Sequencing games

Sequencing situations with linear cost functions are considered. A division rule for the cost savings is introduced and characterized axiomatically. Cooperative game theory is applied to analyse these situations and expressions for division rules induced by solution concepts from cooperative game theory are derived.     

Cost allocation in the establishment of a collaborative transportation agreement—an application in the furniture industry

Transportation is an important part of the Canadian furniture industry supply chain. Even though there are often several manufacturers shipping in the same market region, coordination between two or more manufacturers is rare. Recently, important potential cost savings and delivery time reduction have been identified through transportation collaboration. In this paper we propose and test on a case study involving four furniture companies, a logistics scenario that allows transportation collaboration. Moreover, we address the key issue of cost savings sharing, especially when heterogeneous requirements by each collaborating company impact the cost-savings. To do so, we propose a new cost allocation method that is validated through a case study. Sensibility analysis and details about the actual outcome of the case study complete the discussion.     

Analysis of collaborative savings and cost allocation techniques for the cooperative carrier facility location problem

Transport companies may cooperate to increase their efficiency levels by, for example, the exchange of orders or vehicle capacity. In this paper a new approach to horizontal carrier collaboration is presented: the sharing of distribution centres (DCs) with partnering organisations. This problem can be classified as a cooperative facility location problem and formulated as an innovative mixed integer linear programme. To ensure cooperation sustainability, collaborative costs need to be allocated fairly to the different participants. To analyse the benefits of cooperative facility location and the effects of different cost allocation techniques, numerical experiments based on experimental design are carried out on a UK case study. Sharing DCs may lead to significant cost savings up to 21.6%. In contrast to the case of sharing orders or vehicles, there are diseconomies of scale in terms of the number of partners and more collaborative benefit can be expected when partners are unequal in size. Moreover, results indicate that horizontal collaboration at the level of DCs works well with a limited number of partners and can be based on intuitively appealing cost sharing techniques, which may reduce alliance complexity and enforce the strength of mutual partner relationships.     

Cooperation in assembly systems: The role of knowledge sharing networks

Process improvement plays a significant role in reducing production costs over the life cycle of a product. We consider the role of process improvement in a decentralized assembly system in which a buyer purchases components from several first-tier suppliers. These components are assembled into a finished product, which is sold to the downstream market. The assembler faces a deterministic demand/production rate and the suppliers incur variable inventory costs and fixed setup production costs. In the first stage of the game, which is modeled as a non-cooperative game among suppliers, suppliers make investments in process improvement activities to reduce the fixed production costs. Upon establishing a relationship with the suppliers, the assembler establishes a knowledge sharing network – this network is implemented as a series of meetings among suppliers and also mutual visits to their factories. These meetings facilitate the exchange of best practices among suppliers with the expectation that suppliers will achieve reductions in their production costs from the experiences learned through knowledge sharing. We model this knowledge exchange as a cooperative game among suppliers in which, as a result of cooperation, all suppliers achieve reductions in their fixed costs. In the non-cooperative game, the suppliers anticipate the cost allocation that results from the cooperative game in the second stage by incorporating the effect of knowledge sharing in their cost functions. Based on this model, we investigate the benefits and challenges associated with establishing a knowledge sharing network. We identify and compare various cost allocation mechanisms that are feasible in the cooperative game and show that the system optimal investment levels can be achieved only when the most efficient supplier receives the incremental benefits of the cost reduction achieved by other suppliers due to the knowledge transfer.     

Profit maximizing coalitions with shared capacities in distribution networks

We study the distribution network structure of multiple firms in the context of demand sensitivity to market offers. The problem consists in determining the profitability of horizontal collaboration between firms in a collaborative distribution schema. It considers the case of a set of regional distribution centers (DCs) where each DC is initially dedicated solely to one firm’s distribution activities and studies when it is beneficial that the DC owners collaborate through sharing their storage-throughput capacity. Such strategic decisions are made in order to improve the distribution capabilities of firms in terms of response time and cost-efficiency compared to the stand-alone situation. The problem is modeled as a coalition formation game in a cooperative framework, and we propose a collaborative distribution game with profit maximization. Three sharing mechanisms are modeled and tested: egalitarian allocation, proportional allocation, and Shapley value. The collaboration decision conditions for a given firm are analytically derived according to the sharing method considered and used to enhance the solution approach. Our numerical results clearly highlight the impact of this innovative collaboration opportunity on the firms’ performance in terms of distribution cost savings and revenue increases. An observed behavior is that the formation of several sub-coalitions prevails over the formation of a grand coalition, and that different cost sharing methods can lead to different sub-coalitions. We also provide managerial insights on the appropriate size of a coalition in various business instances tested, and on the key drivers that foster horizontal collaborative behavior among firms.     

