Cooperation in N-person evolutionary snowdrift game in scale-free Barabási-Albert networks

Cooperation in the N-person evolutionary snowdrift game (NESG) is studied in scale-free Barabási-Albert (BA) networks. Due to the inhomogeneity of the network, two versions of NESG are proposed and studied. In a model where the size of the competing group varies from agent to agent, the fraction of cooperators drops as a function of the payoff parameter. The networking effect is studied via the fraction of cooperative agents for nodes with a particular degree. For small payoff parameters, it is found that the small-k agents are dominantly cooperators, while large-k agents are of non-cooperators. Studying the spatial correlation reveals that cooperative agents will avoid to be nearest neighbors and the correlation disappears beyond the next-nearest neighbors. The behavior can be explained in terms of the networking effect and payoffs. In another model with a fixed size of competing groups, the fraction of cooperators could show a non-monotonic behavior in the regime of small payoff parameters. This non-trivial behavior is found to be a combined effect of the many agents with the smallest degree in the BA network and the increasing fraction of cooperators among these agents with the payoff for small payoffs.     

Evolutionary public goods games on scale-free networks with unequal payoff allocation mechanism

In this paper, we bring an unequal payoff allocation mechanism into evolutionary public goods game on scale-free networks and focus on the cooperative behavior of the system. The unequal mechanism can be tuned by one parameter α: if α>0, the hub nodes can use its degree advantage to collect more payoff; if α<0, numerous non-hub nodes will obtain more payoff in a single round game. Simulation results show that the cooperation level has a non-trivial dependence on α. For the small enhancement factor r, the cooperator frequency can be promoted by both negative and positive α. For large r, there exists an optimal α that can obtain the highest cooperation level. Our results may sharpen the understanding of the emergence of cooperation induced by the unequal payoff allocation mechanism.     

Effects of expectation and noise on evolutionary games

Considering the difference between the actual and expected payoffs, we bring a stochastic learning updating rule into an evolutionary Prisoners Dilemma game and the Snowdrift game on scale-free networks, and then investigate how the expectation level A and environmental noise κ influence cooperative behavior. Interestingly, numerical results show that the mechanism of promoting cooperation exhibits a resonance-like fashion including the coaction of A, κ and the payoff parameters. High cooperator frequency is induced by some optimal parameter regions. The variation of time series has also been investigated. This work could be of particular interest in the evolutionary game dynamics of biological and social systems.     

Costly punishment and cooperation in the evolutionary snowdrift game

The role of punishments in promoting cooperation is an important issue. We incorporate costly punishments into the snowdrift game (SG) by introducing a third punishing (P) character, and study the effects. The punishers, who carry basically a cooperative (C) character, are willing to pay a cost α so as to punish a non-cooperative (D) opponent by β. Depending on the initial fractions of the characters, α, β, and the cost-to-benefit ratio r in the SG, the three-character system evolves into a steady state consisting either only of C and P characters or only of C and D characters, in a well-mixed population. The former situation represents an enhancement in cooperation relative to the SG, while the latter is similar to the SG. The dynamics in approaching these different steady states are found to be different. Analytically, the key features in the dynamics and the steady states observed in simulations are captured by a set of differential equations. The sensitivity to the initial distribution of characters is studied by depicting the flow in a phase portrait and analyzing the nature of fixed points. The analysis also shows the role of P-character agents in preventing a system from invasion by D-character agents. Starting from a population consisting only of C and P agents, a D-character agent intended to invade the system cannot survive when the initial fraction of P agents is greater than r/β. Our model, defined intentionally as a simulation algorithm, can be readily generalized to incorporate many interesting effects, such as those in a networked population.     

Self-organized cooperative behavior and critical penalty in an evolving population

The emergence of cooperation and the effectiveness of penalties among competing agents are studied via a model of evolutionary game incorporating adaptive behavior and penalties for illegal acts. For initially identical agents, a phase diagram is obtained via an analytic approach, with results in good agreement with numerical simulations. The results show that there exists a critical penalty for achieving a completely honest population and a sufficiently well-behaved initial population requires no penalty. Self-organized segregation to extreme actions emerges in the dynamics for a system with uniformly distributed initial tendencies for cooperation. After training, the penalty can be relaxed without ruining the adapted cooperative behavior. Results of our model in a population taking on the form of a 2D square lattice are also reported.     

