Cycle games and cycle cut games

Two players play a game on a connected graphG. Each player in his turn occupies an edge ofG. The player who occupies a set of edges that contains a cycle, before the other does it, wins. This game may end in a draw. We call this game the normal cycle game. We define furthermore three similar games, which are called the misère cycle game, the normal cycle cut game and the misère cycle cut game. We characterize the above four games.     

Games with Unknown Past

We define a new type of two player game occurring on a tree. The tree may have no root and may have arbitrary degrees of nodes. These games extend the class of games considered by Gurevich-Harrington in [5]. We prove that in the game one of the players has a winning strategy which depends on finite bounded information about the past part of a play and on future of each play that is isomorphism types of tree nodes. This result extends further the Gurevich-Harrington determinacy theorem from [5].     

Dead ends in misère play: The misère monoid of canonical numbers

We find the misère monoids of normal-play canonical-form integer and non-integer numbers. These come as consequences of more general results for the universe of dead-ending games. Left and right ends have previously been defined as games in which Left or Right, respectively, have no moves; here we define a dead left (right) end to be a left (right) end whose options are all left (right) ends, and we define a dead-ending game to be one in which all end followers are dead. We find the monoids and partial orders of dead ends, integers, and all numbers, and construct an infinite family of games that are equivalent to zero in the dead-ending universe.     

The desirability relation of simple games

We prove some properties of simple games with a complete desirability relation, and investigate the relationships between the desirability of a simple game G and that of some simple games that are derived from G. We also provide an example of a proper simple game that has a complete and acyclic desirability relation but is not a weighted majority game.     

Maker–Breaker domination game

We introduce the Maker–Breaker domination game, a two player game on a graph. At his turn, the first player, Dominator, selects a vertex in order to dominate the graph while the other player, Staller, forbids a vertex to Dominator in order to prevent him to reach his goal. Both players play alternately without missing their turn. This game is a particular instance of the so-called Maker–Breaker games, that is studied here in a combinatorial context. In this paper, we first prove that deciding the winner of the Maker–Breaker domination game is pspace-complete, even for bipartite graphs and split graphs. It is then showed that the problem is polynomial for cographs and trees. In particular, we define a strategy for Dominator that is derived from a variation of the dominating set problem, called the pairing dominating set problem.     

Optimal strategies for equal-sum dice games

In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative two-person zero-sum matrix game, called dice game. In an (n,σ) dice game, two players can independently choose a dice from a collection of hypothetical dice having n faces and with a total of σ eyes distributed over these faces. They independently roll their dice and the player showing the highest number of eyes wins (in case of a tie, none of the players wins). The problem at hand in this paper is the characterization of all optimal strategies for these games. More precisely, we determine the (n,σ) dice games for which optimal strategies exist and derive for these games the number of optimal strategies as well as their explicit form.     

全对策的边际贡献值

全对策是定义在局中人集合的所有分划集上的一类特殊合作对策.本文在效用可转移情形下研究全对策的"值"问题.定义了全对策的边际贡献值,得出全对策的Shapley值,以及具有某些性质的值是边际贡献值,并给出两种边际贡献值的具体表达式,及其一些性质.     

A solitaire game played on 2-colored graphs

We introduce a solitaire game played on a graph. Initially one disk is placed at each vertex, one face green and the other red, oriented with either color facing up. Each move of the game consists of selecting a vertex whose disk shows green, flipping over the disks at neighboring vertices, and deleting the selected vertex. The game is won if all vertices are eliminated. We derive a simple parity-based necessary condition for winnability of a given game instance. By studying graph operations that construct new graphs from old ones, we obtain broad classes of graphs where this condition also suffices, thus characterizing the winnable games on such graphs. Concerning two familiar (but narrow) classes of graphs, we show that for trees a game is winnable if and only if the number of green vertices is odd, and for n-cubes a game is winnable if and only if the number of green vertices is even and not all vertices have the same color. We provide a linear-time algorithm for deciding winnability for games on maximal outerplanar graphs. We reduce the decision problem for winnability of a game on an arbitrary graph G to winnability of games on its blocks, and to winnability on homeomorphic images of G obtained by contracting edges at 2-valent vertices.     

Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games

We define multilinear extensions for multichoice games and relate them to probabilistic values and semivalues. We apply multilinear extensions to show that the Banzhaf value for a compound multichoice game is not the product of the Banzhaf values of the component games, in contrast to the behavior in simple games. Following Owen (Manag Sci 18:64–79, 1972), we integrate the multilinear extension over a simplex to construct a version of the Shapley value for multichoice games. We compare this new Shapley value to other extensions of the Shapley value to multichoice games. We also show how the probabilistic value (resp. semivalue, Banzhaf value, Shapley value) of a multichoice game is equal to the probabilistic value (resp. semivalue, Banzhaf value, Shapley value) of an appropriately defined TU decomposition game. Finally, we explain how semivalues, probabilistic values, the Banzhaf value, and this Shapley value may be viewed as the probability that a player makes a difference to the outcome of a simple multichoice game.     

