共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Andrew Bailey 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(2):85-103
This paper resurrects two discredited ideas in the philosophy of mind. The first: the idea that perceptual illusion might
have something metaphysically significant to tell us about the nature of phenomenal consciousness. The second: that the colours
and other qualities that ‘fill’ our sensory fields are occurrent properties (rather than representations of properties) that
are, nevertheless, to be distinguished from the ‘objective’ properties of things in the external world. Theories of consciousness
must recognize the existence of what Daniel Dennett mockingly labels ‘figment,’ but this result—though metaphysically and
epistemologically significant—is not incompatible with either physicalism or naturalized semantics.
相似文献
Andrew BaileyEmail: |
2.
Michael McDermott 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(4):333-335
In this note I discuss what seems to be a new kind of counterexample to Lewis’s account of counterfactuals. A coin is to be
tossed twice. I bet on ‘Two heads’, and I win. Common sense says that (1) is false. But Lewis’s theory says that it is true.
(1) If at least one head had come up, I would have won.
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Michael McDermottEmail: |
3.
Nikolaj Nottelman 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(2):105-124
In this paper I discuss the claim that believing at will is ‘conceptually impossible’ or, to use a formulation encountered
in the debate, “that nothing could be a belief and be willed directly”. I argue that such a claim is only plausible if directed
against the claim that believing itself is an action-type. However, in the debate, the claim has been univocally directed
against the position that forming a belief is an action-type. I argue that the many arguments offered in favor of the ‘conceptual impossibility’ of performing
such actions fail without exception. If we are to argue against doxastic voluntarism we are better off by resorting to more
modest means.
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Nikolaj NottelmanEmail: |
4.
Javier Kalhat 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(2):161-176
In this paper I argue against Armstrong’s recent truthmaking account of possibility. I show that the truthmaking account presupposes
modality in a number of different ways, and consequently that it is incapable of underwriting a genuine reduction of modality.
I also argue that Armstrong’s account faces serious difficulties irrespective of the question of reduction; in particular,
I argue that his Entailment and Possibility Principles are both false.
相似文献
Javier KalhatEmail: |
5.
6.
We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while
also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of
reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual
machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this
account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of doxastic justification.
相似文献
Terry HorganEmail: |
7.
Ana Isabel Sacristán Richard Noss 《International Journal of Computers for Mathematical Learning》2008,13(1):47-70
In this paper, we describe a design experiment aimed at helping students to explore and develop concepts of infinite processes
and objects. Our approach is based on the design and development of a computational microworld, which afforded students the
means to construct a range of representational models (symbolic, visual and numeric) of infinity-related objects (infinite
sequences, in particular). We present episodes based on four students’ activities, seeking to illustrate how the available
tools mediated students’ understandings of the infinite in rich ways, allowing them to discriminate subtle process-oriented
features of infinite processes. We claim that the microworld supported students in the coordination of hitherto unconnected
or conflicting intuitions concerning infinity, based on a constructive articulation of different representational forms we
name as ‘representational moderation’.
相似文献
Richard NossEmail: |
8.
Kelly Becker 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(1):17-31
Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based
on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible
with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception
of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms.
相似文献
Kelly BeckerEmail: |
9.
Dennis Earl 《Acta Analytica》2007,22(3):189-205
The paradox of analysis has been a problem for analytic philosophers at least since Moore’s time, and it is especially significant
for those who seek an account of analysis along classical lines. The present paper offers a new solution to the paradox, where
a theory of analysis is given where (1) analysandum and analysans are distinct concepts, due to their failing to share the
same conceptual form, yet (2) they are related in virtue of satisfying various semantic constraints on the analysis relation.
Rather than distinguish between analysandum and analysans by appeal to epistemic considerations, the paper appeals to semantic
considerations in giving a candidate account of the identity conditions for concepts. The distinctness of analysandum and
analysans then serves to block the paradox in a straightforward way.
相似文献
Dennis EarlEmail: |
10.
Aristophanes Koutoungos 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(2):125-145
A quantitative interpretation is given of the (in)coherence that moral agents experience as a tension between their ordered moral judgments over n physically incompatible actions, and the competitive ordering of motivating intensities (or, desires). Then a model describing
one’s tendency to reduce the experienced in-coherence is constructed. In this model, moral sensitivity (S) and desire attachment (e) function as primitives that motivate from opposing perspectives the reduction of incoherence. Two distinct sub-processes
of this reduction are therefore initiated by (S) and (e) co-ordinated (more or less efficiently) by the agent’s degree of rationality (R) characteristic of her capacity to handle such internal tensions. This process ends when a new equilibrium between what motivates and what resists (further) reduction has been reached. A macro-equilibrium is described involving
(R) constrained by weakness-of-will (W
w
). A reinterpretation of the Aristotelian characters (enkratês, akratês, etc.) and an exegesis of Hume’s ‘Calm Passions’ follow
as applications.
相似文献
Aristophanes KoutoungosEmail: |
11.
Debugging an Artifact, Instrumenting a Bug: Dialectics of Instrumentation and Design in Technology-Rich Learning Environments 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
This article explores ways of conceptualizing the design of innovative learning tools as emergent from dialectics between
designers and learner-users of those tools. More specifically, I focus on the reciprocities between a designer’s objectives
for student learning and a user’s situated activity in a learning environment, as these interact and co-develop in cycles
of design-based research. Recent investigations of technology-supported mathematics learning conducted from an ‘instrumental’
perspective provide a powerful framework for analyzing the process through which classroom artifacts become conceptual tools,
simultaneously characterizing the ways students come to both implement and understand a device in the context of a task. Similarly,
design-based approaches to investigating instructional activity offer epistemological grounds for treating the process of
designing artifacts to support learning as unfolding in concert with rather than concluding prior to situated student use.