Promotion of cooperation by aspiration-induced migration

In this paper, we study an aspiration-induced migration model, in which each individual plays the prisoner’s dilemma game with those being within a circle of radius r centered on himself/herself. An individual will migrate to a randomly chosen place with the velocity v if his/her payoff is below the aspiration level. We report that cooperative behavior is favored when the aspiration level and interaction radius are moderate, and the migration velocity is slow.     

Spatial evolutionary game with bond dilution

In this paper, we study numerically the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) and snowdrift game (SG) on a two-dimensional square lattice with both quenched and annealed bond dilution. For quenched bond dilution, the system undergoes a dynamical transition at the critical occupation probability q^∗, which is higher than the bond percolation transition point for a square lattice. In the critical region, the defined order parameter has a scaling form as P_e∼(q−q^∗)^β for q<q^∗ with the critical exponents β=1.42 for PDG and β=1.52 for SG, which differ from those with quenched site dilution. For annealed bond dilution, the system exhibits a distinct cooperative behavior. We find that the cooperation is much enhanced in the range of small payoff parameters on a lattice with slightly annealed bond dilution.     

Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents

We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius R. Adopting the the prisoner’s dilemma game and the snowdrift game as metaphors, we find that cooperation can be maintained and even enhanced for low velocities and small payoff parameters, when compared with the case that all agents do not move. But such enhancement of cooperation is largely determined by the value of R, and for modest values of R, there is an optimal value of velocity to induce the maximum cooperation level. Besides, we find that intermediate values of R or initial population densities are most favorable for cooperation, when the velocity is fixed. Depending on the payoff parameters, the system can reach an absorbing state of cooperation when the snowdrift game is played. Our findings may help understanding the relations between individual mobility and cooperative behavior in social systems.     

Critical Behavior of Spatial Evolutionary Game with Altruistic to Spiteful Preferences on Two-Dimensional Lattices

Self-questioning mechanism which is similar to single spin-flip of Ising model in statistical physics is introduced into spatial evolutionary game model. We propose a game model with altruistic to spiteful preferences via weighted sums of own and opponent's payoffs. This game model can be transformed into Ising model with an external field. Both interaction between spins and the external field are determined by the elements of payoff matrix and the preference parameter. In the case of perfect rationality at zero social temperature, this game model has three different phases which are entirely cooperative phase, entirely non-cooperative phase and mixed phase. In the investigations of the game model with Monte Carlo simulation, two paths of payoff and preference parameters are taken. In one path, the system undergoes a discontinuous transition from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the change of preference parameter. In another path, two continuous transitions appear one after another when system changes from cooperative phase to non-cooperative phase with the prefenrence parameter. The critical exponents ν, β, and γ of two continuous phase transitions are estimated by the finite-size scaling analysis. Both continuous phase transitions have the same critical exponents and they belong to the same universality class as the two-dimensional Ising model.     

Understanding cooperative behavior in structurally disordered populations

The effects of an inhomogeneous competing environment on the extent of cooperation are studied within the context of a site-diluted evolutionary snowdrift game on a square lattice, with the occupied sites representing the players, both numerically and analytically. The frequency of cooperation ?_C generally shows a non-monotonic dependence on the fraction of occupied sites ρ, for different values of the payoff parameter r. Slightly diluting a lattice leads to a lower cooperation for small and high values of r. For a range of r, however, dilution leads to an enhanced cooperation. An analytic treatment is developed for?_C^I + ?_C^II, with?_C^I emphasizing the importance of the small clusters of players especially for?_C^II from the other players is shown to be inadequate. A local configuration approximation (LCA) that treats the local competing configurations as the variables and amounts to include spatial correlation up to the neighborhood of a player’s neighbors is developed. Results of ?_C (ρ) and the number of different local configurations from LCA are in good agreement with simulation results. A transparent physical picture of the dynamics stemming from LCA is also presented. The theoretical approach provides a framework that can be readily applied to competing agent-based models in structurally ordered and disordered populations.     

Analyzing phase diagrams and phase transitions in networked competing populations

Phase diagrams exhibiting the extent of cooperation in an evolutionary snowdrift game implemented in different networks are studied in detail. We invoke two independent payoff parameters, unlike a single payoff often used in most previous works that restricts the two payoffs to vary in a correlated way. In addition to the phase transition points when a single payoff parameter is used, phase boundaries separating homogeneous phases consisting of agents using the same strategy and a mixed phase consisting of agents using different strategies are found. Analytic expressions of the phase boundaries are obtained by invoking the ideas of the last surviving patterns and the relative alignments of the spectra of payoff values to agents using different strategies. In a Watts-Strogatz regular network, there exists a re-entrant phenomenon in which the system goes from a homogeneous phase into a mixed phase and re-enters the homogeneous phase as one of the two payoff parameters is varied. The non-trivial phase diagram accompanying this re-entrant phenomenon is quantitatively analyzed. The effects of noise and cooperation in randomly rewired Watts-Strogatz networks are also studied. The transition between a mixed phase and a homogeneous phase is identify to belong to the directed percolation universality class. The methods used in the present work are applicable to a wide range of problems in competing populations of networked agents.     

Adaptive cyclically dominating game on co-evolving networks: numerical and analytic results

A co-evolving and adaptive Rock (R)–Paper (P)–Scissors (S) game (ARPS) in which an agent uses one of three cyclically dominating strategies is proposed and studied numerically and analytically. An agent takes adaptive actions to achieve a neighborhood to his advantage by rewiring a dissatisfying link with a probability p or switching strategy with a probability 1 - p. Numerical results revealed two phases in the steady state. An active phase for p < p _c has one connected network of agents using different strategies who are continually interacting and taking adaptive actions. A frozen phase for p > p _c has three separate clusters of agents using only R, P, and S, respectively with terminated adaptive actions. A mean-field theory based on the link densities in co-evolving network is formulated and the trinomial closure scheme is applied to obtain analytical solutions. The analytic results agree with simulation results on ARPS well. In addition, the different probabilities of winning, losing, and drawing a game among the agents are identified as the origin of the small discrepancy between analytic and simulation results. As a result of the adaptive actions, agents of higher degrees are often those being taken advantage of. Agents with a smaller (larger) degree than the mean degree have a higher (smaller) probability of winning than losing. The results are informative for future attempts on formulating more accurate theories.     

The roles of heterogeneous investment mechanism in the public goods game on scale-free networks

The public goods game is an important theoretical model for investigating the emergence of cooperation in the multi-player social dilemma. It has been proven that scale-free networks can significantly promote cooperation, but fail to sustain cooperation when the player obtains the normalized payoff. In this paper, we introduce heterogeneous investment mechanism into the public goods game on scale-free networks, and study the evolution of cooperation in both cases of accumulated and normalized payoff. Our research reveals that the heterogeneous investment mechanism can obviously facilitate cooperation as the adjusted parameter α increases. The increase of α allows cooperators to emerge under lower values of r. In the case of accumulated payoff, cooperators always firmly occupy the hubs, and the population keeps high cooperation level. In the case of normalized payoff, the increase of α changes the situation that the hubs are easily invaded by defectors, and inhibits the spread of defectors.     

On evolutionary spatial heterogeneous games

How cooperation between self-interested individuals evolve is a crucial problem, both in biology and in social sciences, that is far from being well understood. Evolutionary game theory is a useful approach to this issue. The simplest model to take into account the spatial dimension in evolutionary games is in terms of cellular automata with just a one-parameter payoff matrix. Here, the effects of spatial heterogeneities of the environment and/or asymmetries in the interactions among the individuals are analysed through different extensions of this model. Instead of using the same universal payoff matrix, bimatrix games in which each cell at site (i, j) has its own different ‘temptation to defect’ parameter T(i,j) are considered. First, the case in which these individual payoffs are constant in time is studied. Second, an evolving evolutionary spatial game such that T=T(i,j;t), i.e. besides depending on the position evolves (by natural selection), is used to explore the combination of spatial heterogeneity and natural selection of payoff matrices.     

Spatial Games Based on Pursuing the Highest Average Payoff

We propose a strategy updating mechanism based on pursuing the highest average payoff to investigate the prisoner＇s dilemma game and the snowdrift game. We apply the new rule to investigate cooperative behaviours on regular, small-world, scale-free networks, and find spatial structure can maintain cooperation for the prisoner＇s dilemma game. fn the snowdrift game, spatial structure can inhibit or promote cooperative behaviour which depends on payoff parameter. We further study cooperative behaviour on scale-free network in detail. Interestingly, non-monotonous behaviours observed on scale-free network with middle-degree individuals have the lowest cooperation level. We also find that large-degree individuals change their strategies more frequently for both games.     

Coevolution of game and network structure with adjustable linking

Most papers about the evolutionary game on graph assume the statistic network structure. However, in the real world, social interaction could change the relationship among people. And the change of social structure will also affect people’s strategies. We build a coevolution model of prisoner’s dilemma game and network structure to study the dynamic interaction in the real world. Differing from other coevolution models, players rewire their network connections according to the density of cooperation and other players’ payoffs. We use a parameter α to control the effect of payoff in the process of rewiring. Based on the asynchronous update rule and Monte Carlo simulation, we find that, when players prefer to rewire their links to those who are richer, the temptation can increase the cooperation density.     

Impacts of memory on a regular lattice for different population sizes with asynchronous update in spatial snowdrift game

Memory is an important factor on the evolution of cooperation in spatial structure. For evolutionary biologists, the problem is often how cooperation acts can emerge in an evolving system. In the case of snowdrift game, it is found that memory can boost cooperation level for large cost-to-benefit ratio r, while inhibit cooperation for small r. Thus, how to enlarge the range of r for the purpose of enhancing cooperation becomes a hot issue recently. This paper addresses a new memory-based approach and its core lies in: Each agent applies the given rule to compare its own historical payoffs in a certain memory size, and take the obtained maximal one as virtual payoff. In order to get the optimal strategy, each agent randomly selects one of its neighbours to compare their virtual payoffs, which can lead to the optimal strategy. Both constant-size memory and size-varying memory are investigated by means of a scenario of asynchronous updating algorithm on regular lattices with different sizes. Simulation results show that this approach effectively enhances cooperation level in spatial structure and makes the high cooperation level simultaneously emerge for both small and large r. Moreover, it is discovered that population sizes have a significant influence on the effects of cooperation.     

GLAD: a simple adaptive strategy that yields cooperation in dilemma games

We introduce a simple adaptive rule where agents choose a cooperative effort on a grid. Agents can adjust this effort step by step and G ains and L osses A djust D irections. We show that this process converges to the cooperative outcome in a two-person Prisoners’ Dilemma game, and we provide simulations showing that the results also holds with a larger number of agents.     

Effects of unknown fermion generations on the mw, mZ interdependence

The effect of unknown fermion generations on the m_W, m_Z interdependence is analyzed. It is shown that an additional fermion generation can increase the quantum correction Δr and, therefore, the predicted mass difference m_Z - m_W for given m_Z, but such positive contributions are bounded above by small quantities. In particular, as previously pointed out by Veltman, massive degenerate fermions do not fully decouple but lead to small positive corrections. On the other hand, it is known that significant negative contributions to Δr and m_Z - m_W can arise from exotic values for the mass of the top quark and the isodoublet splittings in higher generations. A method of obtaining information about such masses when m_W and m_Z become precisely known is discussed. The analytic methods of obtaining the general features of the corrections, for essentially arbitrary fermion masses, exploit the convexity properties of elementary functions.