Subgame-perfection in free transition games

We prove the existence of a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium, for every ε > 0, in a class of multi-player games with perfect information, which we call free transition games. The novelty is that a non-trivial class of perfect information games is solved for subgame-perfection, with multiple non-terminating actions, in which the payoff structure is generally not (upper or lower) semi-continuous. Due to the lack of semi-continuity, there is no general rule of comparison between the payoffs that a player can obtain by deviating a large but finite number of times or, respectively, infinitely many times. We introduce new techniques to overcome this difficulty.     

The complexity of node blocking for dags

We consider the following modification of annihilation games called node blocking. Given a directed graph, each vertex can be occupied by at most one token. There are two types of tokens, each player can move only tokens of his type. The players alternate their moves and the current player i selects one token of type i and moves the token along a directed edge to an unoccupied vertex. If a player cannot make a move then he loses. We consider the problem of determining the complexity of the game: given an arbitrary configuration of tokens in a planar directed acyclic graph (dag), does the current player have a winning strategy? We prove that the problem is PSPACE-complete.     

Perfect information two-person zero-sum markov games with imprecise transition probabilities

Based on an extension of the controlled Markov set-chain model by Kurano et al. (in J Appl Prob 35:293–302, 1998) into competitive two-player game setting, we provide a model of perfect information two-person zero-sum Markov games with imprecise transition probabilities. We define an equilibrium value for the games formulated with the model in terms of a partial order and then establish the existence of an equilibrium policy pair that achieves the equilibrium value. We further analyze finite-approximation error bounds obtained from a value iteration-type algorithm and discuss some applications of the model.     

Discounted,positive, and noncooperative stochastic games

In this paper, we consider the stochastic games ofShapley and prove under certain conditions the stochastic game has a value and both players have optimal strategies. We also prove a similar result for noncooperative stochastic games.     

Stochastic games with metric state space

In this paper the stochastic two-person zero-sum game of Shapley is considered, with metric state space and compact action spaces. It is proved that both players have stationary optimal strategies, under conditions which are weaker than those ofMaitra/Parthasarathy (a.o. no compactness of the state space). This is done in the following way: we show the existence of optimal strategies first for the one-period game with general terminal reward, then for then-period games (n=1,2,...); further we prove that the game over the infinite horizon has a valuev, which is the limit of then-period game values. Finally the stationary optimal strategies are found as optimal strategies in the one-period game with terminal rewardv.     

Weighted and roughly weighted simple games

In this paper we give necessary and sufficient conditions for a simple game to have rough weights. We define two functions f(n) and g(n) that measure the deviation of a simple game from a weighted majority game and roughly weighted majority game, respectively. We formulate known results in terms of lower and upper bounds for these functions and improve those bounds. We also investigate rough weightedness of simple games with a small number of players.     

How to play the one-lie Rényi-Ulam game

The one-lie Rényi-Ulam liar game is a two-player perfect information zero-sum game, lasting q rounds, on the set [n]?{1,…,n}. In each round Paul chooses a subset A⊆[n] and Carole either assigns one lie to each element of A or to each element of [n]?A. Paul wins the original (resp. pathological) game if after q rounds there is at most one (resp. at least one) element with one or fewer lies. We exhibit a simple, unified, optimal strategy for Paul to follow in both games, and use this to determine which player can win for all q,n and for both games.     

Transshipment games with identical newsvendors and cooperation costs

In a transshipment game, supply chain agents cooperate to transship surplus products. Although the game has been well studied in the OR literature, the fundamental question whether the agents can afford cooperation costs to set up and maintain the game in the first place has not been addressed thus far. This paper addresses this question for the cooperative transshipment games with identical agents having normally distributed independent demands. We provide characterization of equal allocations which are in the core of symmetric games, and prove that not all transshipment games are convex. In particular, we prove that though individual allocations grow with the coalition size, the growth diminishes according to two rules of diminishing individual allocations. These results are the basis for studying the games with cooperation costs. We model the cooperation costs by the cooperation network topology and the cooperation cost per network link. We consider two network topologies, the clique and the hub, and prove bounds for the cost per link that render coalitions stable. These bounds always limit coalition size for cliques. However, the opposite is shown for hubs, namely newsvendors can afford cooperation costs only if their coalition is sufficiently large.     

Asymmetric directed graph coloring games

This note generalizes the (a,b)-coloring game and the (a,b)-marking game which were introduced by Kierstead [H.A. Kierstead, Asymmetric graph coloring games, J. Graph Theory 48 (2005) 169-185] for undirected graphs to directed graphs. We prove that the (a,b)-chromatic and (a,b)-coloring number for the class of orientations of forests is b+2 if b≤a, and infinity otherwise. From these results we deduce upper bounds for the (a,b)-coloring number of oriented outerplanar graphs and of orientations of graphs embeddable in a surface with bounded girth.