Joint replenishment model with substitution

When products are coupled to the same cycle, the joint replenishment model (JRM) is used to determine optimal inventory levels, where the amount to order (for each item) is designed to minimize the joint holding and ordering costs based on a given demand. JRM studies assume that there is no substitution between items. However, this assumption is unrealistic in some settings where substitution cannot be ignored. This paper combines the separate works on substitution and joint replenishment and proposes a solution procedure for solving the joint replenishment model with substitution (JRMS) for two products within the framework of the classical economic order quantity model. We determine the optimal order quantities for each product taking into consideration substitution between them so that demand is partially met and the total cost associated with the delivery, holding, and shortage of the products is minimized. We also provide an extensive scenario analysis and draw insights. In particular, we shed some light on the role of substitution in reducing the fixed cost. We show that JRMS can result in substantial cost savings compared to the ordinary JRM.     

A multi-product multi-echelon inventory control model with joint replenishment strategy

On the basis of analyzing the shortages of present studies on multi-echelon inventory control, and considering some restrictions, this paper applies the joint replenishment strategy into the inventory system and builds a multi-product multi-echelon inventory control model. Then, an algorithm designed by Genetic Algorithm (GA) is used for solving the model. Finally, we respectively simulate the model under three different ordering strategies. The simulation result shows that the established model and the algorithm designed by GA have obvious superiority on reducing the total cost of the multi-product multi-echelon inventory system. Moreover, it illustrates the feasibility and the effectiveness of the model and the GA method.     

Contingency management under asymmetric information

We model a monopolist supplier whose supply to multiple buyers is disrupted. The supplier can take costly, speed-dependent actions, to restore supply. Buyers experience private backorder costs that are unknown to the supplier. We analyze the supplier's optimal contract structure and explore the impact of an alternate supplier.     

Joint replenishment of multi retailer with variable replenishment cycle under VMI

In the recent article, Darwish and Odah (2010) develop a scheme that allows for identical replenishment cycles for all the retailers, in the context of a single vendor supplying a group of retailers under VMI partnership. This paper proposes an alternative replenishment scheme allowing for different replenishment cycles for each retailer. An example has been shown to illustrate the cost savings under the proposed model.     

A joint optimisation model for inventory replenishment,product assortment,shelf space and display area allocation decisions

In this paper, we propose an optimisation model to determine the product assortment, inventory replenishment, display area and shelf space allocation decisions that jointly maximize the retailer’s profit under shelf space and backroom storage constraints. The variety of products to be displayed in the retail store, their display locations within the store, their ordering quantities, and the allocated shelf space in each display area are considered as decision variables to be determined by the proposed integrated model. In the model formulation, we include the inventory investment costs, which are proportional to the average inventory, and storage and display costs as components of the inventory costs and make a clear distinction between showroom and backroom inventories. We also consider the effect of the display area location on the item demand. The developed model is a mixed integer non-linear program that we solved using LINGO software. Numerical examples are used to illustrate the developed model.     

Patent-investment games under asymmetric information

This paper analyzes preemptive patenting in a two-stage real options game where an incumbent firm competes with a potential entrant firm for the patent of a substitute product in a product market with profit flow uncertainty. The incumbent suffers loss of monopoly in the product market if the entrant acquires the patent of a substitute product and later commercializes the product. Our patent-investment game model assumes that the entrant has complete information on the incumbent’s commercialization cost while the incumbent only knows the distribution of the entrant’s cost. We investigate the impact of information asymmetry on the preemption strategies adopted by the two competing firms on patenting the substitute product by comparing the optimal preemption strategies and the real option value functions of the two competing firms under complete information and information asymmetry. Our analysis reveals that the informationally disadvantaged incumbent always suffers from loss in its real option value of investment since it tends to act more aggressively in competing for the patent. On the other hand, the real option value of investment of the informationally advantaged entrant may be undermined or enhanced. The incumbent’s aggressive response under information asymmetry may lead to reversal of winner in the patent race. We also examine how information asymmetry may affect the occurrence of sleeping patent and the corresponding expected duration between the two stages of patenting and product commercialization.     

Cooperation and game-theoretic cost allocation in stochastic inventory models with continuous review

We study cooperation strategies for companies that continuously review their inventories and face Poisson demand. Our main goal is to analyze stable cost allocations of the joint costs. These are such that any group of companies has lower costs than the individual companies. If such allocations exist they provide an incentive for the companies to cooperate.     

A note on “quality improvement and setup reduction in the joint economic lot size model”

In a recent paper, Affisco et al. [J.F. Affisco, M.J. Paknejad, F. Nasri, Quality improvement and setup reduction in the joint economic lot size model, European Journal of Operations Research 142 (2002) 497–508] propose a quality-adjusted joint economic lot size model that considers investments in quality improvement and setup cost reduction. In particular, they consider a single-vendor, single-buyer, deterministic demand economic lot-sizing problem, and they investigate the potential impact of economic investments in the vendor’s quality improvement and setup cost reduction efforts on the system-wide costs. However, the particular form of the investment function that they use to represent the cost of investments in quality improvement does not represent actual practice in many industries. Hence, in this note, we develop modified models for quality improvement and simultaneous quality improvement and setup cost reduction using a modified form of the investment function. Our fundamental results and conclusions are substantially different than those in Affisco et al. (2002).     

