基于需求和生产成本偏差的Cournot竞争供应链协调

分析一个供应商和两个Cournot竞争零售商组成的供应链系统的协调问题.首先证明收益共享合约在稳定条件下能实现该供应链协调;当突发事件导致零售商面临的需求规模和供应商的生产成本同时与其预测值发生偏差时,为使供应链收益最大,提出了调整生产计划和零售价格的协调策略,进一步证明了改进的收益共享合约可协调需求和成本偏差的分权供应链;最后进行了数值实验.     

风险时收益共享-贸易信贷契约下多个竞争零售商的供应链协调

在供应商向多个零售商提供贸易信贷的环境下,本文考虑了零售商存在违约风险和他们之间存在竞争时的供应链协调问题。研究表明,在比例分配市场需求下,多个竞争的零售商之间存在唯一的纳什均衡订购量,以及零售商违约风险的提高和他们之间竞争增强都会增加均衡订购量。当零售商之间的竞争较弱时,贸易信贷将无法协调供应链。为此,本文使用了收益分享与贸易信贷相结合的机制以协调供应链,且分析了零售商的违约风险和他们之间的竞争对协调契约参数的影响。当零售商的竞争强度一定时,批发价和风险溢价都随着零售商违约风险的提高而增大,而收益分享比例随着违约风险的提高而减小;当零售商的违约风险一定时,批发价和风险溢价都随着零售商之间竞争强度的提高而增大,而收益分享比例随着竞争强度的增强而减小。进一步的研究发现,零售商的违约风险越高以及他们之间竞争越激烈对零售商越不利,而对供应商越有利。最后,结合数值实验验证了收益共享-贸易信贷契约的有效性。     

基于微分对策的绿色供应链生态研发策略与协调机制

综合考虑产品绿色度和价格对市场需求的多重影响,构建微分博弈模型,运用最优控制理论,先后考察并比较批发价契约、收益共享契约和集中式决策三种情形下绿色供应链最优生态研发努力和定价策略,进一步采用Rubinstein讨价还价模型设计合理的利润分配契约。研究发现:收益共享契约无法促使绿色供应链实现协调,但在一定条件下,能够有效消除批发价契约的“双重边际效应”;集中式决策下,合理的利润分配契约能够保证供应链成员分得的利润“帕累托最优”,实现供应链协调,且该契约与收益共享比例有关。     

需求预测更新条件下两阶段电子商务供应链契约协调

研究了一类在贝叶斯需求预测更新情形下,生命周期中采用B2C与C2B两阶段进行产品销售的供应链模型,研究发现无法使用单一契约来协调供应链。在此基础上,设计了具有供应商价格折扣契约与零售商承诺订购契约的两阶段供应链契约协调机制,证明了两阶段协调机制能够实现供应链的帕累托改进。算例分析表明了两阶段契约协调机制的有效性,并发现能够实现供应链完美协调的契约参数不一定在帕累托集合内,供应链不一定能够达到完美协调;且由于零售商与供应商的最优契约参数不同,需要通过零售商与供应商之间的谈判达到纳什均衡。     

Coordination of supply chains by option contracts: A cooperative game theory approach

Manufacturer–retailer supply chains commonly adopt a wholesale price mechanism. This mechanism, however, has often led manufacturers and retailers to situations of conflicts of interest. For example, due to uncertain market demand, retailers prefer to order flexibly from manufacturers so as to avoid incurring inventory costs and to be able to respond flexibly to market changes. Manufacturers, on the other hand, prefer retailers to place full orders as early as possible so that they can hedge against the risks of over- and under-production. Such conflicts between retailers and manufacturers can result in an inefficient supply chain. Motivated by this problem, we take a cooperative game approach in this paper to consider the coordination issue in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain using option contracts. Using the wholesale price mechanism as a benchmark, we develop an option contract model. Our study demonstrates that, compared with the benchmark based on the wholesale price mechanism, option contracts can coordinate the supply chain and achieve Pareto-improvement. We also discuss scenarios in which option contracts are selected according to individual supply chain members’ risk preferences and negotiating powers.     

服务关系对供应链信息分享和信任决策的影响研究

由于信息不对称,供应商和制造商之间的信息分享和信任决策是供应链协调的关键。为了获得充足供给,制造商分享其私有需求信息,但同时存在欺骗动机;鉴于制造商的信息分享,供应商进行信任决策和产能投资。本文通过构建服务价值模型,分析了供应商与制造商之间的服务关系对信息分享和信任决策的影响。研究结果表明如果供应商的服务价值足够高,制造商会选择真实分享信息,此时供应商可以充分信任制造商的信息;如果服务价值低,制造商会采取放大需求信息的欺骗行为,此时供应商应怀疑制造商所分享信息的真实性。     

随机需求下考虑零售商竞争的闭环供应链定价与协调

在随机需求环境下考虑两零售商间存在竞争的闭环供应链定价与协调问题, 其中两个零售商各自面临不同的随机市场需求,并且各自的回收量都受到对方回收价格的影响。在集中决策和分散决策两种情形下分析了制造商和两零售商的定价决策问题,并运用收入费用共享契约实现了闭环供应链的协调。     

