供应链买卖双方协调订货模型

供需关系贯穿供应链的整个过程;然而,如何促使非一体化供应链协调问题在实践中是非常重要的.因此,供需双方订货批量的研究是供应链管理的一个重要内容之一.本文以订单方式为背景,针对供应链环境下单个供应商和多个订货商在非合作情况下的订货模型进行讨论,并在此基础上给出了一个改进后的线性价格折扣策略,该策略同时考虑了增量折扣和减量折扣两种情况,同时给出了供需上双方订货的S tackelberg博弈模型.数字实验结果表明该折扣模型对于改善供应链运作协调是相当有效的.     

订单生产方式下供应链1:1买卖双方协调订货模型

供需关系贯穿供应链的整个过程。因此，供需双方订货批量研究是供应链管理的一个最重要也最基本的内容之一。本以订单方式为背景，讨论了供应链环境下1：1非合作订货模型，并在此基础上给出了1：1供需双方通过适当的线性价格折扣政策的Stackelberg博弈模型。最后给出了两个算例加以说明。     

订单生产方式下供应链1∶1买卖双方协调订货模型

供需关系贯穿供应链的整个过程。因此,供需双方订货批量研究是供应链管理的一个最重要也最基本的内容之一。本文以订单方式为背景,讨论了供应链环境下1∶1非合作订货模型,并在此基础上给出了1∶1供需双方通过适当的线性价格折扣政策的Stackelberg博弈模型。最后给出了两个算例加以说明。     

供应链中供需协调及价格折扣订货模型研究

本文研究由单一供方和单一需方组成的供应链协调问题。通过制定一个合理的价格折扣范围,提出一种改进的订货策略—n阶段订货策略,使供应链整体利润最大化,同时使供需双方达到双赢。     

一种随机需求下的供应链激励机制

研究了在随机需求条件下，供应链中用价格折扣策略协调供需双方利益的问题。考虑随机性需求有可能造成分销商的库存积压，本提出了生产商给予分销商的积压商品价格折扣的策略，分析了其激励机制，给出了最优价格折扣的模型和算法。最后用数值方法验证了这种价格折扣策略能够给生产商和分销商带来利益改善，而且需求波动越大，该策略的协调效果越好。     

基于营运资金信息匹配平台的供应链金融动态折扣决策研究

当前逐渐受到实业界关注的一种新型供应链金融模式是基于营运资金信息匹配平台的动态折扣。本文针对两级供应链的动态折扣决策问题进行建模,揭示了动态折扣的应用对于改善供应链参与方现金流的影响机理。首先通过考虑供需双方动态折扣的独立决策,得出日折扣率的边界条件、双方效用最大时的日折扣率、买方混合还款方式下营运资金的最优准备方案和最低边界值;其次考虑供需双方动态折扣的最优决策,推导出在不同折扣率和利率关系下的最优还款策略,研究表明动态折扣可以明显提升供需双方的利润情况。     

JIT环境下供需采购模型的研究

模型以单一供应商、单一采购商为背景,通过分别对JIT环境下单独考虑供应商利益和综合考虑供需双方利益两种情况下订购、运输策略的研究,求得两种情况下的订购批量和运输批次.模型在相关研究的基础上加入了一个新的成本因素:采购方的柔性损失成本,来量化供应链长期合同的风险.研究结果表明,综合考虑供需双方利益的模型不仅能够降低供需双方的总成本,而且也有效的加强了供需双方的合作关系.     

非对称信息下供应商-零售商供应链的批量折扣决策

在供应链管理的文献中,许多工作研究供应商如何使用激励手段,如数量折扣,去影响零售商的订货行为以增加供应商的利润(与整个供应链的利润).多种形式的激励策略模型已有许多,但通常有一个关键的假设,即,供应商关于零售商的成本结构具有完全信息.本文研究了在非对称信息下供应商的最优数量折扣决策问题,得到了最优策略,并与完全信息的情形进行了比较.     

不同情形下供应链优化决策模型的比较分析

本文提出三种不同情形（制造商与零售商追求各自利润最大化，并且没有价格折扣策略；制造商与零售商共同追求总利润最大化，不实施价格折扣策略；制造商与零售商共同追求总利润最大化，并实施价格折扣策略）下供应链价格和库存补充策略的优化决策模型，并通过具体数例进行比较分析，结果表明，供应链合作并实施价格折扣策略时的供应链总利润最高，而供应链双方利润分配系数的变化对基于供应链总利润最大化的供应链优化决策没有影响．     

基于供应商视角的提前订货协调研究

本文针对一个供应商和零售商组成的供应链系统,主要研究零售商如何设计提前订货折扣来吸引顾客提前订货;而供应商如何根据市场需求的不确定性,设计零售商提前订货资金的付款时间等问题。在供应商-Stackelberg框架下,以期望利润为目标,建立了相应的决策模型。通过对模型的分析求解,给出了不同市场环境下供应商要求零售商支付提前订货资金的策略。最后,用算例验证了模型和理论分析的可行性。     

需求与库存水平相关的供应链量折扣协调模型

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商构成的供应链系统,零售商的市场需求依赖于该产品的库存水平,研究了利用批量折扣实现供应链完美协调的问题.首先,我们得出了在分散式系统下供应链无法实现完美协调,讨论了供需双方的最优决策.其次,作为stackelberg的主导方,供应商提供批量折扣计划,得出了此折扣计划实现系统完美协调的条件,分别给出了实现完美协调和不能实现完美协调时的批量折扣计划.最后分析了需求函数中的参数和产品的成本对实现供应链系统完美协调的影响.     

