有限理性条件下演化博弈行为分析

基于博弈双方有限理性的假设,运用动力系统的相关理论和方法对一般2×2非对称演化博弈过程建立了动态复制方程,并对博弈双方在演化过程中的行为进行了分析,得出博弈双方交互系统均衡点及稳定性相应的结论及其全部动力学行为.     

外卖食品安全问题的演化博弈分析

运用演化博弈论的方法对外卖商家之间,订餐平台监管部门和外卖商家之间相互作用时策略选择行为进行分析.结果表明:当外卖商家生产不合格的外卖收益大于生产合格外卖的收益、订餐平台监督部门对生产不合格外卖的商家处罚力度过轻或对外卖合格性的检测成本过高时,不合格外卖生产必然发生.要确保外卖商家生产合格外卖,就必须对生产不合格外卖的商家进行严惩,降低生产不合格外卖的预期收益.同时,要加强订餐平台建设,降低监管成本,保证监管部门严格执法.     

基于演化博弈的发电侧电力市场长期均衡模型

研究包含生产同质电力产品的两组 (种群 )企业——低成本发电企业和高成本发电企业的发电侧电力市场的长期均衡问题 .应用演化博弈论的有限种群演化稳定战略概念 ,证明了有限种群的演化稳定战略产量分别等于两组 (种群 )企业的竞争产量 .通过建立基于企业战略模仿和试验的随机演化模型 ,分析了发电侧电力市场长期均衡的演化过程 .     

环境治理中的政府监查与企业治污行为研究

通过建立环境治理中地方政府与排污企业的进化博弈模型,考察了参与者的决策演化过程,分析了参与者的进化稳定策略及其影响因素。研究表明,地方政府政绩考核体系中环境指标的权重系数、企业的排污量并不会影响博弈双方的策略选择。地方政府监查行为和企业治污行为会受到包括系统初始状态在内的7种因素的影响。加大对企业不完全治污的处罚,降低企业的治污成本,尽管可以促使企业的策略选择向完全治污的方向演化,但却会不利于地方政府的策略选择向严格监查的方向演化;而中央政府提高对地方政府严格监查的奖励,加大对地方政府监查不力的处罚,降低地方政府的监查成本,以及降低企业利润对地方政府支付水平的影响系数,既可以促使地方政府的策略选择向严格监查的方向演化,又能够促使企业的策略选择向完全治污的方向演化。     

突发公共卫生事件中地方政府与社会公众间的演化博弈研究

近年来,突发公共卫生事件频发,社会公众与地方政府相互配合是及时、高效解决突发公共卫生事件的必然选择。本文以全球抗击新冠肺炎疫情为背景,讨论在突发公共卫生事件中社会公众与地方政府之间的博弈关系,基于有限理性假设,构建演化博弈模型,分析博弈双方决策行为的动态调整过程,得到在不同条件下社会公众和地方政府的演化稳定策略。同时,利用MATLAB进行仿真实验,分析在博弈过程中政府的奖惩、上级部门的处罚等主要因素对博弈双方策略选择的影响。研究结果表明,完善相关的补贴政策,普及疫情防控的相关法律法规,加大对社会公众随意流动、违反疫情相关规章制度的惩罚力度,提高对地方政府宽松防疫的处罚等措施可以有效促进社会公众和地方政府之间的相互协作,最终实现共同积极防疫。     

