Contracting with asymmetric demand information in supply chains

We solve a buyback contract design problem for a supplier who is working with a retailer who possesses private information about the demand distribution. We model the retailer’s private information as a space of either discrete or continuous demand states so that only the retailer knows its demand state and the demand for the product is stochastically increasing in the state. We focus on contracts that are viable in practice, where the buyback price being strictly less than the wholesale price, which is itself strictly less than the retail price. We derive the optimal (for the supplier) buyback contract that allows for arbitrary allocation of profits to the retailer (subject to the retailer’s reservation profit requirements) and show that in the limit this contract leads to the first-best solution with the supplier keeping the entire channel’s profit (after the retailer’s reservation profit).     

A distributed coordination mechanism for supply networks with asymmetric information

The paper analyses the problem of coordination in supply networks of multiple retailers and a single supplier, where partners have asymmetric, private information of demand and costs. After stating generic requirements like distributedness, truthfulness, efficiency and budget balance, we use the apparatus of mechanism design to devise a coordination mechanism that guarantees the above properties in the network. The resulting protocol is a novel realisation of the widely used Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) where the responsibility of planning is at the supplier. We prove that together with the required generic properties a fair sharing of risks and benefits cannot be guaranteed. We illustrate the general mechanism with a detailed discussion of a specialised version, assuming that inventory planning is done according to the newsvendor model, and explore the operation of this protocol through computational experiments.     

Designing contracts for a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry

This paper studies the problem of designing contracts in a closed-loop supply chain when the cost of collection effort is the retailer’s private information. We investigate four cases: two contracts (a two-part nonlinear contract and a collection effort requirement contract), each under complete information and asymmetric information. We derive the manufacturer’s optimal contracts for all four cases and analyze the impact of information on the equilibrium results of supply chain members.     

Supply chain coordination with controllable lead time and asymmetric information

This paper considers coordinated decisions in a decentralized supply chain consisting of a vendor and a buyer with controllable lead time. We analyze two supply chain inventory models. In the first model we assume the vendor has complete information about the buyer’s cost structure. By taking both the vendor and the buyer’s individual rationalities into consideration, a side payment coordination mechanism is designed to realize supply chain Pareto dominance. In the second model we consider a setting where the buyer possesses private cost information. We design the coordination mechanism by using principal-agent model to induce the buyer to report his true cost structure. The solution procedures are also developed to get the optimal solutions of these two models. The results of numerical examples show that shortening lead time to certain extent can reduce inventory cost and the coordination mechanisms designed for both symmetric and asymmetric information situations are effective.     

Single-vendor multi-buyer inventory coordination under private information

This paper considers the problem of coordinating a single-vendor multi-buyer inventory system when there are privacy restrictions in the information required to solve the problem. The objective function and cost parameters of each facility are regarded as private information that no other facilities in the system have access to. Moreover, each facility is responsible to specify its own replenishment policy. The objective is to minimize the total average setup/ordering and inventory-related cost. Solution methodologies under private and global information are developed to find two types of nested power-of-two stationary policies. The first policy assumes all the buyers must replenish simultaneously. The second policy is a more general case where the common replenishment assumption is relaxed. A simple form of information exchange is uncovered that allows the solution methodologies for private and global information yield the same results. The experimental results suggest that the performance of the proposed heuristics is comparable or better than an existing method.     

Patent-investment games under asymmetric information

This paper analyzes preemptive patenting in a two-stage real options game where an incumbent firm competes with a potential entrant firm for the patent of a substitute product in a product market with profit flow uncertainty. The incumbent suffers loss of monopoly in the product market if the entrant acquires the patent of a substitute product and later commercializes the product. Our patent-investment game model assumes that the entrant has complete information on the incumbent’s commercialization cost while the incumbent only knows the distribution of the entrant’s cost. We investigate the impact of information asymmetry on the preemption strategies adopted by the two competing firms on patenting the substitute product by comparing the optimal preemption strategies and the real option value functions of the two competing firms under complete information and information asymmetry. Our analysis reveals that the informationally disadvantaged incumbent always suffers from loss in its real option value of investment since it tends to act more aggressively in competing for the patent. On the other hand, the real option value of investment of the informationally advantaged entrant may be undermined or enhanced. The incumbent’s aggressive response under information asymmetry may lead to reversal of winner in the patent race. We also examine how information asymmetry may affect the occurrence of sleeping patent and the corresponding expected duration between the two stages of patenting and product commercialization.     

Option and forward contracting with asymmetric information: Valuation issues in supply chains

We investigate the role of forward commitments and option contracts between a seller (supplier) and a buyer (retailer) in the presence of asymmetric information. In our case, both parties face price and demand uncertainty but the retailer, being closer to the market, has additional information about the true demand and price. The supplier, aware of this asymmetry, and acting as a Stackelberg leader, designs a contracting arrangement that best meet his interest. We contrast the role of forward and option contracts in this environment and identify cases where combinations of the two are dominant. Finally, we investigate how alternative contracting arrangements alter the expected value of obtaining information that eliminates asymmetric information.     

