Asymptotic solution of zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game with cheap control for minimizer

A two-players zero-sum linear-quadratic differential game with the cheap control for the minimizer (the player which minimizes the cost functional) is considered. An asymptotic solution of the singularly perturbed matrix differential Riccati equation with singular terminal conditions for the "fast" variables, associated with this problem, is constructed. Based on this result, some asymptotic properties of suboptimal feedback strategies of the players are investigated. In particular, an asymptotic equilibrium of the suboptimal strategies is established.     

Zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic games for continuous time Markov chains

We study infinite horizon discounted-cost and ergodic-cost risk-sensitive zero-sum stochastic games for controlled continuous time Markov chains on a countable state space. For the discounted-cost game, we prove the existence of value and saddle-point equilibrium in the class of Markov strategies under nominal conditions. For the ergodic-cost game, we prove the existence of values and saddle point equilibrium by studying the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation under a certain Lyapunov condition.     

奇异双线性系统二次型微分博弈的鞍点均衡

研究了有限时间段内的奇异双线性二次型性能指标的鞍点均衡问题. 针对问题求解的复杂性,引入降阶变换将问题分解为快、慢两个子系统,然后利用极大值原理求得了系统的最优控制策略.最后给出了数值算例的仿真以验证算法的正确性和有效性.     

On the Selection of One Feedback Nash Equilibrium in Discounted Linear-Quadratic Games

We study a selection method for a Nash feedback equilibrium of a one-dimensional linear-quadratic nonzero-sum game over an infinite horizon. By introducing a change in the time variable, one obtains an associated game over a finite horizon T > 0 and with free terminal state. This associated game admits a unique solution which converges to a particular Nash feedback equilibrium of the original problem as the horizon T goes to infinity.     

Deterministic Time-inconsistent Optimal Control Problems - an Essentially Cooperative Approach

A general deterministic time-inconsistent optimal control problem is formulated for ordinary differential equations. To find a time-consistent equilibrium value function and the corresponding time-consistent equilibrium control, a non-cooperative N-person differential game (but essentially cooperative in some sense) is introduced. Under certain conditions, it is proved that the open-loop Nash equilibrium value function of the N -person differential game converges to a time-consistent equilibrium value function of the original problem, which is the value function of a time-consistent optimal control problem. Moreover, it is proved that any optimal control of the time-consistent limit problem is a time-consistent equilibrium control of the original problem.     

Sequential Linear-Quadratic Method for Differential Games with Air Combat Applications

We present a numerical method for computing a local Nash (saddle-point) solution to a zero-sum differential game for a nonlinear system. Given a solution estimate to the game, we define a subproblem, which is obtained from the original problem by linearizing its system dynamics around the solution estimate and expanding its payoff function to quadratic terms around the same solution estimate. We then apply the standard Riccati equation method to the linear-quadratic subproblem and compute its saddle solution. We then update the current solution estimate by adding the computed saddle solution of the subproblem multiplied by a small positive constant (a step size) to the current solution estimate for the original game. We repeat this process and successively generate better solution estimates. Our applications of this sequential method to air combat simulations demonstrate experimentally that the solution estimates converge to a local Nash (saddle) solution of the original game.     

Optimal control of stochastic functional differential equations with a bounded memory

This paper treats a finite time horizon optimal control problem in which the controlled state dynamics are governed by a general system of stochastic functional differential equations with a bounded memory. An infinite dimensional Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation is derived using a Bellman-type dynamic programming principle. It is shown that the value function is the unique viscosity solution of the HJB equation.     

Feedback Competitive Advertising Strategies with a General Objective Function

We introduce a general objective function, which incorporates competitive situations, such as conservative, punitive, and predatory advertising. Linking together the particular situations into a two-parameter family of max–min problems, and using the Lanchester model to describe the dynamics of the market, a bilinear-quadratic differential game is obtained. For this game, we find saddle-point feedback time-invariant advertising strategies and show when these strategies are Nash equilibrium strategies. In an empirical application involving duopolistic competition in the cola market, we find evidence of a punitive motivation for the advertising strategies.     

Mixed boundary value problems of semilinear elliptic PDEs and BSDEs with singular coefficients

In this paper, we prove that there exists a unique weak (Sobolev) solution to the mixed boundary value problem for a general class of semilinear second order elliptic partial differential equations with singular coefficients. Our approach is probabilistic. The theory of Dirichlet forms and backward stochastic differential equations with singular coefficients and infinite horizon plays a crucial role.     

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Feedback Nash Equilibria for the Affine-Quadratic Differential Game

In this note, we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite and the underlying system affine. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has a Nash equilibrium. As a special case, we derive existence conditions for the multi-player zero-sum game.     