智能家居创意空间系统知识协同行为的博弈分析

为明确智能家居创意空间系统知识协同行为实质,在研究其知识协同网络构成的基础上,考虑不同主体间协同行为的无限次重复博弈,构建知识协同行为的一般博弈模型,并利用演化博弈理论分别建立对称与非对称合作博弈模型,对系统中知识协同行为的演化过程进一步分析。研究表明,该系统运营知识资源的能力、激励强度以及协同主体知识协同运作获得的附加利益、合作次数是影响知识协同行为的关键因素;知识协同带来的纯收益与付出的初始成本是影响知识协同行为演化的重要参数。     

A value for multichoice games

A multichoice game is a generalization of a cooperative TU game in which each player has several activity levels. We study the solution for these games proposed by Van Den Nouweland et al. (1995) [Van Den Nouweland, A., Potters, J., Tijs, S., Zarzuelo, J.M., 1995. Cores and related solution concepts for multi-choice games. ZOR-Mathematical Methods of Operations Research 41, 289–311]. We show that this solution applied to the discrete cost sharing model coincides with the Aumann-Shapley method proposed by Moulin (1995) [Moulin, H., 1995. On additive methods to share joint costs. The Japanese Economic Review 46, 303–332]. Also, we show that the Aumann-Shapley value for continuum games can be obtained as the limit of multichoice values for admissible convergence sequences of multichoice games. Finally, we characterize this solution by using the axioms of balanced contributions and efficiency.     

Cost allocation in collaborative forest transportation

Transportation planning is an important part of the supply chain or wood flow chain in forestry. There are often several forest companies operating in the same region and collaboration between two or more companies is rare. However, there is an increasing interest in collaborative planning as the potential savings are large, often in the range 5–15%. There are several issues to agree on before such collaborative planning can be used in practice. A key question is how the total cost or savings should be distributed among the participants. In this paper, we study a large application in southern Sweden with eight forest companies involved in a collaboration. We investigate a number of sharing mechanisms based on economic models including Shapley value, the nucleolus, separable and non-separable costs, shadow prices and volume weights. We also propose a new allocation method, with the aim that the participants relative profits are as equal as possible. We use two planning models, the first is based on direct flows between supply and demand points and the second includes backhauling. We also study how several time periods and geographical distribution of the supply and demand nodes affect the solutions. Better planning within each company can save about 5% and collaboration can increase this about another 9% to a total of 14%. The proposed allocation method is shown to be a practical approach to share the overall cost/savings.     

Cost Comparisons for Out-of-Phase Inventory Models

Inventory costs for a fixed time period have traditionally been determined by allocating total costs per cycle uniformly throughout that cycle as well as any partial cycles. This procedure for cost allocation has led to the solution of numerous inventory problems, most notable of which is the anticipated price-increase model. When comparing two out-of-phase inventory models, if costs are accounted for when they occur over a fixed planning horizon, inventory policies should be changed to reflect the impact of this different cost-allocation procedure. For the anticipated price-increase model, the ‘optimal’ order quantity as well as the implied savings in inventory costs will be different when cost models are developed based on these different cost-allocation methods. If the objective is to maximize over a fixed planning horizon the actual savings in inventory costs as they occur, the cost models presented here should be used.     

Optimal risk-sharing across a network of insurance companies

Risk transfer is a key risk and capital management tool for insurance companies. Transferring risk between insurers is used to mitigate risk and manage capital requirements. We investigate risk transfer in the context of a network environment of insurers and consider capital costs and capital constraints at the level of individual insurance companies. We demonstrate that the optimisation of profitability across the network can be achieved through risk transfer. Considering only individual insurance companies, there is no unique optimal solution and, a priori, it is not clear which solutions are fair. However, from a network perspective, we derive a unique fair solution in the sense of cooperative game theory. Implications for systemic risk are briefly discussed.     

