Advertising for a new product introduction: A stochastic approach

We formulate a stochastic extension of the Nerlove and Arrow’s advertising model in order to analyze the problem of a new product introduction. The main idea is to introduce some uncertainty aspects in connection both with the advertising action and the goodwill decay, in order to represent the random consequences of the advertising messages and of the word-of-mouth publicity, respectively. The model is stated in terms of the stochastic optimal control theory and a general study is attempted using the stochastic Maximum Principle. Closed form solutions are obtained under linear quadratic assumptions for the cost and the reward functions. Such optimal policies suggest that the decision-maker considers both the above mentioned phenomena as opportunities to increase her/his final reward. After stating some general features of the optimal solutions, we analyze in detail three extreme cases, namely the deterministic model and the stochastic models with either the word-of-mouth effect only, or the lure/repulsion effect only. The optimal policies provide us with some insight on the general effects of the advertising action. Supported by MIUR and University of Padua.     

Competitive Advertising Under Uncertainty: A Stochastic Differential Game Approach

We analyze optimal advertising spending in a duopolistic market where each firm's market share depends on its own and its competitor's advertising decisions, and is also subject to stochastic disturbances. We develop a differential game model of advertising in which the dynamic behavior is based on the Sethi stochastic advertising model and the Lanchester model of combat. Particularly important to note is the morphing of the sales decay term in the Sethi model into decay caused by competitive advertising and noncompetitive churn that acts to equalize market shares in the absence of advertising. We derive closed-loop Nash equilibria for symmetric as well as asymmetric competitors. For all cases, explicit solutions and comparative statics are presented.     

On Controlled Linear Diffusions with Delay in a Model of Optimal Advertising under Uncertainty with Memory Effects

We consider a class of dynamic advertising problems under uncertainty in the presence of carryover and distributed forgetting effects, generalizing the classical model of Nerlove and Arrow (Economica 29:129–142, 1962). In particular, we allow the dynamics of the product goodwill to depend on its past values, as well as previous advertising levels. Building on previous work (Gozzi and Marinelli in Lect. Notes Pure Appl. Math., vol. 245, pp. 133–148, 2006), the optimal advertising model is formulated as an infinite-dimensional stochastic control problem. We obtain (partial) regularity as well as approximation results for the corresponding value function. Under specific structural assumptions, we study the effects of delays on the value function and optimal strategy. In the absence of carryover effects, since the value function and the optimal advertising policy can be characterized in terms of the solution of the associated HJB equation, we obtain sharper characterizations of the optimal policy.     

Using mixture‐amount modeling to optimize the advertising media mix and quantify cross‐media synergy for specific target groups

One of the critical decisions in media planning is how to allocate advertising efforts across different media. While studies indicate that marketers can create positive synergy effects by spreading their effort across several media, there is little understanding of how much should be invested in each specific medium to optimize advertising results. In this study, we apply a novel methodology, mixture‐amount modeling, which allows advertisers to determine the optimal allocation of advertising effort across media as a function of the total advertising effort. Moreover, we test how the optimal allocation and the resulting response change for consumers with distinctive media usage patterns and varying degrees of product category experience. Based on these results, we quantify the potential synergy between media and calculate the synergistic capacity for specific target groups. We apply the model to data from 52 beauty care advertising campaigns that ran on TV and in magazines in the Netherlands and Belgium. We determine the optimal allocation of advertising investments (measured through Gross Rating Points) to maximize campaign recognition. Our findings support the existence of positive synergistic effects between magazine and TV advertising and illustrate that these effects depend on consumers' media usage and product category experience.     

Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer–retailer channel

Cooperative advertising is a practice that a manufacturer pays retailers a portion of the local advertising cost in order to induce sales. Cooperative advertising plays a significant role in marketing programs of channel members. Nevertheless, most studies to date on cooperative advertising have assumed that the market demand is only influenced by advertising expenditures but not by retail price. This paper addresses channel coordination by seeking optimal cooperative advertising strategies and equilibrium pricing in a two-member distribution channel. We establish and compare two models: a non-cooperative, leader–follower game and a cooperative game. We develop propositions and insights from the comparison of these models. The cooperative model achieves better coordination by generating higher channel-wide profits than the non-cooperative model with these features: (a) the retailer price is lower to consumers; and (b) the advertising efforts are higher for all channel members. We identify the feasible solutions to a bargaining problem where the channel members can determine how to divide the extra profits.     

