Modelling decision behaviours in pricing game of closed-loop supply chains

This paper experimentally and analytically studies pricing decisions in closed-loop supply chains. Experimental results show considerable deviations from theoretical predictions by traditional pricing models. Moreover, social relationships can affect decision results, and double marginalization is reduced in closed-loop supply chains. For in-depth analysis of experimental results, we further extended the quantal response equilibrium model by incorporating the fairness concerns of both the manufacturer and retailer. The analysis results of the developed model suggest that participants exhibit bounded rationality and fairness concerns when they make decisions. Social relationships can also influence the degree of fairness concerns.     

Flexible long-term capacity planning in closed-loop supply chains with remanufacturing

We deal with long-term demand-driven capacity planning policies in the reverse channel of closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) with remanufacturing, under high capacity acquisition cost coupled with uncertainty in actual demand, sales patterns, quality and timing of end-of-use product returns. The objective is to facilitate the decision-making when the management faces the dilemma of implementing either a strategy of early large-scale investments to benefit from economies of scale and capacity readiness, or a flexible strategy of low volume but more frequent capacity expansions. We consider a CLSC with two sequential product-types. We study the system’s response in terms of transient flows, actual/desired capacity level, capacity expansions/contractions and total supply chain profit, employing a simulation-based system dynamics optimization approach. Extensive numerical investigation covers a broad range of real-world remanufacturable products under alternative scenarios in relation to the market preference over product-types. The key findings propose flexible policies as improved alternatives to large-scale capacity expansions/contractions in terms of adaptability to the actual pattern of end-of-use product returns and involved risk in the investments’ turnover. Flexible policies are also proposed as practices to avoid overcapacity phenomena in collection and remanufacturing capacity and as robust policies to product demand. Their implementation is revealed to be even more important for the case of remanufacturing, when a high capacity acquisition unit-cost ratio (remanufacturing/collection) is coupled with strong economies of scale. Finally, results under different information sharing structures show changes in remanufacturing policies, thus justifying the importance of coordination between the decision-maker and the distributor.     

A novel advanced grey incidence analysis for investigating the level of resilience in supply chains

Annals of Operations Research - Supply chain risk management embroils quite a lot of situations of managerial decision-making under uncertainties. As contemporary supply chains are intricate...     

Modeling reverse logistic tasks within closed-loop supply chains: An example from the automotive industry

In this contribution, the peculiarities of establishing a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) are presented, based on an example considering the end-of-life vehicle (ELV) treatment in Germany. Different design options for a CLSC are put up, concentrating on how reverse material flows can be handled with regard to reintegrate them into their genuine supply chains. Reverse logistics aspects are modeled with vehicle routing planning. Introducing a problem-tailored algorithm, results of several CLSC scenarios are discussed which are based on real case data, depicting measures from German ELV stakeholders.     

Negotiation-based collaborative planning between supply chains partners

It is often proposed that operations planning in supply chains can be organized in terms of a hierarchical planning system. However, the hierarchical approach assumes a single, centralized planning task for synchronizing operations across the supply chain. As central coordination can usually be realized only for isolated parts of an overall supply chain, the question arises whether there are alternative ways of coordination.In this paper we propose a non-hierarchical, negotiation-based scheme which can be used to synchronize plans between two independent supply chain partners linked by material flows. Assuming that plans are generated based upon mathematical programming models, we show how modified versions of these models can be utilized for evaluating material orders or supplies proposed by the supply chain partner and for generating counter-proposals. Resulting is an iterative, negotiation-like process which establishes and subsequently improves a consistent overall plan. Computational tests suggest that the scheme comes close to optimal results as obtained by central coordination.     