A quantity discount approach to supply chain coordination

Quantity discounts provide a practical foundation for inventory coordination in supply chains. However, typical supply chain participants may encounter difficulties in implementing the coordination policy simply because (1) specified lot size adjustments may deviate from the economic lot sizes and (2) the buying firm may face amplified overstocking risks related to increased order quantities. The main objective of this study is to develop a quantity discount model that resolves the practical challenges associated with implementing quantity discount policies for supply chain coordination between a supplier and a buyer. The proposed Buyer’s Risk Adjustment (B-RA) model allows the supplier to offer discounts that capitalize on the original economic lot sizes and share the buyer’s risk of temporary overstocking under uncertain demand. The analytical results suggest that the proposed B-RA discount approach is a feasible alternative for supply chain coordination under uncertain demand conditions.     

Vendor managed inventory contracts – coordinating the supply chain while looking from the vendor’s perspective

The paper studies coordination of a supply chain when the inventory is managed by the vendor (VMI). We also provide a general mathematical framework that can be used to analyze contracts under both retailer managed inventory (RMI) and VMI. Using a simple newsvendor scenario with a single vendor and single retailer, we study five popular coordinating supply chain contracts: buyback, quantity flexibility, quantity discount, sales rebate, and revenue sharing contracts. We analyze the ability of these contracts to coordinate the supply chain under VMI when the vendor freely decides the quantity. We find that even though all of them coordinate under RMI, quantity flexibility and sales rebate contracts do not generally coordinate under VMI. Furthermore, buyback and revenue sharing contracts are equivalent. Hence, we propose two new contracts which coordinate under VMI (one of which coordinates under RMI too, provided a well-known assumption holds). Finally, we extend our analysis to consider multiple independent retailers with the vendor incurring linear or convex production cost, and show that our results are qualitatively unchanged.     

Scheduling and lot sizing models for the single-vendor multi-buyer problem under consignment stock partnership

We consider a centralized supply chain composed of a single vendor serving multiple buyers and operating under consignment stock arrangement. Solving the general problem is hard as it requires finding optimal delivery schedule to the buyers and optimal production lot sizes. We first provide a nonlinear mixed integer programming formulation for the general scheduling and lot sizing problem. We show that the problem is NP-hard in general. We reformulate the problem under the assumption of ‘zero-switch rule’. We also provide a simple sequence independent lower bound to the solution of the general model. We then propose a heuristic procedure to generate a near-optimal delivery schedule. We assess the cost performance of that heuristic by conducting sensitivity analysis on the key model parameters. The results show that the proposed heuristic promises substantial supply-chain cost savings that increase as the number of buyers increases.     

Coordinating supply chain inventories through common replenishment epochs

This paper proposes a model to study and analyze the benefit of coordinating supply chain inventories through the use of common replenishment epochs or time periods. A one-vendor, multi-buyer supply chain for a single product is analyzed. Under the proposed strategy, the vendor specifies common replenishment periods and requires all buyers to replenish only at those time periods. The vendor offers a price discount to entice the buyers to accept this strategy. The optimal replenishment period and the price discount to be offered by the vendor are determined as a solution to a Stackelberg game. After developing a method to solve the game, a numerical study is conducted to evaluate the benefit of the proposed coordinated strategy.     

Solving the vendor–buyer integrated inventory system with arithmetic–geometric inequality

In the past, economic order quantity (EOQ) and economic production quantity (EPQ) were treated independently from the viewpoints of the buyer or the vendor. In most cases, the optimal solution for one player was non-optimal to the other player. In today’s competitive markets, close cooperation between the vendor and the buyer is necessary to reduce the joint inventory cost and the response time of the vendor–buyer system. The successful experiences of National Semiconductor, Wal-Mart, and Procter and Gamble have demonstrated that integrating the supply chain has significantly influenced the company’s performance and market share (Simchi-Levi et al. (2000) [1]). Recently, Yang et al. (2007) [2] presented an inventory model to determine the economic lot size for both the vendor and buyer, and the number of deliveries in an integrated two stage supply chain. In this paper, we present an alternative approach to determine the global optimal inventory policy for the vendor–buyer integrated system using arithmetic–geometric inequality.     

Analysis of a two-stage telecommunication supply chain with technology dependent demand

We analyze a two-stage telecommunication supply chain consisting of one operator and one vendor under a multiple period setting. The operator faces a stochastic market demand which depends on technology investment level. The decision variables for the operator are the initial technology investment level and the capacity of the network for each period. The capacity that the operator installs in one period also remains available in subsequent periods. The operator can increase or decrease the available capacity at each period. For this model, an algorithm to find the centralized optimal solution is proposed. A profit sharing contract where firms share both the revenue and operating costs generated throughout the periods along with initial technology investment is suggested. Also a coordinating quantity discount contract where the discount on the price depends on the total installed capacity is designed. The case where the vendor decides on the technology investment level and the operator decides on the capacity of the network is also analyzed and it is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium.