Competitive food supply chain networks with application to fresh produce

In this paper, we develop a network-based food supply chain model under oligopolistic competition and perishability, with a focus on fresh produce. The model incorporates food deterioration through the introduction of arc multipliers, with the inclusion of the discarding costs associated with the disposal of the spoiled food products. We allow for product differentiation due to product freshness and food safety concerns, as well as the evaluation of alternative technologies associated with various supply chain activities. We then propose an algorithm with elegant features for computation. A case study focused on the cantaloupe market is investigated within this modeling and computational framework, in which we analyze different scenarios prior/during/after a foodborne disease outbreak.     

Comparing improvement strategies for inventory inaccuracy in a two-echelon supply chain

Classical inventory theory often assumes no discrepancies between recorded inventory and actual inventory. However, inventory records are usually inaccurate due to many reasons in practice. For example, inventory shrinkage refers to the difference between booked inventory that a company should have as a result of its sales, purchasing, and manufacturing processes and actual inventory that it has on hand. This paper concerns the impact of inventory shrinkage to a supply chain and investigates different strategies to deal with inventory shrinkage. We consider a single-period two-echelon supply chain consisting of a Stackelberg manufacturer and a retailer whose inventory is subject to shrinkage errors. Our analysis is based on a single-period newsvendor model and considers the following cases of order decisions: (a) the retailer ignores the inventory errors; (b) the retailer estimates the errors; (c) the retailer shares the inventory error information with the manufacturer; and (d) RFID technology is used to reduce or eliminate the errors. The first case is the base strategy and a common practice for many supply chains, the other two represent certain non-technological strategies of the retailer when dealing with inventory inaccuracy, and the last one represents a technology improvement strategy by the manufacturer to reduce or eliminate inventory shrinkage errors. We compare these improvement strategies and derive critical tag price for RFID implementation as a technological remedy for the inventory inaccuracy problem. Conditions for the profitability of RFID adoption are discussed.     

Markdown money contracts for perishable goods with clearance pricing

It is common in practice that retailers liquidate unsold perishable goods via clearance pricing. Markdown money is frequently used between manufacturers and retailers in such a supply chain setting. It is a form of rebate from a manufacturer to subsidize a retailer’s clearance pricing after the regular season. Two forms of markdown money are percent markdown money, in which the markdown money is limited to only a certain percentage of the retail price markdown, and quantity markdown money, which is essentially a buyback contract or returns policy with a rebate credit paid to the retailer for each unsold unit after the regular season. We show both forms of markdown money contracts can coordinate the supply chain and we discuss their strengths and limitations.     

Endogenous information acquisition in supply chain management

In this paper, we analyze an endogenous determination of efforts put into information acquisition and its impact on supply chain management. More specifically, we consider a supplier who sells a product to a buyer during a single selling season. Prior to placing an order with the supplier, the buyer has an option to acquire additional information about the demand by hiring experts (who are capable of providing forecasts). Because a commission fee must be paid to each hired expert, there exists a tradeoff between the cost and the value of the information, and the buyer needs to determine how much information to acquire. We derive the optimal information-acquisition level in an integrated setting and compare it with that determined in a decentralized setting. We also analyze several types of supply contracts to examine if they can coordinate the supply chain and allow an arbitrary division of system profit between the supplier and the buyer.     

Measurement and optimization of responsiveness in supply chain networks with queueing structures

In this paper we consider supply chains with multiple stages of serial or network structure. The supply chains are endogenous in the sense that they involve queues because each order’s lead-time is dependent on the orders already in the system. We define supply chain responsiveness as the probability of fulfilling customer orders within a promised lead-time and study the problems of measuring and optimizing supply chain responsiveness using queueing network models. We first consider a single-server multi-stage serial supply chain and find a closed form expression for the fulfilment time distribution. For the multi-server multi-stage problem, the closed form evaluation of the fulfilment time distribution becomes intractable due to the dependency of the lead-times in different stages. We circumvent this difficulty by proposing a novel FCFS discipline which enables a closed-form analysis. For the multi-server multi-stage Jackson-type supply chain network, to enable analysis, we convert the system into an equivalent single server single stage system with state-dependent rates. For each case, we present detailed numerical examples for both measurement and the optimization of supply chain responsiveness.     