视觉显著性对横幅广告注意及记忆效果的影响研究

目前对横幅广告视觉注意和记忆效果的研究出现了“独特性观”和“盲视观”两种矛盾的观点。本研究从任务驱动的视角出发,引入计算神经科学的视觉注意计算模型,借助眼动追踪技术,探讨不同任务驱动下横幅广告的视觉显著性对消费者的注意和记忆效果的影响。结果表明:在不同任务驱动下,横幅广告的视觉显著性对消费者的注意及记忆效果的影响具有显著差异。具体而言,在浏览任务中,视觉显著性高的横幅广告比视觉显著性低的横幅广告能带来更好的广告注意及记忆效果;在搜索任务中,不同视觉显著性水平的横幅广告对消费者的注意和记忆效果的影响没有显著差异。本研究丰富了计算神经科学在营销领域的运用,为企业选择合适的网络广告策略提供借鉴。     

Modelling Cooperative Advertising Decisions in Franchising

Advertising fee decisions in franchise systems are a frequent source of conflict between franchisors and franchisees. Such disagreements persist because the win-win potential of vertical cooperative advertising is not well appreciated. Our paper introduces a formal normative approach for analyzing, understanding and subsequently making these vertical cooperative advertising decisions within a franchising context in a manner that results in optimal system-wide returns. The model demonstrates that cooperative determination of franchisor's and franchisee's advertising contributions may yield superior payoffs for both exchange partners than the total payoff if the franchisor and franchisee seek to optimize their individual objective functions. Three types of models are developed and evaluated (i.e. deterministic, stochastic and under conditions of differing perceptions of the sales response functions to advertising). Conclusions hold under all three model variants. Industry implications are also presented.     

Stochastic optimal budget decision for advertising considering uncertain sales responses

Firms are faced with uncertain sales responses even though they advertise appropriately. To help marketing managers make optimal budget decisions in this situation, we develop a stochastic model, depicting the problem of advertising budget decision as a special Markov decision process where a new objective, maximizing expected market utility, is proposed. In the model we introduce a two-dimension state variable including accumulative sales, which vary randomly with advertising budget, and the predicted probability that an advertising campaign obtains a full sales response. We make an analysis of the model on the premise of growing infinite market potential, deriving the property of optimal policies and that of optimal value function. These results are successfully used to make advertising budget decisions for a private university in Xi’an, China.     

A communication mix for an event planning: a linear quadratic approach

The communication mix is a relevant decision issue for an organization that plans the advertising campaign for a fixed future event. It is assumed that the objectives of the organization are to minimize the cost of the advertising campaign and to drive the final demand as close as possible to a target value. Two different advertising channels are available: the first affects deterministically the consumers’ demand, whereas the second presents some stochastic aspects which are out of decision-maker’s control. Some recent mathematical developments on the stochastic linear quadratic control problem allow to formulate and solve some interesting instances of the problem. A comparative analysis of the efficiency of deterministic and stochastic controls is done and the optimal feedback policies are discussed. The trade-off between efficiency and risk of an advertising channel is essential to understand the features of the optimal solutions.This study was supported by MIUR and University of Padua.     

Innovation diffusion uncertainty,advertising and pricing policies

We develop and analyze a normative and structurally stochastic model of innovation diffusion by depicting the market at an aggregate level. Model dynamics are defined through the flow pattern of individuals that move from the innovation unaware stage, to the innovation aware, and ultimately to the adopter stages. The stochastic evolution of this stage-wise transition unfolds according to tractable stochastic processes and is influenced by such factors as price, word of mouth, and advertisement efforts. In this environment, techniques of contingent claims analysis and stochastic control theory are employed to obtain optimal pricing or advertising policies that maximize the value of the innovation. To account for their optimal adjustment over time, these policies are modeled as positive real-valued adapted processes. Given this setting, policy adjustments over time (i.e. advertising or pricing) are viewed as a value additive sequence of nested real options. We present closed-form analytic results regarding the optimal policies. Simulations provide a numeric insight to the models' behavior.     

