhaf值的唯一性刻画.在证明唯一性的过程中,利用了一个同构变换,将格上多选择合作对策映射到经典合作对策来进行研究.     

基于Banzhaf指数阿里合伙人模式投票权研究

应用Banzhaf指数探讨了阿里合伙人模式中股东持有股权与投票权之间的非对等关系.首先依据该模式建立了包含合伙人集团和股东大会的加权投票博弈系统,然后运用Banzhaf指数构建了合伙人集团和各股东的权力指数测度公式.最后根据2017年阿里巴巴公司的合伙人成员数和各股东持有股权比例,进行了实际权力指数测算分析,展示了方法的可行性,最后给出了该模式的优化建议.     

有向图对策下的Banzhaf值及其应用

Banzhaf值是经典可转移效用合作对策中重要的分配规则之一，它假设任何有限参与者间均能进行合作形成可行联盟。2006年，Alonso-Meijide和Fiestras-Janeiro考虑无向网络，定义了图对策下的Banzhaf值，以此反映合作网络对参与者间合作以及分配结果的影响。本文则在此基础上，考虑合作网络的方向性，将Banzhaf值进一步推广到有向图对策中，提出了新的分配规则——有向Banzhaf值。首先，本文证明了有向Banzhaf值满足准隔离性、收缩性、公平性、强分支可分解性以及强分支总贡献性。其次，证明了有向Banzhaf值可由公平性、准隔离性以及收缩性唯一刻画，也可由公平性结合强分支总贡献性唯一刻画。最后，以湿地水循环系统为例，对有向Banzhaf值和其他值进行了比较分析，讨论了有向Banzhaf值的应用价值。     

具有图结构和联盟结构的Banzhaf值及应用

Banzhaf值是经典可转移效用合作对策中一个著名的分配规则,可以用来评估参与者在对策中的不同作用。本文将Banzhaf值推广到具有联盟结构和图结构的TU-对策中,首先提出并定义了具有联盟结构和图结构的Banzhaf值(简称PL-Banzhaf值),证明了PL-Banzhaf值满足公平性、平衡贡献性和分割分支总贡献性,并给出了该值的两种公理性刻画。其次,讨论了PL-Banzhaf值在跨国天然气管道案例中的应用,并和其他分配规则进行了比较分析。     

两类分段对称系统周期解的存在性

本文研究了两类分段对称系统周期解的存在性,得到了系统相应的周期解存在的充分条件．作为应用,证明了一类具有分段对称性的时滞微分方程的周期解的存在性,推广了现有的相关结果．     

2n阶两点边值问题的多重非平凡解

本文主要研究2n阶两点边值问题的多重非平凡解的存在性．利用不动点指数理论和Leray-schauder度,在一般的非线性条件下,证明了2n阶两点边值问题至少有六个非平凡解的存在性．而且,如果非线性项是奇函数,则至少有八个非平凡解的存在．     

集合对策边缘解的公理化方法

本文将单调集合对策边缘解推广到一般集合对策上,利用三个公理,确定了集合对策边缘解的唯—性．在证明唯—性的过程中,引进了单调集合对策将集合对策进行分解．证明过程与Aarts等人的方法完全不一样,在某些地方吸收了Young的有关思想．     

Values of games with denumerably many players

In this paper axioms for values of games with denumerably many players are introduced and, on a certain space of games, a value is defined as a limit of values of finite games. Further, some relationships between the value that the topology on the space of games of bounded variation are investigated. It is also shown and the regular weighted majority games are members of the space on which the value is defined.     

An average lexicographic value for cooperative games

For games with a non-empty core the Alexia value is introduced, a value which averages the lexicographic maxima of the core. It is seen that the Alexia value coincides with the Shapley value for convex games, and with the nucleolus for strongly compromise admissible games and big boss games. For simple flow games, clan games and compromise stable games an explicit expression and interpretation of the Alexia value is derived. Furthermore it is shown that the reverse Alexia value, defined by averaging the lexicographic minima of the core, coincides with the Alexia value for convex games and compromise stable games.     

双准均衡合作对策τ值的公理化

介绍了能准确刻画现实生活中每个参与者有三种选择的双合作对策,在此基础上研究了双合作对策的τ值,并对双准均衡合作对策的τ值进行了公理化,其中双合作对策的上向量、间隙函数、让步向量的构造是刻画其τ值的基础．     

Total Reward Stochastic Games and Sensitive Average Reward Strategies

In this paper, total reward stochastic games are surveyed. Total reward games are motivated as a refinement of average reward games. The total reward is defined as the limiting average of the partial sums of the stream of payoffs. It is shown that total reward games with finite state space are strategically equivalent to a class of average reward games with an infinite countable state space. The role of stationary strategies in total reward games is investigated in detail. Further, it is outlined that, for total reward games with average reward value 0 and where additionally both players possess average reward optimal stationary strategies, it holds that the total reward value exists.     

双准均衡合作对策\tau值的公理化

介绍了能准确刻画现实生活中每个参与者有三种选择的双合作对策,在此基础上研究了双合作对策的\tau值,并对双准均衡合作对策的\tau值进行了公理化,其中双合作对策的上向量、间隙函数、让步向量的构造是刻画其\tau值的基础.     

On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs

Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows that the equivalence is not preserved since these solutions can all be different for cooperative games with random payoffs. Properties are studied and a characterization on a subclass of games is provided.2000 Mathematics Subject Classification Number: 91A12.The authors thank two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their helpful comments.This author acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) through project 613-304-059.Received: October 2000     

Games of stopping with infinite horizon

We consider two-person zero-sum games of stopping: two players sequentially observe a stochastic process with infinite time horizon. Player I selects a stopping time and player II picks the distribution of the process. The pay-off is given by the expected value of the stopped process. Results of Irle (1990) on existence of value and equivalence of randomization for such games with finite time horizon, where the set of strategies for player II is dominated in the measure-theoretical sense, are extended to the infinite time case. Furthermore we treat such games when the set of strategies for player II is not dominated. A counterexample shows that even in the finite time case such games may not have a value. Then a sufficient condition for the existence of value is given which applies to prophet-type games.     

On the convexity of communication games

A communication situation consists of a game and a communication graph. By introducing two different types of corresponding communication games, point games and arc games, the Myerson value and the position value of a communication situation were introduced. This paper investigates relations between convexity of the underlying game and the two communication games. In particular, assuming the underlying game to be convex, necessary and sufficient conditions on the communication graph are provided such that the communication games are convex. Moreover, under the same conditions, it is shown that the Myerson value and the posi tion value are in the core of the point game. Some remarks are made on superadditivity and balancedness.     

Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs

We study the approximation of the least core value and the least core of supermodular cost cooperative games. We provide a framework for approximation based on oracles that approximately determine maximally violated constraints. This framework yields a 3-approximation algorithm for computing the least core value of supermodular cost cooperative games, and a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a cost allocation in the 2-approximate least core of these games. This approximation framework extends naturally to submodular profit cooperative games. For scheduling games, a special class of supermodular cost cooperative games, we give a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing the least core value. For matroid profit games, a special class of submodular profit cooperative games, we give exact polynomial-time algorithms for computing the least core value as well as a least core cost allocation.     

The Shapley value and average convex games

In this paper we reformulate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the Shapley value to lie in the core of the game. Two new classes of games, which strictly include convex games, are introduced: average convex games and partially average convex games. Partially average convex games, which need not be superadditive, include average convex games. The Shapley value of a game for both classes is in the core. Some Cobb Douglas production games with increasing returns to scale turn out to be average convex games. The paper concludes with a comparison between the new classes of games introduced and some previous extensions of the convexity notion.The authors thank G. Owen, S. Tijs, and J. Ostroy and two anonymous referees of the International Journal of Game Theory for their comments and suggestions. The usual disclamer applies. We are grateful to the Universidad del Pais Vasco-EHU (grant UPV 209.321-H053/90) and the Ministry of Education and Science of Spain (CICYT grant PB900654) for providing reseach support.