Channel incentives in sharing new product demand information and robust contracts

Demand for a new product is often highly uncertain. As the developer of a new product, the manufacturer may reduce the uncertainty of the product’s demand through observing progress in his product development process or receiving demand signals directly from customers. This paper first shows that a centralized channel always benefits from improved demand information. Yet, to realize this benefit in a decentralized manufacturer–retailer channel, the manufacturer needs to disclose his private demand information to the retailer. We show that the manufacturer’s incentive to share his improved demand information depends on the supply contract signed with the retailer. Furthermore, mandating the manufacturer to disclose his improved demand information can actually reduce the total channel profit. We provide managerial insights by analyzing three widely used contract forms. We investigate whether these contracts are robust under an unanticipated demand information update observed by the manufacturer. We show that the quantity flexibility contract with a high return rate is not robust. The buyback contract, however, is robust and always achieves information sharing while preserving channel performance.     

Double marginalization and coordination in the supply chain with uncertain supply

This paper explores a generalized supply chain model subject to supply uncertainty after the supplier chooses the production input level. Decentralized systems under wholesale price contracts are investigated, with double marginalization effects shown to lead to supply insufficiencies, in the cases of both deterministic and random demands. We then design coordination contracts for each case and find that an accept-all type of contract is required to coordinate the supply chain with random demand, which is a much more complicated situation than that with deterministic demand. Examples are provided to illustrate the application of our findings to specific industrial domains. Moreover, our coordination mechanisms are shown to be applicable to the multi-supplier situation, which fills the research gap on assembly system coordination with random yield and random demand under a voluntary compliance regime.     

The bullwhip effect in supply chain networks

This paper analyzes the propagation and amplification of order fluctuations (i.e., the bullwhip effect) in supply chain networks operated with linear and time-invariant inventory management policies. The supply chain network is allowed to include multiple customers (e.g., markets), any network structure, with or without sharing information. The paper characterizes the stream of orders placed by any supplier for any stationary customer demand processes, and gives exact formulas for the variance of the orders placed and the amplification of order fluctuations. The paper also derives robust analytical conditions, based only on inventory management policies, to predict the presence of the bullwhip effect for any network structure, any inventory replenishment policies, and arbitrary customer demand processes. Numerical examples show that the analytical results accurately quantify the bullwhip effect; managerial insights are drawn from the analysis. The methodology presented in this paper generalizes those in previous studies for serial supply chains.     

An analysis of the structural complexity of supply chain networks

Each enterprise in a supply chain network needs quantitative indicators to analyze and manage its interactions with different business partners in the network. Supply chains exhibit the characteristics of complex systems. In a supply chain network, a large number of firms cooperate simultaneously with many suppliers and customers, and interact through a variety of information and material flows to achieve a balance between supply and demand. However, the complexity of a supply chain is not a simple linear structure where a small change often results in a chain reaction. When supply chain complexity increases, monitoring and managing the interaction between different elements of the chain becomes more difficult. An entropy model based on information theory provides an appropriate means of quantifying the complexity of a supply chain system by delivering information required to describe the state of the system. The entropy measure links uncertainty and complexity so that, as a system grows in uncertainty, it becomes more complex and more information is required to describe and monitor it. In this paper, we propose an entropy-based measure for analyzing the structural complexity in relation to the structure and system uncertainty. The method provides guidelines for estimating the complexity throughout the supply chain structure.     

A possibilistic decision model for new product supply chain design

This paper models supply chain (SC) uncertainties by fuzzy sets and develops a possibilistic SC configuration model for new products with unreliable or unavailable SC statistical data. The supply chain is modeled as a network of stages. Each stage may have one or more options characterized by the cost and lead-time required to fulfill required functions and may hold safety stock to prevent an inventory shortage. The objective is to determine the option and inventory policy for each stage to minimize the total SC cost and maximize the possibility of fulfilling the target service level. A fuzzy SC model is developed to evaluate the performance of the entire SC and a genetic algorithm approach is applied to determine near-optimal solutions. The results obtained show that the proposed approach allows decision makers to perform trade-off analysis among customer service levels, product cost, and inventory investment depending on their risk attitude. It also provides an alternative tool to evaluate and improve SC configuration decisions in an uncertain SC environment.     