Timing and eco(nomic) efficiency of climate-friendly investments in supply chains

Emission trading schemes such as the European Union Emissions Trading System (EUETS) attempt to reconcile economic efficiency with ecological efficiency by creating financial incentives for companies to invest in climate-friendly innovations. Using real options methodology, we demonstrate that under uncertainty, economic and ecological efficiency continue to be mutually exclusive. This problem is even worse if a climate-friendly project depends on investing in of a whole supply chain. We model a sequential bargaining game in a supply chain where the parties negotiate over implementation of a carbon dioxide (CO₂) saving investment project. We show that the outcome of their bargaining is not economically efficient and even less ecologically efficient. Furthermore, we show that a supply chain becomes less economically efficient and less ecologically efficient with every additional chain link. Finally, we make recommendations for how managers or politicians can improve the situation and thereby increase economic as well as ecological efficiency and thus also the eco-efficiency of supply chains.     

Bundling decisions in supply chains

Firms often sell products in bundles to extract consumer surplus. While most bundling decisions studied in the literature are geared to integrated firms, we examine a decentralized supply chain where the suppliers retain decision rights. Using a generic distribution of customers’ reservation price we establish equilibrium solutions for three different bundling scenarios in a supply chain, and generate interesting insights for distributions with specific forms. We find that (i) in supply chain bundling the retailer’s margin equals the margin of each independent supplier, and it equals the combined margin when the suppliers are in a coalition, (ii) when the suppliers form a coalition to bundle their products the bundling gain in the supply chain is higher and retail price is lower than when the retailer bundles the products, (iii) the supply chain has more to gain from bundling relative to an integrated firm, (iv) the first-best supply chain bundling remains viable over a larger set of parameter values than those in the case of the integrated firm, (v) supplier led bundling is preferable to separate sales over a wider range of parameter values than if the retailer led the bundling, and (vi) if the reservation prices are uniformly distributed bundling can be profitable when the variable costs are low and valuations of the products are not significantly different from one another. For normally distributed reservation prices, we show that the bundling set is larger and the bundling gain is higher than that for a uniform distribution.     

Cost analysis in global supply chains

This paper aims to explore effect of supply chain members’ costs change on participants of the network. On one perspective, it explores when there is a cost change to a firm, how other firms are affected and who bear(s) the most effect. On the other perspective, it investigates how an individual firm’s performance is affected by the other members in its network and whose cost change would impose a most significant effect on its profit.     

Managing raw material in supply chains

In this paper, we explore how firms can manage their raw material sourcing better by developing appropriate sourcing relationships with their raw material suppliers. We detail three empirical case studies of firms explaining their different raw material sourcing strategies: (a) firms can adopt a hands-off approach to raw material management, (b) firms can supply raw material directly to their suppliers, and this may be beneficial for some agents in the supply chain, and (c) firms can bring their component suppliers together, and the resulting cooperation between suppliers can be beneficial for supply chain. We then analytically model the three raw material scenarios encountered in our empirical work, examine the resulting profits along the supply chain, and extend the results to a competitive buyer scenario. Overall, our results show that active management of raw material sourcing can add value to supply chains.     

Profit allocation games in supply chains

The paper considers a supply chain where a number of agents are connected in some network relationship. Game theory is a very powerful framework for studying decision making problems, involving a group of agents in a supply chain. Allocation games examine the allocation of value among agents connected by a network. The ongoing actions in the supply chain are a mix of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior of the participants. The paper proposes a two-stage procedure for profit allocation based on combination of non-cooperative and cooperative game approaches. In the first stage, retailers meet customer price-dependent stochastic demand and seek to maximize total profit from the sale. Retailers are trying to align goals with producers on a contract basis and share the total profit with them. In the second stage, the cooperating producers allocate individual profits.     