Controlling for supplier switching in the presence of real options and asymmetric information

Applying a real option approach, this paper examines how asymmetric information alters key variables of a firm’s supplier switching process, such as the timing of contracting (hurried versus delayed contracting), transfer payments, set-up, switching, and abandonment decisions. In a symmetric information setting, delayed contracting is unambiguously beneficial. Abandoning the once established relation with the entrant supplier is never an issue. In contrast, under asymmetric information hurried contracting with potentially abandoning the relation can be beneficial. Consistent with adverse selection models, we find that under delayed contracting, in equilibrium, the firm switches less frequently to the entrant supplier (switching inertia). Surprisingly, we also find that under hurried contracting the firm switches more frequently to the entrant supplier (switching acceleration) and may abandon the relation. Finally, we study how these key variables of the supplier switching process change when also the incumbent supplier has private information (two-sided asymmetric information case).     

A mispricing model of stocks under asymmetric information

We extend the theory of asymmetric information in mispricing models for stocks following geometric Brownian motion to constant relative risk averse investors. Mispricing follows a continuous mean-reverting Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process. Optimal portfolios and maximum expected log-linear utilities from terminal wealth for informed and uninformed investors are derived. We obtain analogous but more general results which nests those of Guasoni (2006) as a special case of the relative risk aversion approaching one.     

An integrated inventory model under conditions of order processing cost reduction and permissible delay in payments

This article develops an integrated inventory model to determine the optimal policy under conditions of order processing cost reduction and permissible delay in payments. Both the vendor and the buyer participate in order processing cost reduction by applying information technologies. The order processing cost can be reduced by certain expenditures and will affect lot-size decisions. Simultaneously, the existence of the credit period serves to reduce the cost of holding stock to the buyer, because it reduces the amount of capital invested in stock for the duration of the credit period. The article derives the total cost function and shows that the function possesses some kinds of convexities. A solution procedure is provided to determine the optimal order policy. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the solution procedure.     

Costly information acquisition under horizontal competition

We analyze endogenous acquisition of costly information for two firms that sell homogeneous products. Prior to determining its production quantity, either firm has an opportunity to acquire a costly forecast. There exists a correlation between errors in the acquired forecasts. We model the problem as a two-stage game in which the firms first decide whether to acquire their respective forecasts and then decide their production quantities. We derive the equilibrium outcome on information acquisition and production quantity.     

Repeated newsvendor game with transshipments under dual allocations

We study a repeated newsvendor game with transshipments. In every period n retailers face a stochastic demand for an identical product and independently place their inventory orders before demand realization. After observing the actual demand, each retailer decides how much of her leftover inventory or unsatisfied demand she wants to share with the other retailers. Residual inventories are then transshipped in order to meet residual demands, and dual allocations are used to distribute residual profit. Unsold inventories are salvaged at the end of the period. While in a single-shot game retailers in an equilibrium withhold their residuals, we show that it is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for the retailers to share all of the residuals when the discount factor is large enough and the game is repeated infinitely many times. We also study asymptotic behavior of the retailers’ order quantities and discount factors when n is large. Finally, we provide conditions under which a system-optimal solution can be achieved in a game with n retailers, and develop a contract for achieving a system-optimal outcome when these conditions are not satisfied.     

Pricing in a supply chain for auction bidding under information asymmetry

We examine a supply chain in which a manufacturer participates in a sealed-bid lowest price procurement auction through a distributor. This form of supply chain is common when a manufacturer is active in an overseas market without establishing a local subsidiary. To gain a strategic advantage in the division of profit, the manufacturer and distributor may intentionally conceal information about the underlying cost distribution of the competition. In this environment of information asymmetry, we determine the equilibrium mark-up, the ex-ante expected mark-up and expected profit of the manufacturer and the equilibrium bid of the distributor. In unilateral communication, we demonstrate the informed agent’s advantage resulting to higher mark-up. Under information sharing, we show that profit is equally shared among the supply chain partners and we explicitly derive the mark-up when the underlying cost distribution is uniform in [0, 1]. The model and findings are illustrated by a numerical example.     

不确定环境下的投标方报价模型研究

在传统投标报价模型的基础上引入风险因子,提出报价要在收益与风险之间进行权衡.放宽了所有投标方的最高成本与最低成本是相同的这一前提假设,并借助Mathematica 5.0推导出投标方的报价模型.最后利用仿真对上述关系进行了分析.     

延期支付条件下零售商的最优售价和订货策略

在供应商给予零售商延期支付和现金折扣的优惠政策下,进一步假设产品的年需求量依赖于零售商产品售价的基础上,建立了由一个零售商和一个供应商所构成的库存决策模型,扩展了经典的经济生产批量(EPQ)模型。通过模型的分析求解,可以得出零售商在上述情况下的最优订货周期、最优售价及最优付款时间的简单判定方法。最后,通过算例,验证了模型的可行性,得出了与实际相符的结论。     

On the joint distribution of surplus before and after ruin under a Markovian regime switching model

We consider a Markovian regime switching insurance risk model (also called Markov-modulated risk model). The closed form solutions for the joint distribution of surplus before and after ruin when the initial surplus is zero or when the claim size distributions are phase-type distributed are obtained.