Product allocation to different types of distribution center in retail logistics networks

We consider the problem of assigning stockkeeping units to distribution centers (DCs) belonging to different DC types of a retail network, e.g., central, regional, and local DCs. The problem is motivated by the real situation of a retail company and solved by an MIP solution approach. The MIP model reflects the interdependencies between inbound transportation, outbound transportation and instore logistics as well as capital tied up in inventories and differences in picking costs between the warehouses. A novel solution approach is developed and applied to a real-life case of a leading European grocery retail chain. The application of the new approach results in cost savings of 6% of total operational costs compared to the present assignment. These savings amount to several million euros per year. In-depth analyses of the results and sensitivity analyses provide insights into the solution structure and the major related issues.     

Fairness versus efficiency in charging for the use of common facilities

The problem of efficiency vs fairness is considered in relation to the splitting of costs for shared facilities between users. This is considered as a result of a problem of sharing the cost of the provision of central computing facilities between different faculties in a large university, but the basic problem is widespread. A linear programming model is considered in order to minimise cost. The dual of this model is shown to correspond to an efficient allocation of costs. An alternative optimal dual solution is shown to give a ‘fair’ solution according to criteria resulting from cooperative game theory.     

Allocating the gains from resource pooling with the Shapley Value

To make their cost structure more efficient, firms often pool their critical resources: small divisions of a large firm may negotiate a joint contract to benefit from volume discounts; or firms may outsource their call centres to an independent provider who is able to increase utilization by reducing variability since demand is now pooled. Since pooling demand reduces total joint costs, an immediate question is how the realized savings should be shared. We model the problem as a cooperative game and use the resulting allocation schemes to distribute the savings. One popular scheme is the Shapley Value, which always exists and, we show, represents each player's incremental value to the pool. When the pooled savings depend on the sum of each player's demand, we label the game coalition symmetric and propose, for those games, an algorithm that makes pseudo-polynomial the computation of the Shapley Value.     

区间合作对策核心存在性的进一步讨论

区间合作对策,是研究当联盟收益值为区间数情形时如何进行合理收益分配的数学模型。近年来,其解的存在性与合理性等问题引起了国内外专家的广泛关注。区间核心,是区间合作对策中一个非常稳定的集值解概念。本文首先针对区间核心的存在性进行深入的讨论,通过引入强非均衡,极小强均衡,模单调等概念,从不同角度给出判别区间核心存在性的充分条件。其次,通过引入相关参数,定义了广义区间核心,并给出定理讨论了区间核心与广义区间核心的存在关系。本文的结论将为进一步推动区间合作对策的发展,为解决区间不确定情形下的收益分配问题奠定理论基础。     

Does cooperation in auditing matter? A comparison of a non-cooperative and a cooperative game model of auditing

A game model of auditing including internal control investigation and substantive testing is analysed as a non-cooperative game. It is shown that in order for the presumed socially desirable outcome of high and honest effort by all to be obtained, it is necessary to adjust the cost structure to ameliorate the costs of not-qualifying erroneous accounts if the auditor can prove he or she has worked hard. Comparison with a cooperative game analysis of the model shows that there is a region of parameters where both cooperative and non-cooperative versions of the game lead to this socially desirable outcome. The significance of this result is that whilst society expects an ‘independent’ auditor not to cooperate with the auditee, the practical realities of auditing require a considerable degree of cooperation. This leads to an ‘expectations gap’ between what society expects and what actually happens, except in those cost regions where both the cooperative and non-cooperative versions of the audit game lead to the same solution.     

Characterization of facility assignment costs for a location-inventory model under truckload distribution

We consider a two-stage distribution system, where the first stage consists of potential distribution centres (DCs) and the second stage consists of geographically dispersed existing retailers. Our goal is to determine the set of open DCs and assignment of open DCs to retailers simultaneously with inventory decisions of retailers. In addition to the DC-specific fixed facility location costs, we explicitly model the inventory replenishment and holding costs at the retailers and truckload transportation costs between the DCs and the retailers. The transportation costs are subject to truck/cargo capacity, leading to an integrated location-inventory problem with explicit cargo costs. We develop a mixed-integer nonlinear model and analyse its structural properties leading to exact expressions for the so-called implied facility assignment costs and imputed per-unit per-mile transportation costs. These expressions analytically demonstrate the interplay between strategic location and tactical inventory/transportation decisions in terms of resulting operational costs. Although both the theory and practice of integrated logistics have recognized the fact that strategic and tactical decisions are interrelated, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to offer closed-form results demonstrating the relationship explicitly. We propose an efficient solution approach utilizing the implied facility assignment costs and we demonstrate that significant savings are realizable when the inventory decisions and cargo costs are modelled explicitly for facility location purposes.     