Coordination of cooperative cost-reduction efforts in a supply chain partnership

We study cooperative cost reduction in a decentralized supply chain with a single manufacturer and multiple suppliers. The manufacturer assembles components that are procured from the suppliers to produce a final product. Both the manufacturer and the suppliers invest in reducing the unit production costs of the components. We see that neither of the two well-known conventional contracts, the wholesale price contract and the cost-plus pricing contract, generally coordinates the supply chain, i.e., under both of these types of contract, the individual optimal cost-reduction efforts of players deviate from the centralized system-optimal solution. However, this result is not surprising because these contracts encourage either only the manufacturer or only the suppliers alone to invest in cost reduction.     

Preferences for contractual forms in supply chains

The supply chain contracting literature has focused on incentive contracts designed to align supply chain members’ individual interests. A key finding of this literature is that members’ preferences for contractual forms are often at odds: the upstream supplier prefers relatively complex contracts that can coordinate the supply chain; however, the downstream retailer prefers a wholesale price-only contract because it leaves more surplus (than does a coordinating contract), which the retailer can capture. This paper addresses the following question: Under what circumstances do suppliers and retailers prefer the same contractual form? We study supply chain members’ preferences for contractual forms under three different competitive settings in which multiple supply chains compete to sell substitutable products in the same market. Our analysis suggests that both upstream and downstream sides of the supply chain may prefer the same “quantity discount” contract, which would eliminate the conflicts of interest that otherwise typify contracting situations. More interesting still is that both sides may also prefer the wholesale price-only contract; this finding provides a theoretical explanation for why that inefficient (but simple) contract is widely adopted in supply chain transactions.     

A stochastic and asymmetric-information framework for a dominant-manufacturer supply chain

Consider a dominant manufacturer wholesaling a product to a retailer, who in turn retails it to the consumers at $p/unit. The retail-market demand volume varies with p according to a given demand curve. This basic system is commonly modeled as a manufacturer-Stackelberg ([mS]) game under a “deterministic and symmetric-information” (“det-sym-i”) framework. We first explain the logical flaws of this framework, which are (i) the dominant manufacturer-leader will have a lower profit than the retailer under an iso-elastic demand curve; (ii) in some situations the system’s “correct solution” can be hyper-sensitive to minute changes in the demand curve; (iii) applying volume discounting while keeping the original [mS] profit-maximizing objective leads to an implausible degenerate solution in which the manufacturer has dictatorial power over the channel. We then present an extension of the “stochastic and asymmetric-information” (“sto-asy-i”) framework proposed in Lau and Lau [Lau, A., Lau, H.-S., 2005. Some two-echelon supply-chain games: Improving from deterministic–symmetric-information to stochastic-asymmetric-information models. European Journal of Operational Research 161 (1), 203–223], coupled with the notion that a profit-maximizing dominant manufacturer may implement not only [mS] but also “[pm]”—i.e., using a manufacturer-imposed maximum retail price. We show that this new framework resolves all the logical flaws stated above. Along the way, we also present a procedure for the dominant manufacturer to design a profit-maximizing volume-discount scheme using stochastic and asymmetric demand information.     

The impact of partial information sharing in a two-echelon supply chain

We consider a simple two-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer in which the demand process of the retailer is an AR(1) where the random component is a function of both sides’ information. We focus on partial information sharing under which each side informs the other of an interval in which the exact value of its own component of demand lies. These various levels of information sharing can reduce the supply chain costs.     

Pricing in a supply chain for auction bidding under information asymmetry

We examine a supply chain in which a manufacturer participates in a sealed-bid lowest price procurement auction through a distributor. This form of supply chain is common when a manufacturer is active in an overseas market without establishing a local subsidiary. To gain a strategic advantage in the division of profit, the manufacturer and distributor may intentionally conceal information about the underlying cost distribution of the competition. In this environment of information asymmetry, we determine the equilibrium mark-up, the ex-ante expected mark-up and expected profit of the manufacturer and the equilibrium bid of the distributor. In unilateral communication, we demonstrate the informed agent’s advantage resulting to higher mark-up. Under information sharing, we show that profit is equally shared among the supply chain partners and we explicitly derive the mark-up when the underlying cost distribution is uniform in [0, 1]. The model and findings are illustrated by a numerical example.     