Advertising in a Differential Oligopoly Game

We illustrate a differential oligopoly game where firms compete à la Cournot in homogeneous goods in the market phase and invest in advertising activities aimed at increasing the consumers reservation price. Such investments produce external effects, characterizing the advertising activity as a public good. We derive the open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria, and show that the properties of the equilibria depend on the curvature of the market demand function. The comparative assessment of these equilibria shows that the firms advertising efforts are larger in the open-loop equilibrium than in the closed-loop equilibrium. We also show that a cartel involving all the firms, setting both output levels and advertising efforts, may produce a steady state where the social welfare level is higher than the social welfare levels associated with both open-loop and closed-loop noncooperative settings.     

Game theoretic analysis of pricing and vertical cooperative advertising of a retailer-duopoly with a common manufacturer

This paper considers competition of duopolistic retailers, who sell substitutable products supplied by a single manufacturer offering a vertical cooperative advertising program. The price-dependent component of the demand function is derived from the consumers’ utility function in order to avoid logically inconsistent results. Additionally, each supply chain member can increase the costumers’ demand by advertising. By means of game theory, we get the following results: (a) Retailer competition harms all players, but is beneficial to the consumers. (b) Stronger competition is followed by less advertising. (c) Channel-leadership is not always advantageous to the manufacturer, and—likewise—retailers can also be better off when accepting followership. However, as our analysis shows, the increased complexity of the model under consideration reaches the limits of an analytical solution. Therefore, we give a brief outlook on non-nalytical solution methods for Nash and Stackelberg games, that could be used in future research, in the end of our paper.     

An oligopoly model of dynamic advertising competition

An oligopoly model is presented that allows the determination of feedback Nash equilibrium advertising strategies for an oligopoly. Analyses of symmetric and asymmetric oligopolies with the model show that unit contribution and advertising effectiveness have positive effects on a competitor’s own advertising and steady-state sales, while discount rate and decay rate have negative effects. An asymmetric analysis further shows that unit contribution and advertising effectiveness affect positively, and discount rate and decay rate negatively, a competitor’s rivals’ advertising, but have effects in opposite directions regarding rivals’ steady-state sales. The symmetric and asymmetric analyses also show that steady-state sales per competitor decline with the number of competitors in the oligopoly, while total oligopoly steady-state sales increase. The model is applied empirically to the triopolistic competition involving Anheuser-Busch, SABMiller, and Molson Coors in the beer industry.     

网络视频节目中羊群效应的影响研究

考虑累积观看节目用户量产生的羊群效应角度构建两阶段决策模型,得到节目最优定价策略和最优广告量策略。研究表明:收费模式中羊群效应对最优定价的影响特征与用户规模有关,并进一步导致免费模式中最优广告量减少。在收费模式羊群效应较高情况下,运营商能通过延长收费模式时间提高节目利润。还发现收费模式中羊群效应导致观看节目用户总规模增加,但收费模式对免费模式有挤兑效应。在免费模式中羊群效应较低情况下,只有收费模式中具有较高的羊群效应才能使节目总利润增加,否则总利润减少。     

考虑品牌差异的双渠道供应链减排与低碳宣传策略

针对双渠道供应链低碳减排、低碳宣传与品牌策略问题,构建微分博弈模型,运用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程分别求得集中决策和Stackelberg博弈下的低碳减排投入、低碳宣传投入和低碳宣传分担率。研究发现:集中决策情形下产品的减排量始终高于Stackelberg博弈情形下的减排量;产品品牌差异化程度与制造商所承担零售商低碳宣传成本的比例呈正相关;供应链成员的最优低碳宣传策略除了与品牌差异程度相关,还取决于供应链成员在不同渠道边际利润的相对大小;存在一个低碳宣传成本分担率能够实现制造商和零售商协调。并用数值算例验证了本文的相关结论。     

