Uncertainty of cooperation in random scale-free networks

We study the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game where the players are located on the nodes of a random scale-free network. The prisoner’s dilemma game is a powerful tool and has been used for the study of mutual trust and cooperation among individuals in structured populations. We vary the structure of the network and the payoff values for the game, and show that the specific conditions can greatly influence the outcome of the game. A variety of behaviors are reproduced and the percentage of cooperating agents fluctuates significantly, even in the absence of irrational behavior. For example, the steady state of the game may be a configuration where either cooperators or defectors dominate, while in many cases the solution fluctuates between these two limiting behaviors.     

Evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on weighted scale-free networks

This paper investigates the evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma on weighted scale-free networks. The weighted networks are generated by adopting Barabási-Albert scale-free network and assigning link weight with w_ij=(k_i×k_j)^β. Simulation results show that the cooperation frequency has a strong dependence on β. The value of β which is associated with the maximal cooperation frequency has been sought out. Moreover, Gini coefficient and Pareto exponent of the system’s wealth distribution are investigated. The inequality of wealth distribution is minimized at β≈−1.     

Offdiagonal complexity: A computationally quick complexity measure for graphs and networks

A vast variety of biological, social, and economical networks shows topologies drastically differing from random graphs; yet the quantitative characterization remains unsatisfactory from a conceptual point of view. Motivated from the discussion of small scale-free networks, a biased link distribution entropy is defined, which takes an extremum for a power-law distribution. This approach is extended to the node–node link cross-distribution, whose nondiagonal elements characterize the graph structure beyond link distribution, cluster coefficient and average path length. From here a simple (and computationally cheap) complexity measure can be defined. This offdiagonal complexity (OdC) is proposed as a novel measure to characterize the complexity of an undirected graph, or network. While both for regular lattices and fully connected networks OdC is zero, it takes a moderately low value for a random graph and shows high values for apparently complex structures as scale-free networks and hierarchical trees. The OdC approach is applied to the Helicobacter pylori protein interaction network and randomly rewired surrogates.     

基于超图的超网络相继故障分析

分析了快递超网络和电子元件超网络的相继故障扩散方式, 结合超图理论提出了2-section 图分析法和线图分析法, 并仿真分析了无标度超网络耦合映像格子的相继故障进程. 结果表明: 无标度超网络对外部攻击表现出了既鲁棒又脆弱的特性. 针对相继故障的不同扩散方式, 无标度超网络的相继故障行为表现出不同的特点. 超网络的相继故障行为和超网络的超度以及超边度分布有密切的联系, 也和超网络中超边的个数有关. 通过和同规模的Barabasi-Albert (BA)无标度网络对比, 在同一种攻击方式下同规模的无标度超网络都比BA 无标度网络表现出了更强的鲁棒性. 另外, 基于超边扩散的相继故障进程比基于节点扩散的相继故障进程更加缓慢.     

Evolution of imitation networks in Minority Game model

The Minority Game is adapted to study the “imitation dilemma”, i.e. the tradeoff between local benefit and global harm coming from imitation. The agents are placed on a substrate network and are allowed to imitate more successful neighbours. Imitation domains, which are oriented trees, are formed. We investigate size distribution of the domains and in-degree distribution within the trees. We use four types of substrate: one-dimensional chain; Erd?s-Rényi graph; Barabási-Albert scale-free graph; Barabási-Albert 'model A' graph. The behaviour of some features of the imitation network strongly depend on the information cost epsilon, which is the percentage of gain the imitators must pay to the imitated. Generally, the system tends to form a few domains of equal size. However, positive epsilon makes the system stay in a long-lasting metastable state with complex structure. The in-degree distribution is found to follow a power law in two cases of those studied: for Erd?s-Rényi substrate for any epsilon and for Barabási-Albert scale-free substrate for large enough epsilon. A brief comparison with empirical data is provided.     

The effect of asymmetric payoff mechanism on evolutionary networked prisoner’s dilemma game

In social and biological systems, there are obvious individual divergence and asymmetric payoff phenomenon due to the strength, power and influence differences. In this paper, we introduce an asymmetric payoff mechanism to evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) on scale-free networks. The co-effects of individual diversity and asymmetric payoff mechanism on the evolution of cooperation and the wealth distribution under different updating rules are investigated. Numerical results show that the cooperation is highly promoted when the hub nodes are favored in the payoff matrix, which seems to harm the interest of the majority. But the inequality of social wealth distribution grows with the unbalanced payoff rule. However, when the node difference is eliminated in the learning strategy, the asymmetric payoff rule will not affect the cooperation level. Our work may sharpen the understanding of the cooperative behavior and wealth inequality in the society.     