基于模糊加值信息的供应链协调均衡研究

研究由一个供应商和两个零售商组成的供应链共享信息均衡问题。两个零售商具有不同的私有成本信息。当零售商不公开此成本信息时,其他的零售商和供应商只能推断出该信息的模糊分布。不同市场需求参数下,使零售商和供应商均达到最大利润的局势也有所不同。为了使供应链上的供应商和零售商达到双赢,分析了各同均衡策略存在的前提条件。     

The impact of forecasting model selection on the value of information sharing in a supply chain

This paper presents a study on the impact of forecasting model selection on the value of information sharing in a supply chain with one capacitated supplier and multiple retailers. Using a computer simulation model, this study examines demand forecasting and inventory replenishment decisions by the retailers, and production decisions by the supplier under different demand patterns and capacity tightness. Analyses of the simulation output indicate that the selection of the forecasting model significantly influences the performance of the supply chain and the value of information sharing. Furthermore, demand patterns faced by retailers and capacity tightness faced by the supplier also significantly influence the value of information sharing. The result also shows that substantial cost savings can be realized through information sharing and thus help to motivate trading partners to share information in the supply chain. The findings can also help supply chain managers select suitable forecasting models to improve supply chain performance.     

需求依赖于货架展示量的单供应商两零售商模型与协调合同设计

针对一个供应商和两个竞争的零售商组成的单产品供应链,研究零售商的货架展示量和订货决策及供应链协调问题.假定产品总需求随机依赖于两个零售商的总货架展示量,给出了每个零售商的产品需求,然后分别建立了供应链的集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,提出了协调供应链的回购加线性补贴合同和回购加货架补贴加转移支付合同,最后的算例表明了决策模型和协调合同的有效性.     

价格和服务双因素影响的供应链协调决策模型研究

以单个制造商和存在竞争的两个零售商组成的供应链结构模型为研究对象,建立价格和服务两个重要因素影响的市场需求函数,研究供应链协调决策模型。以销售价格、服务质量和制造商批发价格作为三个决策变量,分析集中决策和分散决策两种情景的最优策略,研究收益共享、服务成本分担、收益共享成本分担等三种不同契约的供应链协调问题,并使用数值仿真方法,分析了相关参数变化对系统协调的影响。仿真结果表明:收益共享契约和成本分担契约需满足一定条件才能达到供应链协调,但其效果不一定实现帕累托最优;收益共享和成本分担契约可实现供应链协调,但收入共享系数需在合理区间取值;改进的收益共享成本分担契约能够避免共享系数的盲区,更加有效地达到供应链协调,保持供应链良好运行。     

存货质押融资模式下的供应链协调

针对供应商、零售商和银行组成的供应链金融系统,研究了存货质押融资模式下的供应链协调。零售商作为中小企业,资金有限,需要向银行申请贷款,然而零售商信用较低难以获得融资。供应商作为供应链的核心企业,采用含有回购价格和回购比例的回购契约为零售商提供担保,使得零售商融资得以实现。分析了不确定需求下供应链金融系统,供应链以及零售商的最优决策,给出了融资情况下供应链协调的条件,指出了在供应链协调情况下批发价格和回购策略对供应链收益分配的影响,说明了回购的作用:一方面使零售商易于获得银行融资,另一方面使供应链协调得以实现,指出了质押率、贷款利率和零售商自有资金等参数对最优决策的影响。数值算例验证了理论分析结果。     

零售商风险规避条件下基于期权契约的生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

民以食为天,随着生活水平的不断提高,生鲜农产品在消费结构中的重要性越来越突出,本文将期权思想引入生鲜农产品供应链运作当中,针对由一个零售商和一个供应商组成的二级生鲜农产品供应链,结合生鲜农产品的自然属性,考虑在途损耗对产品数量的影响以及保鲜投入对产品新鲜度的影响,运用CVaR模型研究了零售商的风险规避程度对供应链决策的影响以及期权契约协调机制。研究表明,期权机制可实现风险在供需双方之间共担,可解决随机需求下生鲜农产品供应链的协调问题并合理分配整体利润;仅当零售商的风险规避程度较低时系统协调和帕累托改进才能同时达成。     

考虑零售商竞争的供应链契约选择模型

传统的面向竞争性供应链协调的契约设计的高复杂度使得契约学习的成本大大提高,难以在现实中得到普遍应用。研究了由一个供应商和两个竞争性零售商构成的供应链的协调问题。分析了竞争性零售商对简单契约的选择问题,设计了一种不同于以往单一契约模式的契约选择模型,为订货能力不同的零售商提供可供选择的数量折扣契约和批发价格契约。实现了供应链的最优协调,使分散式决策的供应链的利润达到了集中决策的水平。最后通过具体算例验证了结论。     

