共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A new value is defined for n-person hyperplane games, i.e., non-sidepayment cooperative games, such that for each coalition, the Pareto optimal set is linear. This is a generalization of the Shapley value for side-payment games. It is shown that this value is consistent in the sense that the payoff in a given game is related to payoffs in reduced games (obtained by excluding some players) in such a way that corrections demanded by coalitions of a fixed size are cancelled out. Moreover, this is the only consistent value which satisfies Pareto optimality (for the grand coalition), symmetry and covariancy with respect to utility changes of scales. It can be reached by players who start from an arbitrary Pareto optimal payoff vector and make successive adjustments. 相似文献
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This note extends the solution concept of the core for cooperative games to multi-choice games. We propose an extension of
the theorem of Bondareva (Problemy Kybernetiki 10:119–139, 1963) and Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 14:453–460, 1967) to multi-choice games. Also, we introduce a notion of reduced games for multi-choice games and provide an axiomatization
of the core on multi-choice games by means of corresponding notion of consistency and its converse. 相似文献
4.
G. Orshan 《International Journal of Game Theory》1992,21(1):1-11
It is proved that the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games is characterized by Pareto-optimality, symmetry, covariancy, and global consistency. A dynamic process based on global consistency is given. It leads the players to the value from any arbitrary payoff vector.Submitted as an M. Sc. thesis, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 相似文献
5.
Edward M. Bolger 《International Journal of Game Theory》2000,29(1):93-99
In Bolger [1993], an efficient value was obtained for a class of games called games with n players and r alternatives. In these games, each of the n players must choose one and only one of the r alternatives. This value can be used to determine a player’s “a priori” value in such a game. In this paper, we show that
the value has a consistency property similar to the “consistency” for TU games in Hart/Mas-Colell [1989] and we present a
set of axioms (including consistency) which characterizes this value.
The games considered in this paper differ from the multi-choice games considered by Hsiao and Raghavan [1993]. They consider
games in which the actions of the players are ordered in the sense that, if i >j, then action i carries more “weight” than action j.
These games also differ from partition function games in that the worth of a coalition depends not only on the partitioning
of the players but also on the action chosen by each subset of the partition.
Received: April 1994/final version: June 1999 相似文献
6.
Yu-Hsien Liao 《Fuzzy Optimization and Decision Making》2017,16(3):257-268
By applying the supreme-utilities under fuzzy behavior, we propose a new solution on fuzzy games. In order to present the rationality for this solution, we adopt an extended reduction to provide related axiomatizations and dynamics process. Based on different viewpoint, we also define excess function to introduce alternative formulation and related dynamic process for this solution respectively. 相似文献
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Fioravante Patrone Graziano Pieri Stef Tijs Anna Torre 《International Journal of Game Theory》1998,27(2):191-200
Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties
of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality.
There are other solutions, like the ɛ-Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be interesting substitutes
for Nash equilibria when their existence cannot be guaranteed. They can be characterized using an appropriate substitute of
one-person rationality. More generally, we introduce the class of “personalized” Nash equilibria and we prove that it contains
all of the solutions characterized by consistency and converse consistency.
Received January 1996/Final version December 1996 相似文献
8.
Emilio Calvo Esther Gutiérrez Juan Carlos Santos 《International Journal of Game Theory》2000,29(2):177-188
We consider multichoice NTU games, i.e., cooperative NTU games in which players can participate in the game with several
levels of activity. For these games, we define and characterize axiomatically the multichoice consistent value, which is a generalization of the consistent NTU value for NTU games and of the multichoice value for multichoice TU games.
Moreover, we show that this value coincides with the consistent NTU value of a replicated NTU game and we provide a probabilistic
interpretation.
Received: May 1998/Final version: January 2000 相似文献
9.
《高校应用数学学报(A辑)》2015,(4)
针对具有模糊联盟且支付值残缺的合作对策问题,给出了E-残缺模糊对策的定义.基于残缺联盟值基数集,提出了一个同时满足对称性和线性性的w-加权Shapley值公式.通过构造模糊联盟间的边际贡献,探讨了w-加权Shapley值公式的等价表示形式,指出w-加权Shapley值与完整合作对策Shapley值的兼容性.在模糊联盟框架里,探讨了w-加权Shapley值所满足的联盟单调性、零正则性等优良性质.最后通过算例验证了该公式的有效性. 相似文献
10.
J. M. Bilbao J. R. Fernández N. Jiménez J. J. López 《Annals of Operations Research》2008,158(1):99-115
The aim of the present paper is to study a one-point solution concept for bicooperative games. For these games introduced
by Bilbao (Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures, 2000) , we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical
Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value. 相似文献
11.
In this paper, the fuzzy core of games with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be regarded as the generalization of crisp core. The fuzzy core is based on the assumption that the total worth of a fuzzy coalition will be allocated to the players whose participation rate is larger than zero. The nonempty condition of the fuzzy core is given based on the fuzzy convexity. Three kinds of special fuzzy cores in games with fuzzy coalition are studied, and the explicit fuzzy core represented by the crisp core is also given. Because the fuzzy Shapley value had been proposed as a kind of solution for the fuzzy games, the relationship between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley function is also shown. Surprisingly, the relationship between fuzzy core and the fuzzy Shapley value does coincide, as in the classical case. 相似文献
12.
Marcin Malawski 《International Journal of Game Theory》2002,31(1):47-67
The Banzhaf value is the only value satisfying the equal treatment, dummy player and marginal contributions conditions and
neutrality of some linear operators on the spaces of games. Under some of these neutrality assumptions, equal treatment can
be replaced by even weaker conditions. For linear values having the dummy player property, equal treatment is equivalent to
symmetry. All these properties together imply the marginal contributions condition, but in some Banzhaf value axiomatizations
marginal contributions cannot be a substitute for linearity.
Received: December 1997/Revised version: May 2001 相似文献
13.
In this paper, the generalized forms of the fuzzy core and the Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids are given. An equivalent form of the fuzzy core is researched. In order to better understand the fuzzy core and the Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids, we pay more attention to study three kinds of dynamic fuzzy games on matroids, which are named as fuzzy games with multilinear extension form, with proportional value and with Choquet integral form, respectively. Meantime, the relationship between the fuzzy core and the Shapley function for dynamic fuzzy games on matroids is researched, which coincides with the crisp case. 相似文献
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《Operations Research Letters》2020,48(2):142-146
A directed graph game consists of a cooperative game with transferable utility and a digraph which describes limited cooperation and the dominance relation among the players. Under the assumption that only coalitions of strongly connected players are able to fully cooperate, we introduce the digraph-restricted game in which a non-strongly connected coalition can only realize the sum of the worths of its strong components. The Myerson value for directed graph games is defined as the Shapley value of the digraph-restricted game. We establish axiomatic characterizations of the Myerson value for directed graph games by strong component efficiency and either fairness or bi-fairness. 相似文献
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This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominated imputations) and the core of a cooperative
game with transferable utility. Theorem 1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness
(from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity.
Moreover, these axioms also characterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balanced games, and
superadditive games.
相似文献
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Yu-Hsien Liao 《TOP》2018,26(1):146-163
Since the precore violates (weak) converse consistency, two converse consistent enlargements are proposed. These two converse consistent enlargements are the smallest (weak) converse consistent solutions that contain the precore. On the other hand, we turn to a different notion of the reduction by considering the players and the activity levels simultaneously. Based on such revised reductions, we offer several axiomatizations of the precore. 相似文献