Design of contract parameters in a closed-loop supply chain

We study an extended joint economic lot size problem which incorporates the return flow of remanufacturable used products. The supply chain under consideration consists of a single supplier and a single buyer. The buyer orders a single product from the supplier, uses it for her own needs, and collects the remanufacturable items after use. The ordered items are shipped from the supplier to the buyer in the lot-for-lot fashion by a vehicle which also returns the collected used items from the buyer to the supplier for remanufacturing and subsequent service of the buyer’s demand in the next order cycle. For satisfying the total demand, the supplier manufactures new items or remanufactures used ones received from the buyer. For given demand, productivity, collection rate, disposal cost, setup cost, order cost, holding cost for serviceable and nonserviceable products at the supplier as well as the buyer the lot size (order size) for the supplier (buyer) has to be found which minimizes the total cost. Furthermore, we address a decentralised decision making of the parties under a two-part tariff and determine their equilibrium strategies within the Nash framework.     

Capacitated dynamic lot sizing problems in closed-loop supply chain

In this paper, we address the capacitated dynamic lot sizing problem arising in closed-loop supply chain where returned products are collected from customers. These returned products can either be disposed or be remanufactured to be sold as new ones again; hence the market demands can be satisfied by either newly produced products or remanufactured ones. The capacities of production, disposal and remanufacturing are limited, and backlogging is not allowed. A general model of this problem is formulated, and several useful properties of the problem are characterized when cost functions are concave. Moreover, this problem is analyzed and solved to optimality using dynamic programming algorithms under different scenarios. It is shown that the problem with only disposal or remanufacturing can be converted into a traditional capacitated lot sizing problem and be solved by a polynomial algorithm if the capacities are constant. A pseudo-polynomial algorithm is proposed for the problem with both capacitated disposal and remanufacturing. The problem with capacitated production and remanufacturing and the problem with uncapacitated production and capacitated remanufacturing are also analyzed and solved. Through numerical experiments we show that the proposed algorithms perform well when solving problems of practical sizes. From the experimental results also indicates that it is worthwhile to expand the remanufacturing capacity only when returned products exist in a relatively long planning horizon, and production capacities have little effect on the remanufacturing plan when the demand is mainly satisfied by the production.     

Pricing and equity in cross-regional green supply chains

This paper addresses the problem of the firms operating on cross-border or inter-regional platforms that are subject to the enforcement of each local government's carbon emissions regulatory policy, thus causing an imbalance in the sharing of the burden of the greening of the total supply chain. We introduce the concept of equity as the incentive mechanism to coordinate this green supply chain which is a function of the carbon emission permits and the revenue generated by the firms. Due to the complexity and imbalance in the original incentive mechanism to this problem, we provide a new equivalent supply chain network equilibrium model under elastic demand based on user equilibrium theory. We state the user equilibrium conditions and provide the equivalent formulation. We show the trade-offs under various carbon emissions regulatory policies. A product with higher price elasticity and carbon emission intensity not only hampers the firm from gaining a higher revenue, but it also reduces the equity of the system under an invariant emission regulatory policy.     

On the role of revenue-sharing contracts in supply chains

The supply chain coordinating role of revenue-sharing has, to date, been examined only in static models. With downstream competition, the central conclusion in these models is negative: revenue-sharing cannot, except in degenerate form, achieve coordination. Incorporating dynamics, by allowing inventory carryover in discrete time, this paper establishes a foundation for revenue-sharing contracts in aligning incentives.     

Bargaining in competing supply chains with uncertainty

Substantial literature has been devoted to supply chain coordination. The majority of this literature ignores competition between supply chains. Moreover, a significant part of this literature focuses on coordination that induce the supply chain members to follow strategies that produce the equilibria chosen by a vertically integrated supply chain. This paper investigates the equilibrium behavior of two competing supply chains in the presence of demand uncertainty. We consider joint pricing and quantity decisions and competition under three possible supply chain strategies: Vertical Integration (VI), Manufacturer’s Stackelberg (MS), and Bargaining on the Wholesale price (BW(α), α is the bargaining parameter) over a single or infinitely many periods. We show that, in contrast to earlier literature, using VIVI (VI in both chains) is the unique Nash Equilibrium over one period decision, while using MSMS or BW(α)BW(α) may be Nash Equilibrium over infinitely many periods.     