A framework for the value of information in inventory replenishment

Technological advances and changes in supply chain management practices have combined to draw attention to the value of information sharing in inventory replenishment. Academic research has produced seemingly conflicting results due to differences in the type of information that is shared, the supply chain structure, and the selection and parameterization of performance goals. This research provides a framework to help explain apparent differences in the extant literature. Our purpose is to understand what determines the value of information. With this specific view, we establish a set of research questions and suggest directions for future research.     

Preemptive patenting under uncertainty and asymmetric information

This paper examines the investment behaviour of an incumbent and a potential entrant that are competing for a patent with a stochastic payoff. We incorporate asymmetric information into the model by assuming that the challenger has complete information about the incumbent whereas the latter does not know the precise value of its opponent’s investment cost. We find that even a small probability of being preempted gives the informationally-disadvantaged firm an incentive to invest at the breakeven point where it is indifferent between investing and being preempted. By investing inefficiently early to protect its market share, the incumbent gives up not only its option to delay the investment, but also reduces the value of the firm by an amount that increases with the investment cost incurred and the potential loss of market share.     

‘Too Little’ or ‘Too Late’: The timing of supply chain demand collaboration

This study examines the supply chain demand collaboration between a manufacturer and a retailer. We study how the timing of collaboration facilitates production decision of the manufacturer when the information exchanged in the collaboration is asymmetric. We investigate two collaboration mechanisms: ‘Too Little’ and ‘Too Late’, depending on the timing of information sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Our research results indicate that early collaboration as in the ‘Too Little’ mechanism leads to a stable production schedule, which decreases the need of production adjustment when production cost information becomes available; whereas a late collaboration as in the ‘Too Late’ mechanism enhances the flexibility of production adjustment when demand information warrants it. In addition, the asymmetric demand information confounds production decisions all the time; the manufacturer has to provide proper incentives to ensure truthful information sharing in collaboration. Information asymmetry might also reduce the difference in production decision between the ‘Too Little’ and ‘Too Late’ collaboration mechanisms. Numerical analysis is further conducted to demonstrate the performance implications of the collaboration mechanisms on the supply chain.     

Transshipment incentive contracts in a multi-level supply chain

Transshipments within a supply chain can be difficult to implement as the costs and benefits are often incurred by different parties. This difficulty becomes even more problematic when the costs and benefits are not completely known by all parties. The primary purpose of this paper is to introduce the role of asymmetric information into the design of supply chain transshipment contracts. Using a representative supply chain from within the soft drink industry as an example, a multi-level contracting framework is developed that aligns incentives to encourage transshipments and improve performance in the absence of all parties having full information. Analysis of the proposed framework suggests that, even if a transshipment is likely to be unprofitable to the transshipping dyad, it may still be best for the entire supply chain. Moreover, overall supply chain inventories with transshipments do not necessarily increase relative to the no-transshipment case.     

A jump model for fads in asset prices under asymmetric information

This paper addresses how asymmetric information, fads and Lévy jumps in the price of an asset affect the optimal portfolio strategies and maximum expected utilities of two distinct classes of rational investors in a financial market. We obtain the investors’ optimal portfolios and maximum expected logarithmic utilities and show that the optimal portfolio of each investor is more or less than its Merton optimal. Our approximation results suggest that jumps reduce the excess asymptotic utility of the informed investor relative to that of uninformed investor, and hence jump risk could be helpful for market efficiency as an indirect reducer of information asymmetry. Our study also suggests that investors should pay more attention to the overall variance of the asset pricing process when jumps exist in fads models. Moreover, if there are very little or too much fads, then the informed investor has no utility advantage in the long run.     

Scalable methodology for supply chain inventory coordination with private information

This paper considers the problems of coordinating serial and assembly inventory systems with private information where end-item demands are known over a finite horizon. In a private information environment, the objective function and cost parameters of each facility are regarded as private information that no other facilities in the system have access to. The solution approach decomposes the problem into separable subproblems such that the private information is partitioned as required. Global optimality is sought with an iterative procedure in which the subproblems negotiate the level of material flows between facilities. At the core of the solution procedure is a supplier–buyer link model that can be used as a building block to form other supply chain configurations. Experimental results show that the proposed methodology provides promising results when compared to competing methodologies that disregard information privacy.     