广告盈利模式下网购平台间的竞争对其质量管控力度的影响

当前网购市场中的假冒伪劣现象备受社会关注,作为网购供应链的核心主体,网购平台企业应承担相应质量管控义务。既有文献对平台企业的质量管控进行了有益的探索,文章在此基础之上,探讨广告收入为网购平台主要营收来源时,两个不同规模平台企业间的竞争对其质量管控力度的影响。在双边市场理论框架下,通过构建博弈模型得到如下结果：随着网购平台之间竞争程度的增加,或随着网购平台之间广告宣传替代性的增强,或随着进驻网购平台在线商家数量的增多,每个平台企业均会提高质量管控力度;两个平台企业的质量管控力度随着在线消费者对广告厌恶度的增加均呈倒U型变化趋势。     

Non-linear advertising capital model with time delayed feedback between advertising and stock of goodwill

According to the classical Nerlove-Arrow model, advertising expenditure can be considered as a capital investment to create present and future demand for the firm's products and, hence, to create present and future revenues for the firm. Advertising is assumed to influence via stock of goodwill which cumulatively counts for the effects of the firm's current and past advertising outlays. The paper presents a time delayed feedback model describing the relations between advertising and goodwill. Three different types of effects of advertising upon the dynamics of goodwill are modelled. The advertising policy of the management is incorporated into the model via a non-linear advertising function. The advertising function controls the advertising outlay e.g. by budget constraint and by the actual and target values of goodwill. The behavior of the model is analysed both analytically and numerically. Special attention is given for deriving the stability conditions for the limiting solution. The cases of repelling or chaotic limiting solutions are analysed by bifurcation and state space diagrams. Several numerical examples are given.     

Optimal Multi-Period Advertising Budget Allocation within a Competitive Environment

A mathematical model approach is developed for the purpose of aiding advertising and marketing executives in advertising budget allocation decision-making in the face of a competitive environment. Two alternative model formulations are examined to study the dynamic market response to advertising expenditures. These embody numerous realistic characteristics of the advertising phenomenon including carry-over of past expenditures, diminishing returns and saturation effects, response decay in the absence of advertising and product diffusion effects. Through mathematical programming, the model determines the optimal advertising expenditures over a predetermined planning horizon under alternative constraint options (including competitive advertising assumptions). Illustrations of model applications are also presented.     

On the impact of advertising initiatives in supply chains

Advertising plays an important role in affecting consumer demand. Socially responsible firms are expected to use advertising judiciously, limiting advertising of “bad” products. An example is the advertising initiative adopted by several major food manufacturers to limit the advertising of unhealthy food categories to children. Such initiatives are based on the belief that less advertising will lead to less consumption of these unhealthy food categories. However, food manufacturers usually distribute products to consumers through retailers whose advertising is not restricted by those initiative programs. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of such advertising initiative in a leader–follower supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. We assume that both the manufacturer and the retailer can choose to participate in the advertising initiative by reducing their advertising levels. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game. We show that the effectiveness of the advertising initiative critically depends on the leader’s participation in the initiative. If the leader is willing to reduce the advertising level below a threshold, the market coverage of the product can drop significantly. On the other hand, if only the follower participates in the initiative, the market coverage is likely to expand in the majority of cases. Managerial implications of this research are also discussed.     

Periodicity of pricing and marketing efforts in a distribution channel

Most research about cooperative (coop) advertising programs in channels relies on the assumption that manufacturers and retailers decide of pricing and marketing efforts simultaneously. This paper evaluates this central assumption and investigates the optimal periodicity (sequence of move) of pricing and marketing efforts (ME) decisions for a distribution channel. We develop a game theoretic model that accounts for pricing at each level of the channel, for the manufacturer’s ME mix strategies (a direct ME to consumers and coop advertising program offered to the retailer) and the retailer’s ME as well. We obtain solutions for a bilateral channel under different vertical interaction scenarios; when the channel is led by the manufacturer, the retailer or when channel members decide simultaneously of each of their marketing mix decisions (vertical Nash). We compare the effect of pricing and ME decision periodicity on outputs for each channel member. The main findings suggest that simultaneous decision-making of pricing and ME is optimal only for high enough levels of the manufacturer’s ME effects. For very highly effective marketing efforts, sequential play of pricing and ME allows channel members to implement equilibrium strategies and achieve maximum profits that would not be achieved with simultaneous decision-making. This highlights the importance of relaxing the simultaneous play assumption of pricing and ME in a distribution channel.