BCK—代数的模糊理想的若干性质

运用模糊点的概念研究BCK代数的模糊理想等一些基本概念和性质,建立它与利用隶属函数和水平截集等常见刻画方式之间的关系。     

Two Dimensional Incompressible Ideal Flow Around a Small Obstacle

Abstract

In this article we study the asymptotic behavior of incompressible, ideal, time-dependent two dimensional flow in the exterior of a single smooth obstacle when the size of the obstacle becomes very small. Our main purpose is to identify the equation satisfied by the limit flow. We will see that the asymptotic behavior depends on γ, the circulation around the obstacle. For smooth flow around a single obstacle, γ is a conserved quantity which is determined by the initial data. We will show that if γ = 0, the limit flow satisfies the standard incompressible Euler equations in the full plane but, if γ≠ 0, the limit equation acquires an additional forcing term. We treat this problem by first constructing a sequence of approximate solutions to the incompressible 2D Euler equation in the full plane from the exact solutions obtained when solving the equation on the exterior of each obstacle and then passing to the limit on the weak formulation of the equation. We use an explicit treatment of the Green's function of the exterior domain based on conformal maps, a priori estimates obtained by carefully examining the limiting process and the Div-Curl Lemma, together with a standard weak convergence treatment of the nonlinearity for the passage to the limit.     

半群的模糊理想及生成模糊理想

研究半群的模糊理想,利用λ-截集、确界原理对半群的模糊理想作进一步讨论,给出生成模糊理想的构造.     

BCK-代数的模糊代数理想

在有界可换BCK-代数上引入了Fuzzy代数理想的概念,给出了Fuzzy代数理想的某些特征,讨论了Fuzzy理想与Fuzzy代数理想的关系。最后描述了全体Fuzzy集的BCK-代数特征。     

两人进化博弈策略的决定机制与应用研究

通过建立一般情况下的两人进化博弈模型,给出了系统均衡点对应的矩阵行列式和迹表达式的经济含义,分析了16种典型情形下的进化稳定策略,详细讨论了均衡点稳定性分析结果所对应的博弈双方决策过程,从策略权衡的视角揭示了策略选择的内在机制。研究结果表明:不同策略前提下的相对净支付决定了系统的进化稳定策略,对方的策略选择以及自身可选策略的支付比较是影响博弈主体策略选择的两个基本要素,博弈主体会趋向于选择在对方策略既定下能够带来更大支付的策略。最后以环境治理中地方政府与企业以及地方政府之间的博弈关系为例,从对称博弈和非对称博弈两方面阐明了本文所构建模型在政策设计中的应用价值:针对不同案例,只要明确了两人博弈的支付矩阵,就可以通过计算相对净支付确定博弈双方的行为演化规律和稳定策略,从而简化计算过程,更加直接和更为便捷地为政策设计提供理论参考。     

INACCESSIBLE CONTINUOUSLY STABLE STRATEGIES

ABSTRACT. The evolutionary stability concepts continuously stable strategies (CSS) and evolutionarily stable neighborhood invader strategies (ESNIS) share two properties in common. First, they are both evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). Secondly, given any strategy in the close neighborhood of the CSS or ESNIS, there are some strategies that are closer to the CSS or ESNIS that can invade it. An ESNIS is a CSS but the converse is not true in general. We examine evolutionary adaptive dynamics in the neighborhood of a CSS that is not an ESNIS. We show that if an evolutionary game possesses a CSS which is not an ESNIS, the succession of strategies mediated by natural selection become arbitrarily close to the CSS but the precise value of the CSS cannot be attained unless the CSS is the first strategy to invade into the environment and is henceforth never perturbed. Thus if evolution does not start with the CSS that is not an ESNIS, we will have a phenomenon of bounded evolutionary succession that does not come to an end. The analysis is applied to a class of monomorphic population evolutionary game models in which species ecological interaction is modeled by the Lotka‐Volterra equations.     

Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games

We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games.Received October 2001/Revised May 2003     

Ideal polytopes and face structures of some combinatorial optimization problems

Given a finite setX and a family of feasible subsetsF ofX, the 0–1 polytope P (F is defined as the convex hull of all the characteristic vectors of members ofF We show that under a certain assumption a special type of face ofP(F) is equivalent to the ideal polytope of some pseudo-ordered set. Examples of families satisfying the assumption are those related to the maximum stable set problem, set packing and set partitioning problems, and vertex coloring problem. Using this fact, we propose a new heuristic for such problems and give results of our preliminary computational experiments for the maximum stable set problem.Supported by a JSPS Fellowship for Young Scientists.Supported by Grant-in-Aids for Co-operative Research (06740147) of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture.     