Systemic risk on different interbank network topologies

In this paper we develop an interbank market with heterogeneous financial institutions that enter into lending agreements on different network structures. Credit relationships (links) evolve endogenously via a fitness mechanism based on agents’ performance. By changing the agent’s trust on its neighbor’s performance, interbank linkages self-organize themselves into very different network architectures, ranging from random to scale-free topologies. We study which network architecture can make the financial system more resilient to random attacks and how systemic risk spreads over the network. To perturb the system, we generate a random attack via a liquidity shock. The hit bank is not automatically eliminated, but its failure is endogenously driven by its incapacity to raise liquidity in the interbank network. Our analysis shows that a random financial network can be more resilient than a scale free one in case of agents’ heterogeneity.     

Multiple Partial Attacks on Complex Networks

We numerically investigate the effect of four kinds of partial attacks of multiple targets on the Barabási Albert （BA） scale-free network and the Erdos-Rényi （ER） random network. Comparing with the effect of single target complete knockout we find that partial attacks of multiple targets may produce an effect higher than the complete knockout of a single target on both BA scale-free network and ER random network. We also find that the BA scale-free network seems to be more susceptible to multi-target partial attacks than the ER random network.     

Experimental evidence for the interplay between individual wealth and transaction network

We conduct a market experiment with human agents in order to explore the structure of transaction networks and to study the dynamics of wealth accumulation. The experiment is carried out on our platform for 97 days with 2,095 effective participants and 16,936 times of transactions. From these data, the hybrid distribution (log-normal bulk and power-law tail) in the wealth is observed and we demonstrate that the transaction networks in our market are always scale-free and disassortative even for those with the size of the order of few hundred. We further discover that the individual wealth is correlated with its degree by a power-law function which allows us to relate the exponent of the transaction network degree distribution to the Pareto index in wealth distribution.     

Travel and tourism: Into a complex network

It is discussed how the worldwide tourist arrivals, about 10% of the world’s domestic product, form a largely heterogeneous and directed complex network. Remarkably the random network of connectivity is converted into a scale-free network of intensities. The importance of weights on network connections is brought into discussion. It is also shown how strategic positioning particularly benefits from market diversity and that interactions among countries prevail on a technological and economic pattern, questioning the backbone of driving forces in traveling.     

Detrended Fluctuation Analysis on Correlations of Complex Networks Under Attack and Repair Strategy

We analyze the correlation properties of the Erdos-Rényi random graph (RG) and the Barabási-Albert scale-free network (SF) under the attack and repair strategy with detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA). The maximum degree k representing the local property of the system, shows similar scaling behaviors for random graphs and scale-free networks. The fluctuations are quite random at short time scales but display strong anticorrelation at longer time scales under the same system size N and different repair probability pre. The average degree , revealing the statistical property of the system, exhibits completely different scaling behaviors for random graphs and scale-free networks. Random graphs display long-range power-law correlations. Scale-free networks are uncorrelated at short time scales; while anticorrelated at longer time scales and the anticorrelation becoming stronger with the increase of pre.     

Stability and dynamical properties of material flow systems on random networks

The theory of complex networks and of disordered systems is used to study the stability and dynamical properties of a simple model of material flow networks defined on random graphs. In particular we address instabilities that are characteristic of flow networks in economic, ecological and biological systems. Based on results from random matrix theory, we work out the phase diagram of such systems defined on extensively connected random graphs, and study in detail how the choice of control policies and the network structure affects stability. We also present results for more complex topologies of the underlying graph, focussing on finitely connected Erdös-Réyni graphs, Small-World Networks and Barabási-Albert scale-free networks. Results indicate that variability of input-output matrix elements, and random structures of the underlying graph tend to make the system less stable, while fast price dynamics or strong responsiveness to stock accumulation promote stability.     

Study of a market model with conservative exchanges on complex networks

Many models of market dynamics make use of the idea of conservative wealth exchanges among economic agents. A few years ago an exchange model using extremal dynamics was developed and a very interesting result was obtained: a self-generated minimum wealth or poverty line. On the other hand, the wealth distribution exhibited an exponential shape as a function of the square of the wealth. These results have been obtained both considering exchanges between nearest neighbors or in a mean field scheme. In the present paper we study the effect of distributing the agents on a complex network. We have considered archetypical complex networks: Erdös–Rényi random networks and scale-free networks. The presence of a poverty line with finite wealth is preserved but spatial correlations are important, particularly between the degree of the node and the wealth. We present a detailed study of the correlations, as well as the changes in the Gini coefficient, that measures the inequality, as a function of the type and average degree of the considered networks.     

Evolutionary ultimatum game on complex networks under incomplete information

This paper studies the evolutionary ultimatum game on networks when agents have incomplete information about the strategies of their neighborhood agents. Our model assumes that agents may initially display low fairness behavior, and therefore, may have to learn and develop their own strategies in this unknown environment. The Genetic Algorithm Learning Classifier System (GALCS) is used in the model as the agent strategy learning rule. Aside from the Watts-Strogatz (WS) small-world network and its variations, the present paper also extends the spatial ultimatum game to the Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free network. Simulation results show that the fairness level achieved is lower than in situations where agents have complete information about other agents’ strategies. The research results display that fairness behavior will always emerge regardless of the distribution of the initial strategies. If the strategies are randomly distributed on the network, then the long-term agent fairness levels achieved are very close given unchanged learning parameters. Neighborhood size also has little effect on the fairness level attained. The simulation results also imply that WS small-world and BA scale-free networks have different effects on the spatial ultimatum game. In ultimatum game on networks with incomplete information, the WS small-world network and its variations favor the emergence of fairness behavior slightly more than the BA network where agents are heterogeneously structured.     