Preferences for contractual forms in supply chains

The supply chain contracting literature has focused on incentive contracts designed to align supply chain members’ individual interests. A key finding of this literature is that members’ preferences for contractual forms are often at odds: the upstream supplier prefers relatively complex contracts that can coordinate the supply chain; however, the downstream retailer prefers a wholesale price-only contract because it leaves more surplus (than does a coordinating contract), which the retailer can capture. This paper addresses the following question: Under what circumstances do suppliers and retailers prefer the same contractual form? We study supply chain members’ preferences for contractual forms under three different competitive settings in which multiple supply chains compete to sell substitutable products in the same market. Our analysis suggests that both upstream and downstream sides of the supply chain may prefer the same “quantity discount” contract, which would eliminate the conflicts of interest that otherwise typify contracting situations. More interesting still is that both sides may also prefer the wholesale price-only contract; this finding provides a theoretical explanation for why that inefficient (but simple) contract is widely adopted in supply chain transactions.     

Coordination of dynamic lot-sizing in supply chains

This paper presents a new scheme for the coordination of dynamic, uncapacitated lot-sizing problems in two-party supply chains where parties’ local data are private information and no external or central entity is involved. This coordination scheme includes the following actions: At first, the buyer generates a series of different supply proposals using an extension of her local lot-sizing problem. Then the supplier calculates his cost changes that would result from the implementation of the buyer’s proposals. Based on these information, parties can identify the best proposal generated. The scheme identifies the system-wide optimum in different settings—for instance in a two-stage supply chain where the supplier’s costs for holding a period’s demand in inventory exceed his setup costs.     

Modeling and analysis of build-to-order supply chains

The build-to-order supply chain (BTO-SC) or make-to-order (MTO) system has received a great deal of attention in recent years because of the success of high-tech companies such as Dell, BMW, Compaq, and Gateway. Some auto companies have also implemented BTO-SC. Quite a few research articles have been written on BTO-SC and MTO. However, those that explicitly address the problems of BTO-SCM with modeling are rather limited in number. Considering the growing importance of more informed and timely decision making in these areas, there is a need to encourage further research on the modeling and analysis of global outsourcing, optimization between product variants and the cost of production, the point of differentiation along the production/assembly process, the selection of suppliers, logistics costs, and customer relationship management. Traditional operations research models have been used to solve supply chain management problems. Considering the importance of BTO or MTO, an attempt has been made to review the selected literature on the modeling and analysis of BTO-SC with the objectives of providing assistance to and motivating both researchers and practitioners to design, develop, and manage BTO-SC effectively; and suggesting some future research directions on BTO supply chain management (BTO-SCM). The literature available on BTO-SCM has been classified based on the nature of the decision-making areas and then sub-classified to focus on solving problems with modeling and analysis. We have focused mostly on the modeling aspect of the BTO-SC, but have not extended our efforts to empirical research. We have developed a unified framework for modeling and analyzing BTO-SCM and suggest some future research directions.     

On the impact of advertising initiatives in supply chains

Advertising plays an important role in affecting consumer demand. Socially responsible firms are expected to use advertising judiciously, limiting advertising of “bad” products. An example is the advertising initiative adopted by several major food manufacturers to limit the advertising of unhealthy food categories to children. Such initiatives are based on the belief that less advertising will lead to less consumption of these unhealthy food categories. However, food manufacturers usually distribute products to consumers through retailers whose advertising is not restricted by those initiative programs. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of such advertising initiative in a leader–follower supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. We assume that both the manufacturer and the retailer can choose to participate in the advertising initiative by reducing their advertising levels. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game. We show that the effectiveness of the advertising initiative critically depends on the leader’s participation in the initiative. If the leader is willing to reduce the advertising level below a threshold, the market coverage of the product can drop significantly. On the other hand, if only the follower participates in the initiative, the market coverage is likely to expand in the majority of cases. Managerial implications of this research are also discussed.