Single-supplier/multiple-buyer supply chain coordination: Incorporating buyers’ expectations under vertical information sharing

We address the coordination problem in a single-supplier/multiple-buyer supply chain. The supplier wishes to coordinate the supply chain by offering quantity discounts. To obtain their complete cost information, the supplier exchanges his own cost parameters with buyers leading to vertical information sharing. The supplier thinks that the buyers, as they have access to supplier’s setup and holding cost information, may demand a portion of the anticipated coordination savings based on the partial information they hold about the cost structure of the entire supply chain. We model each buyer’s expectations based on her limited view of the entire supply chain which consists of herself and the supplier only. These expectations are then incorporated into the modeling of the supply chain, which results in a generalization of the traditional Stackelberg type models. We discuss alternative efficiency sharing mechanisms, and propose methods to design the associated discount schemes that take buyers’ expectations into account. In designing the discount schemes, we consider both price discriminatory and non-price discriminatory approaches. The study adds to the existing body of work by incorporating buyers’ expectations into a constrained Stackelberg structure, and by achieving coordination without forcing buyers to explicitly comply with the supplier’s replenishment period in choosing their order quantities. The numerical analysis of the coordination efficiency and allocation of the net savings of the proposed discount schemes shows that the supplier is still able to coordinate the supply chain with high efficiency levels, and retain a significant portion of the net savings.     

Quick response policy with Bayesian information updates

In this paper we investigate the quick response (QR) policy with different Bayesian models. Under QR policy, a retailer can collect market information from the sales of a pre-seasonal product whose demand is closely related to a seasonal product’s demand. This information is then used to update the distribution for the seasonal product’s demand by a Bayesian approach. We study two information update models: one with the revision of an unknown mean, and the other with the revision of both an unknown mean and an unknown variance. The impacts of the information updates under both models are compared and discussed. We also identify the features of the pre-seasonal product which can bring more significant profit improvement. We conclude that an effective QR policy depends on a precise information update model as well as a selection of an appropriate pre-seasonal product as the observation target.     

Controlling for supplier switching in the presence of real options and asymmetric information

Applying a real option approach, this paper examines how asymmetric information alters key variables of a firm’s supplier switching process, such as the timing of contracting (hurried versus delayed contracting), transfer payments, set-up, switching, and abandonment decisions. In a symmetric information setting, delayed contracting is unambiguously beneficial. Abandoning the once established relation with the entrant supplier is never an issue. In contrast, under asymmetric information hurried contracting with potentially abandoning the relation can be beneficial. Consistent with adverse selection models, we find that under delayed contracting, in equilibrium, the firm switches less frequently to the entrant supplier (switching inertia). Surprisingly, we also find that under hurried contracting the firm switches more frequently to the entrant supplier (switching acceleration) and may abandon the relation. Finally, we study how these key variables of the supplier switching process change when also the incumbent supplier has private information (two-sided asymmetric information case).     

Contingency management under asymmetric information

We model a monopolist supplier whose supply to multiple buyers is disrupted. The supplier can take costly, speed-dependent actions, to restore supply. Buyers experience private backorder costs that are unknown to the supplier. We analyze the supplier's optimal contract structure and explore the impact of an alternate supplier.     

Coordinating order quantity decisions in the supply chain contract under random demand

In this paper, we are concerned with the coordinating quantity decision problem in a supply chain contract. The supply chain contract is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer to meet the random demand of a single product with a short lifecycle. Our analysis show that the retailer expects to obtain higher profit under proper ordering policies, which can also maximize the expected profit of the supply chain. The manufacturer may induce the retailer to order the coordinated quantity by adjusting the unit return price. As a result, the supply chain is expected to achieve the optimal expected profit.     

The coordinating contracts for a fuzzy supply chain with effort and price dependent demand

This paper investigates the coordination of a two-echelon supply chain with fuzzy demand that is dependent on both retail price and sales effort. In contrast with the centralized and decentralized decision models, two coordinating models based on symmetric information and asymmetric information about retailer’s scale parameter are developed by game theory, and the corresponding analytical solutions are obtained. Theoretical analysis and numerical examples yield the maximal supply chain profits in two coordination situations are equal to that in the centralized situation and greater than that in the decentralized situation. Furthermore, under asymmetric information contract, the maximal expected profit obtained by the low-scale-level retailer is higher than that under symmetric information contract.     

Supplier quality improvement: The value of information under uncertainty

We consider supplier development decisions for prime manufacturers with extensive supply bases producing complex, highly engineered products. We propose a novel modelling approach to support supply chain managers decide the optimal level of investment to improve quality performance under uncertainty. We develop a Poisson–Gamma model within a Bayesian framework, representing both the epistemic and aleatory uncertainties in non-conformance rates. Estimates are obtained to value a supplier quality improvement activity and assess if it is worth gaining more information to reduce epistemic uncertainty. The theoretical properties of our model provide new insights about the relationship between the degree of epistemic uncertainty, the effectiveness of development programmes, and the levels of investment. We find that the optimal level of investment does not have a monotonic relationship with the rate of effectiveness. If investment is deferred until epistemic uncertainty is removed then the expected optimal investment monotonically decreases as prior variance increases but only if the prior mean is above a critical threshold. We develop methods to facilitate practical application of the model to industrial decisions by a) enabling use of the model with typical data available to major companies and b) developing computationally efficient approximations that can be implemented easily. Application to a real industry context illustrates the use of the model to support practical planning decisions to learn more about supplier quality and to invest in improving supplier capability.