Closed-loop supply chain network design: A financial approach

The more common approaches used in the SCM consider only the physical logistic operations and ignore the financial aspects of the chain. This paper presents a financial approach to model a closed-loop supply chain design in which financial aspects are explicitly considered as exogenous variables. The model decides to determine the strategic decisions as well as the tactical decisions. The main contribution of this paper is to incorporate the financial aspects (i.e. current and fixed assets and liabilities) and a set of budgetary constraints representing balances of cash, debt, securities, payment delays, and discounts in the supply chain planning. Moreover, the financial approach applies the change in equity (instead of the measure of profit/cost in traditional approaches) as the objective function to be optimized in the presented model.To show the advantages of the presented approach, the results attributed to the financial approach and the traditional approach are compared, where the latter firstly decides on operations and fits finances afterwards. The results indicate that the traditional approach leads to lower change in equity compared to the financial approach. This fact illustrates the inadequacy of treating process operations and finances in isolated environments and pursuing as objective myopic performance indicators such as profit or cost. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis of the parameters using ANOVA for different levels of the parameters under different customer order patterns is performed to enhance the managerial insights of the study. The results clearly reveal the better improvement of using the financial approach over the traditional approach, and convince the decision makers to take advantage of the proposed approach.     

A distributed coordination mechanism for supply networks with asymmetric information

The paper analyses the problem of coordination in supply networks of multiple retailers and a single supplier, where partners have asymmetric, private information of demand and costs. After stating generic requirements like distributedness, truthfulness, efficiency and budget balance, we use the apparatus of mechanism design to devise a coordination mechanism that guarantees the above properties in the network. The resulting protocol is a novel realisation of the widely used Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) where the responsibility of planning is at the supplier. We prove that together with the required generic properties a fair sharing of risks and benefits cannot be guaranteed. We illustrate the general mechanism with a detailed discussion of a specialised version, assuming that inventory planning is done according to the newsvendor model, and explore the operation of this protocol through computational experiments.     

Channel coordination using product returns for a supply chain with stochastic salvage capacity

We examine returns policy in a Newsboy framework. Unlike the prior literature, however, we assume that both supplier and retailer have limited and stochastic salvage capacities. We first analyze the case of integrated supply chain in which the agents’ decisions are fully coordinated for the joint profits. The result prescribes a partial returns policy, in which the retailer returns a part of the leftovers to the supplier and liquidates the remainder through its clearance sale. In a decentralized system, the supplier should motivate the retailer to duplicate the outcome of the integrated system in choosing order and returns quantities. We propose three coordination contracts, of which each uses two benefit transfer schemes as an incentive to the retailer, instead of using a single benefit scheme as in the prior literature. All three effectively coordinate the supply chain. The supplier, as a Stakelberg leader, chooses the most profitable one since each contract yields the different shares of the agents’ profits.     

Robust tests for the bullwhip effect in supply chains with stochastic dynamics

This paper analyzes the bullwhip effect in single-echelon supply chains driven by arbitrary customer demands and operated nondeterministically. The supply chain, with stochastic system parameters, is modeled as a Markovian jump linear system. The paper presents robust analytical conditions to diagnose the bullwhip effect and bound its magnitude. The tests are independent of the customer demand. Examples are given. Ordering policies that pass these tests, and thus avoid the bullwhip effect in random environments for arbitrary customer demands, are shown to exist. The paper also presents possible extensions to multi-echelon chains.     

Alternative supply chain production-sales policies for new product diffusion: An agent-based modeling and simulation approach

Applying agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) methodology, this paper analyzes the impact of alternative production-sales policies on the diffusion of a new generic product and the generated NPV of profit. The key features of the ABMS model, that captures the marketplace as a complex adaptive system, are: (i) supply chain capacity is constrained; (ii) consumers’ new product adoption decisions are influenced by marketing activities as well as positive and negative word-of-mouth (WOM) between consumers; (iii) interactions among consumers taking place in the context of their social network are captured at the individual level; and (iv) the new product adoption process is adaptive. Conducting over 1 million simulation experiments, we determined the “best” production-sales policies under various parameter combinations based on the NPV of profit generated over the diffusion process. The key findings are as follows: (1) on average, the build-up policy with delayed marketing is the preferred policy in the case of only positive WOM as well as the case of positive and negative WOM. This policy provides the highest expected NPV of profit on average and it also performs very smoothly with respect to changes in build-up periods. (2) It is critical to consider the significant impact of negative word-of-mouth in choosing production-sales policies. Neglecting the effect of negative word-of-mouth can lead to poor policy recommendations, incorrect conclusions concerning the impact of operational parameters on the policy choice, and suboptimal choice of build-up periods.