Degree and wealth distribution in a network induced by wealth

A network induced by wealth is a social network model in which wealth induces individuals to participate as nodes, and every node in the network produces and accumulates wealth utilizing its links. More specifically, at every time step a new node is added to the network, and a link is created between one of the existing nodes and the new node. Innate wealth-producing ability is randomly assigned to every new node, and the node to be connected to the new node is chosen randomly, with odds proportional to the accumulated wealth of each existing node. Analyzing this network using the mean value and continuous flow approaches, we derive a relation between the conditional expectations of the degree and the accumulated wealth of each node. From this relation, we show that the degree distribution of the network induced by wealth is scale-free. We also show that the wealth distribution has a power-law tail and satisfies the 80/20 rule. We also show that, over the whole range, the cumulative wealth distribution exhibits the same topological characteristics as the wealth distributions of several networks based on the Bouchaud-Mèzard model, even though the mechanism for producing wealth is quite different in our model. Further, we show that the cumulative wealth distribution for the poor and middle class seems likely to follow by a log-normal distribution, while for the richest, the cumulative wealth distribution has a power-law behavior.     

Weighted Scaling in Non-growth Random Networks

We propose a weighted model to explain the self-organizing formation of scale-free phenomenon in nongrowth random networks.In this model,we use multiple-edges to represent the connections between vertices and define the weight of a multiple-edge as the total weights of all single-edges within it and the strength of a vertex as the sum of weights for those multiple-edges attached to it.The network evolves according to a vertex strength preferential selection mechanism.During the evolution process,the network always holds its total number of vertices and its total number of single-edges constantly.We show analytically and numerically that a network will form steady scale-free distributions with our model.The results show that a weighted non-growth random network can evolve into scale-free state.It is interesting that the network also obtains the character of an exponential edge weight distribution.Namely,coexistence of scale-free distribution and exponential distribution emerges.     

Cascading failure in Watts-Strogatz small-world networks

In this paper, we study the cascading failure in Watts-Strogatz small-world networks. We find that this network model has a heterogeneous betweenness distribution, although its degree distribution is homogeneous. Further study shows that this small-world network is robust to random attack but fragile to intentional attack, in the cascading failure scenario. With comparison to standard random graph and scale-free networks, our result indicates that the robust yet fragile property in the cascading failure scenario is mainly related to heterogeneous betweenness, rather than the network degree distribution. Thus, it suggests that we have to be very careful when we use terms such as homogeneous network and heterogeneous network, unless the distribution we refer to is specified.     

A unified framework for the pareto law and Matthew effect using scale-free networks

We investigate the accumulated wealth distribution by adopting evolutionary games taking place on scale-free networks. The system self-organizes to a critical Pareto distribution (1897) of wealth P(m)∼m^-(v+1) with 1.6 < v <2.0 (which is in agreement with that of U.S. or Japan). Particularly, the agent's personal wealth is proportional to its number of contacts (connectivity), and this leads to the phenomenon that the rich gets richer and the poor gets relatively poorer, which is consistent with the Matthew Effect present in society, economy, science and so on. Though our model is simple, it provides a good representation of cooperation and profit accumulation behavior in economy, and it combines the network theory with econophysics.     

Synchronization of mobile chaotic agents on connected networks

This work studies the synchronization of a number of mobile agents on a substrate network. Each agent carries a chaotic map and randomly walks on a connected network. The collection of agents consists of another time-varying network derived from the substrate network. It is found that the synchronization conditions of this agent network depend on the average degree of the substrate network’s connectivity, the coupling strength between interacting agents, and the agent density in the network. Synchronization of the agent network on scale-free and ER networks is considered here, and it is found that the scale-free topology is more applicable to synchronize mobile chaotic agents. To get analytical insights, the star graph is taken and considered as a substrate network.     

Weighted Scaling in Non-growth Random Networks

We propose a weighted model to explain the self-organizing formation of scale-free phenomenon in non-growth random networks. In this model, we use multiple-edges to represent the connections between vertices and define the weight of a multiple-edge as the total weights of all single-edges within it and the strength of a vertex as the sum of weights for those multiple-edges attached to it. The network evolves according to a vertex strength preferential selection mechanism. During the evolution process, the network always holds its total number of vertices and its total number of single-edges constantly. We show analytically and numerically that a network will form steady scale-free distributions with our model. The results show that a weighted non-growth random network can evolve into scale-free state. It is interesting that the network also obtains the character of an exponential edge weight distribution. Namely, coexistence of scale-free distribution and exponential distribution emerges.