一类具非线性边界条件的高阶方程的双参数奇摄动问题

研究了一类含双参数的非线性高阶微分方程的奇摄动问题.运用合成展开法构造了问题的形式渐近解,并运用微分不等式理论证明了原问题解的存在性及所得形式渐近解的一致有效性.     

Uniqueness of unbounded viscosity solutions for impulse control problem

We study here the impulse control problem in infinite as well as finite horizon. We allow the cost functionals and dynamics to be unbounded and hence the value function can possibly be unbounded. We prove that the value function is the unique viscosity solution in a suitable subclass of continuous functions, of the associated quasivariational inequality. Our uniqueness proof for the infinite horizon problem uses stopping time problem and for the finite horizon problem, comparison method. However, we assume proper growth conditions on the cost functionals and the dynamics.     

Infinite horizon noncooperative differential games

For a noncooperative differential game, the value functions of the various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. In the present paper, we consider a class of infinite horizon games with nonlinear costs exponentially discounted in time. By the analysis of the value functions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form and provide results and counterexamples on their uniqueness and stability.     

On the saddle-point solution of a class of stochastic differential games

This paper deals with the saddle-point solution of a class of stochastic differential games described by linear state dynamics and quadratic objective functionals. The information structure of the problem is such that both players have access to a common noisy linear measurement of the state and they are permitted to utilize only this information in constructing their controls. The saddle-point solution of such differential game problems has been discussed earlier in Ref. 1, but the conclusions arrived there are incorrect, as is explicitly shown in this paper. We extensively discuss the role of information structure on the saddle-point solution of such stochastic games (specifically within the context of an illustrative discrete-time example) and then obtain the saddle-point solution of the problem originally formulated by employing an indirect approach.This work was done while the author was on sabbatical leave at Twente University of Technology, Department of Applied Mathematics, Enschede, Holland, from Applied Mathematics Division, Marmara Scientific and Industrial Research Institute, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey.     

A Qualitative Characterization of Symmetric Open-Loop Nash Equilibria in Discounted Infinite Horizon Differential Games

The local stability, steady state comparative statics, and local comparative dynamics of symmetric open-loop Nash equilibria for the ubiquitous class of discounted infinite horizon differential games are investigated. It is shown that the functional forms and values of the parameters specified in a differential game are crucial in determining the local stability of a steady state and, in turn, the steady state comparative statics and local comparative dynamics. A simple sufficient condition for a steady state to be a local saddle point is provided. The power and reach of the results are demonstrated by applying them to two well-known differential games.     

Mean-field stochastic control with elephant memory in finite and infinite time horizon

ABSTRACT

Our purpose of this paper is to study stochastic control problems for systems driven by mean-field stochastic differential equations with elephant memory, in the sense that the system (like the elephants) never forgets its history. We study both the finite horizon case and the infinite time horizon case.

• In the finite horizon case, results about existence and uniqueness of solutions of such a system are given. Moreover, we prove sufficient as well as necessary stochastic maximum principles for the optimal control of such systems. We apply our results to solve a mean-field linear quadratic control problem.

• For infinite horizon, we derive sufficient and necessary maximum principles.

  As an illustration, we solve an optimal consumption problem from a cash flow modelled by an elephant memory mean-field system.

     

一类具非线性边界条件的高阶方程的奇摄动问题

通过引入伸展变量和非常规的渐近序列{∈}）,运用合成展开法,对一类具非线性边界条件的非线性高阶微分方程的奇摄动问题构造了形式渐近解,再运用微分不等式理论证明了原问题解的存在性及所得渐近近似式的一致有效性．     

Mean-field type forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equations and related stochastic differential games

We study a kind of partial information non-zero sum differential games of mean-field backward doubly stochastic differential equations, in which the coefficient contains not only the state process but also its marginal distribution, and the cost functional is also of mean-field type. It is required that the control is adapted to a sub-filtration of the filtration generated by the underlying Brownian motions. We establish a necessary condition in the form of maximum principle and a verification theorem, which is a sufficient condition for Nash equilibrium point. We use the theoretical results to deal with a partial information linear-quadratic (LQ) game, and obtain the unique Nash equilibrium point for our LQ game problem by virtue of the unique solvability of mean-field forward-backward doubly stochastic differential equation.     

3D differential game guidance

Three-dimensional guidance in the neighborhood of collision course, based on a terminal differential game, renders ellipsoidal control sets. As a result, a saddle-point contains singularities. This paper (a) generalizes previous results on linear dynamics with terminal cost and ellipsoidal control sets and (b) applies the results to the above guidance problem to include general missile and target transfer functions. We further demonstrate the construction of the isocost surfaces (tubes).