Collaboration among small shippers in a transportation market

Intense competition in markets is pushing companies to increase their operational efficiency. One possible way to achieve increased efficiency is through cooperation with other companies. We study the coalition formation among small shippers in a transportation market characterized by uncertain demand. We analyze the decisions taken by the coalition and study the effect of shipper characteristics on the benefit of collaboration. Analysis shows that the shippers always benefit from the coalition, but when the benefits are to be allocated, the coalition may not always guarantee the budget balance, which is elementary for sustainability of any coalition. Using a game theoretical approach this study proposes saving allocation mechanisms and discusses the conditions that lead to a balanced budget.     

New mathematical model for the bi-objective inventory routing problem with a step cost function: A multi-objective particle swarm optimization solution approach

Inventory management and satisfactory distribution are among the most important issues considered by distribution companies. One of the key objectives is the simultaneous optimization of the inventory costs and distribution expenses, which can be addressed according to the inventory routing problem (IRP). In this study, we present a new transport cost calculation pattern for the IRP based on some real cases. In this pattern, the transportation cost is calculated as a function of the load carried and the distance traveled by the vehicle based on a step cost function. Furthermore, previous methods usually aggregate the inventory and transportation costs to formulate them as a single objective function, but in non-cooperative real-life cases, the inventory-holding costs are paid by retailers whereas the transportation-related costs are paid by the distributor. In this study, we separate these two cost elements and introduce a bi-objective IRP formulation where the first objective is to minimize the inventory-holding cost and the second is minimizing the transportation cost. We also propose an efficient particle representation and employ a multi-objective particle swarm optimization algorithm to generate the non-dominated solutions for the inventory allocation and vehicle routing decisions. Finally, in order to evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, the results obtained were compared with those produced using the augmented ε-constraint method, thereby demonstrating the practical utility of the proposed multi-objective model and the proposed solution algorithm.     

Optimal business policies for a supplier–transporter–buyer channel with a price-sensitive demand

As the third party logistics partners (carriers) taking a more and more significant role in supply chain practices and customer service performance improvement, there is an emerging need for the studies on optimal channel coordination policies for business processes involving not only supplier and buyer (retailer), but also transportation partners. In this paper, we explicitly add a transportation partner with concave cost functions into the analysis for supplier–buyer channel coordination policies, and analyse the impact of coordination and pricing policies on supply chain profitability. The market demand is assumed to be a decreasing convex function of buyer's selling price (x), D(x)=d/x². Under this assumption, we quantify the improvement on total supply chain profitability when moving from a non-cooperative environment to a fully cooperative environment, and show that the joint annual profit of three partners in a cooperative environment can be at least twice of what may be achieved by three independently operated companies in a leader–follower business game. While in a real-world business environment, a perfect collaboration is hard to achieve, this result can be used to provide a quick estimation on the upper bound on the budget for profit sharing or discount offers among the supply chain partners.     

基于博弈论的节能量保证型EPC合同决策分析

合同能源管理(EPC)是一种以未来节约的能源费用支付节能项目成本的节能管理机制。节能量保证型EPC模式中,耗能企业负责为项目融资,节能服务公司提供项目的全程服务并向客户企业保证一定的节能效益。若达不到承诺值,节能服务公司向客户进行补偿,若超出承诺值,客户给予节能服务公司一定的奖励。合同决策问题是该模式应用中的重要问题。本文以节能量保证型EPC合同中初始项目投资、合同期限和超额节能效益奖励的决策问题为研究对象,建立了客户和节能服务公司之间的决策博弈模型,分析二者的最优合同决策。数值试验结果表明,该方法不仅能让客户企业和节能服务公司均受益,还可以有效提高项目的投资报酬率,并且较高的节能服务公司技术水平和客户初始耗能水平能产生更高的节能效率。