Drawing on each of these perspectives, I describe the design and initial implementation of a set of software artifacts intended
to support students’ collaborative problem solving through locally networked handheld computers. Through detailed analyses
of three classroom episodes, I report on the ways one student group’s innovative and unexpected use of these tools served
as an opportunity to both examine student learning in the context of that novelty and to refine the software design. This
account provides an empirical example through which to consider the potential for instrumental genesis to inform design, and
for design research epistemology to broaden the scope of instrumental theory.
相似文献
Tobin WhiteEmail: |
12.
13.
Iris Einheuser 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(3):185-192
Some entities, such as fictional characters, propositions, properties, events and numbers are prima facie promising candidates for owing their existence to our linguistic and conceptual practices. However, it is notoriously hard
to pin down just what sets such allegedly “language-created” entities apart from ordinary entities. The present paper considers
some of the features that are supposed to distinguish between entities of the two kinds and argues that, on an independently
plausible account of what it takes to individuate objects, the criteria let in more than friends of the strategy might be
happy with.
相似文献
Iris EinheuserEmail: |
14.
Anomaly detection in a mobile communication network 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Alec Pawling Nitesh V. Chawla Greg Madey 《Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory》2007,13(4):407-422
Mobile communication networks produce massive amounts of data which may be useful in identifying the location of an emergency
situation and the area it affects. We propose a one pass clustering algorithm for quickly identifying anomalous data points.
We evaluate this algorithm’s ability to detect outliers in a data set and describe how such an algorithm may be used as a
component of an emergency response management system.
相似文献
Greg MadeyEmail: |
15.
Steffen Borge 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(2):149-154
In this paper I argue against a criticism by Matthew Weiner to Grice’s thesis that cancellability is a necessary condition
for conversational implicature. I argue that the purported counterexamples fail because the supposed failed cancellation in
the cases Weiner presents is not meant as a cancellation but as a reinforcement of the implicature. I moreover point out that
there are special situations in which the supposed cancellation may really work as a cancellation.
相似文献
Steffen BorgeEmail: |
16.
Richard Garner 《Applied Categorical Structures》2009,17(3):247-285
The small object argument is a transfinite construction which, starting from a set of maps in a category, generates a weak
factorisation system on that category. As useful as it is, the small object argument has some problematic aspects: it possesses
no universal property; it does not converge; and it does not seem to be related to other transfinite constructions occurring
in categorical algebra. In this paper, we give an “algebraic” refinement of the small object argument, cast in terms of Grandis
and Tholen’s natural weak factorisation systems, which rectifies each of these three deficiencies.
相似文献
Richard GarnerEmail: |
17.
Charles B. Cross 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(2):115-124
I show the incompatibility of two theses: (a) to desire the truth of p amounts to believing a certain proposition about the value of p’s truth; (b) one cannot be said to desire the truth of p if one believes that p is true. Thesis (a), the Desire-As-Belief Thesis, has received much attention since the late 1980s. Thesis (b) is an epistemic
variant of Socrates’ remark in the Symposium that one cannot desire what one already has. It turns out that (a) and (b) cannot both be true if it is possible for there
to exist an agent who has a desire initially, say the desire for the truth of p, and then expands the corpus of propositions she believes to include p. This result provides a new route to the denial of (a).
相似文献
Charles B. CrossEmail: |
18.
Dennis Earl 《Acta Analytica》2009,24(2):139-148
Quine famously argued that analyticity is indefinable, since there is no good account of analyticity in terms of synonymy,
and intensions are of no help since there are no intensions. Yet if there are intensions, the question still remains as to
the right account of analyticity in terms of them. On the assumption that intensions must be admitted, the present paper considers
two such accounts. The first analyzes analyticity in terms of concept identity, and the second analyzes analyticity in terms
of the analysis relation. The first fails in light of possible counterexamples. The second is defended, both by considering
test cases of intuitively clear analyticities, and by developing the account in light of possible counterexamples.
相似文献
Dennis EarlEmail: |
19.
James A. Kitts Paul T. Trowbridge 《Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory》2007,13(4):333-353
This paper considers a formal model of cultural transmission in organizations, examining the interplay of structured social
influence and organizational demography. A set of focused and fine-grained computational experiments elucidates this model’s
assumptions, facilitates deeper explanations for some of its behavior, and explores the robustness and scope conditions of
previously published conclusions. In doing so, this investigation highlights several important issues in the design and evaluation
of computational experiments.
相似文献
Paul T. TrowbridgeEmail: |
20.
Warren Shrader 《Acta Analytica》2008,23(3):257-271
This paper is an investigation into the nature of physicalism as well as to the possibility of formulating physicalism as
a supervenience thesis. First, I review the motivation for finding a supervenience thesis that characterizes physicalism.
Second, I briefly survey the types of supervenience theses that have been proposed as necessary (or, in some cases, as necessary
and sufficient) for physicalism. Third, I analyze the recent supervenience thesis proposed by Frank Jackson and expounded
upon by Gene Witmer. Jackson claims the supervenience thesis is both necessary and sufficient for physicalism; Witmer has
proposed a different interpretation of one of the Jackson’s key notions and has suggested an amended supervenience thesis
that is, if not sufficient, at least necessary for physicalism. However, I will argue that neither Jackson’s nor Witmer’s
supervenience theses as stated are necessary for physicalism.
相似文献
Warren ShraderEmail: |