需求分布未知且提前期可控的联合库存决策

在提前期内需求为自由分布且提前期依赖于订购批量和生产率的条件下,建立了同时考虑供需双方成本的联合库存决策模型,运用最小最大准则分析了模型最优解的存在性,设计了高效的最优解搜索算法.通过数值算例说明算法的有效性,分析了获取需求分布信息的代价与收益;并与供需独立的决策模型比较,表明了联合库存决策可以显著地降低供应链成本.     

A STRONG ERGODIC THEOREM FOR SOME NONLINEAR MATRIX MODELS FOR THE DYNAMICS OF STRUCTURED POPULATIONS

A general class of matrix difference equation models for the dynamics of discrete class structured populations in discrete time which possess a certain general type of nonlinearity introduced by Leslie for age-structured populations is considered. Arbitrary structuring is allowed in that transitions between any two classes are permitted. It is shown that normalized class distributions for such nonlinear models globally approach a “stable class distribution” and thus possess a strong ergodic property exactly like that of the classical linear theory of demography. However, unlike in the linear theory according to which the total population size grows or dies exponentially, the dynamics of total population size in these nonlinear models are shown to be governed by a nonlinear, nonautonomous scalar difference equation. This difference equation is asymptotically autonomous, and theorems which relate the dynamics of total population size to those of this limiting equation are proved. Examples in which the results are applied to some nonlinear age-structure models found in the literature are given.     

分布自由时基于可控提前期的契约适应性研究

研究表明回购契约与收益共享契约具有等价性,然而二者却适用于不同的供应链。本文从提前期可控的视角并将供应链管理引入需求分布自由的市场环境,研究二者的适应性。首先构建一体化供应链系统的决策模型,基于模型推导其最优生产量和最优生产时点的存在性条件;然后分别以回购契约和收益共享契约作为激励机制,研究契约对单一供应商-零售商构成的二级分散供应链系统的适应性。结果表明,回购契约和收益共享契约均能协调供应链,但二者具有不同的适应性:当单位时间内边际生产成本增幅较大时,供应商偏好选择回购契约;提前压缩期越长,零售商越偏好选择收益共享契约。最后通过数值分析验证文章模型的有效性。     

超市配送中心库存策略SD模型研究与分析

超市配送中心库存策略的确定是实现零售商零库存的一种重要方法.运用系统动力学方法分析了配送中心与超市库存系统,结合系统动力学建模工具VEN S IM软件的使用,建立了配送中心与超市库存系统动力学模型,对该模型进行了运行及结果分析.     

ESS,NIS and GIS for matrix games in n‐species systems

In this paper, we discuss the concepts of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) and global invader strategy (GIS) in n‐species systems. We give their definitions both on system level and species level. Although the definition on system level and that on species level are apparently different, it is found that they are equivalent to one another. About the relationships among an ESS, an NIS and a GIS for n‐species systems, we obtain the results similar to the ones for single species models: a GIS must be an NIS; an NIS must be an ESS; an ESS may not be a GIS; a GIS must be unique. The stability in the frequency dynamics with two phenotypes is also considered and the global stability of a GIS is shown. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

环境规制中地方政府与中央政府的演化博弈分析

针对环境规制中地方政府与中央政府之间的行为互动,从演化博弈论的研究视角探讨了地方政府与中央政府的决策演化过程。通过建立地方政府与中央政府的非对称演化博弈模型,考察了环境规制中参与者的行为特征。根据复制动态方程得到了参与者的行为演化规律、分析了参与者的演化稳定策略及其影响因素。研究表明,环境规制系统的初始状态、地方政府的环境规制成本和环境规制收益、中央政府的监查成本以及中央政府对地方政府的处罚额都会影响地方政府与中央政府的演化稳定策略。降低中央政府的监查成本、加强中央政府对地方政府的监查力度和违规处罚力度,降低环境规制成本、提高环境规制收益,将有利于促使地方政府执行环境规制,从而达到改善环境质量的目的。