公平偏好下考虑供应商质量投入的供应链契约协调

针对传统的基于数量参考标准的奖励惩罚契约无法适应当下“多品种,小批量”的需求特点实现供应链协调,本文建立公平偏好情况下,以供应商提供产品的质量水平为参考标准的奖励惩罚契约模型,探讨其对供应链协调的影响。假设在由单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链系统中零售商具有公平偏好,分别就供应链内各参与主体渠道力量相等和渠道力量不相等这两种情形进行分析。研究发现零售商对自身收益和对公平的关注程度相同时,供应商和零售商会自愿的按照契约进行合作,取得均衡结果,实现供应链协调,且各参与主体渠道力量的不同会对供应链的整体利润产生显著影响。最后使用算例验证了结论。     

模糊连续需求下供应链收益共享契约机制研究

研究一个由供应商和零售商组成的两级供应链系统在模糊连续需求环境下的运作过程。将市场需求视为三角模糊数,利用模糊截集理论分析模糊连续需求下的分散决策和集中决策过程,并给出收益共享契约机制下的决策模型。研究结果表明：在模糊连续需求环境下,零售商的订购量存在唯一最优解;供应链系统的“双重边际化”效应同样存在;收益共享契约机制可以实现供应链中成员问的协调。最后,通过数值例子对模型进行了比较分析。     

A fuzzy newsvendor approach to supply chain coordination

In the absence of a clear command and control structure, a key challenge in supply chain management is the coordination and alignment of supply chain members who pursue divergent and often conflicting goals. The newsvendor model is typically used as a framework to quantify the cost of misalignment and to assess the impact of various coordination initiatives. The application of the newsvendor framework, however, requires the specification of some probability distribution for the sources of uncertainty, and in particular, for the market demand. The specification of an adequate demand distribution becomes difficult in the absence of statistical data. We therefore consider a fuzzy approach to the newsvendor problem. We use several fuzzy parameters in the model for the demand, the wholesale price, and the market sales price. We solve the fuzzy newsvendor problem to study three coordination policies: quantity discounts, profit sharing, and buyback. For each coordination policy, the optimal order quantity of the retailer is computed. The possible profits of the members in the supply chain are calculated with minimum sharing of private information. We further extend the fuzzy newsvendor model to a setting with a single manufacturer and multiple retailers under the assumption of ample capacity for the manufacturer. Detailed numerical examples are also provided.     

模糊需求下的供应链收益共享契约模型

在模糊需求环境下,研究由单一供应商和零售商组成的两级供应链系统的协调机制问题。将市场需求视为模糊变量,建立不确定理论下,基于可信性分布的集成供应链模型和收益共享契约模型,并给出了模型中的最优策略。最后,以三角形模糊变量为例,通过数值算例对模型中的参数进行了求解,并分析批发价格和收益系数对其他参数的影响。研究结果表明,零售商的最优订购量在模糊需求中心点的左、右浮动,并随着零售价格的提高而增加;不同的收益系数对应不同的批发价格策略;通过改变收益系数可以实现供应链成员之间的完美协调。     

Single-supplier/multiple-buyer supply chain coordination: Incorporating buyers’ expectations under vertical information sharing

We address the coordination problem in a single-supplier/multiple-buyer supply chain. The supplier wishes to coordinate the supply chain by offering quantity discounts. To obtain their complete cost information, the supplier exchanges his own cost parameters with buyers leading to vertical information sharing. The supplier thinks that the buyers, as they have access to supplier’s setup and holding cost information, may demand a portion of the anticipated coordination savings based on the partial information they hold about the cost structure of the entire supply chain. We model each buyer’s expectations based on her limited view of the entire supply chain which consists of herself and the supplier only. These expectations are then incorporated into the modeling of the supply chain, which results in a generalization of the traditional Stackelberg type models. We discuss alternative efficiency sharing mechanisms, and propose methods to design the associated discount schemes that take buyers’ expectations into account. In designing the discount schemes, we consider both price discriminatory and non-price discriminatory approaches. The study adds to the existing body of work by incorporating buyers’ expectations into a constrained Stackelberg structure, and by achieving coordination without forcing buyers to explicitly comply with the supplier’s replenishment period in choosing their order quantities. The numerical analysis of the coordination efficiency and allocation of the net savings of the proposed discount schemes shows that the supplier is still able to coordinate the supply chain with high efficiency levels, and retain a significant portion of the net savings.     

Random yield supply chain with a yield dependent secondary market

This paper considers a simple supply chain with one supplier and one retailer where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield and the retailer faces uncertain demand. There exists a secondary market for acquiring or disposing products by the supplier. We study both the centralized and decentralized systems. In the decentralized system, a no risk sharing contract and a risk sharing minimum commitment contract are analyzed. The supply chain with the risk sharing contract is further analyzed with a constant secondary market price and a yield dependent secondary market price. We present both the supplier’s and the retailer’s optimal strategies and provide insights for managers when making decisions under random yield risk and demand uncertainty. We find that the secondary market generally has a positive impact on supply chain performance and the actual effect of random yield risk on the supply chain performance depends on cost parameters and supply chain contract settings. Under certain conditions, reducing yield randomness may weaken the double marginalization effect and improve the chain performance. From the numerical study, we also show that there exists an optimal commitment level for the supply chain.